This post presents an interview of Lilla Garayová, Professor of Children’s Rights at Pan-European University, on private international law issues arising from Slovakia’s 2025 constitutional reform, highlighting implications also for other EU Member States and in relation to the proposed EU Regulation on Parenthood. The interview was conducted by Marco Pasqua (PhD, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan).


Marco Pasqua (MP): In September 2025, Slovakia adopted Constitutional Law No. 255/2025, amending the Constitution of the Slovak Republic No. 460/1992 in its Articles 7, 15, 41 and introducing Article 52a. These amendments define parenthood strictly as the relationship involving a mother (woman) and a father (man), prohibit surrogacy, restrict adoption to married couples and exceptional single cases, and recognize only biologically determined sexes.

How should private international law conceptualise constitutional amendments of this kind? Do they primarily affect domestic family law, or do they reshape the conditions under which foreign family statuses are recognised?

Lilla Garayová (LG): From a private international law perspective, the amendment is not really about changing domestic family law in Slovakia and more about changing the filters through which Slovak authorities will read foreign family status. This could impact foreign birth certificates, foreign court decisions, foreign adoptions, and foreign civil‑status registrations. In practice, the constitutional definitions (parenthood as mother + father, a ban on surrogacy, restrictive adoption rules, and recognition of only biologically determined sexes) will likely become a stronger constitutionalised public policy baseline against which cross-border family situations are tested. That matters because, across the EU, most cross‑border parenthood problems do not arise from conflict rules in the abstract, but from recognition.

First, the constitutional definition of parenthood as exclusively mother and father introduces a potential public policy obstacle in recognition proceedings. Slovak courts may now be constitutionally obliged to refuse to recognize foreign decisions or civil status records that establish same-sex parenthood.

Second, the constitutional ban on surrogacy reinforces the public policy exception in cases of children born abroad under legal surrogacy agreements. Until now, Slovak law has operated in a gray area. In practice, this increases the likelihood of foreign decisions on parenthood not being recognized. From the child’s point of view this raises concerns such as statelessness, lack of legal parenthood, and obstacles to inheritance, maintenance, or nationality.

Third, binary gender recognition has implications for civil status registration and the recognition of foreign documents. Private international law is deeply dependent on mutual trust in civil status records.

These amendments express a conservative domestic vision of the family. But for private international law, the key question will not be whether Slovakia can conservatively define its internal model of the family. It will be whether it can do so while ensuring that children and families formed abroad are not left in a legal vacuum.

MP: From a broader EU perspective, in Poland, Hungary and Romania national legislation or administrative practices have created obstacles to the recognition of cross-border parenthood. These cases highlight limits in and challenges for private international law.

Do these developments reveal limits in the current architecture of recognition in the Union? Where, concretely, do you see the system struggling most?

LG: I think the main problem is not ideological disagreement, but fragmentation. Private international law assumes that personal status is transferable. In practice, however, parenthood often ends at the border. A child may legally have two parents in Spain or Belgium, but only one in Poland or Romania. The result is what we call limping parenthood – a family that exists fully in one jurisdiction and only partially in another.

One practical challenge is documentation. If a registry office refuses to transcribe a foreign birth certificate listing two mothers or two fathers, the consequences are immediate. No ID card. No passport. No clear proof of parental authority. What starts as a technical administrative refusal quickly becomes a mobility issue under EU law.

Another challenge is legal uncertainty. Families often do not know in advance whether recognition will be granted, partially granted, or refused. Much depends on how broadly national authorities interpret public policy. This unpredictability discourages free movement.

And most importantly – the potential impact on the rights of children. Judicial authorities at the European level insist on functional recognition more and more, at least for the purposes of free movement and identity. However, domestic systems sometimes still perceive recognition as symbolic approval of a family model rather than as a protective measure for the child.

MP: On 21 November 2025, the European Commission opened an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU against Slovakia (INFR(2025)2208) following constitutional amendments granting Slovak authorities, including courts, the power to assess whether and to what extent EU law applies in Slovakia, including rulings of the Court of Justice. The Commission’s procedure raises questions regarding the interaction between national constitutional rules and EU law.

How do you see these developments affecting the practical application of EU law and private international law in Slovakia?

LG: Yes, Article 7 of the constitution has been amended to allow Slovak authorities to assess the scope of application of EU law in the Slovak Republic, and in “matters of national identity,” the constitution and domestic laws take precedence over international law. Slovakia has attempted to define the red lines of its sovereignty through a constitutional amendment, particularly in cultural and ethical issues such as family, marriage, parenthood, and gender identity. Similar to Hungary and Poland in the past, Slovakia is signaling that it claims the final say in these areas, regardless of EU law. Judges in private international law cases, particularly those involving cross-border families, may feel encouraged to assess EU obligations through the prism of constitutional identity. This leads to hesitation. And hesitation in private international law means delays in recognition, delays in issuing documents, delays in protecting children. Private international law depends on predictability. Families moving across borders need to know whether a birth certificate, a parental status, or a court decision will be recognized. When constitutional identity enters that equation as a variable, uncertainty increases.

MP: The proposal for a regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood, which also introduces the European Certificate of Parenthood, aims to ensure legal certainty and recognition of cross-border family ties. If adopted, however, it may clash with national constitutional rules, such as Slovakia’s definitions of parenthood and gender, raising questions on how authorities can reconcile domestic mandates with EU law.

How much flexibility will courts retain in recognising status acquired abroad?

LG: The proposed regulation is designed to reduce the fragmentation we have discussed. The logic behind it is very simple: if parenthood is validly established in one Member State, it should be valid throughout the Union. The European Certificate of Parenthood would serve as a uniform document of status. Having worked as the Slovak national expert in the European Commission’s impact assessment study on this initiative, I can say that one of the main findings was the remarkable degree of legal uncertainty that families face today. In several Member States, including more conservative ones, children risk “losing” a parent at the border. The proposal aims to prevent this.

So how much flexibility would Slovak courts retain? Formally, some room would remain. The proposal preserves a public policy exception, albeit narrowly defined. Courts would still be able to invoke it in exceptional cases. Under existing Union law, the space for refusal is limited. A Member State cannot invoke national identity under Article 4(2) TEU or rely on public policy to refuse recognition of a parent-child relationship between a child and their same-sex parents where such recognition is necessary for the child to exercise rights granted by Union law. In other words, constitutional identity does not override a child’s rights.

MP: These developments raise concerns for human and fundamental rights, including private and family life, non-discrimination and the best interests of the child.

How might national reforms, like those in Slovakia, be reconciled with the protection of fundamental rights in cross-border family situations?

LG: The key is to distinguish between defining the domestic model of the family and protecting the status of cross-border families.

States have the right to shape their domestic family law in accordance with their constitutional traditions. This is part of pluralism in Europe. Slovakia, for example, has decided to enshrine a more conservative understanding of parenthood and gender equality in its constitution. This is a political and cultural decision. However, when we look at the cross-border implications, the real question is not the symbolic definition of the family. It is the way the system treats a child who arrives at the border with a birth certificate issued elsewhere. Harmonization in family matters begins with a child-centered perspective. The best interests of the child can not remain an abstract slogan.  Even if the state does not recognize certain forms of family in its domestic law, it must avoid creating a legal vacuum in cross-border situations. Recognition for specific purposes, such as documents, right of residence, inheritance, or parental authority, can ensure protection without the state having to rethink its entire substantive law.

MP: Before we conclude, is there anything else you would like to add?

LG: What we are seeing here is not just a matter of constitutional law, but clearly has an immense impact on private international law. Private international law was never meant to harmonise values. Its function is more modest and, in a way, more humane. It ensures continuity of personal status and protects acquired rights across borders. If this function is weakened, the consequences could be children who cannot obtain documents, parents who cannot make medical decisions, or families who are suddenly legally incomplete. Each Member State is entitled to shape its own constitutional identity, but no constitutional identity should be constructed in a way that leaves a child without legal security. The strength of any constitution is measured by how firmly it protects its values, but also by how carefully it protects the most vulnerable when those values are tested in cross-border reality.

MP: Thank you for this insightful exchange.

On 18 February 2026, a Corrigendum to Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

The Corrigendum concerns Annex I, Form K, point 1.3, and modifies the wording of the standard form used in connection with the right of the addressee to refuse a document on linguistic grounds.

Whereas the original version of point 1.3 merely stated that the addressee of the document had been informed in writing, in accordance with Article 12(2) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1784, of the possibility to refuse acceptance of a document not drafted in, or accompanied by a translation into, either a language he or she understands or the official language (or one of the official languages) of the place of service, the corrected version now requires the authority completing the form to indicate explicitly “yes □ no □” as to whether such information was provided.

The substantive safeguard remains unchanged. However, by inserting a structured “yes/no” field into Form K, the Corrigendum strengthens the evidentiary dimension of that safeguard. Authorities are now required to record expressly whether the information obligation has been fulfilled, thereby enhancing transparency and facilitating subsequent judicial review in cases where the validity of service or the effectiveness of the right of refusal is contested.

On 24 February 2026, the Council of the European Union approved the position of the European Parliament at first reading (reported on this blog) on the proposal for a directive amending, among other legislative measures, Directive (EU) 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD). The directive has thereby been formally adopted (the final text can be read here) and will be published shortly on the Official Journal of the European Union.

It will enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal.

As a result of the amending directive, the deadline for the transposition of the CSDDD will be postponed to 26 July 2028. Member States will apply those measures from 26 July 2029, with the exception of the measures necessary to comply with Article 16 of the CSDDD – which requires Member States to ensure that companies publish an annual statement on their due diligence activities – and which will apply to financial years starting on or after 1 January 2030.

On 5 and 6 March 2026, the Faculty of Law at Lund University will host a conference entitled Collaboration in International Family Law.

The event will bring together leading academics and practitioners to explore how cooperation between key actors functions in international family law, from both national and comparative perspectives.

The first day (from 14 to 16.30) is devoted to collaboration within the Swedish system. The focus will be on the interaction between courts, lawyers, municipal family law services, and the Swedish Central Authority. The speakers include Cecilia Wachtmeister (Wachtmeister Advokatbyrå), Johan Sarvik (Advokaterna Nyblom & Sarvik), Lena Carlberg Johansson and Anna Uppfeldt (both Stockholm District Court), Annika Kvist (local family authority in Hässleholm) and Erica Neglick (Head of the Swedish Central Authority). A panel discussion featuring Michael Hellner (Stockholm University) and Maarit Jänterä-Jahreborg (Uppsala University) will close the day.

The second day (from 9 to 12.30) will follow a comparative approach, with contributions from experts from France (Fabienne Jault-Seseke, University of Paris Saclay), Germany (Konrad Duden, University of Hamburg), the Netherlands (Marta Pertegas Sender, Maastricht University) and Denmark (Kristine Kirkegaard, Central Authority, Copenhagen).

Unlike the first day (which is in Swedish and on-site only), the second day will be conducted in English and will also be available online.

The full programme is available here.

Participation is free of charge. Registrations are open until 19 February 2026.

Participants may register for one conference days or both, using the form available here.

Questions regarding the conference should be directed to the conference organisers, Ulf Maunsbach (ulf.maunsbach@jur.lu.se) or Lina Rönndahl (lina.ronndahl@jur.lu.se).

On 30 December 2025, Directive (EU) 2025/2647 amending Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Directives (EU) 2015/2302, (EU) 2019/2161 and (EU) 2020/1828 following the discontinuation of the European Online Dispute Resolution Platform has been published on the Official Journal of the European Union.

Directive (EU) 2025/2647 introduces important changes to the EU framework on consumer alternative dispute resolution (ADR), with implications that go beyond consumer law and are of clear relevance for private international law. While maintaining the voluntary and out-of-court nature of ADR, Directive (EU) 2025/2647 strengthens its role in cross-border consumer disputes and extends its scope to situations involving traders established in third countries, using connecting factors closely aligned with the Rome I and the Brussels I bis Regulations.

First, Directive (EU) 2025/2647 amends Directive 2013/11/EU with the aim of increasing the effectiveness, accessibility and cross-border reach of ADR procedures within the internal market. It responds to the findings of several Commission reports and evaluations, which highlighted persistent obstacles to the uptake of ADR, including low awareness among consumers and traders, uneven coverage across Member States and specific difficulties affecting cross-border disputes, such as language barriers and uncertainty regarding the applicable law. These challenges are compounded in an increasingly digital marketplace, where consumer transactions frequently involve traders established outside the Union.

Against this background, Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2025/2647 significantly reshapes the scope of consumer ADR by clarifying that the Directive applies to procedures for the out-of-court resolution of domestic disputes, cross-border disputes and third-country trader disputes between a consumer resident in the Union and a trader, through the intervention of an ADR entity that proposes or imposes a solution or facilitates an amicable settlement.

The Directive thus covers disputes arising from sales or service contracts, including contracts for the supply of digital content or digital services, where the consumer pays or undertakes to pay a price, as well as disputes relating to contractual obligations stemming from the pre-contractual phase. Within this broadened framework, the extension of ADR procedures to disputes involving third-country traders that direct their activities towards one or more Member States stands out as a particularly significant development.

The notion of “directing activities” is expressly linked to Article 6(1)(b) of the Rome I Regulation and Article 17(1)(c) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, thereby relying on well-established private international law connecting factors. By distinguishing between domestic disputes, cross-border disputes and third-country trader disputes on the basis of the consumer’s residence and the trader’s place of establishment, the Directive reinforces legal coherence across EU instruments and situates ADR as a complementary mechanism alongside judicial jurisdiction, particularly in consumer contracts with an international dimension.

Therefore, Directive 2013/11/EU is amended also in its material scope. ADR procedures cover disputes relating not only to the performance of contractual obligations, but also to pre-contractual practices, including misleading advertising and failures to provide mandatory information. Moreover, disputes concerning digital content and digital services are explicitly included, reflecting the realities of contemporary consumer markets and the growing importance of e-commerce and digital platforms.

From a private international law perspective, particular attention is drawn to the provisions governing third-country trader disputes.

Article 5 of Directive 2013/11/EU is amended by providing that Member States may make access to ADR conditional on the parties’ agreement that the dispute be resolved on the basis of the law applicable in the Member State where the ADR entity is established and where the consumer resides. At the same time, the changed framework safeguards the consumer by ensuring that such an agreement does not deprive them of mandatory protections under the law of their habitual residence. These rules mirror familiar techniques of EU private international law, combining party autonomy with the protection of weaker parties.

Article 6 of Directive 2013/11/EU is amended requiring that natural persons in charge of ADR possess the necessary knowledge and skills in the field of alternative or judicial resolution of consumer disputes, as well as a general understanding of law and, when dealing with cross-border disputes, a general understanding of private international law.

In addition, Member States are required to provide assistance to consumers and traders in cross-border disputes, facilitating access to competent ADR entities and reducing procedural barriers.

Finally, Directive (EU) 2025/2647 amends several related consumer law instruments in order to align them with the revised ADR framework.

Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package travel is updated to reinforce transparency obligations, requiring traders to inform consumers about available in-house complaint handling procedures and ADR mechanisms pursuant to Directive 2013/11/EU, as well as, where applicable, the ADR entity by which the trader is covered.

Directive (EU) 2019/2161 is amended to clarify the consumer’s right to submit a complaint to the competent centre of the European Consumer Centres Network, thereby strengthening institutional support for consumers, particularly in cross-border disputes.

Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on representative actions is adjusted by deleting point (44) in Annex I, ensuring consistency with the discontinuation of the European Online Dispute Resolution platform and with the updated consumer ADR system.

Directive (EU) 2025/2647 entered into force on 19 January 2026.

Member States shall adopt and publish the measures necessary to comply with Directive (EU) 2025/2647 by 20 March 2028.

The Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers of the European Commission has recently published a fourth edition of the Compendium of European Union legislation on judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters.

This document is extremely valuable and its updated publication is to be welcomed.

In a common judicial area, marked by a tradition of written law and codification, the collection of legal texts is a key instrument for accessing the law. Judicial cooperation in civil matters pursuant to Article 81 TFEU is an area that needs this compilation of the legal acquis in order to facilitate its reading, understanding and, therefore, its application.

The abstract of the new edition of the Compendium reads as follows:

Twenty-five years after the Amsterdam Treaty conferred competence on the European Union to legislate in the area of private international law, the creation of an area of civil justice in the EU based on the principle of mutual trust is entering an era of maturity. It is now marked more by a process of consolidation, rather than growth, and by providing a strong foundation to support the European Commission’s political priorities. Since the last edition of this Compendium, the EU’s legislature has adopted new instruments and many existing instruments have been updated, be it by amendments and corrigenda, or by the adoption of a recast instrument. The latter category includes the recast Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction, as well as the recast Service of documents Regulation and the recast Taking of evidence Regulation. The success of the EU legislators in keeping up with recent technical and societal developments is demonstrated by the 2023 Digitalisation Regulation, and by the 2024 Anti-SLAPP Directive. Thanks to the valuable feedback from users of the Compendium, this edition also contains several instruments adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, because of their connection with and importance for the European civil justice area.

The document can be downloaded in all EU official languages here.

European Commission logoThe European Commission has established the Brussels Ia sub-group and launched a Call for Applications to select members of this group, which will support the revision of the cornerstone instrument of EU Private International Law.

Members of the sub group will contribute to the evaluation of the Brussels Ia Regulation, support the preparation of any eventual legislative proposal for the Brussels Ib Regulation, and exchange best practices with leading experts from across Europe.

In principle, the sub-group shall meet at least once per year physically on Commission premises and as needed virtually in order to discuss the application and future prospects of the Brussels Ia Regulation and related matters. DG JUST shall provide secretarial services. Members should be prepared to attend meetings systematically, to contribute actively to discussions in the sub-group, to be involved in preparatory work ahead of meetings, to examine and provide comments on documents under discussion, and to act, as appropriate, as ‘rapporteurs’ on ad hoc basis. As a general rule, working documents will be drafted in English and meetings will be also conducted in English.

The selection process of members  shall be carried out in such a manner as to ensure a high level of expertise and balance in terms of knowledge, geographical origin and gender.

🧑‍⚖️ Up to 20 members
⏳ Five-year renewable mandate
📅 Apply by 23 February 2026

More details can be found here, including the procedure to apply.

On 16 December 2025, the European Parliament approved at first reading the proposal for a directive amending, among other legislative measures, Directive (EU) 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD).

The proposal now awaits approval by the Council of the European Union.

As reported on this blog, the amending directive, part of the Omnibus Simplification Package, aims to recalibrate certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence obligations.

Both the scope of application of the CSDDD and several of its substantive provisions are affected by the proposed directive.

As regards the scope, the due diligence obligations in the CSDDD will apply only to EU companies with more than 5,000 employees and a net annual turnover exceeding 1.5 billion Euros. Non-EU companies generating the latter turnover within the EU would also be covered.

The substantive amendments concern, inter alia, the provisions whereby a company is required to adopt and implement transition plans ensuring the compatibility of its business model with the transition to a sustainable economy (these will no longer appear in the CSDDD, as amended), and the provisions on the identification and assessment of adverse impacts (which will be adjusted and mitigated). The rules on  penalties will also be affected.

Of particular interest for the readers of this blog are the changes affecting Article 29 of the CSDDD on the civil liability of companies. While some elements of the existing provision are retained, others have been removed or reformulated.

Article 29(1) establishes an autonomous EU-level basis for civil liability, defining when companies incur liability for intentional or negligent breaches of their due diligence obligations under Articles 10 and 11, while excluding liability where damage is caused solely by business partners. This paragraph would be deleted under the amending directive, meaning that the above issues will be left to the applicable national law.

Article 29(2) links the right to full compensation to liability established under paragraph 1 and expressly excludes punitive or multiple damages. The directive, as amended, will preserve the right to full compensation but anchors it in national civil liability regimes.

Article 29(3) is concerned with remedies and access to justice, and covers issues such as limitation periods, litigation costs, injunctive relief, representative actions and access to evidence. Most safeguards remain unchanged, but the proposal deletes point (d), which set out the obligation to allow trade unions, NGOs or national human rights institutions to bring actions on behalf of alleged injured parties.

Article 29(4) clarifies that participation in industry or multi-stakeholder initiatives, third-party verification or contractual clauses does not exclude liability. The directive, as amended, refers this provision to liability under national law, consistently with the removal of an EU-harmonised liability regime.

Article 29(5) preserves the liability of subsidiaries and business partners and expressly provides for joint and several liability where damage is caused jointly. The provision will be narrowed under the amended directive, stating only that the company’s liability is without prejudice to that of its subsidiaries or business partners, without any express reference to joint and several liability.

Article 29(7) provides that Member States shall ensure that the provisions of national law transposing the Article are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the national law of a Member State. This paragraph will no longer appear in the amended directive.

A review clause has nevertheless been introduced, requiring the Commission to reassess the need for an EU-level liability regime at a later stage.

Under the amended rules, the deadline for transposition of the CSDDD is postponed by one year, to 26 July 2028. The companies concerned will be required to comply with the new obligations from 26 July 2029.

On 21 October 2025, the European Commission adopted its 2026 work programme, titled Europe’s Independence Moment.

It outlines how the EU plans to respond to current and emerging challenges, from security threats and geopolitical tensions to economic vulnerabilities and the accelerating climate crisis, building on the priorities set out in President von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines 2024-2029 and the 2025 State of the Union address.

The initiatives that the Commission plans to prioritise in 2026 are set out across three annexes.

Annex I outlines the new initiatives. Although the document does not list any new measures based on Article 81 TFEU, certain initiatives, particularly those grounded in Article 114 TFEU, may nonetheless have an indirect effect on matters of private international law.

Among these, more specifically among the “simplification initiatives” listed in the programme, the 28th Regime for Innovative Companies aims to create an optional EU framework for startups and cross-border business.

Beyond simplification, the Digital Fairness Act will enhance consumer protection in the digital environment, ensuring greater transparency and accountability in online markets.

As non-legislative, the Gender Equality Strategy 2026–2030 will set new priorities to promote equal opportunities across the EU, with private international law playing a key role in safeguarding EU citizens’ rights when status and relationships cross national borders.

Annex II covers the annual plan for evaluations and fitness checks, while pending legislative proposals are discussed in Annex III, which includes: the Proposal for a Directive amending Directives 2006/43/EC, 2013/34/EU, (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements; the Proposal for a Regulation on combating late payment in commercial transactions; the Proposal for a Directive harmonizing certain aspects of insolvency law; the Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions, and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood, including the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood; the Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement of measures, and cooperation in matters relating to the protection of adults; and the Proposal for a Regulation establishing the Justice programme for the period 2028-2034 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2021/693.

It also cover the Proposal as regards the enforcement of passenger rights within the EU, and the Proposal in the context of multimodal journeys; the Proposal on the establishment of a digital euro and related measures; the Proposal on substantiation and communication of environmental claims (the Green Claims Directive); and the Proposal on safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the Union.

Also interesting is Annex IV, on withdrawals. The list of proposals that the Commission plans to withdraw includes the Proposal for a Directive on European cross-border associations.

On 17 October 2025, Regulation (EU) 2025/2073 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 October 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings to replace its Annexes A and B was published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

The amendment reflects recent notifications by several Member States introducing new types of insolvency proceedings and insolvency practitioners in their domestic legal systems. Specifically, notifications were submitted by Slovakia, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Malta and Luxembourg, later followed by Bulgaria, Czechia, Spain (for a second time) and France.

These new national procedures and practitioner types comply with the requirements of the Insolvency Regulation, warranting their inclusion in the Annexes to ensure the Regulation’s uniform and up-to-date application across the Union.

The Regulation also recalls Ireland’s decision, pursuant to Protocol No 21, to participate in the adoption and application of this instrument, while Denmark, under Protocol No 22, remains outside its scope.

As a result, Annexes A and B to Regulation (EU) 2015/848 have been replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this amending Regulation. The new Annexes A and B list the insolvency proceedings and the corresponding insolvency practitioners applicable in each Member State.

Pursuant to Article 2, Regulation (EU) 2025/2073 will enter into force on 6 November 2025.

The European Commission has formally withdrawn two legislative proposals related to judicial cooperation in civil matters, namely the Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims, as well as the Proposal for a Directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI Liability Directive).

A notice of the withdrawals has been published in the Official Journal on 6 October 2025, following the Commission’s 2533rd meeting on 16 July 2025. Both proposals had previously been listed in Annex IV of the Commission 2025 Work Programme of 11 February 2025, already noted on this blog.

Reasons for the withdrawals are set out in Annex IV referred to above. As regards the proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims, the stated reason is the absence of a foreseeable agreement among the EU political institutions. For the AI Liability Directive, the stated reason is also the lack of a foreseeable agreement; the Commission further indicated that it will evaluate whether to present a revised proposal or to pursue an alternative approach.

This post was written by Sara Migliorini and João Ilhão Moreira, who both teach at the Faculty of Law of the University of Macau. It builds on article they co-authored, titled Clashing Frameworks: the EU AI Act and Arbitration, just published on the European Journal of Risk Regulation.


The EU AI Act (hereinafter, the “Act” or the “AI Act”) is now in force, and arbitration is firmly in its sights. The Act classifies certain uses of AI in arbitration as ‘high risk’, triggering a demanding set of obligations for providers and deployers alike: arbitral institutions, individual arbitrators, and specialised legal tech companies.

In doing so, the Act directly affects cornerstone principles of arbitration, such as party autonomy, procedural flexibility, and confidentiality. As we argue in our recent article, this marks a sharp departure from the EU’s long-standing hands-off approach to commercial arbitration.

With the Act’s high‑risk provisions set to take effect within the next 15 months, we think it is timely to assess their impact and take steps to mitigate potential negative effects, including a targeted carve‑out for commercial arbitration.

The Traditional EU Approach to Arbitration

Over the years, EU law and arbitration have had a relationship that, with the exception of consumer arbitration, was largely one of mutual indifference. Despite available legislative avenues, the EU’s competence to regulate arbitration has been significantly underutilised. For example, although Article 81 TFEU empowers the EU to adopt harmonisation measures for the development of ADR, arbitration has been systematically excluded from measures based on Article 81. This approach appears to be substantially maintained in the latest document by the Commission regarding the review the Brussels I bis Regulation.  The CJEU has traditionally interpreted these exclusions broadly, confirming the EU’s restraint in regulating arbitration (e.g.London Steam-Ship).

On occasion, the EU legislator has utilised other legal bases to regulate arbitration, notably in the area of consumer protection (e.g., the Consumer ADR Directive, or the Digital Service Act). Yet commercial arbitration, as a whole, has remained largely untouched by direct EU legislation.Consequently, before the AI Act, the relationship between EU law and commercial arbitration was mainly limited to issues of substantive law arising out of court proceedings related to arbitrations and awards. The classic concern was the risk that arbitrators might commit errors of law and the fact that, unlike in litigation, there are limited avenues to correct such errors. In such contexts, the CJEU has addressed matters of arbitrability (e.g., Mostaza Claro), public policy (e.g., Eco Swiss), and generally the interaction with the judicial procedures for the annulment, recognition, and enforcement of arbitral awards (e.g., London Steam-Ship).

By contrast, EU law has abstained from regulating procedural issues of commercial arbitration. Traditionally, such aspects are regulated by party autonomy (often through institutional rules), supplemented by national arbitration laws and rules produced by the arbitral community itself.

The EU’s legislative and judicial abstention has sustained the doctrinal view that the EU’s legal order and commercial arbitration would evolve in parallel, with minimal interference between them. This arrangement was welcomed by a community that has historically self-regulated.

High-Risk Classification under the Act

Things have changed with the AI Act. Under the combined reading of Article 6, Annex III(8)(a), and Recital (53), AI systems are classified as high risk where they are intended to (1) assist arbitrators in researching or interpreting facts and the law, (2) apply the law to a specific set of facts, unless they fall within a closed series of use cases where the impact on fundamental rights and decision-making is not substantial.

Such use cases are (a) “narrow procedural tasks”, such as transforming unstructured data or classifying documents; (b) tasks that are adjunct to human effort, such as enhancing the language of documents; and (c) preparatory tasks, such as indexing and data processing activities.

This definition raises questions of interpretation, especially while we wait for the European Commission to issue clarifying guidelines (due in February 2026).

In our view, there are clear-cut cases. For example, AI used for ancillary tasks such as proofreading or language enhancement falls outside the high‑risk category, as these functions merely refine prior human work. By contrast, use of AI for any core decision‑making task is unequivocally high risk (and very likely in tension with existing principles of arbitration).

However, between these extremes lies a vast grey area: tasks like legal research, drafting, summarizing or reviewing submissions can still shape how arbitrators interpret facts and the law. Given this, the Act’s broad language might cause uncertainty for potential addressees of these rules.

Personal Scope and Obligations

Where a system is high risk, two groups of actors assume compliance obligations: those who develop or commercialise the systems (“providers”) and those who use such systems under their own authority (“deployers”).

Arbitral institutions, individual arbitrators, and specialised legal tech companies will be subject to obligations in both capacities.

The demanding obligations for providers are listed in Sections 2 and 3 of the Act and include: risk management (Article 9), data quality/governance (Article 10), effective human oversight (Article 14), accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity (Article 15), registration of the system, demonstration of conformity on request, and accessibility compliance (Article 16).

The relatively less demanding obligations for deployers are listed in Article 26 and include: keeping logs for at least six months, organising oversight implementation, and ensuring suitable input data, among others.

Arbitral Institutions and Specialised Legal Tech Companies

Many tools currently marketed to support arbitration, from legal research platforms to document analysis systems, will likely be qualified as ‘high-risk’, because they are, indeed, intended to be used to research facts and the law. Even more general legal tech widely used in law firms, such as Harvey or Robin AI, may qualify as high risk when used by arbitrators. In all these cases, the costs and regulatory uncertainty may prove particularly burdensome for smaller providers and institutions.

Individual Arbitrators

Arbitrators using AI tools face two scenarios. Firstly, an arbitrator who relies on an AI system specifically designed for arbitration will be treated as a “deployer” of a high‑risk system and subject to the relevant obligations.

Secondly, general-pourpose tools not specifically designed for arbitration and not considered AI risk, such as ChatGPT, may still fall into the high‑risk category if used for legal reasoning or applying the law to facts. A literal reading of Article 25 of the Act could even mean that arbitrators who use systems such as ChatGPT, may be requalified and fall within provider‑level obligations, which are more demanding than provider-level obbligations.

Difficulties in Enforcement

Notwithstanding all the uncertainty surrounding its interpretation, non‑compliance with the Act exposes actors to serious risks. Fines are up to 15 million Euros or 3% of global turnover, whichever is higher. For individual arbitrators, small firms, or smaller institutions, such fines may be unsustainable, discouraging innovation and consolidating the market around large providers.

Arbitrators also face reputational and, possibly, civil liability risks, with unresolved questions as to how misuse of AI might affect the validity of an award.

Enforcement is complicated by the confidentiality of arbitration. Under current confidentiality practices, it may be difficult to determine whether AI was used, let alone whether its use complied with the Act. For example, reliance on AI for legal research may never appear in the procedural record. How enforcement might affect the duties of arbitrators, notably with respect to confidentiality, remains also to be seen.

Impact Outside of the EU

The Act’s extraterritorial scope adds further complexity. Under Article 2, the Act applies not only to EU‑based providers and deployers, but also to those outside the EU when (a) the output of an AI system is used within the EU, or (b) an affected party is located in the EU.

EU‑based companies, institutions, and arbitrators fall directly under the Act. However, depending on how “use of an output” in the EU is interpreted, it can be argued that the Act extends to non‑EU arbitral institutions and arbitrators who, although physically outside the EU, conduct arbitral proceedings that are legally seated in the EU.  The expression “use of an output”  may even cover enforcement of awards before EU courts or cases involving a party located in the EU, irrespective of any other link with the EU.

For non‑EU actors in particular, this creates significant uncertainty.

Our Proposal

 We belive that the best option would be for the EU Commission to completely exclude commercial arbitration from the scope of the Act. This could be done via a delegated act under Article 7(3), which would exclude commercial arbitraiton from Annex III(8)(a), while keeping consumer ADR within the Act’s scope.

An alternative option would be for the EU Commission to adopt guidelines under Article 6(5) of the Act, clarifying which uses of AI in arbitration are not high risk, following consultation with arbitral institutions and practitioners.

Two years have passed since the European Commission published two proposals on the protection of adults in international situations, namely a proposal for a Council Decision that would authorise all EU Member States to become parties of the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the international protection of adults “in the interest of the European Union”, and a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council that would complement the Convention in the relations between the Member States.

The latter proposal has been extensively discussed within the Council of the European Union. An agreement for a partial general approach has been reached in this context in late May 2025 on the provisions in Chapters I to V, regarding respectively  the scope of the future Regulation and the rules on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of measures of protection and authentic instruments.

The Presidency of the Council expressed the view that the text resulting from the agreed general approach “is stable and represents a finely balanced compromise reflecting the wide range of positions by Member States”, while noting that “more time is needed to explore the rest of the text further”, in particular concerning the establishment and interconnection of registers of powers of representation and cooperation in the event of the placement of an adult in an establishment or other place where protection can be provided, in another Member State.

Some Member States, including Spain, Estonia (with a corrigendum), and Malta, have since made public their opinion on the topics under discussion.

A conference will take place in Milan, at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, on 17 and 18 September 2025 to discuss the two Commission’s proposals and the developments that followed their publication.

The programme, which will be available soon, will feature, inter alia, presentations by Giacomo Biagioni, University of Cagliari; Patrizia De Luca (TBC), Senior Expert at the European Commission; Giovanni Freise, University of Hamburg; Cristina Gonzalez Beilfuss, University of Barcelona; Jan von Hein, University of Freiburg; Katja Karjalainen, University of Lapland; Thalia Kruger, University of Antwerp; Philippe Lortie, First Secretary of the Hague Conference on Private International Law; Francesca Maoli, University of Genova; Paolo Pasqualis, Notary; Geraldo Rocha Ribeiro, University of Coimbra; Rieneke Stelma-Roorda, VU Amsterdam; Chloé Terraube, Ministry of Justice of France

The working language will be English. Attendance is free and can be either in person or on-line. Prior registration, however, is required here.

A working group composed of French scholars chaired by Professors Mathias Audit and Sylvain Bollée (both Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne University) has issued a report on the opportunity of the EU lawmaker to include new provisions in the Brussels I bis Regulation on international commercial arbitration (Towards an EU Law on International Commercial Arbitration?). The report was presented in the Paris Arbitration Week and a recent conference on the recast of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The core proposals would be to include two new provisions in the Regulation.

First, the report proposes to add a new Article 25 bis defining the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States to support the arbitral process, to entertain challenges to arbitral awards, and to determine the existence and validity of arbitral agreements. The rule would grant jurisdiction to the court of the seat of the arbitration.

Article 25 bis

1. If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed to settle their dispute by arbitration with its seat in the territory of a Member State, the courts of that Member State shall have jurisdiction over the following actions:
(a) Actions relating to the support for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or the conduct of the arbitration procedure. This should be without prejudice to the jurisdiction of any other court expressly designated by the parties;

(b) Actions relating to the existence, validity or enforceability of the arbitration agreement. This should be without prejudice to:
– provisions of the national law of that State Member empowering the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and, as the case may be, recognising it a priority in this respect; and
– article 31 bis paragraph 2.
(c) Actions for annulment, recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award.
2. Actions referred to in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) may not be brought before a court of a Member State on the basis of national rules of jurisdiction.

3. Paragraph 1 (c) should be without prejudice to the right for a party to seek recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award before a court of a Member State on the basis of its national rules of jurisdiction.

4. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the application of a rule of national law of the Member State where the seat of arbitration is located enabling the parties to waive their right to bring an action for annulment.

5. The provision of this article do not apply in dis putes concerning matters referred to in Sections 3, 4 or 5 of Chapter II.

Second, the report proposes to add a new Article 31 bis which would grant a priority to the courts of the Member State of the seat of arbitration to decide on the existence, validity or enforceability of the arbitration agreement. The underlying policy would be to reinforce the rule of jurisdiction set out by proposed Article 25 bis, ensure the full protection of contractual agreements regarding the location of the seat, but also prevent forum shopping. On balance, the report finds it preferable that the court ruling on the existence, validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement be that of the seat, which the parties have prima facie elected by mutual agreement, rather than a judge unilaterally seized by only one of the parties.

Article 31 bis

1. Where a court of a Member State is seized of an action and its jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement establishing the seat of the arbitration in another Member State, it shall, on the application of the party seeking to rely upon the said agreement, stay the proceedings until the courts of this other Member State have ruled or may no longer rule on the existence, validity or enforceability of the arbitration agreement.

2. However the court whose jurisdiction is contested continues the proceedings if:
(a) the arbitration agreement is manifestly inexistent, invalid or unenforceable under the law of the Member State where the seat is located; or
(b) the arbitral tribunal was seized and declined jurisdiction, and the arbitration agreement is inexistent, invalid or unenforceable under the law of the Member State where the seat is located.
For the purposes of this paragraph, reference to the law of the Member State where t he seat is located encompasses conflict-of-laws rules applicable in that Member State.

3. The provisions of this article are without prejudice of the application of a rule of national law of the Member State where the seat of arbitration is located empowering the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and, as the case may be, recognising it a priority in this respect.

The full report, including detailed comments of the proposed new provisions, can be downloaded here.

On 18 June 2025 the European Commission opened an infringement procedure under Article 258 of the TFEU against Malta (INFR(2025)2100), alleging that Malta is failing to comply with its obligations under the Brussels I bis Regulation with respect to litigation in matters related to gambling.

Following the formal notice sent by the Commission, the Maltese Government has now two months to address the shortcomings raised by the Commission. Absent a satisfactory response, the Commission may decide to issue a reasoned opinion. If indeed such an opinion is issued, and Malta fails to comply with it, the Commission may then bring the matter before the Court of Justice.

The Alleged Infringement

As stated in its own press release, the Commission considers that Malta is breaching the Brussels I bis Regulation by requiring its courts to “systematically refuse”, on grounds of public policy, the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in other Member States against Maltese-licensed gaming companies. In the view of the Commission, Malta is also violating the Regulation by discouraging “foreign litigants from pursuing legal action in Maltese courts against these entities, despite EU rules designating such courts as the appropriate forum based on the defendant’s domicile”.

In the Commission’s view, this “undermines the principle of mutual trust in the administration of justice within the Union and violates the prohibition on reviewing judgments from other Member States on their substance, exceeds the limits of the public policy exception, and distorts the EU’s rules on jurisdiction”.

The Commission’s press release only provides a short description of the relevant facts. The circumstances of the alleged infringement, however, can be retraced based on court and media reports that have been emerging over the last few years, in particular after May 2023, when an Austrian law firm and a German lawyer wrote to the European Commission, as reported in article in the Times of Malta, to inform that the Maltese government was “undermining European rule of law through a Bill tabled in parliament to amend Malta’s gaming regulations” with a view to preventing “Maltese courts from enforcing sentences handed down against Maltese gaming companies in foreign jurisdictions”.

An article by Paulo Pena, Harald Schumann, Maxence Peigné, published on EUobserver on 6 March 2025, further explains that

[t]he world’s biggest gambling companies are using a little-known Maltese law, that nullifies court verdicts elsewhere in the European Union, to protect themselves from potentially having to pay out millions in legal claims.

Under a law known as Bill 55, Maltese courts can “refuse recognition and, or enforcement” of any foreign judgment involving companies registered on the island — namely, the scores of betting companies based there thanks to an already favourable corporate climate. 

The law effectively shields owners of brands such as Pokerstars, Betsson and Unibet from judgements handed down abroad, of which there are an increasing number.  

Bill 55, as another article in the Times of Malta recalls, has sparked significant controversy, especially in Austria, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, where courts “have ruled against Malta-based online gaming companies, demanding reimbursement for losses incurred by players” using what those courts consider “illegal” foreign betting platforms.

According to a report published on 18 June 2025 on the Time of Malta, the Maltese government maintains that the “law does not establish new or separate grounds for refusing the enforcement of judgments” beyond those set in the Brussels I bis Regulation. The Malta Gaming Authority, for its part, argued that the law “does not impose a blanket ban on enforcing European judgments against Maltese-licensed gaming companies, nor does it shield them from legal action in other EU courts”.

Cases Pending before the Court of Justice

Two requests for a preliminary ruling, currently pending at the Court of Justice, are concerned with private international law issues in connection with gambling.

The first request forms the object of the Wunner case and concerns the interpretation of Articles 1 and 4 of the Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. The second request resulted in the Mr Green case, which revolves around Article 7(1) of Regulation No 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) procedure.

As reported by Marta Requejo on this blog, the Wunner case arises from proceedings pending in Austria between a company running an online casino via a website from its registered office in Malta, holding a valid Maltese gaming licence but no licence under the Austrian rules on gambling, and a natural person domiciled in Austria. The latter had played online games via the company’s website, paying the amount claimed but without gaining any winnings. He sought repayment of his losses from the managing directors of the company, claiming that, in the absence of an Austrian licence, the gambling contract is null and void. He bases his claim on liability for damages, on the ground that interference with the Austrian monopoly on games of chance entails an infringement of protective provisions.

In his opinion delivered on 12 June 2025, AG Emiliou proposed that the questions referred should be answered as follows.

To begin with, AG Emiliou suggests that Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome II Regulation, which excludes from the scope of the Regulation the non-contractual obligations “arising out of the law of companies” , should be interpreted as meaning that the exclusion  does not cover an alleged non-contractual obligation of a company director arising out of the infringement of a duty or prohibition imposed by the law independently of the director’s own appointment, such as the prohibition on anyone to offer games of chance in a given Member State without a licence granted by the authorities of that State

Secondly, according to AG Emiliou, Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation should be interpreted as meaning that, “where a consumer alleges to have sustained gambling losses as a result of participating, from the Member State in which he or she is habitually resident, in the online games of chance offered to him or her by a provider established in another Member State without a licence granted by the authorities of the first State, the ‘damage’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of that regulation occurred in that first State, as the country from which the bets were placed”.

The questions submitted to the Court of Justice in the Mr Green case are closely related to the facts underlying the recente infringement procedure opened by the Commission. An Austrian applied in Austria for a European Account Preservation Order against a defendant seated in Malta. The former asserted, in particular. that, following final and enforceable judgments, the defendant had moved, and could further move, its assets to Malta, apparently relying on the Maltese legislation (Bill 55) prohibiting enforcement of foreign judgments against gaming operators which have a Maltese licence. The issue arose of whether this would justify the periculum in mora required to obtain an EAPO.

Issues similar to those raised by the case are discussed in the guest post written by Carlos Santalò Goris in November 2023 fo this blog: The 2023 Reform of the Maltese Gaming Act: A Valid Ground to Reject the Issuance of an EAPO?

Further Readings

The EAPIL blog has dealt with various issues raised by cross-border (Malta-related) litigation over gambling. See, in particular, Matthias Lehmann’s posts published respectively in January 2024 (Where Do Gamblers Lose their Money? Lessons from an Austrian-Maltese Conflict), and in April 2024 (How Can Gamblers Get Their Winnings? Not Under Article 6 of Rome I!).

Geert van Calster has also discussed some private international law issues in connection with gambling and the Maltese Bill 55 in his blog, here.

The author of this post is Rob Rooman, PhD Researcher at KULeuven.


Ever since its adoption, the future of Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence (hereinafter, the CS3D) has been unsure.

The Directive in general is facing significant political resistance, and has seen its transposition deadline delayed. Furthermore, the European Commission in February proposed its Omnibus Simplification Package, aiming to simplifying the EU’s ESG regulations in order not to disadvantage EU companies in terms of competitiveness. In the CS3D, this is concretized for example by restricting due diligence obligations to direct business partners and not indirect business partners, or increasing the scope of maximum harmonization.

Amendments to Article 29

I will not dive into the amendments to the due diligence obligations. Rather, I will focus on the consequences of Omnibus on the civil liability regime laid down in Article 29 (for a more extensive analysis of that Article, see for example Bueno and Oehm). This liability regime should ensure private enforcement of the Directive by ensuring that claimants who have sustained damages arising out of adverse impact on human rights and environment caused by corporate activity, can hold the parent company accountable. In short, the proposal removes most of Article 29, leaving only the principle of full compensation according to national law intact, together with additional rules, for example on access to justice (although possibility for claimants to authorize organizations to bring representative actions has disappeared too). The Commission has done so to ensure respect for the different national liability regimes of the Member States, and to avoid the litigation risks of a harmonized civil liability regime.

By removing Article 29(1), which set out the liability conditions, the Commission leaves it up to national law to decide on what conditions a company will be liable for infringing the CS3D.  This means that the conditions of the liability will depend on the state in which the claim is brought, aligning with the Commission’s goal to ensure respect for different regimes.

No Overriding Mandatory Application? The Risk of a New Enforcement Gap

However, the Commission has also proposed to remove Article 29(7), which designates the liability rules to be of overriding mandatory application. This allows the Member States not only to decide on the conditions of liability, but also to decide whether or not to include an express characterization as overriding mandatory provisions (OMP’s) in the implementation of the CS3D (which, as said by Pannebakker, they might not be eager to do). If they refrain from doing that, courts will be forced to apply the normal conflict of laws rules set out in the Rome II Regulation, with the general rule pointing towards the country in which the damage has arisen (aka lex loci damni, and in such claims most likely third state law). Alternatively, the national judiciary might attempt to apply the Directive with national liability rules as OMP’s in accordance with the CJEU case law on Article 16 Rome II, but that would then lead to the necessary unpredictability and litigation.

From an enforcement point of view, this risks opening a major enforcement gap at the stage of applicable law. With the already existing enforcement gap at the stage of jurisdiction (as explained by Sommerfeld and Michaels on this blog), this could effectively put the application of the Directive’s liability rules to death.

With one of the Commission’s objectives being the avoidance of litigation risks, it is ironic that on the contrary, Omnibus actually seems to make it harder to manage those. Whether or not the company will be liable under the CS3D will depend not only on the conditions of CS3D liability in the laws of the Member State of the seized court, but also on what law those courts will apply. As noticed by Geert Van Calster, this may lead to a wide variety of possible results, and the law applicable to CS3D liability claims may now very well be the law of any country in the world where damage has arisen. In the recent study by the JARO Institute on Sustainability and Digitalization, approximately half (53%) of the surveyed businesses expect more liability risks now that the CS3D might not be of overriding mandatory application. In addition, timely clarity on the content of the rules is much needed, so that businesses can prepare accordingly. The survey shows that nearly half of the participating businesses are delaying investments due to the current state of unclarity following Omnibus.

In its opinion, the European Economic and Social Committee advises against removing the harmonized rules on liability and their application as OMP’s, as this leads to fragmentation on the internal market, and to a decrease in access to justice. With respect to the latter, Omnibus indeed proposed to remove one of the access to justice measures in Paragraph 3, i.e. on representative actions. Regarding the other four (on costs, statutes of limitations, disclosure and injunctive measures), it is of note that two of those (rules on costs and disclosure) are likely categorized as matters of procedural law. They are excluded from Rome II’s scope (Article 1(3)) and most probably subject to lex fori. EU courts will therefore always be able to apply their own laws (including the transposed CS3D) to those matters, irrespective of the law applicable.

How to Proceed

In any case, to avoid unwanted and unnecessary unpredictability, and to ensure the effective application of the Directive, even in its ‘simplified’ version, it is strongly recommended to include an express reference to OMP’s in the CS3D. This would at least harmonize the fact that if an EU court has jurisdiction to hear a CS3D liability claim, it in fact applies that Directive together with its national liability rules. Whether or not, and with what result the company will be liable in the end will then still depend on the different national liability regimes of the Member States, but at least the application of the CS3D is guaranteed.

An opinion and two hearings are scheduled in June 2025 in relation to requests for preliminary rulings on private international law instruments.

On Thursday 12 June, Advocate General N. Emilou will deliver his opinion in case C-77/24, Wunner. The Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria) has referred two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the interpretation of Regulation No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (the Rome II Regulation):

1. Must Article 1(2)(d) of [the Rome II Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that it also applies to claims for damages against an officer of a company which a creditor of the company bases on tortious liability for infringement of protective provisions (such as provisions of legislation on games of chance) by that officer?

2. If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

Must Article 4(1) of the abovementioned regulation be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of an action for damages based on tortious liability in respect of gaming losses suffered which is brought against an officer of a company offering online games of chance in Austria without a licence, the place where the damage occurred is determined by

(a) the place from which the player effects credit transfers from his or her bank account to the player account maintained by the company,

(b) the place where the company maintains the player account in which deposits from the player, winnings, losses and bonuses are entered,

(c) the place from which the player places bets via that player account which ultimately result in a loss,

(d) the player’s place of residence as the location of his or her claim to payment of the credit balance in his or her player account,

(e) the location of the player’s main assets?

In main proceedings TE, an individual domiciled in Austria, is suing NM and OU, who used to be the managing directors of Titanium Brace Marketing Limited (‘TBM’) at the time of the facts. TBM ran an online casino via the website http://www.drueckglueck.com from its registered office in Malta. It offered its services to the European market as a whole. TMB held a valid Maltese gaming licence, but no licence under the Austrian Glücksspielgesetz (Law on Gambling), and is currently in liquidation.

TE played online games of chance via TBM’s website during the period from 14 November 2019 to 3 April 2020 without gaining any winnings.

In order to be able to play on TBM’s website, TE had to open a customer account in Malta. He made payments from his Austrian bank account into an account in a Maltese bank in order to top up his player account (his customer account). TBM booked those deposits as credit. The account opened for TE in Malta was a TBM real-money account for him as a player, not commingled with TBM’s company assets. If the respondent decided to participate in a game of chance, the stake for the game was debited from the player account. In the event of a win, said win would also have been credited to the player account. TE suffered a total gambling loss of EUR 18 547.67.

TE claims that the gambling contract is null and void in the absence of a TBM’s Austrian licence. He seeks reimbursement of its losses from both defendants. His claim is based on tortious liability – the infringement of the Austrian gambling monopoly would entail a violation of a protective law (Schutzgesetz). According to TE, NM and OU, as managers of TBM, are liable for the fact that the company offered illegal games of chance in Austria. They are personally and, as joint perpetrators, jointly and severally liable towards the persons injured by the violation of the provisions of the Austrian Gambling Act relating to the protection of players.

The court of first instance dismissed TE’s claim for lack of international jurisdiction. The appeal court overturned this decision. The appeal for Revision by NM and OU before the Austrian Supreme Court seeks the reinstatement of the decision of the court of first instance or, in the alternative, the annulment of the judgment given on appeal and referral to the previous courts. TE claims that the appeal for Revision should be dismissed.

The judgment will be adopted by a chamber of five judges, with F. Biltgen as reporting judge.

A hearing in case C- 516/24, Windermill, will be held on Wednesday 18 June. The Amtsgericht Schleswig (Local Court Schleswig, Germany) is requesting the interpretation of Regulation 4/2009 on maintenance obligations:

Is an application for legal aid, to which an application to vary in a matter relating to maintenance obligations – which is intended to be formally submitted in the event that legal aid is granted – is attached only in draft form, an ‘equivalent document’ within the meaning of Article 9(a) of the EU Maintenance Regulation, with the result that a national court has been seised and the jurisdiction of that court established?

In the case at hand the applicant resides in Sweden and his father, the defendant, resides in Germany. By application filed with the German competent court on 17 December 2021, which arrived by fax the same day, the applicant requested legal aid for an application to vary child maintenance. A draft of the latter application was attached and it was indicated that it would be submitted in the event of legal aid was granted.

On 28 January 2022, before the German court ruled on the issue of legal aid, the defendant brought an action seeking variation of the maintenance obligation before the Swedish court Eskilstuna Tingsrätt.

By order of 29 March 2022, the Local Court of Schleswig refused legal aid for the proposed application to vary in Germany for lack of international jurisdiction. By order of 27 May 2022, the Schleswig-Holsteinische Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court, Schleswig-Holstein), in response to the applicant’s appeal, set aside the order of the Local Court and granted legal aid, pointing out that international jurisdiction is to be established in the main proceedings and not in the context of the granting of legal aid.

The Swedish court Eskilstuna Tingsrätt – after the action was dismissed at first instance on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, that decision set aside by the Swedish Supreme Court, and the action referred back to the Tingsrätt – stayed the proceedings by order of 6 May 2024 pursuant to Article 12(1) of the EU Maintenance Regulation.

The legal issue to be determined is whether the application for the granting of legal aid already constitutes seising of the German court within the meaning of Article 9(a) of the EU Maintenance Regulation, and thus establishes jurisdiction as the court first seised, within the meaning of Article 12(1) of the same Regulation. In this context, the Court of Justice will need to establish whether the interpretation for the purposes of the Maintenance Regulation follows the lines of the Brussels system, or is an independent one.

A chamber of five judges (O. Spineau-Matei reporting) will be deciding on this case, counting with the support of AG R. Norkus’s opinion.

A hearing in case C-198/24, Mr Green, will take place on Thursday 19. The Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Vienna, Austria), requests the interpretation of the European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) Regulation:

Is Article 7(1) of [the EAPO Regulation] to be interpreted as meaning that action taken by the debtor three years or more previously and/or obstacles to enforcement of the judgment in the Member State of the debtor are not to be taken into account?

TQ, who resides in Austria, played from that country online games of chance offered by Mr. Green Limited, a company based in Malta. Mr. Green Limited has a Maltese online gambling licence but not an Austrian licence under the Glücksspielgesetz (Gambling Act).

Between 3 January 2017 and 25 April 2019, TQ suffered a loss of EUR 62,878, in respect of which he brought a claim in Austria. By judgment of the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Vienna) of 2 December 2021, TQ was awarded EUR 62 878.00 including interest and costs against the defendant from the claim for recovery of those losses. The appeal lodged by Mr. Green Limited was dismissed by judgment of 21 February 2022. Both judgments have been final and enforceable since (at least) 13 April 2022. TQ’s claim has not yet been paid. Other players had in the past attempted to recover sums awarded to them by way of enforcement in Austria and had been successful.

Mr. Green Limited engaged Dimoco Europe GmbH, which is established in Austria, as a payment service provider with which he had a credit balance and which, as a third-party debtor, paid claims against the defendant until the beginning of February 2021. Mr. Green Limited terminated the contract with Dimoco Europe GmbH on an unspecified date before 16 February 2021 in order to prevent creditors from accessing assets.

By document of 13 February 2024, TQ applied for the adoption of a European account preservation order. In addition to an account held by Mr. Green Limited in Malta, TQ named five other accounts in Sweden, Luxembourg and Ireland. With regard to jeopardisation, he asserted that, following final and enforceable judgments, Mr. Green Limited had moved assets by terminating the contract with the Austrian third-party debtor Dimoco Europe GmbH after enforcement had been authorised in January 2021 or previously in other enforcement proceedings. There was a risk that it would take similar steps in other countries and all assets would be transferred to Malta. An Act had recently been adopted in that Member State prohibiting enforcement of Austrian judgments against gaming operators which have a Maltese licence, by reason of breach of public policy (On 12 June 2023, the Maltese Parliament adopted Act No XXI of 2023 to amend the Gaming Act. Under Article 56A of that Act, actions against gaming operators with a Maltese licence are prohibited and it is provided that the court must refuse recognition and/or enforcement in Malta of any foreign judgment and/or decision given upon such an action).

The Austrian court of first instance rejected the application for the adoption of a European account preservation order under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 on the ground that it could not be inferred from the events in 2021 that enforcement would be impeded or made substantially more difficult in 2024. No urgency was evident because the underlying instrument was from 2021 and TQ had submitted the application only three years later. Appeal has followed before the referring Austrian court.

A chamber of five judges, with N. Jääskinen reporting, will decide on the case, which will benefit from an opinion by AG N. Emiliou.

Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine was from the very beginning doomed to undergo frequent amendment.

The first text contained only 14 articles. After the last modification in February 2025 (the thirty-fifth in a row), the number has more than tripled. As an anecdote, I note that the new provisions keep the original numbering, adding (in the English version, at least) a letter to it; a new insertion related to a previous one holding a number and a letter gets another letter. It may be better than simply re-numbering, but the outcome becomes a bit confusing.

The Regulation has an obvious impact on cross-border private transactions. In 2014, it already included under Article 11 a ban on the satisfaction of specific claims, and a rule on the burden of proof in proceedings for the enforcement of said claims. The provision has experienced several changes in the form of insertions and replacements in 2022 and 2024, which did not take the form of PIL rules, although, as said, they affect cross-border relations (see, on the difficulties of interpretation, case C-802/24, Reibel, currently pending). Besides, further recent additions to the Regulation immediately after Article 11 are of direct interest from a PIL perspective.

To start with, in June 2024, Articles 11a and 11b were inserted enabling Member State nationals and companies to obtain compensation from Russian individuals and entities that caused damages to them:

  1.  as a consequence of claims lodged with courts in third countries by those Russian individuals and entities, in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected by the measures imposed under the Regulation, or
  2. by any persons, entities or bodies referred to under Article 11(1) that benefited from, or issued, a decision pursuant to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 302 of 25 April 2023 as subsequently amended, or pursuant to related or equivalent Russian legislation, provided that such decision is illegal under international customary law or under a bilateral investment treaty entered into between the relevant Member State and the Russian Federation.

[Presidential Decree No. 302 the Russian Federation established a legal framework to authorize the Government to take control of Russian assets owned or managed by investors associated with ‘unfriendly’ foreign States].

In either case, the claim for compensation is nevertheless conditional upon the lack of effective access to remedies, for example under the relevant bilateral investment treaty.

In December 2024, the 2014 Regulation was again amended. This time, a new Article 11c was inserted creating a ban on the recognition or enforcement in a Member State of any court decision pursuant to, or derived from, Article 248 of the Arbitration Procedure Code of the Russian Federation or equivalent Russian legislation. For those not familiar with Article 248 of the Arbitration Procedure Code: pursuant to it Russian courts have already issued anti-injunctions prohibiting the initiation or continuation of proceedings in foreign courts or tribunals on the part of European companies against Russian companies; the injunctions are usually coupled with disproportionately high financial penalties in cases of failure to comply. Recital 8 of the amending Regulation explains: ‘The Union considers that the manner in which Russian courts issue such anti-suit injunctions and fines is in clear violation of established international principles and long-standing practices in the resolution of international business disputes’.

The 2024 changes (which have themselves experience a few amendments afterwards) did not address international jurisdiction. In fact, until very recently, the 2014 Regulation had no rules on jurisdiction, but referred to the existing provisions of Union and Member State law regarding jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, including those concerning interim relief.

The situation is different since February 2025. According to Article 11d of Regulation 833/2014,

Where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to other provisions of Union law or of the law of a Member State, a court of a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear a claim for damages brought pursuant to Article 11a or 11b, provided that the case has a sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seised.

In other words, a forum necessitatis has been added to the already existing grounds for jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters.

Interestingly, the amending Regulation also gives guidance on the interpretation of ‘sufficient connection’, explaining in Recital 39 that the condition is met ‘for example where the claimant is domiciled in, or incorporated under the law of, that Member State.’

Moreover, it should also be noted that immediately before, Recital 38 addresses the meaning of ‘being deprived of effective access to the remedies under those domestic jurisdictions’. I indicated before that the requirement is not met, for the purposes of suing in a Member State under Articles 11a and 11 b, if the claimant has access to remedies abroad under an investment bilateral treaty. As of February 2025,

In situations where Russia or another third country takes measures to frustrate compliance with Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, Union operators can be regarded as being de facto deprived of having effective access to the remedies under those domestic jurisdictions.

I assume we will learn soon, by way of practical examples, what the actual reach of this enlargement implies – especially in combination with the forum necessitatis.

The European Parliamentary Research Service has recently released a Briefing, by Nikolina Šajn, on the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on cooperation among enforcement authorities responsible for the enforcement of Directive (EU) 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain.

Background

The proposal aims at improving farmers’ position in the agri-food supply chain, building on Directive (EU) 2019/633 on Unfair Trading Practices (UTP). In that respect, the proposed regulation lays down new rules under which the enforcement authorities of EU Member States (designated pursuant to the UTP Directive) should better cooperate and coordinate actions with each other, overcoming the principle of territoriality (Article 1 and Recital 3).

The abstract of the Briefing, titled Cross-border enforcement of the Unfair Trading Practices Directive, reads as follows:

The 2019 Unfair Trading Practices (UTP) Directive sought to address imbalances in bargaining power between suppliers and buyers of agricultural products. The directive was primarily aimed at protecting farmers, as a weaker party, selling their products to big supermarkets and food processing companies. However, experience has shown that the directive does not always provide a sufficient legal basis for mutual assistance in cross-border investigations. The Commission’s proposal for a new regulation on cross-border cooperation among authorities responsible for the enforcement of the UTP Directive is part of EU efforts to improve farmers’ position in the agri food supply chain. It would enable cooperation between enforcement authorities in cases of unfair trading practices where suppliers and buyers are in different Member States. Farmer associations have welcomed the proposal but are calling for a more substantial revision of the directive, in particular a ban on buying agricultural products below production cost. Retailers meanwhile are highly critical, saying that the proposal risks fragmenting the single market.

Private International Law Perspective

The draft regulation mainly focuses on establishing public enforcement rules and “is without prejudice to the Union and national rules on private international law, in particular rules related to court jurisdiction and applicable laws” (Article 2(2)).

However, some EU substantive rules on cross-border enforcement could have an indirect impact on conflict of laws, according to the positions of the interested parties reported in the report. Indeed, several industry representatives claim that “the proposal raises serious legal concerns for the single market as it could undermine businesses’ right to choose the law and jurisdiction applicable to their contracts” (EuroCommerce and, similarly, Independent Retail Europe).

Other stakeholders argue that the draft regulation “should help address practices such as forum shopping, ‘where some operators, particularly retail alliances, have located in certain jurisdictions to avoid the application of UTP laws’” (European Brands Association). This seems to open up avenues for exploration for PIL experts.

On 14 April 2025, the Council of the European Union approved the position of the European Parliament at first reading, illustrated in this blog, on the proposal for a directive amending Directives (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 (the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive – CSDDD) as regards the dates from which Member States are to apply certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements. The directive has thereby been formally adopted (the final text can be read here) and will be published shortly on the Official Journal of the European Union.

As result of the amendments by the stop-the-clock directive, Member States will have until 26 July 2027 to transpose the CSDDD into their national legislation.

Member States shall apply those measures: from 26 July 2028 as regards EU-based companies (over 3,000 employees and €900 million turnover), with Article 16 on communicating obligations applying from financial years starting on or after 1 January 2029; from 26 July 2028 as regards non-EU based companies (€900 million turnover), with Article 16 on communicating obligations applying from financial years starting on or after 1 January 2029; from 26 July 2029 for all other covered companies, with Article 16 on communicating obligations applying from financial years starting on or after 1 January 2030.

This prompt agreement will allow the co-legislators sufficient time to reach consensus on the substantive amendments to the CSDDD, also put forward by the Commission under the ‘Omnibus I’ sustainability package.

As reported on this blog, the European Commission published on 26 February 2025 a proposal for a directive amending Directives 2006/43, 2013/34, 2022/2464 and 2024/1760. The initiative, part of the Omnibus Simplification Package, seeks to adjust certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence obligations.

On 1 April 2025, the European Parliament invoked the urgent procedure under Article 170 of its Rules of Procedure to expedite its review of the proposal in the parts aimed at postponing the implementation of social and environmental reporting, as well as due diligence requirements.

The Parliament adopted on 3 April 2025 its position at first reading voting overwhelmingly — 531 in favour, 69 against, and 17 abstentions — to postpone the transposition deadline and the initial phase of due diligence obligations under Directive 2024/1760 (the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive – CSDDD) by one year for the largest companies.

Consequently, according to the proposal, Member States have until 26 July 2027 to transpose the directive into their national laws. This one-year extension under the proposal also extends to the first group of companies subject to the new rules: EU-based companies with more than 3,000 employees and a net turnover exceeding € 900 million, and non-EU companies generating more than € 900 million in turnover in the EU. These companies will only have to apply the rules from 2028. For the other companies within the scope of the CSDDD, instead, the rules will have to be applied starting from 2029.

This decision by the European Parliament follows the Council’s Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), which, on 26 March 2025, endorsed the Council’s negotiating position on the Commission’s proposal without amendments.

The proposal now requires formal approval by the Council of the European Union.

On 4 March 2025, Prof. Thomas Kadner-Graziano presented publicly on line the project of research and the achievements to date of the EAPIL’s Working Group on the Feasibility of a European Private International Law Act (to which I belong).

A few days earlier, the EAPIL blog had informed about an article of Prof. K. Boele-Woelki available on SSRN entitled The next step in the unification of private international law in Europe: should it be codification?, published in November last year. Further references can be found there to recent publications on the topic, such as Prof. C. González Beilfuss’s Reflexiones en torno a una eventual codificación del Derecho internacional privado europeo (Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, 2024). It can be claimed that, at least for the ‘invisible college’ of PIL scholars, the topic is recovering momentum.

The EAPIL project is the only ongoing attempt to draft a wide-ranging European Private International code (rather: act), understood as something different to a simple structured compilation of unchanged law.

Still, according to the Working Group’s name, the final goal of the project is not necessarily to produce a code (act). The key word is ‘feasibility’: the possibility that something can be made, done, or achieved, or is reasonable. In this regard, one could say that the Group follows the European Parliament resolution of 7 September 2010 on the implementation and review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. There, the Parliament encouraged the Commission ‘to review the interrelationship between the different regulations addressing jurisdiction, enforcement and applicable law’; it considered that ‘the general aim should be a legal framework which is consistently structured and easily accessible’ and that ‘for this purpose, the terminology in all subject-matters and all the concepts and requirements for similar rules in all subject-matters should be unified and harmonised (e.g. lis pendens, jurisdiction clauses, etc.).’ Eventually, it posited that ‘the final aim might be a comprehensive codification of private international law’ (italics added).

It is indeed known that no proposal for a binding EU PIL code or act, even partial or restricted, will be put forward by the Commission any time soon.

The reason does not lie with it rejecting ‘codification’ as a law-making method. Codification, as well as consolidation and simplification of legislation figure expressly in the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, of 18 July 2024. ‘Codes’ exist in other areas of EU law, such as those regulating medicinal products for human use, or the movement of persons across borders. In principle, this kind of codification appears to be related to amendments to the original legislative measure: after a number of amendments by way of new acts, the whole is assembled in a single document ‘in the interests of clarity and rationality’. The word ‘code’ is sometimes used, though, to designate the outcome of a recast of an act in need of amendment, as it happened with the Union customs code.

As things stand, coming up with a text like the one the EAPIL Working Group has in mind would prove that codification of European PIL is feasible. A second step to bring such a code or act into being would be to convince the legislator that it is not only convenient, but also needed and worth the effort and the investment. An impact analysis of non-economic and, above all, economic advantages would be required. Such analysis falls outside the remit of the EAPIL Working Group and , to the best of my knowledge, has not yet been done. Neither the study commissioned by the European Parliament ‘A European Framework for Private International Law: Current Gaps and Future Perspectives’ (2012) nor the workshop organized for the JURI committee ‘Towards a European Code on Private International Law? In -Depth Analysis for the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament’ (2014) addressed the point.

A report drawn up in 2013 by the European Added Value Unit of the Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value, aimed at quantifying the cost of not having a Code on Private International Law. However, this ‘Cost of non-Europe’ report, based on a study by Nick Bozeat, mainly identified areas directly related to the citizens’ day-to-day lives which, at the time (and today), were still unregulated at European, in order to provide an estimation of the related costs for said citizens – around €138 million a year.

Assuming numbers confirmed that a codification of EU PIL is a sound policy option, there would be other obstacles to surmount for it to become a reality. The transactions and legal relationships falling under the scope of PIL rules are not a priority focus for the second half of this decade, neither at the political level nor for the lawmaker. Concern for cross-border civil and commercial matters, particularly those related to family, fits probably better with periods of calm and stability.

In theory, the time is ripe for a legislative proposal aimed at improving the regulatory environment for said matters. To start with, after the 2015 assessment on the implementation of the 2003 Inter-institutional Agreement on better law-making, new better regulation guidelines and a new Better regulation toolbox were respectively published in 2021 and 2023. Secondly, as already hinted, the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, of 18 July 2024, proclaim the will to ‘make proposals to simplify, consolidate and codify legislation to eliminate any overlaps and contradictions while maintaining high standards’.

As a follow up, last February the Commission published its communication Simpler and Faster Europe. Communication on Implementation and Simplification. Indeed, the 2025 Commission work programme has a stronger focus on simplification than ever before. However, the Omnibus packages and the other simplification proposals listed (although non-exhaustively) in the above-mentioned Communication are meant to tackle specific priority areas, which, according to the Communication, have been identified with stakeholders over 2024.

None of them connects directly with the legal issues dealt with in the currently in force PIL regulations, or in the one(s) in the making. An indirect association is also far from evident. Only with good will, some PIL rules could be linked to the motto ‘Making business easier’ to which the quote of the Political Guidelines reproduced above corresponds.

Against this background, the task and findings of the EAPIL Working Group could be of a practical use in a different way. Code or no code, it is always legitimate to expect from the Commission, the EU Parliament and the Council that they care for consistency among the legal instruments they propose and adopt.

To this effect, formulae like (by way of example) recital 21 and Article 2, paragraph 3 of Directive 2020/1828 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, are clearly not enough. The interface between the Directive and the Brussels I bis regulation has been put to the test before the Court of Justice in case C-34/24, but the potential difficulties it generates do not stop there. In order to establish the exact terms of the relationship between both instruments it is necessary to consider as well the acts listed in Annex I to the Directive: while some of them express their intention to apply without prejudice to Regulation No 1215/2012, others indicate the opposite (see, for instance, recital 80 of Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services, and recital 147 of the GDPR).

More sophisticated solutions are viable and actually being implemented. An example is the proposed Directive to harmonise certain aspects of insolvency law. Said proposal, of 7 December 2022, aims to encourage cross border investment within the single market through targeted harmonisation of insolvency proceedings. It was published after stakeholders consultation, and is preceded by several studies, one of them (not publicly available, to the best of my knowledge) assessing abusive forum shopping practices in insolvency proceedings after Regulation (EU) 2015/848.

In principle, nothing new there. More interesting is the fact that the proposal and the impact assessment led to critical comments from the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, an independent body within the Commission that examines the quality of impact assessments, replacing the former Impact Assessment Board and being endowed with a strengthened role. The Board concluded in its first opinion on 24 June 2022 that adjustments were necessary before proceeding further with this initiative. Among other, more extensively explanations of the differences between Regulation (EU) 2015/848 and the Commission’s proposal were required.

In line with it, the Directive proposed by the Commission acknowledges the existence of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings and connects both instruments (see recital 2, Articles 20, 45, 59, 68). It is therefore admitted that even if the Regulation has no impact on the contents of national insolvency law, it is a) possible to build on it for harmonization purposes and, b) clashes with the Directive may exist. The Partial general approach of the Council, dated November 29, 2024, insists on creating bridges  between the texts, and clarifies some of the links between them (see recital 2 , Article 2, Article 36, and, in particular, recutal 58 and Article 68).

Regulation (EU) 2015/848 is not the only EU legal act which the proposed Directive takes into account. The final product and how the ‘dialogue’ among instruments will fare in practice remain to be seen. In any case, the law-making process shows already a refined and cautious attitude in that it accords relevant weight to systemic coherence.

It is in this context that I see the added value of  a project such as the EAPIL one on the feasibility of a European PIL Act. Whatever its final conclusion (that is to say, even if it ends up denying the feasibility of the Act as such), it will map the areas where systemic coherence is more needed, indicate whether achieving it is or not possible, and if yes, how. Because of the wide material reach of the project and the thorougness of the research, it will fill an existing gap. It can thus provide precious support to the European lawmaker both in the drafting of new limited-in-scope PIL rules, and in producing an all-inclusive recast of the current ones, if and when, in his view, the time comes.

The European Commission has published on 26 February 2026 a proposal for a directive amending Directives 2006/43, 2013/34, 2022/2464 and 2024/1760 concerning certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements, as part of its Omnibus Simplification Package.

The explanatory memorandum highlights that business associations have raised concerns about the regulatory burden resulting, inter alia, from due diligence obligations under Directive 2024/1760 (the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive or CSDDD), especially for companies operating within large and complex value chains. Similar concerns, the memorandum notes, have been voiced by SMEs, as they could face unintended trickle-down effects.

Concerns have also been raised regarding potential increases in liability risks. Although the CSDDD includes proportionality mechanisms aimed at ensuring that companies in scope benefit from reputational and resilience advantages through sustainable value-chain management, the Commission has addressed these concerns. The proposal aims to clarify and simplify the existing framework, reducing compliance costs — both one-off and recurring — and making the directive more business-friendly in the short term.

Key Amendments

Article 4 of the proposed directive contemplates several amendments. These involve expanding the scope of maximum harmonization, making due diligence primarily focused on direct business partners as a general rule and removing the obligation to terminate business relationships as a last resort.

The definition of ‘stakeholder’ is narrowed and the due diligence stages requiring stakeholder engagement are further limited.

The proposal also increases the intervals at which companies must assess the adequacy and effectiveness of their due diligence measures.

Additionally, the Commission proposes to clarify the principles governing pecuniary penalties, remove the ‘minimum cap’ for fines, eliminate certain provisions of the civil liability clause and rules on representative actions, modify the provisions related to implementing climate transition plans, delete the review clause concerning financial services and accelerate the adoption of the first set of general implementing guidelines by the Commission.

Civil Liability

Article 4(12) of the proposal aims to amend Article 29 of the CSDDD in relation to civil liability by deleting paragraph (1), which currently states that a company can be held liable for damage to a natural or legal person if it intentionally or negligently fails to comply with the obligations in Articles 10 and 11 (i.e., obligations to prevent potential adverse impacts and address actual ones), leading to harm to the person’s legal interests protected under national law, where the right, prohibition or obligation in the Annex is designed to protect them.

The Commission Staff Working document accompanying the proposal underscores that the harmonized liability framework under Article 29(1) CSDDD was originally established in response to legal actions taken against companies under national laws for failing to mitigate human rights and environmental violations in their value chains. While the CSDDD introduced constraints on liability— such as the necessity of proving fault and excluding responsibility for harm solely caused by business partners — the proposed removal of this EU-wide framework seeks to defer the regulation of liability conditions, including causality and fault, to national laws.

This shift may lower liability risks for companies operating in Member States with more restrictive regimes than Article 29(1) but could simultaneously heighten risks in jurisdictions with more claimant-favorable provisions, such as strict liability without a fault requirement.

Furthermore, the proposed new legislation amends Article 29 by removing paragraph (3), point (d), which require that Member States ensure conditions for allowing trade unions, NGOs and national human rights institutions to bring actions on behalf of an alleged injured party, in accordance with national civil procedure rules.

The access to justice provision has been designed to ensure that victims, especially those in disadvantaged positions (e.g., distant, facing complex legal issues, lacking expertise), can effectively access justice. The aforementioned document accompanying the proposal highlights that removing this obligation may lessen companies’ exposure to collective claims, reducing litigation risks. However, it could also lead to a more fragmented legal landscape, with individual victims filing separate lawsuits rather than pursuing claims collectively.

The proposal further envisages the deletion of Article 29(7), under which Member States must ensure that the provisions of national law transposing this Article are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the national law of a Member State. However, the Commission Staff Working document notes that this deletion does not prevent Member States from independently deciding to impose mandatory application at the national level.

Finally, Article 4(12) contemplates modifying Article 29(2), (4) and (5). Paragraph (2) stipulates that when a company is held liable under national law for damage caused to a natural or legal person due to non-compliance with the due diligence requirements, Member States must ensure that these persons are entitled to full compensation. Safeguards are introduced to prevent over-compensation, such as prohibiting punitive, multiple or other excessive damages. Then, the revision of paragraph (4) establishes that companies involved in industry or multi-stakeholder initiatives, or that have used independent third-party verification or contractual clauses to support due diligence obligations, can still be held liable under national law. Lastly, the modification of paragraph (5) clarifies that the civil liability of a company for damages as referred to in this Article shall be without prejudice to the civil liability of its subsidiaries or of any direct and indirect business partners in the chain of activities of the company.

German law shall be applied to a non-contractual obligations arising out of wrongful components in ship engines built in Germany, the Norwegian Supreme Court held in a  judgment rendered on 17 December 2024. Regardless of the fact that the Rome II Regulation is not binding for Norway and that it was not applicable in the EU at the time of the harmful event, the Norwegian Supreme Court paralleled its conclusions on analogous interpretations of the Regulation.

Background

In 2000, a Norwegian shipping company ordered six ships from a Chinese shipyard. In the contract with the Chinese shipyard, it was stated that the Norwegian shipping company had a right to choose what components that should be used. The Norwegian shipping company ordered the Chinese shipyard to use MAN engines. A contract for the delivery of the engines were entered into between MAN and the Chinese shipyard. Before the ships were delivered to Norway, the engines underwent testing at MAN’s factory in Germany. However, several years after the engines were delivered, it was discovered that these factory tests had been manipulated by MAN to show lower emission levels.

In 2012, MAN informed the Norwegian shipping company that the actual emission levels could be higher than originally promised. By this time, a criminal investigation had already been initiated against MAN in Germany. In a 2013 German court ruling, MAN was ordered to pay an administrative fine of 8.2 million Euros. Due to statutes of limitation under German law, the judgment only addressed events that had occurred after 2006.

In 2015, the Norwegian shipping company filed legal proceedings against MAN and its Norwegian subsidiary in the Oslo District Court. MAN lost the case in both the district court and the court of appeal. While both instances applied Norwegian law, they did so on different grounds. The district court found that the parties had agreed to apply Norwegian law, while the court of appeal reached the same conclusion by applying uncodified general conflict of law rules.

MAN appealed the decision to the Norwegian Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case, focusing on the conflict of laws issue.

The Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Supreme Court began by observing that there was no agreement between the parties on the application of Norwegian law. It then turned to the issue whether the claim ought to be characterised as contractual or non-contractual. MAN had claimed that the plaint concerned precontractual liability and that the conflict of laws rules for contracts therefore should be applied. The argument was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the matter did not relate to any contractual obligations as the Norwegian shipping company had not been a party to the contract for deliverance of the engines or to the contract for the construction of the ships.

Having concluded that the matter was non-contractual, the Supreme Court continued to seek to establish the applicable conflict of law rule. This was not an easy exercise under Norwegian private international law, as most conflict of law rules are uncodified and rather result from precedents and principles.

In the last decades, the Norwegian Supreme Court repeatedly held that the interest of keeping track with the conflict of law rules in the EU motivates a general presumption to take the choice of law solutions in the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations into consideration. A problem in the issue at stake was that the harmful event occurred long before the Rome II Regulation was applicable or even drafted. Hence, the Norwegian Supreme Court made an analysis of what conflict of law rules that were applicable in Norway in the early 2000s.

What Conflict of Laws Rules Were to Be Applied?

Recognizing that the main principle under the Rome II Regulation is that the law of the place where the damage occurs shall be applied (lex loci damni), the Supreme Court noted that older Norwegian case law rather relied on a centre of gravity test to determine the law applicable in non-contractual matters. Under the old Norwegian centre of gravity test, the place of damage was an important factor.

How the place of damage was to be determined in “distance delicts” (where the harmful event and the damage occurs in different states) was unsettled in old Norwegian case law. However, with reference to old Norwegian legal literature, the Supreme Court held that it was the place where the damage occurred that was decisive in such matters.

Noting that the place where the damage occurs is the main rule of the Rome II Regulation, the Supreme Court went on to remark that that rule in EU private international law makes a difference between direct and indirect damages. That issue had not been adjudicated in a choice of law context in Norwegian case law. Norway is however part to the 2007 Lugano Convention. In case law dealing with jurisdiction, the Norwegian Supreme Court had recognized the EU private international law difference between direct and indirect damages. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that, in similarity with contemporary EU law, also the place where the direct damage occurred was decisive to determine the law applicable in old Norwegian private international law.

Are German Rules on Limitation Compatible with Norwegian Public Policy?

Applying that conflict of law rule to the facts in the case, the Norwegian Supreme Court held that the direct damage took place in Germany as the urged damages were damages that had been inflicted to foreign companies after events fully taken place abroad. In such a situation the court held that it would be unpredictable to let Norwegian law apply only on the ground that a decision had been taken in Norway.

Having concluded that Norwegian choice of law rules pointed out German law as applicable, the Supreme Court continued to assess whether German rules on limitation was compatible with Norwegian public policy. According to German law, the matter was already precluded. Under Norwegian law it was not. The Norwegian Court concluded in this part that it was clear that the German limitation rules were shorter but held that it cannot be in conflict with “Norwegian sense of justice”. Consequently, German law was to be applied.

Comment

The judgment makes it clear that the Norwegian Supreme Court takes EU private international law seriously. By aligning its reasoning with the Rome II Regulation, the Supreme Court indeed affirmed its commitment to European harmonization of conflict of law rules. Such an approach is valuable from a predictability point of view and strengthens legal coherence.

However, a notable omission in the judgment is the lack of discussion on Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation. In this Article, the Rome II Regulation lays down lex specialis conflict of law rules for non-contractual product liability obligations. To me, it would have made sense to at least discuss those rules as the facts concerned some sort of product liability.

On 16 January 2025 the European e-Justice Strategy 2024–2028 has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union. It provides a framework designed to enhance the digitalization of justice systems across the EU and is a continuation of the Union’s ongoing efforts to modernize judicial systems.

Context

The Strategy builds on several EU legislative instruments. Among these, Regulation (EU) 2022/850 on the e-CODEX system, which establishes a computerized framework for the secure cross-border exchange of judicial data. This system enables judicial authorities to communicate through secure services, streamlining judicial cooperation. For more details on Regulation (EU) 2022/850, see the earlier posts by Elena Alina Ontanu and Marta Requejo Isidro on this blog, available here and here. Complementing this, the Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 on service of documents and Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 on taking of evidence require the use of interoperable IT systems based on e-CODEX for digital communication in civil and commercial matters starting in May 2025.

The ‘Digitalisation Package’, comprising Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 and Directive (EU) 2023/2843 on the digitalization of cross-border judicial cooperation and access to justice, is central to the EU’s e-Justice initiatives.

These instruments enable natural and legal persons and their representatives to communicate electronically via a European electronic access point. They also allow authorities to securely exchange data in civil and commercial matters with cross-border implications. Implementation of these instruments will require the establishment of national access points and compliance with electronic communication principles. Further insights into Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 are found in Marion Ho-Dac’s post on this blog.

Non-legislative initiatives, such as the consolidation of the e-CODEX system under eu-LISA management, support these legislative measures. Member States play a critical role in connecting to e-CODEX and enabling interaction between authorities, legal professionals and individuals through secure digital channels.

The shift to mandatory compliance with digitalization initiatives highlights the EU’s dedication to legal certainty and operational efficiency in justice systems.

Guiding Principles, Operational Goals, Follow-up Mechanisms

The Strategy is founded on principles that prioritize respect for fundamental rights, access to justice, people centricity, bridging the digital divide, digital empowerment of users and sustainability. Operationally, the Strategy promotes efficiency through principles like the once-only, digital by default approach, interoperability and cybersecurity, dynamic justice, data-driven justice and open source.

The strategic and operational objectives of the e-Justice Strategy’s are then referred to and briefly described. Its overarching goal is to facilitate the right to effective judicial protection, focusing on four key strategic objectives: improving access to digital justice, strengthening judicial cooperation, increasing efficiency and fostering innovation.

To improve access, the Strategy emphasizes inclusivity, ensuring digital justice is accessible to all, with tools like the e-Justice Portal and tailored training for users and professionals. Efforts will focus on bridging the digital divide and enhancing the functionality of online platforms to deliver added value.

In terms of cooperation, the strategy prioritizes interoperability between Member States’ systems, supported by the implementation of the ‘Digitalisation Package’. Real-time tools, such as video conferencing and AI-driven interpretation, will further streamline cross-border judicial processes.

Efficiency is another critical focus, with data-oriented approaches driving transparency and innovation. Technologies like automated case allocation and online dispute resolution will optimize resources, while selective digitization of face-to-face processes ensures flexibility.

Finally, the Strategy promotes innovation by integrating new technologies and promoting the exchange of experiences and best practices across Member States. This approach aims to enhance the justice system’s functionality while safeguarding fundamental rights.

The Strategy’s action plan is outlined. The e-Justice domain focuses on several key working areas: e-CODEX, e-Justice Portal, electronic access points, real time (RT) applications, law data and case law, AI and other innovative IT services in the justice domain and, finally, other working areas.

The strategic objectives are further broken down into operational objectives, for which specific actions to be taken and the actors involved are identified.

A follow-up mechanism ensures effective implementation through annual monitoring reports, stakeholder consultations and a mid-term review in 2026 to adjust the Strategy as needed.

The European Commission published on 31 January 2025 its long-awaited report (COM(2025) 20 final) on the application of Regulation No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).

The report is based on Article 30 of the Regulation. The latter provision required the Commission to submit to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee a report focusing, among other issues, on “the effects of the way in which foreign law is treated in the different jurisdictions and on the extent to which courts in the Member States apply foreign law in practice pursuant to this Regulation”, and on the effects of Article 28 (on the relationship of the Regulation with international conventions in force for individual Member States) “with respect to the Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the law applicable to traffic accidents”. The Commission was equally expected to report on the “situation in the field of the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality”.

Soon after the Regulation entered into force, three specific studies were carried out for this purpose, namely on road traffic accidents (2009), on privacy and rights relating to personality (2009) and on the application of foreign law (2011). Additional information concerning the practical experience with Rome II came, in particular, from an external study carried out in 2021 under the scientific coordination of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.

The published report, which builds on these and other sources, consists of a general overview of the operation of the Regulation, followed by a focus on a specific areas, such as: (1) privacy, rights relating to personality, including defamation and SLAPP; (2) artificial intelligence; (3) financial market torts and prospectus liability; and (4) collective redress and cases involving multiple parties.

The Commission’s overall conclusion is that the Regulation “generally works well and is fit for purpose”. However, “several issues” exist that “merit further in-depth analysis with a view to assessing whether targeted legislative adjustments of Rome II are desirable and what options may exist to efficiently address them”, notably as concerns: (a) the current exclusion from the scope of the Regulation for privacy and personality rights, including defamation; (b) the application of the Regulation “in cases where the damage occurs simultaneously in many jurisdictions, leading to a possible application of multiple national laws”, such as cases of collective redress and torts committed online, including infringements of IP rights online, especially of copyright; and (c) torts causing purely economic losses, including financial market torts and prospectus liability.

With a view to assessing whether legislative change is needed, the Commission plans to “carry out further analysis in order to consider and potentially prepare a proposal to amend or recast the Regulation in accordance with the Better Regulation rules”, noting that “further analysis can also be carried out to assess the merits of other conceivable modifications or, in areas where the existing rules are fully appropriate, possible textual clarifications to facilitate their application”.

The report is accompanied by a Commission Staff Working Document (SWD(2025) 9 final). The latter provides, in particular, a more detailed analysis of the practical experience of the Regulation, chapter by chapter, a summary of the studies conducted for the purposes of the report, and a table summarizing the findings of the rulings of the Court of Justice concerning (or mentioning) the Regulation.

On 1 January 2025, Poland assumed the presidency of the Council of the European Union, marking the start of a new trio of presidencies that also involves Denmark and Cyprus.

The Polish presidency’s programme for the semester ending on 30 June deals with a broad range of topics, including judicial cooperation in civil matters.

In this area, the Polish presidency will “aim at strengthening the legal protection of European Union citizens in cross-border situations”. It plan to do so by making “substantial progress on the draft Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of measures and cooperation in matters relating to the protection of adults“, while continuing “work on the draft Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood and on the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood”.

To remove “barriers to the competitiveness of the EU economy, which at the same time hinder citizens from exercising fundamental freedoms, such as the free movement of capital and freedom of establishment, and put their legally protected interests at risk”, the Polish presidency intends to “further focus on the draft Directive harmonizing
certain aspects of insolvency law“. The presidency will also be “ready to continue work on a draft Directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence“, and support “cooperation of Member States in the digitalisation of justice, particularly in key areas arising from the European e-Justice Strategy 2024-2028”.

The programme includes a more general statement on the importance of “political guidance for future European
Union action in the field of justice”, and indicates that the Polish Presidency aims to “take an active role in this discussion, taking into account the positions of all stakeholders”. No indications are provided in the text as to the directions that future developments may take, or as regards any possible area of intervention.

On 7 November 2024 the Court of Justice handed down its judgement in Hantoch case (C‑291/23) in which it interpreted jurisdictional rules of Article 10 of the Succession Regulation. The preliminary question originated from Germany, from Landgericht Düsseldorf.

Background of the Case and the Doubt of the Referring Court

The deceased lived and worked for many years in Germany. Since the retirement the deceased resided principally in Egypt. As he was entitled to a German retirement pension he maintained a German bank account solely for the purpose of transferring the payments from his pension scheme to the bank account in Egypt, by way of a standing order. On the date of his death in Egypt, in  2017, he had both German and Egyptian nationality. LS and PL are descendants of the deceased, whereas PL is the sole testamentary heir. LS brought an action before the referring court, requesting certain information from PL and claiming a right to a reserved share. In LS view the court has jurisdiction as at the time of death of the deceased, he did held assets in Germany consisting of, inter alia, a sum in the bank account.

As the deceased was found to be habitually resident in Egypt at the time of death and held German nationality, the referring court contemplated establishing its jurisdiction based on Article 10(1)(a) of the Succession Regulation. The referring court noticed that legal literature is divided as to the point in time, at which assets should be present in the Member State of the forum. The solution to this doubt is crucial in the case at hand, as ‘at the time of death’ of the deceased there was a credit balance in his bank account, but the account had already been closed at the time the proceedings were initiated. Hence, the referring court turned to the Court of Justice.

Judgment of the Court of Justice

The Court of Justice answered in a straightforward way that in order to establish subsidiary jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State based on Article 10 ‘it is necessary to examine whether those assets were located in that Member State not at the time those courts were seised, but rather at the time of death.’

Comments on the Jurisdictional Rules of the Succession Regulation and the Judgment

Succession Regulation, as opposed to the Brussels I bis or Brussels II ter Regulations, does not provide for residual jurisdiction of the court of the Member States, which might be derived from domestic laws of the Member States. The jurisdictional rules of the Succession Regulation are of exclusive nature, as long as the given succession proceedings falls within the material (Article 1), temporal (Article 83(1)) and territorial scope of the Succession Regulation (Recitals 82, 83); and no international agreement concluded by a given Member State with a third state comes into play (see with that respect: OP case, C-21/22, commented on this blog here).

The jurisdictional rules of the Succession Regulation are built on two pillars: Article 4 and Article 10 (and supplemented by mechanisms, regulated in Articles 5-9, allowing for ‘transfers’ of jurisdiction from one Member State to another, solely in case the deceased has chosen his/her national law as applicable pursuant to Article 22 of the Succession Regulation). Already in VA, ZA v. TP case (C-645/20, commented on this blog here). Court of Justice underlined that there is no hierarchical relationship between Article 4 and Article 10 Succession Regulation, even though the latter is referred to as ‘subsidiary jurisdiction’. As nicely put in the opinion of the AG Sànchez-Bardona to the above case: ‘each caters for a different factual situation: either the deceased was last habitually resident in a Member State of the European Union (the assumption informing Article 4) or he or she wasn’t (the assumption informing Article 10)’.

In its order in Jurtukała case (C‑55/23), the Court of Justice had to explain that Article 10 comes into play only in scenarios, where the deceased at the time of death was habitually resident in a third state. In its judgment in VA, ZA v TP. the Court of Justice reminded that a Member State, which do not apply the Succession Regulation (now Denmark and Ireland; and the UK before its withdrawal from the EU) is not ‘a Member State’ within the meaning of the Regulation, but consequently a third state.

So, if the deceased at the time of death was habitually resident in a third state (including in Denmark or Ireland), the jurisdiction of an EU Member State might be derived from the location of assets of the estate and nationality of the deceased (Article 10(1)(a)) or ‘previous’ habitual residence of the deceased (Article 10(1)(b)); or location of assets only (Article 10(2)). Depending on the strength of the connection with a Member State – including both assets and personal connection of nationality or previous habitual residence; or assets only – the extent of jurisdiction is different. In the former case it extends to ‘the succession as a whole’, meaning all assets of the estate irrespctive their location, including assets located outside of the EU, or in the latter case covers only the assets located in the Member State of the forum.

 In Hantoch case the Court of Justice had to look closer on the requirement of the presence of assets within the territory of the Member State of the forum, and more precisely the point in time, where the assets have to be present in order to trigger the existence of jurisdiction in succession matters. The Court of Justice rightly underlined that the Succession Regulation generally refers to ‘the time of death’ for the purposes of assessing whether the criteria for establishing general jurisdiction or subsidiary jurisdiction are met (para. 21). In view of the Court of Justice, this interpretation is supported by the objectives of the Succession Regulation, which is ensuring that citizens are able to organise their succession in advance, which requires legal certainty and predictability for all interested parties: heirs, legatees or creditors. This certainty and predictability would be jeopardised if jurisdiction could be dependand on circumstances arising after the death of the deceased (paras 24-25). This argument is very convincing.

Another interesting aspect revealed by the case but not specifically discussed in the preliminary question and the judgment, is how substantial these assets located on the territory of a Member State should be in order to justify the jurisdiction based on Article 10 of the Succession Regulation. It seems that when it comes to bank account held in the bank in a Member State, even small amount should justify the existence of the jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State. When coupled with nationality or ‘previous’ habitual residence, these immaterial assets give quite a power to the court of the Member State to rule on the ‘succession as a whole’. Would this be also the case if the assets consisted of a suitcase in a hotel where the deceased unexpectedly died during a business trip?

Regulation 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence, commonly known as the EU AI Act, has entered into force on 1 August 2024 and will progressively be applicable to several (private and public) organisations within transnational AI value chains connected to the EU internal market.

This Regulation is remarkable for two main reasons. First, it has a horizontal dimension covering in principle (all) hazardous AI systems and models. Second, it is of a binding legal nature going beyond classical AI  ethical principles such as those developed by UNESCO, the OECD or the HLEG on AI.

As the AI Act is based on the New Legislative Framework (NLF) established for EU product safety policy, readers of the blog may wonder how it could have any private international law (PIL) aspect or even any impact on the field. Here are some first answers.

The AI Act in a Nutshell
Main Regulatory Blocks

The AI Act lays down three main regulatory blocks (see in details here). First, it provides for harmonised rules concerning the placing on the market, putting into service and use of AI systems in the Union. It includes, at a higher level of granularity, provisions prohibiting certain AI practices (such as social scoring or crime prediction under certain conditions) as well as specific requirements for high-risk systems and AI models. The second block consists of a dense public enforcement scheme covering, on the one hand, market surveillance rules to be implemented by national authorities. On the other hand, these rules are reinforced by a federal/EU-level governance framework – inspired by other regulatory instruments of the digital single market – and embodied by the AI Office. The third set of rules provides for measures to promote innovation, notably in the form of regulatory sandboxes, support measures and regulatory exemptions for SMEs and start-ups.

Conformity Regimes for AI Systems and Models

Under the AI Act, an AI system is “a machine-based system”, autonomous and adaptive, “[inferring] from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments” (AI Act, Article 3 point 1). Based on this broad definition, the Act provides for a taxonomy of AI systems and models, anchored in the “risk-based approach”. The more the AI system or model presents potential risks to the health, safety or fundamental rights of citizens, the more stringent the legislative requirements are.

The main regulated category in the Act is high-risk AI systems. It includes systems in the field of biometrics, critical infrastructure, law enforcement, education and employment, essential services, migration and the administration of justice. The regulation provides for numerous requirements relating to the safety and trustworthiness of AI (e.g. provisions on risk management, data governance, transparency, human oversight, etc.). These requirements and complemented obligations are mainly intended for AI providers (who develop and market the systems in the EU) and deployers (who use these systems in the course of their professional activity in the EU).

A lighter regulatory regime is established for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models presenting systematic risk – such as the Large Language Model GPT-4 used by the famous chatbot Chat-GPT –. It is surprising that GPAI models with high-impact capabilities fall under a less restrictive regulatory framework (than high risk AI systems), although they are expected to have “a significant impact on the Union market […] due to actual or reasonably foreseeable negative effects on […] fundamental rights, or the society as a whole” (AI Act, Article 3 point 65). They are already used for instance – once integrated into AI systems – in the judicial domain, notably for the development of legal tech services for lawyers, of robot-judges or, at least, as a tool to support court proceedings (as recently illustrated in a Dutch decision).

Private International Law Issues

Despite the absence of reference to PIL rules or instruments in the AI Act, including to regulate the interplay between the Act and EU regulations on PIL, there are some important points of contact between the two fields. They may be identified both at the implementation and enforcement stages of the AI Act’s regulatory framework.

PIL Issues in the AI Act Implementation
A. The Global Reach of the AI Act

First, the AI Act has a broad geographical scope of application. It replicates the broad understanding and legal treatment of transnational supply chains for products followed by EU law on product safety. Since the vast majority of the AI industry is established outside the Union, the AI Act must ensure a cross-border level playing field among all AI players and the protection of EU values including the safeguard of fundamental rights for European citizens. Article 2, 1 of the AI Act provides for the geographical delineation of the regulatory framework and consists of a rule of applicability, in the same vein as Article 2, 1 of the DSA or Article 3 of the GDPR. Organisations are subject to the EU regulation even when they are established outside the Union, as soon as the AI system has an impact on individuals in the Union. More precisely, even when both the provider and the deployer of an AI system are established in a third country, but “the output produced by the AI system is used in the Union”, the regulation is applicable. The difficulties here will be the predictability as well as the practicability of this broad delimitation, especially for providers. The latter should anticipate the jurisdictions – here the EU – in which their AI systems may be deployed but also in which the outputs of the system’s deployment may be used.

From a PIL perspective, this provision of the AI Act is a strong expression of EU unilateralism. The Union intends to impose its regulatory leadership in the field of AI technologies internationally to ensure the protection of its citizens. It gives the AI Act an international mandatory nature and this could have further conflict of laws implication at the Act’s enforcement stage.

B. AI Systems in the Field of (Cross-Border) Justice and Dispute Resolution

Second, among the various AI systems covered by the AI Act, those used in the administration of justice are considered high-risk. One specific use-case deals with AI assisting a judicial authority in different tasks: researching and interpretating facts and the law; and applying the law to a concrete set of facts. This applies to the Judiciary and the “judicial function” (i.e. juris dictio stage), beyond mere PIL issues. However, two aspects concerning PIL in particular can be highlighted.

On the one hand, the (above-mentioned) functions of judicial assistance particularly reflect PIL reasoning which, by its very nature, encompasses the entire dispute resolution process through an international focal point (i.e. determination of the competent jurisdiction, of the applicable law and of the foreign law’s content). It is good news that AI systems that may be used in the future to resolve PIL issues by courts are qualified as high-risk. PIL is a complex field of law indeed!

On the other hand, the said use-case is extended to arbitration, which therefore includes international arbitration. The use of AI has developed considerably in the context of alternative dispute resolution. Those involved in the ecosystem of international commercial or investment arbitration therefore need to be extremely cautious. The AI Act applied both to the provider and the deployer – it means, for the latter, the arbitrator – of an AI system.

PIL Issues in the AI Act Enforcement

During the legislative process, the draft AI Act was severely criticized by civil society representatives for not establishing a private enforcement scheme (see here and here). Given the serious risks to fundamental rights posed by AI, how can affected citizens obtain compensation in case of harm? This question obviously concerns PIL rules since the AI systems used in the EU are marketed, for the most part, by non-European operators. In addition, numerous AI systems are digital in nature and used via a computer interface. Thus, here again, the legal relationships will often be of international nature.

The AI Act at least provides for a complaint mechanism, including for individuals, before the market supervisory authority concerned in the event of a breach of the provisions of the Regulation. Moreover, in case of deployment of automated or support decision-making systems, qualified high risk, end-users have a right of information and a right to explanation of the role of the AI system in the decision-making procedure. However, there is no legal basis for plaintiffs to access to the courts. Plus, these international substantive rules may require the support of private international law to clarify their implementation in a particular EU member State. In parallel to the AI Act, EU law has developed a specific framework for civil liability for defective products, recently modernised and a proposal for a directive introducing a special liability regime for AI is under discussion in the European legislative arena. However, private international law aspects are not directly considered by these texts.

In this highly complex and dense context, legal practitioners will have to learn thinking in terms of cross-border civil justice in the AI ecosystem. The latter is not necessarily equivalent to the more general digital ecosystem, as AI is a multifaceted technology.

On 5 July 2024, Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859 (Text with EEA relevance) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Pursuant to Article 38 of the Directive, it will enter into force on 25 July 2024.

Member States shall adopt and publish, by 26 July 2026, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive.

They shall apply those measures:

(a) from 26 July 2027 as regards companies formed in accordance with the legislation of the Member State and that had more than 5 000 employees on average and generated a net worldwide turnover of more than EUR 1 500 000 000 in the last financial year preceding 26 July 2027;

(b) from 26 July 2028 as regards companies formed in accordance with the legislation of the Member State and that had more than 3 000 employees on average and generated a net worldwide turnover of more than EUR 900 000 000 in the last financial year preceding 26 July 2028;

(c) from 26 July 2027 as regards companies formed in accordance with the legislation of a third country and that generated a net turnover of more than EUR 1 500 000 000 in the Union, in the financial year preceding the last financial year preceding 26 July 2027;

(d) from 26 July 2028 as regards companies formed in accordance with the legislation of a third country and that generated a net turnover of more than EUR 900 000 000 in the Union, in the financial year preceding the last financial year preceding 26 July 2028;

(e) from 26 July 2029 as regards all other companies referred to in the Directive.

The last seminar in the series organised by Marie-Elodie Ancel (University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas) and Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) and hosted by the Cour de cassation on the recast of the Brussels I bis Regulation was held on 24 June 2024.

The general topic of the seminar was recognition and enforcement of judgments. Speakers included Fabien Marchadier, Christelle Chalas, Claudia Cavicchioli and Jean Sébastien Quéguiner.

The video of the full seminar is freely available on the website of the Cour de cassation and below.

Norway is not bound by the EU choice of law regulations. Still, Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation applies fully in Norway and the Rome II Regulation governs what law that applies in any non-contractual matter between an insurance company and a person claiming compensation after a traffic accident. This was the view expressed by the Norwegian Supreme Court in a judgment on 21 June 2024, concluding that Danish law should be applied in a non-contractual matter between a Danish plaintiff and a Danish defendant insurance company regarding damages that occurred in Norway.

Background

A crane truck driver was severely injured when the vehicle he drove overturned during the construction of a wind turbine park in Norway. The crane truck driver was a Danish citizen, habitually residing in Denmark and employed by a Danish company that was contracted to build the windmill park. The crane truck was registered in Denmark, owned by the employer company and insured through a Danish insurance company.

As a result of the accident, the crane truck driver was on sick leave for about eight months. He received compensation in accordance with Danish occupational injury rules, but that compensation did not cover his entire loss. Therefore, he made a claim for payment against the Danish insurance company in a Norwegian court. According to the insurance certificate, it did not cover compensation to the driver of the vehicle in case of an accident. Such an exclusion is allowed under Danish law, but not under Norwegian law. Consequently, a decisive aspect of the claim was whether Danish or Norwegian law should be applied.

The courts of first and second instance both held that Norwegian law should be applicable. The defendant Danish insurance company appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the courts of lower instances had characterized the issue incorrectly. In the judgment of the court of appeal, the Norwegian Act on Choice of Law in Insurance (Lov om lovvalg i forsikring) was applied when concluding that Norwegian law was applicable. The insurance company argued that the choice of law rule applied was applicable to contractual matters only and that the case at hand was a non-contractual matter, to which Norway should apply the choice of law rules in the Rome II Regulation (864/2007).

Judgment

First, the Norwegian Supreme Court held that the application of the substantive claim made by the plaintiff under the Norwegian Act Relating to Compensation for Injury Caused by a Motor Vehicle (Lov om ansvar for skade som motorvogner gjer) was subject to private international law choice of law rules for matters with international connecting factors.

Thereafter, the Supreme Court assessed what choice of law rules should be applied to the matter. In line with the defendant insurance company’s argumentation, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act on Choice of Law in Insurance applies to contractual matters only. Here, the court noted that that act was enacted to implement Norway’s obligations under the EEC treaty. The EEC rules that the Norwegian choice of law act implemented correspond to those in the contemporary Solvency II Directive (2009/138). Article 178 in this directive states that the choice of law rules in Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) shall apply. The Supreme Court concluded that this means that Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation applies in Norway, even though Norway is not bound by the rest of that regulation.

Having established that Norway is bound by Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation, the Supreme Court turned to the issue of whether the matter at hand was contractual. To draw the line between contractual and non-contractual obligations stemming from traffic accidents, the Norwegian Supreme Court referred to paragraph 48 of the CJEU’s judgment ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic, C-359/14 and C-475-14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:40. Here, the CJEU expressed that whether or not there is an obligation to compensate someone must be determined by the law applicable to the tort, not the law applicable to the insurance contract. The Supreme Court also held that the possibility to make direct claims against the insurer of the person liable under Article 18 of the Rome II Regulation is based on the logic that non-contractual obligations can exist in an insurance relation. Holding that the choice of law rules for non-contractual matters apply in determining the liability to pay compensation and that the contractual obligations determine the insurance compensation, the Supreme Court concluded that the matter at hand was non-contractual. Hence, the Norwegian choice of law rules implementing Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation were not applicable.

Where there are no explicit Norwegian choice of law rules, Norwegian private international law generally relies on EU private international law rules. Holding that this principle applied also in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the choice of law rules of the Rome II Regulation should apply. Even if the general rule in Article 4 p. 1 of the Rome II Regulation states that the law in the state where the damage occurs shall apply, Article 4 p. 2 gives precedence to the law of the common habitual residence of the parties. As both the plaintiff and the defendant were habitually residing in Denmark, the Norwegian Supreme Court held that Danish law should apply.

Comment

A rationale for the Norwegian shadow application of EU choice of law rules is the striving for uniform choice of law rules. Adherence to this purpose is certainly desirable, especially as Norwegian judgments enjoy free circulation in the legal community that applies either the Brussels I bis Regulation (1215/2012) or the Lugano Convention.

As regards the law applicable to traffic accidents, the uniformity created by the Rome II Regulation is less obvious. In fact, the EU member states are split on what choice of law rules should apply. Instead of applying the Rome II Regulation, around half of the EU member states (13 of 27) apply the 1971 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents.

Although the default choice of law rule in Article 3 of the 1971 Hague Convention relies on applying the law of the state where the accident occurred (lex loci delicti), instead of the law of the state where the damage occurred (lex loci damni), as set out in Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation, this generally has little effect in the case of traffic accidents. Damage from a traffic accident will usually occur at the same place as the accident (especially as indirect damages are not recognized in this regard in the Rome II Regulation). In other words, the basic rules of the 1971 Hague Convention and the Rome II Regulation will result in application of the same law.

However, the exceptions to the general rules of the 1971 Hague Convention and the Rome II Regulation differ. Whereas the exceptional rule in Article 4 p. 2 of the Rome II Regulation, which the Norwegian Supreme Court applied, states that it is the common habitual residence of the parties that is relevant, the 1971 Hague Convention has several exceptions that rely on the application of the law in the state where the vehicle involved was registered. In the Norwegian Supreme Court case, the vehicle involved was registered in Denmark. It is therefore likely that the choice-of-law rules of the 1971 Hague Convention would also lead to the application of Danish law. Still, the uniformity between the two instruments in this case is sheer coincidence. It could just as well have been that the vehicle driven was registered in Norway or that the injured person and the insurance company habitually resided in different states.

In my opinion, it is quite unsatisfactory that there is no EU consensus for the application of the choice of law rules to such a common type of torts as traffic accidents. This creates incentives for forum shopping for those who have been injured in traffic accidents. When doing a forum shopping analysis, potential parties will now know that Norway is part of the Rome II team instead of the 1971 Hague team.

This post was prepared by Tess Bens from University of Vienna.


Burkhard Hess and his team at the University of Vienna have finalised an updated version of the Position Paper on the Reform on the Brussels Ibis Regulation of the association.

Establishment of the EAPIL Working Group

The Brussels Ibis Reform project leading up the Academic Position Paper commenced with the formation of a Working Group within the European Association for Private International Law (EAPIL) in 2021, spearheaded by Burkhard Hess and Geert Van Calster. This Working Group consisted of 42 academics from 22 EU Member States plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. The Members of the Working Group provided information on the application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in their respective jurisdictions by means of a questionnaire, after which a Members Consultative Committee of the EAPIL produced a report. Based on this input, the former MPI Luxembourg and the KU Leuven organised a conference in Luxembourg on 9 September 2022.

Reform Proposals

After the Luxembourg conference, Burkhard Hess and a team of researchers of the former MPI Luxembourg prepared a Working Paper with 32 reform proposals. The Members of the EAPIL Working Group and the academic public were invited to express their opinion on these proposals through online surveys. The results of these surveys were processed by Burkhard Hess and his team , which led to amendments to the original proposals. These amended proposals were presented discussed at a conference in Vienna on 12 April 2024. The findings of this conference were integrated into the Academic Position Paper that, after consulting the Members of the EAPIL Working Group, received a final update before being uploaded on SSRN

The Academic Position Paper

The five parts of the Academic Position Paper cover the role and scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, collective redress, third-state relations, jurisdiction and pendency, as well as recognition and enforcement. Each part covers distinct issues identified at the 2022 Luxembourg conference and formulates specific proposals to resolve them. The background of each proposal is briefly explained and the charts indicating the responses to the surveys are presented, before discussing the feedback received through the surveys and during the 2024 Vienna Conference.

Thanks to Participants

Burkhard Hess and his team would like to thank everyone that has taken the time to answer the surveys and/or attend the conferences. Your input was invaluable, and we have sought to take your views into account as much as possible. We believe that the proposals in the Academic Position Paper provide a solid set of recommendations to consider in recasting the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which will be presented to the European Commission as a meaningful contribution of academia in the upcoming law-making process.

On 24 May 2024, the Council of the European Union approved the position of the European Parliament at first reading on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (and subsequently also Regulation (EU) 2023/2859).

The directive has thereby been formally adopted (the final text can be read here) and should be published shortly on the Official Journal of the European Union.

It will enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal. Member States will then have two years to transpose the directive into national legislation.

The implementing measures enacted by Member States will become applicable according to timeframes that vary depending on the size and origin of the companies concerned, ranging from three to five years following the entry into force of the directive, as specified in Article 37.

A presentation of the key provisions of the directive can be found here.

The directive formed the object of several posts on this blog, by Giesela Rühl (Human Rights in Global Supply Chains: Do We Need to Amend the Rome II Regulation?’, 9 October 2020), Marion Ho-Dac (Brief Overview of the Directive Proposal on Corporate Due Diligence and PIL, 27 April 2022), Hans van Loon Hans (GEDIP’s Reccommendation on the Proposal for a Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, 25 October 2022), Ralf Michaels and Antonia Sommerfeld (The EU Sustainability Directive and Jurisdiction, 3 August 2023), and Marco Pasqua (Deal on the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, 20 March 2024).

Other blogs hosted contributions relating to the private international law aspects of the directive. These notably include a recent post by Eduardo Silva de Freitas and Sandra Kramer Xandra, titled The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive: PIL and Litigation Aspects, published on Conflict of Laws.

During the legislative process that resulted in the directive, several contributions regarding the issues of private international law surrounding the new text have also appeared in journals and collective works. Some of them are listed below:

– Angelica Bonfanti, ‘Catene globali del valore, diritti umani e ambiente, nella prospettiva del diritto internazionale privato: verso una direttiva europea sull’obbligo di diligenza delle imprese in materia di sostenibilità’ (2022) 3 JUS 295-329

– Nerina Boschiero, ‘L’extraterritorialità della futura direttiva europea sul dovere di diligenza delle imprese ai fini della sostenibilità, tra diritto internazionale pubblico e privato’ (2023) 3 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 661-706

– Olivera Boskovic, ‘Extraterritoriality and the proposed directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, a recap‘ (2024) 20 Journal of Private International Law 117-128

– Antonia Duran Ayago, ‘Human Rights, Due Diligence and Corporate Sustainability: Implications for European Private International Law regarding a Proposal for a Directive in the Air‘ (2022) 22 Anuario Espanol Derecho Internacional Privado 329-358

– Nadia Perrone, ‘Perspectives of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for Environmental Damage in the Proposal of the European Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence’ (2023) 3.2 The Italian Review of International and Comparative Law 389-408

– Chiara Enrica Tuo, ‘Rimedi per abusi di diritti umani da parte delle imprese: profili di diritto internazionale privato’ in Fabrizio Marrella, Carlo Mastellone (eds), International Business Contracts and Sustainability (Pacini 2024) 101-142.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 establishing the European Digital Identity Framework entered into force on 20 May 2024.

As reported on this blog (at the time of the Commission’s proposal), the major contribution of this Regulation is the creation of a “European Digital Identity Wallet” (EUDIW). It aims to allow citizens and companies based in the European Union, to store person identification data (e.g. name, address, gender, civil status) and electronic attestations of attributes (e.g. bank account, birth certificate, diploma, company statute) for cross-border use (see Article 5a of the Regulation). It should also allow users to authenticate and access online public or private services.

Compared to the Commission’s proposal, the final version of the EUDI Regulation reinforces and expands the provisions on the European digital identity wallet to make it more secure, trustworthy and pratical for users. In particular, numerous provisions now deal with personal data protection issues based on GDPR.

Main Provisions of the EUDI Regulation

As summarised in the updated version of the Briefing paper from the EP Research Services on European Digital Identity, the main provisions of the Regulation are as follows:

Member States have to provide citizens and businesses with a European digital identity wallet that allows users to digitally identify themselves, store and manage identity data and official documents (such as driving licences, university diplomas, medical prescriptions) in digital form in all EU countries. The wallet can also be used to digitally sign documents. The European digital identity wallets can be provided either by the Member State itself or by a private-sector provider.

The wallet is voluntary and free of charge for individuals, while businesses may incur costs. It does not replace existing identification and authentication means but complements them.

The wallet contains a dashboard of all transactions and offers the possibility to report alleged violations of data protection. Users can also request that their data be deleted.

The wallet should ensure the highest level of data protection and implement advanced security features such as state-of-the-art encryption and storage methods.

Whenever there is no legal requirement for users to have a legal identity for authentication, they will be able to use freely chosen pseudonyms.

Very large online platforms will have to accept the European digital identity wallet when users wish to log in on them.

Member States have to disclose the source code of the user application software components of the wallet to enable members of the public to understand its operation and to be able to audit and review its code. The disclosure of the source code may be limited for public security purposes.

The Commission has to establish a European Digital Identity Cooperation Group to support and facilitate cooperation among EU Member States.

Web browsers are required to recognise QWACs, so that users can verify the identity of persons or legal entities behind a website. This identity data has to be displayed in a user-friendly manner. In case of substantiated security concerns, web browsers are still allowed to take precautionary measures related to these certificates.

Private International Law Perspective

I propose to breifly present two provisions of the new Regulation in the light of private international law.

Article 5 f on Cross-border Reliance on European Digital Identity Wallets

This provision lays down the equivalent effect of European Digital Identity Wallets based on the Regulation with other means of electronic identification and authentication to access an online service provided by a public sector body in the Member States. The same applies for access to essential services (such as energy, banking, financial services, social security, health, drinking water, digital infrastructure or education) provided by private relying parties, and also for online services provided by very large online platforms and search engines (as defined by the Digital Services Act, Article 33).

This gives rise to two main comments. First, European digital identity based on the European Digital Identity Wallet is meant as a “renewed sovereign identity”, towards the “privatisation” of digital identity by major economic operators. In that respect, the European digital identity must be cross-border (i.e. across national borders) and even transnational (i.e. beyond states borders). In that respect, the European wallet will have to be accepted by private tech operators as an identifier for access to their service. On the other hand, the boundaries between domestic identity and European identity will necessarily blur. The European digital  wallet is, according to the Union’s competences, of a cross-border nature (cf. Article 114 TFEU); it aims at establishing equal access to cross-border services within the Member States. But when services are accessible online or digital per se, the difference between national and cross-border is much less clear. In this sense, the Regulation encourages Member States to integrate European Digital Wallets “with the ecosystem of public and private digital services already implemented at national, local or regional level […] including by enhanced interoperability with existing national electronic identification means” (Rec. 21). The development of a digital ecosystem at Union’s level plays a major role in European legal integration based on an area without internal borders. The same observation was recently made in the context of digitalisation of the European judicial cooperation in civil and penal matters.

Article 45 b on Legal Effects of Electronic Attestation of Attributes

Electronic attestations of attributes (e.g. bank account, birth certificate, diploma, company statutes) may be stored and managed within the European Digital Identity Wallet. These attestations cannot be deprived of legal effect simply because they are in electronic format. Furthermore, qualified electronic attestation of attributes (i.e. attributes provided by the qualified trust service providers, see Rec. 61 and Annex V of the Regulation) and attestations of attributes issued by (or on behalf of) a public sector body responsible for an authentic source (see Article 45 f and Annex VII; e.g. the civil registrar or the clerck of the commercial register) have the same legal effect as equivalent paper documents. Finally, attestations of attributes issued by (or on behalf of) a public sector body responsible for an authentic source (such as civil status documents or company statutes) benefit from the principle of mutual recognition within all Member States.

There is therefore a gradation of normative effects for the attributes contained in the European Digital Identity Wallet. In a cross-border context, these effects will have to be analysed through the lens of private international law. This is what my previous post on the draft regulation began to do. To limit myself here to the mutual recognition of electronic attestations of public documents (as mentionned above), this recognition should be equivalent to that applied to the documents themselves when they circulate from one Member States to another. The European Digital Identity Wallet will therefore have to be coordinated with the Public Document Regulation and the ICCS Conventions (and the circulation of digital public documents organised by these texts).

Fascinating work ahead!

On 24 April 2024, the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, in light of the positive outcome of the negotiations with the Council (see this post on the deal struck in March 2024 at Council level).

The adoption of the resolution marks the end of the Parliament’s first reading of the proposal.

The text, once formally endorsed by the Council of the European Union, will be signed and published in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will enter into force twenty days later. Member States will then have two years to transpose the directive into their national laws.

The harmonised rules will apply gradually: from 2027 to companies with over 5000 employees and net worldwide turnover higher than 1500 million euro; from 2028 to firms with over 3000 employees and a 900 million euro of net worldwide turnover; from 2029 to all the remaining companies within the scope of the directive (including those over 1000 employees and net worldwide turnover higher than 450 million euro.

On 16 April 2024, Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Pursuant to Article 21, it will enter into force on 6 May 2024.

Member States have until 7 May 2026 to adopt such laws, regulations and administrative provisions as are necessary to comply with the Directive.

On 19 March 2024, the Council of the European Union approved the position of the European Parliament at first reading on the proposal for a directive on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings, also known as Strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPPs. The directive has thereby been formally adopted (the final text can be read here) and will be published shortly on the Official Journal of the European Union.

It will enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal. Member States will then have two years to transpose the directive into national legislation.

The directive is addressed to all Member States with the usual exception of Denmark. Ireland, for its part, made known, back in 2022, its wish to take part in the adoption and application of the directive.

Object and Scope

The directive, as stated in Article 1, provides safeguards against manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings in civil matters brought against natural and legal persons – typically journalists, activists, human rights defenders, etc. – on account of their engagement in public participation.

The legal basis being Article 81(2)(f) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“the European Parliament and the Council … shall adopt measures … aimed at ensuring … (f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States”), the directive only applies to claims and proceedings (including procedures for interim and precautionary measures and counteractions, whatever the nature of the court or tribunal) with cross-border implications.

As clarified in Article 5, a matter is considered to have cross-border implications for the purposes of the directive “unless both parties are domiciled in the same Member State as the court seised and all other elements relevant to the situation concerned are located only in that Member State”.

Pursuant to Article 4(3), the term “abusive court proceedings against public participation” refers to proceedings “which are not brought to genuinely assert or exercise a right, but have as their main purpose the prevention, restriction or penalisation of public participation … and which pursue unfounded claims”. Under the directive, as clarified in Article 4(2), “public participation” means “the making of any statement or the carrying out of any activity by a natural or legal person in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information, freedom of the arts and sciences, or freedom of assembly and association, and any preparatory, supporting or assisting action directly linked thereto, and which concerns a matter of public interest”.

A matter is to be considered of public interest for the purposes of the directive if it “affects the public to such an extent that the public may legitimately take an interest in it”, and relates to areas such as (a) fundamental rights, public health, safety, the environment or the climate; (b) activities of a natural or legal person that is a public figure in the public or private sector; (c) matters under consideration by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceedings; (d) allegations of corruption, fraud, or of any other criminal offence, or of administrative offences in relation to such matters; (e) activities aimed at protecting the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, including the protection of democratic processes against undue interference, in particular by fighting disinformation;

According to Article 4(3), in assessing whether the claimant purports to prevent, restrict or penalise public participation the following elements may be considered, by way of example: (a) the disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable nature of the claim or part thereof, including the excessive dispute value; (b) the existence of multiple proceedings initiated by the claimant or associated parties in relation to similar matters; (c) intimidation, harassment or threats on the part of the claimant or the claimant’s representatives, before or during the proceedings, as well as similar conduct by the claimant in similar or concurrent cases; (d) the use in bad faith of procedural tactics, such as delaying proceedings, fraudulent or abusive forum shopping or the discontinuation of cases at a later stage of the proceedings in bad faith.

Procedural Safeguards

Article 6 stipulates that Member States shall ensure that persons targeted by a SLAPP can apply, in accordance with national law, for: (a) a security; (b) an early dismissal of the claim; (c) additional remedies such as the award of costs and the issuance of penalties. The mentioned safeguards remain available notwithstanding any subsequent amendment of the pleadings made by the claimant, including the withdrawal of the claim itself.

Security

Article 10 asks Member States to ensure that the court seised of a SLAPP “may require, without prejudice to the right of access to justice, that the claimant provide security for the estimated costs of the proceedings, which may include the costs of legal representation incurred by the defendant, and, if provided for in national law, damages”.

Early Dismissal

Individuals targeted by a SLAPP can ask the court to dismiss the claim at the earliest possible stage, pursuant to Article 11. In addition, Article 12(2) requires that Member States ensure that “where a defendant has applied for early dismissal, it shall be for the claimant to substantiate the claim in order to enable the court to assess whether it is not manifestly unfounded”. Article 13 provides that decision granting early dismissal must be subject to an appeal.

Costs and penalties

As stated in Article 14, claimants, if they are found to have brought abusive court proceedings against public participation can be ordered to bear “all types of costs of the proceedings that can be awarded under national law, including the full costs of legal representation incurred by the defendant unless such costs are excessive”. Where national law does not guarantee the award in full of the costs of legal representation
beyond what is set out in statutory fee tables, Member States shall ensure that such costs are fully covered, unless they are excessive, by other means available under national law.

Article 15 requires that Member States must ensure that courts or tribunals seised of a SLAPP may impose “effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties or other equally effective appropriate measures, including the payment of compensation for damage or the publication of the court decision, where provided for in national law, on the party who brought those proceedings”.

Protection from SLAPPs Brought in a Third Country

The directive includes two provisions the aim of which is to protect persons domiciled in the Union from SLAPPs initiated in a State outside the Union.

Article 16, titled “Grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of a third-country judgment”, requires that Member States ensure that the recognition and enforcement of a third-country judgment given in the framework of court proceedings against public participation targeting a natural or legal person domiciled in a
Member State is refused “if those proceedings are considered manifestly unfounded or abusive
under the law of the Member State in which such recognition or enforcement is sought”.

According to Article 17 (“Jurisdiction for actions related to third-country proceedings”), Member States must ensure that, where abusive court proceedings against public participation have been brought by a claimant domiciled outside the Union in a third-country against a natural or legal person domiciled in the Union, the latter person “may seek, in the courts or tribunals of the place where that person is domiciled,
compensation for the damage and the costs incurred in connection with the proceedings before the court or tribunal of the third-country”. It is provided, however, that Member States may limit the exercise of jurisdiction under the previous provision for as long as proceedings are pending in the third-country.

Other Provisions

The directive further asks Member states to put in place rules that would allow associations, organisations and trade unions to support the defendant. Specifically, Article 9 requires that a court seised of a SLAPP “may accept that associations, organisations, trade unions and other entities which have, in accordance with the criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate interest in safeguarding or promoting the rights of persons engaging in public participation, may support the defendant, where the defendant so approves, or provide information in those proceedings in accordance with national law”.

The Council of the European Union on 15 March 2024 reached a final deal on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on corporate sustainability due diligence (see here and here for previous analysis on the proposal hosted on this blog).

The deal comes after a series of meetings following a provisional political agreement reached at Council level and the European Parliament’s negotiating position, both reported here.

After the approval by the Permanent Representative Committee, the Presidency of the Council has transmitted the final compromise text to the Chair of the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI). On 19 March 2024, the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament adopted the text, agreed with the Council.

The draft agenda for the plenary sittings of the European Parliament schedules the vote on the corporate sustainability due diligence directive for 24 April 2024.

The key provisions of the directive, as it results from the latest changes, are summarized below.

Subject Matter

The directive deals with obligations for companies regarding human rights and environmental impacts, including those of subsidiaries and business partners, and the operations carried out by their business partners in companies’ chains of activities, as well as liability for violations and the requirement to adopt a transition plan for climate change mitigation.

While doing so, the text ensures that it does not lower the existing level of protection for human, employment, and social rights, environmental protection, or climate protection provided by Member States’ laws or applicable collective agreements.

Finally, the directive does not override obligations under other EU laws in areas such as human rights, employment, social rights, environmental protection, and climate change. If there is a conflict between the directive and another EU law pursuing similar objectives with more extensive obligations, the latter prevails.

Scope

The proposed directive applies to (a) companies formed in accordance with the law of a Member State, where they meet certain criteria; these include having over 1000 employees on average and a net worldwide turnover exceeding EUR 450 million in the last financial year; the directive also applies to to ultimate parent companies whose subsidiaries meet these thresholds and those engaged in franchising or licensing agreements within the EU, provided certain conditions regarding royalties and turnover are met; (b) companies governed by the law of a third country, whenever specific conditions are fulfilled; among other things, they must have generated a net turnover exceeding EUR 450 million in the Union in the preceding financial year or being the ultimate parent company of a group meeting this threshold; additionally, companies engaged in franchising or licensing agreements within the Union, with royalties exceeding EUR 22.5 million, fall within the scope if the directive if their net turnover in the Union exceeds EUR 80 million in the preceding financial year.

An exemption is provided for ultimate parent companies primarily engaged in holding shares in operational subsidiaries without making management decisions.

It is specified that the number of part-time employees must be calculated on a full-time equivalent basis for the purposes of determining company eligibility. Additionally, temporary agency workers and other non-standard workers meeting the criteria established by the Court of Justice must be included in the calculation as if they were directly employed by the company. Furthermore, if a company meets the eligibility conditions outlined before, the proposed directive applies only if these conditions persist for two consecutive financial years. However, the directive ceases to apply to a company if it no longer meets the eligibility criteria for each of the last two relevant financial years.

Definitions

The directive comes with several definitions, including the following.

The term ‘company’ is understood to refer to any entity falling under the following categories: (i) a legal entity established in one of the legal structures outlined in Annex I and Annex II of Directive 2013/34/EU; (ii) a legal entity established under the legislation of a third country in a structure similar to those listed in Annex I and II of Directive 2013/34/EU.

An ‘adverse human rights impact’ denotes a detrimental effect on individuals stemming from: (i) the violation of any of the human rights delineated in Annex I, Part I Section 1, as outlined in the international agreements referenced in Annex I, Part I Section 2; (ii) the infringement of a human right not specified in Annex I, Part I Section 1, but covered by the human rights agreements listed in Annex I, Part I Section 2, provided some criteria are met. An ‘adverse impact’ encompasses adverse environmental effects and adverse human rights impacts. The impact is understood to be ‘severe’ when it is significant due to its nature, such as causing harm to human life, health, or liberty, or due to its scale, scope, or irreversibility.

A ‘business partner’ refers to an entity: (i) engaged in a commercial agreement with the company concerning its operations, products, or services, or to which the company offers services (‘direct business partner’); (ii) involved in business activities related to the operations, products, or services of the company, even if not directly engaged in a commercial agreement (‘indirect business partner’).

The ‘chain of activities’ encompasses: (i) the activities of a company’s upstream business partners involved in producing goods or providing services, including design, extraction, sourcing, manufacturing, transportation, storage, and supply of raw materials, products, or components, as well as product or service development.; and (ii) the activities of a company’s downstream business partners related to product distribution, transportation, and storage, conducted for or on behalf of the company, excluding distribution, transportation, and storage subject to export control regulations under Regulation (EU) 2021/821 or export controls pertaining to weapons, ammunition, or war materials post-authorization of product export.

Level of Harmonisation

Member States may not introduce provisions within the scope of the directive that lay down human rights and environmental due diligence obligations diverging from those resulting in specified provisions of the directive. An example illustrating this concept is Article 7(1) of the directive stating that Member States are responsible for ensuring that companies adopt suitable measures to either prevent or, if immediate prevention is not feasible, effectively mitigate potential adverse impacts. This provision mandates the consideration of specific factors to assess the adequacy of these measures. Member States, instead, are free from introducing, in their national law, more stringent provisions. Drawing from the precedent set by this provision, Member States could provide for such an obligation, or factors to assess the adequacy of the preventive measures, more specific in terms of the objective or the field covered, in order to achieve a different level of protection of human, employment and social rights, the environment or the climate.

Due Diligence and Related Obligations

Member States must ensure that companies undertake risk-based human rights and environmental due diligence. This includes integrating due diligence into policies and risk management systems, identifying and prioritizing adverse impacts, preventing and mitigating impacts, providing remediation, engaging stakeholders, establishing notification mechanisms and complaints procedures, monitoring effectiveness, and publicly communicating on due diligence.

Companies are allowed to share resources and information within their groups and with other legal entities for due diligence purposes. Business partners are not required to disclose trade secrets to compliant companies but must disclose information necessary to identify potential adverse impacts. Companies must retain documentation demonstrating compliance for at least 5 years or until the conclusion of any ongoing proceedings.

Parent companies falling under the proposed directive can fulfil due diligence obligations on behalf of subsidiaries if this ensures effective compliance. Subsidiaries must cooperate with the parent company, integrate due diligence into their policies, continue appropriate measures, seek contractual assurances, and comply with transition plans for climate change mitigation.

Due diligence requirements must be integrated into the concerned companies’ policies and risk management systems.

Supervisory Authorities

Member States must designate one or more supervisory authorities to oversee compliance with national provisions. The competent supervisory authority for companies formed under Member States legislation is that of the State of registration. For third-country companies, the competent authority is that of the Member State where the company in question has a branch or, if not applicable, where it generated most of its net turnover in the EU.

Supervisory authorities must publish annual reports on their activities and have adequate powers and resources to carry out investigations and inspections related to compliance with the directive. Supervisory authorities may initiate investigations and inspections, order corrective actions, impose penalties, and adopt interim measures to address non-compliance. These powers can be exercised directly, cooperatively, or through judicial authorities, ensuring effective legal remedies for affected parties. Decisions by supervisory authorities do not affect a company’s civil liability under the directive.

Penalties

Member States must establish rules on penalties, including pecuniary penalties, for breaches of national provisions derived from the proposed directive, ensuring they are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. When determining penalties, factors considered include the nature, gravity, and duration of the breach, impacts resulting from it, investments made, collaboration efforts, previous infringements, remedial actions, financial gains or losses, and other relevant circumstances.

Penalties must include pecuniary penalties and, if the company fails to comply, public statements about the infringement. Pecuniary penalties are based on the company’s net worldwide turnover, with a maximum limit set at not less than 5% of the company’s net worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year.

Member States ensure that decisions containing penalties are published, publicly available for at least 5 years, and shared with the European Network of Supervisory Authorities, without including personal data.

Civil Liability of Companies and a Right to Full Compensation

Companies can be held liable for damages caused to natural or legal persons if: (a) they intentionally or negligently failed to comply with the obligations under the proposed directive; (b) and, as a result, a damage to the person’s legal interests protected under national law was caused. A company cannot be held liable if the damage was caused only by its business partners in its chain of activities.

If held liable, natural or legal persons have the right to full compensation for damages under national law, ensuring no overcompensation.

Member States must ensure: (a) limitation periods for damages actions are reasonable, starting after the infringement ceases and the claimant becomes aware of it; (b) costs of proceedings are not prohibitively expensive for claimants; (c) claimants can seek injunctive measures and authorize certain organizations to bring actions; (d) courts can order disclosure of evidence by companies when necessary for a claim, ensuring proportionality and protection of confidential information.

Participation in industry or multi-stakeholder initiatives or third-party verification does not exempt companies from liability.

Civil liability of companies does not affect subsidiaries or business partners’ liability, and joint liability applies when damage is caused jointly.

These rules do not limit companies’ liability under other legal systems and are of overriding mandatory application if applicable law is not that of a Member State.

Entry into Force and Transposition

The proposed directive will come into force on the twentieth day after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Member States must enact regulations and administrative provisions to comply with the directive within two years of its entry into force.

The application of these provisions varies based on company size and origin: (a) for companies formed in accordance with Member State legislation with over 5000 employees and a net worldwide turnover exceeding EUR 1500 million, measures must be applied within three years; (b) as regards companies with over 3000 employees and a net worldwide turnover exceeding EUR 900 million, within a four-year timeframe; (c) for companies formed under third-country legislation with a net turnover over EUR 1500 million in the Union, within three years; (d) for third-country companies with a turnover over EUR 900 million, within a four-year timeframe. All other companies must comply within five years.

Annex I

The lists contained in the Annex specify the adverse environmental and human rights impacts relevant for the directive, to cover (the violation of) rights and prohibitions included in international human rights instruments (Part I Section 1), human rights and fundamental freedoms instruments (Part I Section 2), and prohibitions and obligations included in environmental instruments (Part II).

A corrigendum to Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 of 25 November 2020 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (the Recast Service Regulation) has been published on the Official Journal of the European Union of 2 February 2023 (L 405).

It concerns Article 33, which is about the information that Member States must share with the Commission so that the latter can make it available to the public at large.

Article 33(1) refers to such information as is required under Articles 3, 7, 12, 14, 17, 19, 20 and 22 of the Regulation. This includes, for example, the names and addresses of receiving agencies, the professions or competent persons that are permitted under national law to effect the direct service of documents, whether national law requires a document to be served within a particular period, etc.

The correction is, specifically, about Article 33(3). As originally published, the latter provision read as follows:

The Commission shall publish the information communicated in accordance with paragraph 1 in the Official Journal of the European Union, with the exception of the addresses and other contact details of the agencies and of the central bodies and the geographical areas in which they have jurisdiction.

According to the corrigendum, Article 33(3) should read instead:

The Commission shall publish the information communicated in accordance with paragraph 1 through appropriate means, including through the European e-Justice Portal.

As this is presented as a corrigendum, rather than an amendment to the Regulation, the revised text is meant to apply as of the date of application of the Regulation, that is, 1 July 2022. In fact, the information referred to in Article 33(3) has never been published on the Official Journal, and appears to be already available on the European Judicial Atlas in Civil Matters, which can be reached through the e-Justice Portal.

Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation, also knowns as the “Digital Justice” Regulation, was adopted on 13 December 2023 (see already here on the Regulation proposal, here on the text negotiations and here on the new text).

General Background

This Regulation constitutes an important step in the EU commitment to modernise cross-border proceedings in the European judicial area, in accordance with the “digital by default” principle. For the record, this principle means that delivering services digitally is the preferred option through a single contact point. In the judicial context, it applies to digital communication between authorities and litigants. It aims to improve the efficiency of exchanges and reduce costs and administrative burden. At the same time, this digital shift implies that all the necessary safeguards must be put in place to prevent social exclusion of certain litigants, while ensuring mutual trust between authorities, interoperability and the security of processes and data.

The “Digital Justice” Regulation seeks to find this difficult balance by establishing a uniform legal framework for the use of electronic communications between, on the one hand, the competent authorities in cross-border legal proceedings and, on the other, between these authorities and the parties. The Regulation also provides for harmonised provisions relating to the use of videoconferencing, the application of electronic signatures, the legal effects of electronic documents and the electronic payment of fees.

The Regulation builds on the increasingly  dense “digital acquis” in EU law, starting with the protection of personal data (i.e. GDPR and its extension to EU bodies), the eDIAS Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions and, more specifically in the area of judicial cooperation, the deployment of the e-CODEX system in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, the management of which has just been transferred to eu-LISA. This complex “regulatory web” dealing with the digitalisation of human and economic exchanges in the Union can no longer be ignored by legal practitioners and will have to be articulated with the e-Justice Regulation.

Scope of the Regulation
Cross-border Cooperation in Civil and Criminal Matters

The Regulation lays down provisions on the digital exchanges of information which are intended to apply to cross-border proceedings in civil, commercial and criminal matters.

This material scope is quite remarkable, since until now the regulatory framework of judicial cooperation in the Union has developed in a differentiated and even hermetic manner between its civil component (Article 81 TFEU) and its criminal component (Article 82 seq. TFEU). Digitalisation marks a turning point in favour of the unification of the European judicial area, initiated with the e-CODEX Regulation, which is meant to constitute one of its structural (digital) dimensions. Indeed, digitalisation is a common issue relevant for the various forms of justice (and, more broadly, for public services and administrations). It is therefore welcome that the EU legislator has adopted a unified regulatory framework in this area. From an academic perspective, it should encourage scholars to look beyond their discipline – (EU) civil or criminal justice – to enhance cross-cutting analyses of the EU judicial area as a whole.

As far as private international law is concerned, Annex I of the Regulation includes most of the instruments adopted in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, with the exception of the “Rome” (I, II, III) Regulations dedicated to conflicts of laws and the Service of Documents and Taking of Evidence Regulations, which were already modernised in 2020 to incorporate the digital procedural dimension (see here and here).

Interplay Between EU Judicial Cooperation Acquis and e-Justice Regulation

The “Digital Justice” Regulation shall be understood as an instrument for “upgrading” the legal framework of EU judicial cooperation in its digital dimension. How does it work? Among all instruments adopted as part of EU policy on judicial cooperation in civil and in criminal matters, the implementation of those relating to cross-border proceedings triggers the “complementary” application of the new Regulation. In that respect, the Annex to the Regulation contains a list of the instruments concerned (Annex I in civil matters and Annex II in criminal matters). This means that the tools and channels for digitalising judicial cooperation provided for in the Regulation are intended to apply in the context of cross-border proceedings based on one or more of these listed instruments. The internationality criterion of the judicial proceedings in question will thus depend on the definition adopted by each instrument concerned.

By contrast, more recent (and future) EU instruments in civil and criminal matters do not (will not) fall within the scope of the e-Justice Regulation since they (will) develop their own digital-related provisions – as illustrated by the Taking of Evidence Regulations in civil matters and in criminal matters or de lege ferenda by the Regulation Proposal on the Protection of Adults –Eventually, the long-term objective of the EU legislator is to establish a judicial cooperation digitalised “by design” in the European area; and that will require strong commitment and concrete changes – in particular at the technical and administrative level – for the judicial systems of Member States.

Temporal implementation

It will certainly comfort legal practitioners and judicial actors to briefly mention the timeframe for implementing the new Regulation: this will be very gradual and will take several years. In principle, the Regulation will be applicable in spring 2025. However, as far as the provisions on electronic communications are concerned, the date of application of the new provisions depends on the implementing Acts that the European Commission will adopt to organise the future structural channels of digital interactivity between authorities and between authorities and litigants. To this end, a staggered timetable (from n+2 years to n+5 years) has been set for the adoption of several successive implementing Acts aimed respectively at one or other of the texts listed in the Annex. All in all, it will take until 2031 (according to a rough calculation) for the entire legal framework to be fully operational.

Main Innovations for Cross-border e-Justice
Electronic Communication Networks

In terms of technical innovations, the Regulation sets up a uniform legal framework for digital exchanges of information via the Internet or another electronic communications network. The Regulation establishes two information channels for such electronic communications: first, a decentralised IT system to handle exchanges between the competent authorities (including relevant EU bodies) and, second, a European electronic access point for litigants to interact with the competent authorities. It is for the European Commission to specify, through implementing acts, the content of these two information channels. In addition, the Commission is in charge of developing “reference implementation software” so that Member States can adopt it, on a voluntary basis, as their back-end system, in place of a national IT system. It will also be responsible for maintaining the software as well as the European electronic access point. These are major technical and legal responsibilities for the Commission vis-à-vis national judicial systems; they may invite to reflect on the strategic positioning of this institution in the EU institutional architecture.

Decentralised IT system — The first channel for electronic communications will consist of national IT systems with interoperable access points, interconnected via the pan-European computerised communication system e-CODEX. The decentralised IT system should be used “as a matter of principle” for all exchanges between competent authorities in different Member States and between a competent national authority and an EU body or agency. This could be a court (e.g. for small claims procedures), a central authority (e.g. under the Brussels II ter Regulation) or an EU body or agency involved in judicial cooperation procedures in criminal matters, such as Eurojust. The decentralised computer system will in particular have to be used for the exchange of standard forms established by the instruments listed in the Annex.

Other means of electronic communication may be used by way of derogation only, in the event of disruption of the decentralised system, force majeure or because of the nature of the documents to be transmitted.

European electronic access point — The second digital communication channel is an innovation for civil litigants: the European electronic access point. It will be accessible from the European e-Justice portal and may be seen as a counterpart to the Single Digital Gateway for cross-border administrative procedures (including the cross-border circulation of public documents). It should in theory govern electronic exchanges between litigants and the competent authorities in all the cases provided for by the instruments listed in Annex I to the Regulation. This could involve making requests, sending and receiving information relevant to proceedings or being served with procedural documents. In that respect, Article 4 of the Regulation should be of particular interest to legal practitioners, as it offers a “systematic mapping” of the different scenarios for cross-border communication in the light of the instruments of judicial cooperation in civil matters listed in Annex I. In those scenarios, the competent authorities may have to accept electronic communication.

In order to make this work in practice, the Regulation requires Member States to train legal staff in these new digital channels. This is essential and will require an excellent understanding of the issues of accessibility, personal data protection and cyber security, both by practitioners and, more broadly, by public authorities.

Unlike the decentralised IT system, which responds to the digital by default principle, litigants will have to give their prior consent to enter into a dematerialised communication exchange with the national authorities of a Member State. In case of refusal, this should mean that the exchange will take place via “traditional” communication channels. Nothing is specified by the Regulation, as this is a matter for national law. In the long term, however, it is questionable whether this choice will always be possible, particularly in those Member States that have already made or well advanced the digital transition of their justice system. As a matter of fact, there are major disparities between Member States, including in terms of local territories and population, which could create gaps between the (requesting and requested) authorities for cross-border judicial cooperation.

Legal Effects of Electronic Communications and Documents

The Regulation makes several references on the legal effects of the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and, more specifically, of its communications aspect. The sensitive point here relates to the potential influence of the digital format on the legal value of the document as “data flow”. The Regulation recalls that the rules governing cross-border judicial procedures established by the legal acts listed in the Annex are not affected, apart from the digital communication dimension of the new framework. In particular, the national law of the Member States continues to govern questions relating to the authenticity, accuracy and appropriate legal form of documents or information that will transit through the new digital channels.

A contrario, digitised exchanges must not deprive electronic documents of legal effects. This is provided for in Article 8 of the Regulation, which is a well-known provision as it already appears in other European instruments in digital matters: “Documents transmitted by electronic means shall not be deprived of legal effect and shall not be considered inadmissible in cross-border legal proceedings concerning the legal acts listed in Annexes I and II solely on the ground that they are in electronic form”.

Cross-border Justice by Videoconference

The Regulation also organises the use of videoconferencing for hearings of persons in cross-border judicial proceedings listed in the Annex. The European legal acquis already contains provisions on the use of videoconferencing on an optional basis or subject to the existence of technical tools within the authorities concerned. The same rationale is followed by the Regulation, so there is no obligation. The promoters of digital justice may regret this, but the Regulation nevertheless provides that the use of videoconferencing may not be refused by the authorities of a Member State “solely on account of the non-existence of national rules governing the use of distance communication technology. In such a case, the most appropriate rules applicable under national law, such as rules on the taking of evidence, should apply mutatis mutandis” (Rec. 33). This voluntary and incentive-based approach is certainly justified, in order to take account of the disparities between national legal systems in terms of their level of digitalisation and, in the case of criminal proceedings, because of the great vulnerability of the individuals concerned by the proceedings, which digital communications may increase.

Concluding Remarks

 The “Digital Justice” Regulation is an important step in the structuring of cross-border digital justice in the Union and paves the way for a (new) European “digital judicial culture”. In that respect, the Regulation leaves the Member States room for manoeuvre by allowing them to extend its scope to purely domestic judicial procedures – i.e. outside the EU competence based on Articles 81 and 82 TFEU –. This is of great significance since digitalisation blurs the boundaries between internal and international proceedings. The EU cross-border digital Justice should therefore have a long-term impact on national judicial systems of the Member States. But to succeed, major changes will be needed in national justice systems (as recently highlighted by the new e-Justice Strategy). In this context, a solid dialogue with legal and judicial practitioners will be central as well as keeping the “big picture” of digitalisation in mind, starting with the crucial issues of the digital divide, the protection of personal data and cybersecurity in relation to Article 47 of the EU Charter.

On 7 December 2023, The Council presidency and European Parliament representatives reached a provisional agreement on a reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice (last version available here).

Among other things, the reform will permit the transfer of jurisdiction over preliminary rulings to the General Court in specific areas, while the Court of Justice will retain jurisdiction over questions of principle, like those that involve interpretation of the Treaties or the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The amendment, which is meant to reduce the workload of the Court of Justice and, therefore, to help her work more efficient, represents an essential step in the history of the institution as we know it.

The possibility of the handover is formally established by Article 256 TFEU, according to which:

  1. The General Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 267, in specific areas laid down by the Statute.

Where the General Court considers that the case requires a decision of principle likely to affect the unity or consistency of Union law, it may refer the case to the Court of Justice for a ruling.

Decisions given by the General Court on questions referred for a preliminary ruling may exceptionally be subject to review by the Court of Justice, under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the Statute, where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected.

It should be noted that the provision is not a novelty in EU law; it corresponds to former Article 225 TEC. In fact, the transfer to the General Court of partial jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings had already been considered in the past: at the end of last century, first, against the background of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the foreseen enlargement of the Union; and later, around 2015, in view of the increasing number of requests for preliminary rulings. However, in 2017, in a report submitted pursuant to Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Court of Justice had denied the need of a transfer at the time. On the other hand, it  simultaneously stressed that such standpoint “should not at all be understood as a definitive position on the question of the distribution of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings between the Court of Justice and the General Court”. And, indeed, it has not been a definitive position.

For the readers of this blog the essential question is, of course, what the impact of the competences adjustment will be on preliminary rulings conerning PIL instruments.

The simple answer would be that, in principle, none is to be expected. The specific areas in which the General Court will be competent over preliminary rulings are: the common system of value added tax; excise duties; the Customs Code; the tariff classification of goods under the Combined Nomenclature; compensation and assistance to passengers in case of delay or cancellation of transport services or denied boarding; the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading. In other words, as of today requests on the instruments for judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters are not affected, i.e., they fall under the scope of exclusive competence of the Court of Justice.

But this, of course, can change any moment in the future. More importantly, already now it is legitimate to have doubts as to the operation of the assignments to, respectively, the Court of Justice and the General Court: one single request for a preliminary ruling may concern at the same time one of the above-mentioned areas and another one; besides, requests related to one of those matters may as well entail questions of principle or of a cross-cutting nature.

More concretely, with an example: should the request for a preliminary ruling in, let’s say, case C‑213/18, or in case C-20/21, had been referred to Luxembourg after the transfer has been accomplished, who would have taken care?

In the Council’s press release of 7 December 2023 (the same date as the agreement’s) not much is said to shed light on this and similar questions. It is explained, though, that, ‘On the procedural aspects, the reform provides for a “one-stop-shop” mechanism, under which national judges will continue to address requests for preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice, which will in turn forward to the General Court the questions under its jurisdiction’.

This possibly means that a screening will take place at the level of the Court of Justice, and that a substantiated decision will be made there on the allocation of requests not squarely corresponding to one of the categories listed above. No doubt, for the sake of transparency the criteria for such allocation will also be communicated to the public at some point, likely soon. It is also to be expected (and it is hoped) that resources of the Court will be invested in making sure that, from the very beginning, they are consistently applied.

The readers of the blog are aware of the proposal for a Directive on the protection of persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings, also known as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

After the political agreement reached at Council level and the European Parliament’s negotiating position, the negotiators of the Parliament and of the Council reached on 30 November 2023 a provisional political agreement on the text to be adopted. The agreement is expected to be formally approved by the Council and the European Parliament at a later stage.

The text of the deal, made accessible here, features various innovations, including the following.

Minimum Requirements

The text resulting from the political agreement now makes clear that the Directive lays down minimum rules, thus enabling the Member States to adopt or maintain provisions that are more favourable to persons engaging in public participation, including national provisions that establish more effective procedural safeguards. The implementation of the Directive should not serve to justify any regression in relation to the level of protection that already exists in each Member State.

Public Participation

Public participation is more broadly defined.

It should mean any statement, activity or preparatory, supporting or assisting action directly linked thereto, by a natural or legal person expressed or carried out in the exercise of fundamental rights.

Future public interest is included, referring to the fact that a matter might not yet be of public interest, but could become so, once the public becomes aware of it, for example by means of a publication.

Such activities should directly concern a specific act of public participation or be based on a contractual link between the actual target of SLAPP and the person providing the preparatory, supporting or assisting activity. Bringing claims not against a journalist or a human rights defender but against the internet platform on which they publish their work or against the company that prints a text or a shop that sells the text can be an effective way of silencing public participation, as without such services opinions cannot be published and thus cannot influence public debate.

Matter of Public Interest

The notion of a matter of public interest is clarified in more detail.

It should include matters relevant to the enjoyment of fundamental rights.

Activities of a natural or legal person who is a public figure should also be considered as matters of public interest since the public may legitimately take an interest in them.

In addition, matters under consideration by a legislative, executive or judicial body or any other official proceedings can be examples of matters of public interest.

Finally, the Directive text provides under Recital 19b for many cases where a matter of public interest is at stake.

Abusive Court Proceedings

The description of when court proceedings can be considered abusive is reworked and better described.

They typically involve litigation tactics deployed by the claimant and used in bad faith including but not limited to the choice of jurisdiction, relying on one or more fully or partially unfounded claims, making excessive claims, the use of delaying strategies or discontinuing cases at a later stage of the proceedings, initiating multiple proceedings on similar matters, incurring disproportionate costs for the defendant in the proceedings. The past conduct of the claimant and, in particular, any history of legal intimidation should also be considered when determining whether the court proceedings are abusive in nature. Those litigation tactics, which are often combined with various forms of intimidation, harassment or threats before or during the proceedings, are used by the claimant for purposes other than gaining access to justice or genuinely exercising a right and aim to achieve a chilling effect on public participation in the matter at stake.

Claims made in abusive court proceedings can be either fully or partially unfounded. This means that a claim does not necessarily have to be completely unfounded for the proceedings to be considered abusive. For example, even a minor violation of personality rights that could give rise to a modest claim for compensation under the applicable law can still be abusive, if a manifestly excessive amount or remedy is claimed. On the other hand, if the claimant in court proceedings pursues claims that are founded, such proceedings should not be regarded as abusive for the purposes of the Directive.

Scope

Few express indications have been added.

The Directive shall apply to matters of a civil or commercial nature with cross-border implications entertained in civil proceedings, including interim and precautionary measures and counteractions, entertained in civil proceedings, whatever the nature of the court or tribunal.

Then, it shall not apply to criminal matters or arbitration and shall be without prejudice to criminal procedural law.

Matters with Cross-border Implications

The cross-border implications element has been revised.

According to the text, a matter is considered to have cross-border implications unless both parties are domiciled in the same Member State as the court seised and all other elements relevant to the situation are located only in that Member State. Domicile shall be determined in accordance with the Brussels I bis Regulation.

Common Rules on Procedural Safeguards

Article 5a, devoted to the accelerated treatment of applications for safeguards, has been added.

Member States shall ensure that applications for security and early dismissal of manifestly unfounded claims are treated in an accelerated manner in accordance with national law, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial.

Member States shall ensure that applications for remedies against abusive court proceedings may also be treated in an accelerated manner, where possible, in accordance with national law, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial.

Early Dismissal of Manifestly Unfounded Claims

In relation to the early dismissal, Member States shall ensure that courts and tribunals may dismiss, after appropriate examination, claims against public participation as manifestly unfounded at the earliest possible stage, in accordance with national law. In addition, Member States shall ensure that an application for early dismissal is treated in an accelerated manner in accordance with national law, taking into account the circumstances of the case and the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial.

The burden of proof and substantiation of claims, under Article 12, have been specified. The burden of proving that the claim is well founded rests on the claimant who brought the action. Member States shall ensure that where a defendant has applied for early dismissal, it shall be for the claimant to substantiate the claim in order to enable the court to assess whether it is not manifestly unfounded.

Finally, Member States shall ensure that a decision granting early dismissal is subject to an appeal.

Remedies Against Abusive Court Proceedings

The award of costs, under Article 14, is clarified. Member States shall ensure that a claimant who has brought abusive court proceedings against public participation can be ordered to bear all types of costs of the proceedings, available under national law including the full costs of legal representation incurred by the defendant, unless such costs are excessive. Where national law does not guarantee the award in full of the costs of legal representation beyond statutory fee tables, Member States shall ensure that such costs are fully covered, unless they are excessive, by other means available under national law.

Article 15, specifically devoted to compensation of damages, has been deleted. It provided a natural or legal person who has suffered harm as a result of a SLAPP case to be capable of claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm. The text resulting from the political agreement loses this (express) provision.

Article 16, dedicated to penalties, has been amended including other equally effective appropriate measures. Member States shall ensure that courts or tribunals seised of SLAPPs cases may impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties or other equally effective appropriate measures, including the payment of compensation for damages or the publication of the court decision, where provided for in national law, on the party who brought those proceedings.

Protection against Third-country Judgments

This chapter has been affected by significant changes relevant from a private international law perspective.

In relation to grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of a third-country judgment, the reference to public policy, which was used in the original text version proposed by the Commission, has been deleted. According to the current text version, Member States shall ensure that the recognition and enforcement of a third-country judgment in court proceedings against public participation by a natural or legal person domiciled in a Member State is refused if those proceedings are considered manifestly unfounded or abusive according to the law of the Member State in which recognition or enforcement is sought.

Article 18, on jurisdiction for actions related to third-country proceedings, provides as follows. Member States shall ensure that, where abusive court proceedings against public participation have been brought by a claimant domiciled outside the Union in a court or tribunal of a third country against a natural or legal person domiciled in a Member State, that person may seek, in the courts or tribunals of the place where he is domiciled, compensation for the damages and the costs incurred in connection with the proceedings before the court or tribunal of the third country.

A paragraph 2 has been added, providing that Member States may limit the exercise of the jurisdiction while proceedings are still pending in the third country.

Relations with other Private International Law Instruments

In final provisions, under Article 19, the Directive shall not affect the application of bilateral and multilateral conventions and agreements between a third State and the Union or a Member State concluded before the date of entry into force of the Directive. Recital 33a refers, as example, to the 2007 Lugano Convention, in line with Article 351 of the TFEU.

Under Recital 33b it is specified that any future review of the rules under the Brussels I bis and the Rome II Regulations should assess also the SLAPP-specific aspects of the rules on jurisdiction and applicable law.

The Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters is currently in force for more than 80 States.

All the Member States of the European Union are bound by the Convention. Most of them were parties to the Convention well before the Union was given the power to adopt measures concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters. Others joined afterwards.

Austria and Malta were the latest to do so. They respectively ratified and acceded to the Convention based on a Council Decision of 10 March 2016 whereby they were authorised (and in fact requested) to do so “in the interest of the Union”. The latter expression is used in cases where the Union considers it has the power to conclude an international agreement, but the agreement in question fails to include a REIO clause or is otherwise only open to States, meaning that the Union has no other option than to join the agreement through its Member States.

The Council Decision of 2016 was adopted on the assumption that the Union has external competence with regard to the Convention “in so far as its provisions affect the rules laid down in certain provisions of Union legislation or in so far as the accession of additional Member States to the Convention alters the scope of certain provisions of Union legislation”.

One such provision is Article 28 of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Article 28(2) stipulates that the court seised “shall stay the proceedings so long as it is not shown that the defendant has been able to receive the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps have been taken to this end”. It is added in (3) that Article 19 of the 2007 Service Regulation (bow Article 22 of the Recast Service Regulation) applies instead of (2) where service occurred under the latter Regulation, and, in (4), that were the Union’s rules are not applicable, then Article 15 of the Hague Service Convention shall apply, “if the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad pursuant to that Convention”.

The stated existence of a Union’s external competence in this area has not prevented other uncertainties from arising. Specifically, the question arose of whether it is for the Union (and the Union alone) to take a stance on subsequent accessions to the Convention by third States.

Pursuant to Article 28 of the Convention, any State not represented at the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (which took place in 1964) may accede to the Convention after the latter’s entry into force on the international plane. The Convention will then enter into force for such a State “in the absence of any objection from a State, which has ratified the Convention before such deposit, notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands within a period of six months after the date on which the said Ministry has notified it of such accession”.

Put in another way, the Hague Service Convention offers the States that are already bound by it to veto the establishment of relations under the Convention between any acceding State and all of the Contracting States. So far, this “right of veto” has never been used in practice.

The Council of the European Union has recently discussed whether it is for the Union, or rather its Member States, individually, to decide about the line to take regarding the accession of Singapore to the Convention, which occurred on 16 May 2023.

Member States had apparently no difficulties in agreeing that there were no grounds, in substance, to issue such an objection. However, procedurally, while the majority took the view that the decision belonged to the Union, two States – France and the Czech Republic – expressed doubts in this regard, and abstained from the vote.

In a joint statement, France and Czechia noted that the other Member States agree that the Hague Service Convention falls under EU exclusive external competence, pursuant to Article 3(2) TFEU, but argued, for their part, that, “since the provisions of the Hague Convention on service do not apply in relations between Member States but only when a third State is involved, the possibility of affecting or modifying the common EU rules is doubtful”.

France and Czechia did not intend to prevent the Council from adopting an EU-wide approach to the accession of Singapore, but stressed they would not consider such a decision “as a precedent for any other accessions to the Hague Service Convention and other measures of the European Union that aim to regulate comparable subject matters, where exclusive external competence of the European Union could play a role but has not been agreed upon by the Member States”.

On 13 October 2023, Coreper issued a recommendation to approve the line to be taken regarding the accession of Singapore (the recommendation being that no objection should be raised), while acknowledging that the recommendation “is without prejudice to the procedure to be followed in the future to establish the European Union’s position concerning the accession of third States to such Hague Conventions which have the same accession mechanism as the 1965 Hague Convention”.

The issue, it is believed, may resurface, in particular, with respect to the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. The latter Convention, too, has special rules on the acceptance of accessions (Article 39), although their design and practical implications depart from the corresponding provisions of the Hague Service Convention.

European Law Institute (ELI) has recently launched a new project devoted to the proposal of the EU Regulation on the Recognition of Foreign Filiations.

The ELI Project Team wants to scrutinise the rules of the proposal  from four specific perspectives: children’s, LGBTI persons’ and women’s fundamental rights, and the underlying EU primary law, especially concerning the free movement of citizens.

The works within the project will be conducted under the accelerated procedure, with the aim of having results by February 2024. Based on its analysis, the Project Team wants to develop a Position Paper, in which provisions of the proposal will be scrutinized and alternative formulations proposed. Additionally, the Position Paper will be supplemented with explanations and comments. Model Rules in the form of desirable amendments to the proposal will also be drafted.

The ELI Project Team consists of Claire Fenton-Glynn, Cristina Gonzalez Beilfuss, Fabienne Jault-Seseke, Martina Melcher, Sharon Shakargy, Patrick Wautelet, Laima Vaige with Susanne Gössl and Ilaria Pretelli acting as Reporters.

On 2 October 2023 the Kick-Off Webinar of the Project was held. Here is a summary of discussions and a recording of the whole meeting.

Posts on this blog devoted to the same proposal and academia’s reactions to it may be found herehere and here.

On 2 August 2023, Gerard Quinn, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, and Claudia Mahler, the Independent Expert on the enjoyment of all human rights by older persons, issued a joint statement regarding the European Commission’s proposals of 31 May 2023 on the protection of adults in cross-border situations.

As explained in a post on this blog, the latter proposals consist of a proposal for a Council Decision whereby all Member States would become (or remain) parties to the Hague Convention of 2000 on the International Protection of Adults Convention “in the interest of the Union”, and a proposal for a Regulation of the Parliament and the Council that would complement the Hague Convention in the relations between Member States. The envisaged complementing measures include the creation of a European Certificate of Representation which would make it easier for the representatives of an adult to prove their powers in a Member State other than the Member State where those powers were conferred or confirmed.

Scope and Purpose of the Submission

The joint submission examines the above proposals against the background of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). While acknowledging that private international law “has a profoundly important role to play in giving effect to the object and purpose, substance and interpretation of the UNCRPD”, the authors express serious reservations regarding the solutions envisaged by the Commission, and reiterate the idea – voiced in a previous joint statement, of 2021 – whereby the Hague Convention should “be re-purposed” in light of the UNCRPD “to subserve higher and newer goal of protecting human autonomy”.

According to the document, ratification of the Hague Convention and its implementation (including regionally, through the proposed EU measures) “must selfconsciously steer toward higher substantive norms and trends”, notably as regards the preservation of the autonomy of persons with disabilities.

There is “a real risk”, the submission warns, that, “if enacted as proposed”, the Regulation and the Decision

will only be used to freeze into place an outdated policy response to disability and the needs of older persons [and] only attract needless legal liability in the international legal order for the EU and its Member States.

Hence the call to

think through how the Hague Convention might be selfconsciously moulded to underpin and not undermine the UN CRPD and also create breathing space for the drafting and eventual adoption of a universal (UN) treaty on the rights of older persons.

Main Concerns Expressed in the Submission

The authors of the submission note that the Commission did recall the UNCRPD in its proposals, notably in Recitals 10 and 15 of the proposed Regulation, but consider that is largely insufficient. They just “do not see any consistent follow-through from these Recitals in the substantive provisions of the proposed Regulation”, and rather see “many contradictions”.

According to Recital 10, the interpretation of the Regulation “should be guided by its objectives that are to enhance the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms and other rights of adults in cross-border situations, including their right to autonomy, access to justice, right to property, right to be heard, right to free movement and equality”, since the rights enshrined in this regard in both the UNCRPD and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union “are to be protected both in national and cross-border cases”. Measures taken in relation to persons with disabilities, the Recital goes on, are to be in line with the UNCRPD in order to benefit from recognition under the Regulation.

For its part, Recital 15 of the proposed Regulation observes that, regardless of the terminology used in each Member State, “measures directed to the protection of adults and taken in compliance with the fundamental rights of the adults concerned should circulate without obstacles in the Union”, adding that, to this end, the Regulation “should be interpreted in accordance with the Charter and the UNCRPD”, where assessing whether a measure taken by the authorities of another Member State is not manifestly contrary to public policy (and should accordingly be refused recognition), “the authorities of a Member State where the recognition is sought should assess whether that measure ensures the fundamental rights of the adult, in light of Articles 3, 9 12 and 19 of the UNCRPD”.

All this being regarded as insufficient, the authors of the submission reiterate the view, expressed in the joint statement of 2021, mentioned above, that States, when joining the Hague Convention, should adopt an interpretive declaration whereby they would commit to interpret and apply the Hague Convention in accordance with obligations arising out of or relating to their participation in the UNCRPD and other relevant human rights obligations, “or as a result of participation in future human rights treaties” on the same matter.

The move, the submission explains, “would make clear (not only within the EU but also vis-à-vis third States) that the CRPD is given lexical priority”.

The authors of the joint submission further suggest, for the same purpose, that States joining the Hague Convention should make a reservation to that Convention, aimed at excluding (to the effect that the Convention does allow for it) “institutionalisation” (i.e., measures whereby an adult would be placed or kept in a residential institution against or regardless of their will), from the scope of protective measures that would benefit from the Convention (and the Regulation).

This would play a significant role, they say, in ensuring that institutionalisation “is no longer seen as an appropriate response to the needs of persons with disabilities or older persons”.

According to the submission, the proposed Regulation should even go further than that, and “explicitly” prohibit institutionalisation “as a form of ‘protection’ … as between EU Member States”, as this would be “manifestly at odds” with Articles 5 and 19 of the UNCRPD.

The submission is also concerned with “representation agreements”. The expression is used in the document to refer to private mandates or “powers of representation”, to use the language of the Convention. The authors argue that the arrangements in question “should be re-framed to only mean ‘supported decision making agreements’”. Arrangements “that only kick into place upon the occurrence of a contingency like ‘incapacity’”, it is added, should be “avoided at all costs”.

Some General Remarks

Gerard Quinn and Claudia Mahler address in their submission a range of delicate and complex issues. These cannot be discussed in detail here. I will limit myself to two rather general remarks.

Do the Hague Convention (and the Proposed EU Regulation) Really Need “Re-purposing”?

The joint submission appears to build on the premise that the rules of private international law (PIL) laid down in the Hague Convention (and in the Proposed Regulation) are designed to serve goals that differ from (and couldin fact be incompatible view) the objects of the UNCRPD. The general orientation, the submission seems to argue, not just their practical operation, should be reconsidered.

This assumption is, in my view, questionable. In a contribution to the Guide to Global Private International Law edited by Paul Beaumont and Jayne Halliday (Hart Publishing 2022), I argued that the Hague Convention was designed in such a way as to advance precisely the goals that the UNCRPD (which was adopted a few years later) is meant to promote.

The Convention, for example, sets out some rather elaborate rules regarding the allocation of jurisdiction among Contracting States and the mutual communication and cooperation between the authorities of the States concerned. These rules depart significantly from those found in other texts (the Brussels I bis Regulation for instance). This is so because they are inspired by policy considerations that reflect the peculiar concerns that surround the protection of adults, including the preservation and enhancement of their autonomy. In fact, the Convention is not guided by “value-neutral” policies such as legal certainty, nor it purports to ensure that Contracting States “blindly” open their legal systems to measures of protection taken elsewhere, or private mandates governed by foreign law. Rather, the Hague Convention aims to ensure that the fundamental rights of the adults concerned may be properly realised in cross-border situations; the same can be said, generally speaking, of the proposed EU Regulation.

The question, then, in my view, is not so much whether the purpose of the Convention or the proposed Regulation should be “corrected”. The issue is rather whether the technical solutions in the Convention and in the Regulation are such that they effectively and efficiently ensure the realisation of the UNCRPD in all circumstances.

Thus, the matter is not one of orientation, but one of legal engineering. I believe the Convention and the proposed Regulation already go in the same direction as the UNCRPD. One might wonder whether the interpretation of the Convention and the wording of the proposed Regulation can be improved in a way that is more conducive to the objectives of the UNCRPD being fully met.

Should References to the UNCRPD be Featured More Prominently in PIL Rules in this Area?

The joint submission seems to underlie a concern for the visibility of the UNCRPD. This is entirely understandable. The UNCRPD brought about a real paradigm shift in disability law. Tremendous efforts are needed at the national, regional and international law level to make sure that the rights enshrined in the UNCRPD turn into policy and normative changes that can actually improve the life of those concerned. In this sense, recalling the achievements of the UNCRPD and the challenges posed by its implementation is no doubt helpful.

That said, various elements indicate that PIL scholars and practitioners are already generally aware, notably in Europe, of the need to take human rights seriously in their day-by-day work.

For instance, more than twenty years have passed since the European Court of Human Rights ruled, in Pellegrini, that foreign judgments simply cannot be recognised if they were given in breach of the fundamental rights of the parties. And while it’s true that EU legislation has made the (intra-EU) movement of judgments easier, but – as the Court of Justice itself consistently repeated (starting from Debaecker) – this goal cannot be attained by undermining in any way the fundamental rights of those concerned. The two-decade long experience with EU texts dealing with the cross-border protection of children further attest that it is perfectly possible to embody human rights considerations in PIL instruments. Additionally, as the Court made clear in Krombach, the public policy defence – if no other tools are available – can always be triggered to avoid that fundamental rights are infringed through a “mechanical” application of PIL rules.

The question, accordingly, is not whether practitioners should be directed at taking the UNCRPD into account (they obviously should, and this should occur in respect of any rule, in the field of PIL or elsewhere). The issue is, again, technical rather than political in nature. It is uncontroversial that PIL rules must be crafted and applied in a manner that is entirely consistent with the UNCRPD: the question is, rather, whether this entails that safeguards other than those arising from the Convention and the Regulation must be adopted.

The joint submission suggests that States should issue a declarative interpretation when ratifying the Hague Convention that the latter must be read and applied in light of the UNCRPD, and even make a reservation regarding institutionalisation.

I’m not entirely certain this would be strictly necessary (the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties already provides various tools aimed to guarantee the kind of inter-textual coordination advocated by the submission), and sense that a similar initiative may have some unintended adverse effects.

I consider, however, that such a move would hardly be sufficient in itself. It is the task of those applying PIL rules (and, of course, the task of the Union’s legislature, for its part) to ensure the proper articulation of PIL rules and human rights instruments relating to the protection (including the self-determination) of adults. It’s a complex and certainly unfinished task, but one that should reasonably be approached with optimism.

The joint submission of Gerard Quinn and Claudia Mahler is a powerful reminder that the topic requires further discussion, and that efforts aimed to ensure mutual understanding between experts in different fields (human rights law and PIL, in this case) remain crucially necessary.

This post was written by Ralf Michaels and Antonia Sommerfeld, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, and is also available via conflictoflaws.net.


The Draft for a Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directive currently contains no rules on jurisdiction. This creates inconsistencies between the scope of application of the Draft Directive and existing jurisdictional law, both on the EU level and on the domestic level, and can lead to an enforcement gap: EU companies may be able to escape the existing EU jurisdiction; non-EU companies may even not be subject to such jurisdiction. Effectivity requires closing that gap, and we propose ways in which this could be achieved.

The Proposal for a Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence

The process towards an EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive is gaining momentum. The EU Commission published a long awaited Proposal for a Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (CSDDD), COM(2022) 71 final, on 23 February 2022; the EU Council adopted its negotiation position on 1 December 2022; and now, the EU Parliament has suggested amendments to this Draft Directive on 1 June 2023. The EU Parliament has thereby backed the compromise textreached by its legal affairs committee on 25 April 2023. This sets off the trilogue between representatives of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission.

The current state of the CSDDD already represents a milestone. It not only introduces corporate responsibility for human rights violations and environmental damage – as already found in some national laws (e.g. in France; Germany; Netherlands; Norway; Switzerland; United Kingdom) – but also and in contrast (with the exception of French law – for more details see Camy) introduces civil liability. Art. 22 (1) CSDDD entitles persons who suffer injuries as result of a failure of a company to comply with the obligations set forth in the Directive to claim compensation. It thereby intends to increase the protection of those affected within the value chain, who will now have the prospect of compensation; it also intends to create a deterrent effect by having plaintiffs take over the enforcement of the law as “private attorney generals”. Moreover, the Directive requires that Member States implement this civil liability with an overriding mandatory application to ensure its application, Art. 22 (5) CSDDD. This is not unproblematic: the European Union undertakes here the same unilateralism that it used to criticize when previously done by the United States, with the Helms/Burton Act as the most prominent example.

That is not our concern here. Nor do we want to add to the lively discussion on the choice-of-law- aspects regarding civil liability (see, amongst others, van Calster, Ho-Dac, Dias and, before the Proposal, Rühl). Instead, we address a gap in the Draft Directive, namely the lack of any provisions on jurisdiction. After all, mandatory application in EU courts is largely irrelevant if courts do not have jurisdiction in the first place. If the remaining alternative is to bring an action in a court outside the EU, the application of the CSDDD civil liability regime is not, however, guaranteed. It will then depend on the foreign court’s conflict-of-law rules and whether these consider the CSDDD provisions applicable – an uncertain path.

Nonetheless, no mirroring provisions on international jurisdiction were included in the CSDDD, although such inclusion had been discussed. Suggestions for the inclusion of a new jurisdictional rule establishing a forum necessitatis in the Brussels I Regulation Recast existed (see the Study by the European Parliament Policy Department for External Relations from February 2019, the Draft Report of the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (2020/2129(INL) as well as the Recommendation of the European Groupe of Private International Law (GEDIP) communicated to the Commission on 8 October 2021). Further, the creation of a forum connexitatis in addition to a forum necessitatis had been recommended by both the Policy Department Study and the GEDIP. Nevertheless, the report of the European Parliament finally adopted, together with the Draft Directive of 10 March 2021, no longer contained such rule on international jurisdiction, without explanation. Likewise, the Commission’s CSDDD draft and the Parliament’s recent amendments lack such a provision.

Enforcement Gap for Actions against Defendants Domiciled within the EU

To assess the enforcement gap, it is useful to distinguish EU companies from non-EU companies as defendants. For EU companies, the Directive applies to companies of a certain size which are formed in accordance with the legislation of a Member State according to Art. 2 (1) CSDDD – the threshold numbers in the Commission’s draft and the Parliament amendments differ, ranging between 250–500 employees and EUR 40–150 million annual net worldwide turnover, with questions of special treatment for high-risk sectors.

At first sight, no enforcement gap seems to exist here. The general jurisdiction rule anchored in Art. 4 (1) Brussels I Regulation Recast allows for suits in the defendant’s domicile. Art. 63 (1) further specifies this domicile for companies as the statutory seat, the central administration or the principal place of business. (EU-based companies can also be sued at the place where the harmful event occurred according to Art. 7 (2) Brussels I Regulation Recast, but this will provide for access to an EU court only if this harmful event occurred within the EU.) The objection of forum non conveniens does not apply in the Brussels I Regulation system (as clarified in the CJEU’s Owusu decision). Consequently, in cases where jurisdiction within the EU is given, the CSDDD applies, including the civil liability provision with its mandatory application pursuant to Art. 22 (1), (5).

Yet there is potential leeway for EU domiciled companies to escape EU jurisdiction and thus avoid the application of the CSDDD’s civil liability. One way to avoid EU jurisdiction is to use an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of a third country, or an arbitration clause. Such agreements concluded in advance of any occurred damage are conceivable between individual links of the value chain, such as between employees and subcontractors (in employment contracts) or between different suppliers along the chain (in purchase and supply agreements). EU law does not expressly prohibit such derogation. Precedent for how such exclusive jurisdiction agreements can be treated can be found in the case law following the Ingmar decision of the CJEU. In Ingmar, the CJEU had decided that a commercial agent’s compensation claim according to Arts. 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agents Directive (86/653/EEC) could not be avoided through a choice of law in favour of the law of a non-EU country, even though the Directive said nothing about an internationally mandatory nature for the purpose of private international law – as Art. 22 (5) CSDDD in contrast now does. The German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) extended this choice-of-law argument to the law of jurisdiction and held that jurisdiction clauses which could undermine the application of mandatory provisions are invalid, too, as only such a rule would safeguard the internationally mandatory scope of application of the provisions. Other EU Member State courts have shown a similar understanding not only with regard to exclusive jurisdiction agreements but also with regard to arbitration agreements (Austrian Supreme Court of Justice; High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division).

Common to Arts. 17 and 18 Commercial Agents Directive and Art. 22 CSDDD is their mandatory nature for the purpose of private international law, which established by the ECJ for the former and is legally prescribed for the latter in Art. 22 (5) CSDDD. This suggests a possible transfer of the jurisdictional argument regarding jurisdiction. To extend the internationally mandatory nature of a provision into the law of jurisdiction is not obvious; choice of law and jurisdiction are different areas of law. It also means that the already questionable unilateral nature of the EU regulation is given even more force. Nonetheless, to do so appears justified. Allowing parties to avoid application of the CSDDD would run counter to its effective enforcement and therefore to the effet utile. This means that an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of a third country or an arbitration clause will have to be deemed invalid unless it is clear that the CSDDD remains applicable or the applicable law provides for similar protection.

Enforcement Gap for Actions against Defendants Domiciled Outside the EU

While the enforcement gap with regard to EU companies can thus be solved under existing law, additional problems arise with regard to non-EU corporations. Notably, the Draft Directive applies also to certain non-EU companies formed in accordance with the legislation of a third country, Art. 2 (2) CSDDD. For these companies, the scope of application depends upon the net turnover within the territory of the Union, this being the criterion creating a territorial connection between these companies and the EU (recital (24)). The Parliament’s amendments lower this threshold and thereby sharpen the scope of application of the Directive.

While application of the CSDDD to these companies before Member State courts is guaranteed due to its mandatory character, jurisdiction over non-EU defendants within the EU is not. International jurisdiction for actions against third-country defendants as brought before EU Member State courts is – with only few exceptions – generally governed by the national provisions of the respective Member State whose courts are seized, Art. 6 (1) Brussels I Regulation Recast. If the relevant national rules do not establish jurisdiction, no access to court is given within the EU.

And most national rules do not establish such jurisdiction. General jurisdiction at the seat of the corporation will usually lie outside the European Union. And the territorial connection of intra-EU turnover used to justify the applicability of the CSDDD does not create a similar basis of general jurisdiction, because jurisdiction at the place of economic activity (“doing business jurisdiction”) is alien to European legal systems. Even in the US, where this basis was first introduced, the US Supreme Court now limits general jurisdiction to the state that represents the “home” for the defendant company (BNSF Railroad Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.Ct. 1549 (2017); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)); whether the recent decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. (2023) will re-open the door to doing business jurisdiction remains to be seen (see Gardner).

Specific jurisdiction will not exist in most cases, either. Specific jurisdiction in matters relating to tort will be of little use, as in value chain civil liability claims the place of the event giving rise to damages and the place of damage are usually outside the EU and within that third state. Some jurisdictional bases otherwise considered exorbitant may be available, such as the plaintiff’s nationality (Art. 14 French Civil Code) or the defendant’s assets (Section 23 German Code of Civil Procedure). Otherwise, the remaining option to seize a non-EU defendant in a Member State court is through submission by appearance according to Art. 26 Brussels I Regulation Recast.

Whether strategic joint litigation can be brought against an EU anchor defendant in order to drag along a non-EU defendant depends upon the national provisions of the EU Member States. Art. 8 (1) Brussels I Regulation Recast, which allows for connected claims to be heard and determined together, applies only to EU-defendants – for non-EU defendants the provision is inapplicable. In some Member States, the national civil procedure provisions enable jurisdiction over connected claims against co-defendants, e.g. in the Netherlands (Art. 7 (1) Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering), France (Art. 42 (2) Code de procédure civile) and Austria (§ 93 Jurisdiktionsnorm); conversely, such jurisdiction is not available in countries such as Germany.

Various Member State decisions have accepted claims against non-EU companies as co-defendants by means of joinder of parties. These cases have based their jurisdiction on national provisions which were applicable according to Art. 6 (1) Brussels I Recast Regulation: In Milieudefensie in December 2015, the Court of Appeal at the Hague held permissible an action against a Dutch anchor defendant that was joined with an action against a Nigerian company as co-defendant based on Dutch national procedural law, on the condition that claims against the anchor defendant were actually possible. The UK Supreme Court ruled similarly in its Vedanta decision in April 2019, wherein it found that English private international law, namely the principle of the necessary or proper party gateway, created a valid basis for invoking English jurisdiction over a defendant not domiciled in a Member State (with registered office in Zambia) who had been joined with an anchor defendant based in the UK. The claim was accepted on the condition that (i) the claims against the anchor defendant involve a real issue to be tried; (ii) it would be reasonable for the court to try that issue; (iii) the foreign defendant is a necessary or proper party to the claims against the anchor defendant; (iv) the claims against the foreign defendant have a real prospect of success; (v) either England is the proper place in which to bring the combined claims or there is a real risk that the claimants will not obtain substantial justice in the alternative foreign jurisdiction, even if it would otherwise have been the proper place or the convenient or natural forum. The UK Supreme Court confirmed this approach in February 2021 in its Okpabi decision (for discussion of possible changes in UK decisions after Brexit, see Hübner/Lieberknecht).

In total, these decisions allow for strategic joint litigation against third-country companies together with an EU anchor defendant. Nonetheless, they do not establish international jurisdiction within the EU for isolated actions against non-EU defendants.

How to Close the Enforcement Gap – forum legis

The demonstrated lack of access to court weakens the Directive’s enforceability and creates an inconsistency between the mandatory nature of the civil liability and the lack of a firm jurisdictional basis. On a substantive level, the Directive stipulates civil liability for non-EU companies (Art. 22 CSDDD) if they are sufficiently economically active within the EU internal market (Art. 2 (2) CSDDD). Yet missing EU rules on international jurisdiction vis-à-vis third-country defendants often render procedural enforcement before an intra-EU forum impossible – even if these defendants generate significant turnover in the Union. Consequently, procedural enforcement of civil liability claims against these non-EU defendants is put at risk. The respective case law discussed does enable strategic joint litigation, but isolated actions against non-EU defendants cannot be based upon these decisions. At the same time, enforceability gaps exist with respect to EU defendants: It remains uncertain whether the courts of Member States will annul exclusive jurisdiction agreements and arbitration agreements if these undermine the application of the CSDDD.

This situation is unsatisfactory. It is inconsistent for the EU lawmaker to make civil liability mandatory in order to ensure civil enforcement but to then not address the access to court necessary for such enforcement. And it is inadequate that the (systemic) question of judicial enforceability of civil liability claims under the Directive is outsourced to the decision of the legal systems of the Member States. National civil procedural law is called upon to decide which third-country companies can be sued within the EU and how the Ingmar case law for EU domiciled companies will be further developed. This is a problem of uniformity – different national laws allow for different answers. And it is a problem of competence as Member State courts are asked to  render decisions that properly belong to the EU level.

The CSDDD aims to effectively protect human rights and the environment in EU-related value chains and to create a level playing field for companies operating within the EU. This requires comparable enforcement possibilities for actions based on civil liability claims that are brought pursuant to Art. 22 CSDDD against all corporations operating within the Union. The different regulatory options the EU legislature has to achieve this goal are discussed in what follows.

Doing business jurisdiction

A rather theoretical possibility would be to allow actions against third-country companies within the EU in accordance with the former (and perhaps revived) US case law on doing business jurisdiction in those cases where these companies are substantially economically active within the EU internal market. This would be consistent with the CSDDD’s approach of stretching its scope of application based on the level of economic activity within the EU (Art. 2 (2) CSDDD). However, the fact that such jurisdiction has always been considered exorbitant in Europe and has even been largely abolished in the USA speaks against this development. Moreover, a doing business jurisdiction would also go too far: it would establish general jurisdiction, at least according to the US model, and thus also apply to claims that have nothing to do with the CSDDD.

Forum necessitatis and universal jurisdiction

Another possible option would be the implementation of a forum necessitatis jurisdiction in order to provide access to justice, as proposed by the European Parliament Policy Department for External Relations, the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and the GEDIP. However, such jurisdiction could create uncertainty because it would apply only exceptionally. Moreover, proving a “lack of access to justice” requires considerable effort in each individual case. Until now, EU law provides for a forum necessitatis only in special regulations; the Brussels I Regulation Recast does not contain any general rule for emergency jurisdiction. Member State provisions in this regard generally require a certain connection with the forum to establish such jurisdiction – the exact prerequisites differ, however, and will thus not be easily agreed upon on an EU level (see Kübler-Wachendorff).

The proposal to enforce claims under Art. 22 CSDDD by means of universal civil jurisdiction for human rights violations, which could be developed analogously to universal jurisdiction under criminal law, appears similarly unpromising; it would also go further than necessary.

Forum connexitatis

It seems more promising to implement a special case of a forum connexitatis so as to allow for  litigation of closely connected actions brought against a parent company domiciled within the EU together with a subsidiary or supplier domiciled in a third country, as proposed by the European Parliament Policy Department for External Relations and the GEDIP. This could be implemented by means of a teleological reduction of the requirements of Art. 8 (1) Brussels I Regulation Recast with regard to third-country companies, which would be an approach more compatible with the Brussels Regulation system than the implementation of a forum necessitatis provision (such a solution has, for instance, been supported by Mankowski, in: Fleischer/Mankowski (Hrsg.), LkSG, Einl., para. 342 and the GEDIP). This would simultaneously foster harmonisation on the EU level given that joint proceedings currently depend upon procedural provisions in the national law of the Member States. Moreover, this could avoid “blame games” between the different players in the value chain (see Kieninger, RW 2022, 584, 589). For the implementation of such a forum connexitatis, existing Member State regulations and related case law (Milieudefensie, Vedanta, and Okpabi) can serve as guidance. Such a forum is not yet common practice in all Member States; thus, its political viability remains to be seen. It should also be borne in mind that the implementation of a forum connexitatis on its own would only enable harmonised joint actions that were brought against EU domiciled anchor defendants together with non-EU defendants; it would not enable isolated actions against third-country companies – even if they are economically active within the EU and fall within the scope of application of the CSDDD.

Best option: Forum legis

The best way to close the CSDDD enforcement gap would be introducing an international jurisdiction basis corresponding to the personal scope of application of the Directive. The EU legislature would need to implement a head of jurisdiction applicable to third-country companies that operate within the EU internal market at the level specified in Art. 2 (2) CSDDD. Effectively, special jurisdiction would be measured on the basis of net turnover achieved within the EU. This would procedurally protect the Directive’s substantive regulatory objectives of human rights and environmental protection within EU-related value chains. Moreover, this would ensure a level playing field in the EU internal market.

Other than a forum premised on joint litigation, this solution would allow isolated actions to be brought – in an EU internal forum – against non-EU companies operating within the EU. The advantage of this solution compared to a forum of necessity is that the connecting factor of net turnover is already defined by Art. 2 (2) CSDDD, thus reducing the burden of proof, legal uncertainty and any unpredictability for the parties. Moreover, this approach would interfere less with the regulatory interests of other states than a forum necessitatis rule, which for its part would reach beyond the EU’s own regulatory space.

A forum legis should not be implemented only as a subsidiary option for cases in which there is a lack of access to justice, because this would create legal uncertainty. The clear-cut requirements of Art. 2 (2) CSDDD are an adequate criterion for jurisdiction via a forum legis. On the other hand, it should not serve as an exclusive basis of jurisdiction, because especially plaintiffs should not be barred from the ability to bring suit outside the EU. The risk of strategic declaratory actions brought by companies in a court outside the EU seems rather negligeable, and this  can be avoided either by giving preference to actions for performance over negative declaratory actions, as is the law in Germany or through the requirement of recognisability of a foreign judgment, which would not be met by a foreign decision violating domestic public policy by not providing sufficient protection.

This leaves a problem, however: The CSDDD does not designate which Member State’s court have jurisdiction. Since a forum legis normally establishes adjudicatory jurisdiction correlating with the applicable law, jurisdiction lies with the courts of the country whose law is applied. This is not possible as such for EU law because the EU does not have its own ordinary courts. The competent Member State court within the EU must be determined. Two options exist with regard to the CSDDD: to give jurisdiction to the courts in the country where the highest net turnover is reached, or to allow claimants to choose the relevant court. The first option involves difficult evidentiary issues, the second may give plaintiffs an excessive amount of choice. In either case, non-EU companies will be treated differently from EU companies on the question of the competent court – for non-EU companies, net turnover is decisive in establishing the forum, for EU-companies, the seat of the company is decisive. This difference is an unavoidable consequence resulting from extension of the scope of application of the Directive to third-country companies on the basis of net turnover.

Implementation

How could this forum legis be achieved? The most straightforward way would be to include a rule on jurisdiction in the CSDDD, which would then oblige the Member States to introduce harmonised rules of jurisdiction into national procedural law. This would be a novelty in the field of European international civil procedure law, but it would correspond to the character of the special provision on value chains as well as to the mechanism of the CSDDD’s liability provision. An alternative would be to include in the Brussels I Regulation Recast a sub-category of a special type of jurisdiction under Art. 7 Brussels I Regulation Recast. This as well would be a novelty to the Brussels system, which in principle requires that the defendant be seated in a Member State (see also Kieninger, RW 2022, 584, 593, who favours reform of the Brussels I Regulation Recast for the sake of uniformity within the EU). This second option would certainly mesh with current efforts to extend the Brussels system to non-EU defendants (see Lutzi/Piovesani/Zgrabljic Rotar).

The implementation of such a forum legis is not without problems: It subjects companies, somewhat inconsistently with the EU legal scheme, to de facto jurisdiction merely because they generate significant turnover in the EU’s internal market. Yet such a rule is a necessary consequence of the extraterritorial extension of the Directive to third-country companies. The unilateral character of the CSDDD is problematic. But if the CSDDD intends to implement such an extension on a substantive level, this must be reflected on a procedural level so as to enable access to court. The best way to do this is by implementing a forum legis. The CSDDD demonstrates the great importance of compensation of victims of human rights and environmental damage, by making the cicil liability rule internationally mandatory. Creating a corresponding head of jurisdiction for these substantive civil liability claims is then necessary and consistent in order to achieve access to court and, thus, procedural enforceability.

On 28 June 2023, the European Commission presented a package consisting of three proposals regarding the Euro currency. It includes a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of Euro banknotes and coins, a proposal for a regulation on the establishment of the digital euro, accompanied by a proposal for a regulation of on the provision of digital Euro services by payment services providers incorporated in Member States whose currency is not the Euro.

While ensuring that individuals and businesses can continue to access and pay with Euro banknotes and coins across the Euro area, the package aims to set out a framework for a possible new digital form of the Euro that the European Central Bank could choose to issue in the future, as a complement to cash.

The package is not concerned, as such, with private international law. However, it appears to have some implications for private international law, which will be briefly discussed below.

Background

Digitalisation and new technology are progressively influencing the lives of Europeans and the European economy. As the European economy becomes more digital, Europeans are increasingly using private digital payment methods to transact. Banknotes and coins, the only existing forms of central bank money with legal tender available to the general public (including individuals, governments, and corporations), cannot support the EU’s economy in the digital age.

As online transactions expand and payment habits of the general public migrate to the wide range of private digital payment methods available in the EU, their use in payments declines. The lack of a widely available and useable form of central bank money that is technologically fitted to the digital era may also erode trust in commercial bank money, and eventually in the Euro itself.

In this context, the issuing of a retail CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) has acquired substantial attention in recent years: a retail CBDC, like cash, would be an official form of central bank money that is directly available to the general public and has the legal tender status. And attention would like to turn into reality also in the EU.

Indeed, many central banks across the world have started looking at the possibility of introducing CBDCs. They, like the European Central Bank, have been conducting research and piloting programmes to better understand their potential advantages and drawbacks. Sweden, for instance, began a research on the viability of an e-krona within the EU. Outside of the EU, the United Kingdom has published multiple consultations and begun research towards a digital pound, akin to the European Central Bank’s technical inquiry into a digital euro. China has previously produced a digital yuan outside of Europe, which is already accessible for payment in an increasing number of places, with major banks and payment service providers facilitating the process. The United States, then, is looking at the possibility of a digital dollar but has not yet concluded if it is necessary.

However, some underlying choices need to be faced. For example, CBDC can be of two different types: (a) Account-based: before allowing a user to make a payment, an account-based approach often entails the use of a trusted third party to authenticate the identification of the account holder and the check on account balance; the accounts are then debited and credited accordingly; or (b) Token-based: a form of money issued by a central bank whereby the monetary claim on the central bank is incorporated in a digital token and the transfer of the token equals transfer of the claim, without current-account relationship between the central bank and the holder.

To conclude this overall background, it is useful to clarify that it is not a matter of crypto-assets and blockchain. Crypto assets, indeed, are purely digital assets that use public ledgers over the internet to prove ownership. They use cryptography, peer-to-peer networks and a distributed ledger technology (DLT) – such as blockchain – to create, verify and secure transactions. While the digital euro, unlike crypto-assets, would be central bank money. The European Central Bank would guarantee its safety, stability, and ability to be exchanged for Euro currency at face value. In contrast, the value of crypto-assets might vary substantially, and their conversion into Euro currency or even commercial bank money cannot be guaranteed.

Proposal on Digital Euro

The goal of the proposal on digital Euro is to keep central bank money with legal tender status available to the general public, while also providing a cutting-edge and cost-effective payment method, ensuring a high level of privacy in digital payments, maintaining financial stability, and promoting accessibility and financial inclusion.

As a result, they offer the essential legal framework to guarantee the successful use of the digital Euro as a single currency throughout the eurozone, addressing the demands of users in the digital age, and supporting competitiveness, efficiency, innovation, and resilience in the EU’s digitalizing economy. They offer the essential legal framework to guarantee the successful use of the digital Euro as a single currency throughout the eurozone, addressing the demands of users in the digital age, and supporting competitiveness, efficiency, innovation, and resilience in the EU’s digitalizing economy.

Subject Matter, Establishment and Issuance of the Digital Euro

‘Digital euro’ means the digital form of the single currency available to natural and legal persons for the purpose of retail payments. It may be issued by the European Central Bank and, if authorised by the European Central Bank, by eurozone national central banks. This means that it would be public money or central bank money. Like Euro banknotes and coins, the digital Euro will be a direct liability of the European Central Bank or of eurozone national central banks vis-à-vis digital Euro users, i.e. those making use of a digital Euro payment service in the capacity of payer, payee, or both.

Several rules are being proposed to integrate the digital Euro into the current legal framework. In particular, digital Euro payment transactions shall be subject to Payment Services Directive (PSD2, as will be replaced by proposed PSD3 and PSR), the Cross-Border Payments Regulation (as will be amended by the proposed accompanying Regulation), the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5, as will be replaced by proposed AMLD6 and AMLR) and the Funds Transfer Regulation.

Legal Tender

The digital Euro will have legal tender status, which means that it must be accepted at face value with the ability to satisfy a payment obligation; this is not the case for existing electronic means of payments provided by commercial banks. Surcharges will be prohibited. To guarantee the effective preservation of the digital euro’s legal tender status as a unified currency throughout the eurozone, as well as the acceptance of digital Euro payments, provisions on sanctions for infringements will be adopted and implemented in the Member States.

Payees are entitled to refuse payment in digital Euro under the circumstances indicated in Article 9.
The digital Euro will be convertible in the same way as Euro banknotes and coins, scriptural money, and electronic money are. Where both digital Euro and Euro cash acceptance is required, the payer may choose between the two.

Distribution

(Private) Payment service companies would act as intermediaries for the digital euro. Banks and other payment service providers, indeed, would be in charge and in responsibility of distributing digital euros and providing payment services to natural and legal persons, primarily via offering a variety of digital Euro payment services (without the need for an extra licence). These services include first of all enabling users to access and use digital euro; persons, indeed, would be able to open a digital Euro account at any commercial bank or any other payment service provider, such as payment institutions and electronic money institutions. Then, other digital Euro payment services included cover initiating and receiving digital Euro payment transactions, managing their digital Euro payment accounts (which function similarly to digital wallets and have a unique account number), providing users with digital Euro payment instruments, and conducting funding (i.e., acquiring digital Euro in exchange for cash or other funds) / defunding operations.

There is also a list of basic digital Euro payment services that must be provided to individuals for free, such as opening and maintaining digital Euro payment accounts, funding/defunding from/into cash, initiating and receiving digital Euro payment transactions (person-to-person, person-to-government, government-to-person, or point of interaction including point-of-sale and e-commerce) via an electronic payment instrument, or providing such instruments. Users using digital euros can have one or more digital Euro payment accounts with the same or other payment services providers.

Access, Use and its Limits, Technical Features and Privacy

The proposal provides also other rules.

Chapter six, devoted to the access side, deals with the use of the digital Euro outside the Euro area, which depend on whether natural and legal persons reside or are established in a non-Euro area Member States or in a third country. It will be possible, subject to described conditions under Articles 18 to 21.

Technical features are also taken into account under chapter seven, where it is indicated that the digital Euro should be developed in a way that makes it easy to use for the general public, including financially excluded or at-risk individuals, those with impairments, functional limits, or inadequate digital skills, and the elderly. In order to achieve this aim, digital Euro users will not be needed to have a non-digital Euro payment account. And the digital Euro should be available for digital Euro payment transactions both offline and online as of the first issuance of the digital Euro and should allow for conditional payment transactions. Users may use the European Digital Identity Wallets established under the proposed Regulation on a European Digital Identity, described on this blog, to onboard and make payments. The digital Euro should enable digital users to switch their digital Euro payment accounts to another payment services provider at the request of the digital Euro user.

Finally, privacy and data protection issues are addressed.

Private International Law Implications

CBDCs are not free from private international law implications. Payment currency, indeed, is a component that private international law cannot ignore.

Basically, the problem of problems, which then concerns all the classic private international law issues, is that relating to the connecting factors to be used for this currency. Can the criteria of the locus rei sitae and lex rei sitae have any weight? And if so, where is this currency located? If not, what other criteria to use?

And, generally related to the latter, also the role of private autonomy and its possible limits is to be addressed. For instance, if the CBDC is included in a contract with cross-border elements, how do you provide for party autonomy? Should boundaries to CBDC, and the contract, be established?

In jurisdiction matter, it follows that identifying the court to deal with it is relevant, among intermediaries and account holders.

But also for the applicable law the problems are no less: opening CBDC accounts, holding, transactions, payments, settlements, and other aspect such as data flow can be dealt with.

An impact, also, in terms of recognition and enforcement, imagining having a judgement including CBDC matters to be recognized and enforced in different countries.

History tends to repeat itself: what to do then? Adapt existing rules, if they resist this tool, or devise new ones?

Surely a good starting point is to refer to the contribution in progress in this field, such as the Proposal for Exploratory Work: Private International Law Aspects of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Perhaps the HCCH is also the place to regulate these private international law issues at international level (so, with non-EU countries) on these topics?

Finally, since we are talking about dematerialized assets, can some help come from the system developed under the Convention of 5 July 2006 on the Applicable Law to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an Intermediary (Securities Convention)?

The authors of this post are Bernadette Boehl, Sophie Dannecker, Larissa Grundmann, Maira Gabriela Nino Pedraza (all University of Bonn). A series of webinars took place in May 2023 under the title The Future of Cross-Border Parenthood in the EU – Analysing the EU Parenthood Proposal. Experts from various Member States discussed the main elements of the proposal and possibilities for improvement. The key issues addressed  in  each webinar are illustrated  below. Those interested in the PowerPoint presentations prepared by the speakers, are invited to follow this link


Session One

The first webinar (3 May 2023) started with a presentation by Jens Scherpe about Surrogacy in comparative perspective. 

Scherpe emphasized the impossibility of avoiding surrogacy as a worldwide phenomenon, hence the global surrogacy market which affects people on an international level.  He classified the jurisdictions into three categories. The jurisdictions that prohibit (e.g., France, Germany), tolerate (e.g. England), and regulate surrogacy.

For Scherpe, surrogacy tourism is a consequence of the prohibitive as well as the tolerant approach to surrogacy. Surrogacy plays an important economic role. It can be a multi-million-dollar business. This is especially true in countries whose jurisdictions follow a free market approach, such as some Canadian provinces, which could be described as “Rolls Royce” jurisdictions. This allows the intended parent to be recognised on the birth certificate from the outset. Countries that allow surrogacy in a way that the intended parents can be documented on the birth certificate beforehand but leave the process more or less unregulated tend to be attractive to a lot of people from prohibitive or tolerant countries. Those “Wild-West” jurisdictions, as Scherpe calls them, are much cheaper for future parents. But as a matter of fact, they are less protective of the surrogate and of children, and exploitation may occur. According to Scherpe, the achievement of the seemingly morally better approaches, the prohibitive and the tolerant, has the effect of exporting exploitation to those countries.

After signaling the experiences of countries like England and Denmark, the speaker concluded that both models, the prohibitive and the tolerant, have failed to prevent surrogacy by not recognising parenthood. In fact, a clear regulation is necessary and unavoidable and could solve some of the legal problems. He ends with the prediction that good regulation will not wipe out all exploitation in surrogacy matters but will, with no doubt, reduce the number of cases drastically.

Afterwards, Cristina González Beilfuss introduced the Parenthood Proposal and explained in her presentation (What’s in it? The subject matter, scope and definitions) four of the most important issues regarding the scope of the proposal.

(1) The substantive scope of the proposal is described in Article 1. “jurisdiction and applicable law for the establishment of parenthood in a Member State in cross-Border situations”. To understand parenthood is also to be seen from a sociological perspective, the definition in Article 4 can be used. Beilfuss expresses her sympathy with the term used in the Spanish draft, which is not “parentalidad” but “filiación” because it puts the child in the center of the law. Filiation should also be the preferred term in the English version, since it is a more child-centered concept than parenthood. For González, the contestation of parenthood, which is included, should have a more significant role in the proposal.

(2) Following the traditional practice of the European Commission, Article 3 defines the scope of application in a negative way. This Article confirms that the Proposal focuses on the bond of filiation but not on its consequences (Articles 3, 2. (b), (f) or (g)). Parental responsibility is not covered and should be consistently distinguished from filiation.

(3) Among the excluded matters is the existence, validity or recognition of a marriage. Marriage, however, regularly arises as a preliminary question in filiation matters. This is due to the significance of the mother´s civil status in establishing  a second child-parent relationship. It would therefore be important that the Regulation included a common rule on the preliminary question in order to ensure that it is solved uniformly across the Member States.

(4) Another exclusion that is problematic is that of adoption. The English text is more correct than the French or the Spanish.  Only intercountry adoptions, e.g. adoptions where the child is taken from their country of habitual residence to the country of habitual residence of those adopting are excluded, The Proposal is however wrong in assuming that all other adoptions are domestic adoptions that do not give rise to Private international questions. Whenever the child or the prospective adopters hold a foreign nationality there is a need to determine jurisdiction and the applicable law. The rules proposed are not well suited for adoption cases.

(5) The proposed rules only apply to the recognition or, as the case may be, acceptance of documents issued in a Member (see Article 3.3). Documents, in particular, birth certificates may however be issued after the recognition or acceptance of a decision or document issued in a Third State. This entails that the dividing line between Third State and European Union cases is far from clear.

In conclusion, the examination conducted by Cristina González Beifuss, as well as the questions left open, highlights the need for further discussion about the Proposal from the European Commission.

Session Two

The second webinar (10 May 2023) opened with a look at EU Primary law and a presentation by Susanne Gössl titled The EU Proposal and primary EU law: a match made in heaven?

The presentation started with an overview of the case law of the CJEU regarding the free movement of citizens (Article 21 TFEU), Article 18 TFEU (discrimination on grounds of nationality) and Article 20 (EU citizenship) in questions of status. According to that case law, a limping status constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of EU citizens and EU primary law requires the Member States to remove the obstacle.

To avoid a limping status, courts need to recognize at least parts of a status validly established in another EU Member State. The EU has two possibilities to legislate: harmonization of substantial law (as happened in Company Law) and the harmonization of private international law which is the approach the EU has taken in family law matters. The Proposal follows the second path and transforms the CJEU case law into EU secondary law.

In that reading, Article 2 of the Proposal (relationship with other provisions of Union law) seems mysterious, as EU primary law is at another level of hierarchy than EU secondary law.

One reading could be that the provision allows Member States to give more room to free movement if the national law is more generous than the proposal. Another interpretation could be that the Proposal does not understand itself as exhaustive in transforming the case law into secondary law. The latter could be the case if the scope of application does not extend to situations where EU citizens are not domiciled and therefore not registered in a Member State. They would fall under EU primary law as EU citizens but not under the proposal.

Furthermore, Gössl criticized Article 17 para. 2 (applicable law) as it contains alternative connecting factors and discretion to the court in case the main rule does not establish two parents. Discretion of the court means that EU primary law could give an obligation to recognize as father an EU citizen no matter whether this is in the best interest of the child. Finally, it remains unclear whether the conflict of laws rules of the proposal can be used in EU Member States to accept a status if they use the method of “recognition via conflict of laws”.

In Sahyouni I & II, the CJEU rejected the use of Rome III for such a national method. It would enhance the free movement of citizens if the Parenthood Proposal allowed Member States to use the Proposal for that way of acceptance. At least a clarification would be helpful.

In this order of ideas, the relationship between the draft and European private law is, for Gössl, not a match made in heaven, but at least a match.

Afterwards, Tobias Helms talked about The law governing parenthood: are you my father?.

Helms emphasized in advance that the initiative of the European Commission is to be welcomed. However, there would still be room for improvement in detail. During his presentation, Tobias Helms mainly analysed Article 17 of the Proposal.

The primary connecting factor for the establishment of parenthood is, according to para. 1, the law of the state in which the person giving birth has their habitual residence at the time of birth. As Tobias Helms pointed out, this connecting factor would be particularly friendly to surrogate motherhood. However, the connecting factor is unchangeable because it is fixed forever at the time of birth, which is problematic. Therefore, Article 17 para. 1 of the draft should be applied only with regard to the time of the child’s birth; thereafter, the child’s habitual residence should be decisive.

Also, Article 17 would have to be supplemented by establishing an Article 17a concerning the termination of parenthood. Additionally, a new Article 18a should be introduced regarding adoptions. An extra Article 22a could deal with overriding mandatory provisions.

Session Three

The third webinar (17 May 2023) started with a presentation by Alina Tryfonidou on The mutual recognition of decisions under the EU Proposal: much ado about nothing?

Tryfonidou provided an overview of the EU provisions regarding the recognition of decisions concerning parenthood. The provisions broadly follow the approach of other EU private international law regulations in the field of family law.

Article 4 of the proposal defines court and court decisions. The definitions are more abstract than those used in other EU private international law provisions in family law. Therefore, further clarification is desirable. The EU proposal is only applicable to cases with cross-border elements between member states. Decisions in third-party states are excluded from the scope of the application (Article 3(3)). Recognition of those decisions remains a question of national law. Children subject to decisions in third states are at least protected by the ECHR.

The central provision regarding the recognition of decisions is Article 24(1). It states that a court decision on parenthood given in a Member State shall be recognized in all other Member States without any special procedure being required. Article 24(3) allows the court to determine the issue where the recognition of a court decision is only raised as an incidental question.

Article 26 specifies the documents to be produced for recognition of a decision. The required attestation is supposed to enable the authority to determine whether there are grounds for refusal. The exhaustive list of such grounds is laid down in Article 31(1). The most famous ground allows the refusal if the recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought. The provision must be applied in observance of fundamental rights and principles laid down in the CFR. Articles 32 and 25 regulate applications for the refusal of recognition or the decision that there are no grounds for the refusal of recognition.

The next presentation was given by Maria Caterina Baruffi on Who decides on parenthood? The rules of jurisdiction.

Baruffi started by referring to the heavy criticism aimed at the proposal. Although she admitted that some of these criticisms are partly justified, she emphasized the positive aspects, namely the protection of children and fundamental rights.

The general system of jurisdiction is laid down in Article 6 of the proposal. It lists six grounds for jurisdiction alternatively. That allows for additional flexibility and facilitates access to justice.

On the other hand, a different approach may have reduced the possibility of parallel proceedings and forum shopping. Article 7 combines the presence rule with these grounds. According to recital 42, this is supposed to allow the courts to exercise jurisdiction regarding third-country national children. Article 8 states that where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 6 or 7, jurisdiction is determined by national law. Article 9 adds the forum necessitatis rule. Articles 6 to 9 could be called exorbitant when combined. The reference to the national law of member states in Article 8 creates the additional possibility of taking recourse to exorbitant rules of jurisdiction in national law. However, the broad approach further facilitates access to justice and protects children’s fundamental rights.

Following this, Maria Caterina Baruffi briefly introduced Articles 10 and 14 which mirror the Brussels IIb Regulation, Article 15 which specifies the child’s right to be heard. She then touched on the child’s right to know its origin. This right was excluded from the proposal. Maria Caterina Baruffi argued that the Union does not have the competence to include such a right. It is not possible to predict the outcome of the proposal. It is a good starting point for a reasonable solution.

Session Four

The last webinar started with Patrick Wautelet who talked about Authentic documents and parenthood: between recognition and acceptance.

Wautelet discussed the recognition of court decisions in another Member State (Chapter IV, Section 1-2) together with the acceptance of other authentic instruments with either binding legal effect (Chapter IV, Section 3) or those with no binding legal effect (Chapter V) in the Member State of origin.

The most critical point of the proposal regarding Chapters IV and V is the distinction between the authentic instruments with binding or no binding legal effect since the question of whether an instrument has legally binding effect or not is a matter for the national law of the Member State in which the instrument was issued. It may therefore be answered differently in each Member State.

Wautelet illustrated the difficulties which this diversity may cause with an example from practice: when a child is born in France to married parents, the birth certificate drawn up must, of course, be regarded as an authentic instrument. Whether it also has a “binding legal effect” must be determined according to French family law. This question must be answered differently in France regarding maternity and paternity. However, this does not apply equally to every Member State, which means the question which category is relevant may not be answered in general for all birth certificates.

In the presentation and the following discussion, it was underlined that drawing the line between authentic instruments with binding and no binding legal effect can be complex, not least regarding other existing family arrangements (same-sex parenthood).

Furthermore, it was suggested that the terms used in the Proposal lack precision: even if an authentic act has a binding legal effect, it may be that it is not completely binding, as it may be amenable to challenge. The  term ‘no legal binding effect’ suggests further that the instrument is not legally effective although it actually is. Those labels are therefore confusing and should either be reconsidered or at least explained further. His preferred choice is to not differentiate between the two categories but to merge the two.

Another topic was the acceptance of authentic instruments with no binding legal effect, as stated in Article 45 of the Proposal. There are two options for an evidentiary effect of those documents: the text may provide that the effects the original instrument has in the Member State of origin will be extended to other Member States (“same evidentiary effects”). Article 45, however, also includes another possibility, i.e. that an instrument be giventhe “most comparable effect”. Understand the evidentiary effect exiting in the state of origin requires extensive and difficult work. Patrick Wautelet proposes simplifying the Regulation with regard to the comparable effect by striking it out.

To conclude, the speaker presented four points to be considered for further reflection. Firstly, it is important to work on the language, ensuring that all terms are clearly defined. Secondly, the alternative rules for acceptance and the relationship with public policy need to be cleared. Thirdly, it is advisable to merge the two categories of authentic instruments, which should help avoid confusion or ambiguity in their application. Finally, he would like to strive for a less complex regulation – not at least to keep the users in mind.

The very last presentation, given by Ilaria Pretelli, concerned The European certificate of Parenthood: a passport for parents and children?.

The last presentation refers to Chapter VI of the proposal and the creation of a “European Certificate of Parenthood”. The certificate is supposed to make a binding presumption of the status, which results only from the certificate itself. This certificate may not make a decisive difference in numerous cases because birth certificates are widely accepted even today. But especially for cases of co-maternity, it will help with an easier recognition of co-maternity and support same-sex couples by setting a reliable framework. Additionally, this framework will be useful regarding contractual arrangements, such as surrogacy. It eliminates the risk of the child being stateless.

The similarity between the proposed “European Certificate of Parenthood” and the “European Certificate of Succession” regarding the presumption of status should not be seen as extensive as it may seem at first sight. The presumption of the status of parenthood stated by Article 53 para. 2 of the proposal differs not in the wording but in the meaning, from the presumption of status regulated by the Certificate of Succession (Article 69 para. 2). According to Ilaria Pretelli there is a huge difference in the meaning of the “presumption of status” as it is used by the proposal, because of how it can be challenged. The granted status by the proposal states a much stronger binding effect than the certificate of succession. This she concludes from seeing the explanatory memorandum, which stresses the evidentiary effects of established parenthood in another Member State. But she suggests that this matter should be clarified because of the identical and therefore misleading wording. She points to the unanswered question about the possibility of challenging the certificate by another Member State as a main problem in the proposal.

Also, Ilaria Pretelli explained the background of the numerous specifications of the certificate’s content. The purpose of those elaborate regulations is to prevent attempts of manipulation. In this respect, the rights of the child should be more in the focus of the regulations, especially the right of the child to know their origin. To do so, appropriate safeguards could be introduced by means of ad hoc rules specially designed to meet the need of pursuing the best interests of the child.  In this matter, she points out that the language of the whole proposal is not focused enough on the child. She suggests to change the wording of the English version of the proposal, e.g. “filiation” instead of “parenthood”.

“Wishes” of the Organisers of the Series of Webinar

At the end of the seminar, the five organizers of the Webinars concluded the last session by expressing their “wishes” for improvement of the proposal.

These wishes were:
– Further definition of the concept of Court (Cristina Gonzalez Beilfuss);
– If the Regulation keeps the distinction between 2 types of authentic acts, that Member States and the Commission find a better way to distinguish them (Patrick Wautelet);
– Restrict the existing rule on the applicable law to designating the applicable law at the time of birth and find other rules for the time after birth (Tobias Helms);
– Introduce safeguards to prevent child-trafficking or exploitation (e.g. right of the child to know their origins or rules as those preventing illegal adoptions) (Ilaria Pretelli);
– Define the concept of “establishment” of parenthood in cases parenthood is established by the law and not by courts or authentic acts with binding effect (Susanne Gössl).

The European Parliament on 11 July 2023 adopted its negotiating position on the proposal for a directive on the protection of persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings, also known as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

The Parliament will now start discussions on this basis with the European Council, whose first position has been analysed by Pietro Franzina in a previous post on this blog.

The text resulting from the Council’s general approach departs from the initial proposal (analysed by Marta Requejo in a previous post on this blog), in various respects.

The most significant innovations include the following.

Subject Matter

Parliament specified that the directive poses a set of minimum standards of protection and safeguards against manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings in civil matters, as well as the threats thereof, with cross-border implications brought against natural and legal persons engaging in public participation. No specification on journalists and human rights defenders is provided.

Scope

The scope of the proposed directive should apply to matters of a civil or commercial nature having cross-border implications, including interim and precautionary measures, counteractions or other particular types of remedies available under other instruments, whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. Parliament, then, specified the directive tool as posing minimum requirements. Member States, indeed, may introduce or maintain more favourable provisions than the safeguards provided for in this directive against manifestly unfounded and abusive court proceedings in civil matters. As a result, the implementation of this directive shall in no circumstances constitute grounds for a reduction in the level of safeguards already afforded by Member States in the matters covered by this directive.

Definitions

Parliament clarified the definition of ‘public participation’ to mean any statement or activity by a natural or legal person expressed or carried out in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information, academic freedom, or freedom of assembly and association, and preparatory, supporting or assisting action directly linked thereto, on a matter of public interest. This includes complaints, petitions, administrative or judicial claims, the participation in public hearings, the creation, exhibition, advertisement or other promotion of journalistic, political, scientific, academic, artistic, satirical communications, publications or works.

Also the ‘matter of public interest’ is deepened by the Parliament, adding fundamental rights including gender equality, media freedom and consumer and labour rights, as well as the already indicated public health, safety, the environment or the climate. Activities of a person or entity in the public eye or of public interest includes governmental officials and private entities too. Allegations of corruption and fraud are extended, comprising also embezzlement, money laundering, extortion, coercion, sexual harassment and gender-based violence, or other forms of intimidation, or any other criminal or administrative offence, including environmental crime. All activities aimed to protect the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the principle of non-interference in democratic processes, and to provide or facilitate public access to information with a view to fighting disinformation are included.

The ‘fully or partially unfounded’ element related to these proceedings is better explained, that is when characterised by elements indicative of a misuse of the judicial process for purposes other than genuinely asserting, vindicating or exercising a right and have as their main purpose to abusively prevent, restrict or penalize public participation. Indications of such a purpose are added and further clarified, as follows. It is added the misuse of economic advantage or political influence by the claimant against the defendant, leading to an imbalance of power between the two parties. Intimidation, harassment or threats on the part of the claimant or his or her representatives can occur before or during the proceedings, as well as any previous history of legal intimidation by the claimant. It is then added also the use in bad faith of procedural tactics, such as delaying proceedings, and choosing to pursue a claim that is subject to the jurisdiction of the court that will treat the claim most favourably, or the discontinuation of the cases at a later stage of the proceedings.

Matters with Cross-Border Implications

The aim is to cover as many cases as possible, working on the cross-border notion in order to enlarge it. Cross-border implications, indeed, occur for the Parliament if the act of public participation is relevant to more than one Member State, either due to the cross-border dimension of the act itself or due to the legitimate interest which the public may take in the matter concerned by the act, including if the act is accessible via electronic means. The other element, i.e. the filing of concurrent or previous proceedings against the same or associated defendants in another Member State, is confirmed by the Parliament.

Application for Procedural Safeguards

Providing expeditious court proceedings is outlined. Member States shall ensure that courts or tribunals seised with an application for procedural safeguards in the proceedings in relation to which the application has been sought using the most expeditious procedures available under national law, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial.

According to the Parliament, then, Member States shall (not ‘may’) provide that measures on procedural safeguards in accordance with chapters on early dismissal and remedies can be taken by the court or tribunal seised of the matter ex officio.

Assistance to natural or legal persons engaging in public participation is added. Member States shall ensure that natural or legal persons engaging in public participation have access, as appropriate, to support measures, in particular the following: (a) comprehensive and independent information and advice which is easily accessible to the public and free of charge on procedures and remedies available, on protection against intimidation, harassment or threats of legal action, and on their rights; and (b) legal aid in accordance with Directive 2003/8/EC, and, in accordance with national law, legal aid in further proceedings, and legal counselling or other legal assistance; (c) financial assistance and support measures, including psychological support, for those targeted by abusive court proceedings against public participation.

Third Party Intervention

The third party intervention is strengthened: in addition to widening the audience of interveners, their role is increased. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a court or tribunal seised of court proceedings against public participation may accept that associations, organisations and other collective bodies, such as trade unions, and any other legal entities which have, in accordance with the criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate interest in safeguarding or promoting the rights of persons engaging in public participation may take part in those proceedings, either on behalf or in support of the defendant, with his or her approval or to provide information, in any judicial procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations under this directive. This provision is without prejudice to existing rights of representation and intervention as guaranteed by other Union or national rules.

Security

Security for procedural costs, or for procedural costs and damages, is remodelled as security for costs of the proceedings, including the full costs of legal representation incurred by the defendant and damage. Where national law provides for such possibility, security may be granted to the defendant at any stage of the court proceedings.

Early Dismissal

Member States shall (not ‘may’) establish time limits for the exercise of the right to file an application for early dismissal. The time limits shall be also reasonable.

Award of Costs

The claimant who has brought abusive court proceedings against public participation is to be ordered to bear all the costs. Where national law does not guarantee the award in full of the costs of legal representation beyond statutory fee tables, Member States shall ensure that such costs are fully covered by other means available under national law, and, where appropriate, through compensation of damages in accordance with Article 15.

Compensation of Damages

Full compensation for harm is clarified covering material or non-material harm, including reputational harm, without the need to initiate separate court proceedings to that end.

Penalties and National Register

Parliament added that Member States shall ensure that courts or tribunals imposing penalties take due account of: (i) the economic situation of the claimant; (ii) the nature and number of the elements indicating an abuse identified.

In addition, Member states shall take appropriate measures to establish a publicly accessible register of relevant court decisions falling within the scope of this directive, in accordance with Union and national rules on the protection of personal data.

Jurisdiction for Actions Against Third-Country Judgements

Parliament modified this matter, stating that the concerned person shall (not ‘may’) have the right granted under Article 18.

Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Relations with Union Private International Law Instruments

On jurisdiction matters, a new article has been included stating that in defamation claims or other claims based on civil or commercial law which may constitute a claim under this directive, the domicile of the defendant should be considered to be the sole forum, having due regard to cases where the victims of defamation are natural persons. With the exception of the latter new added Article, this directive then shall not affect the application of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

On the applicable law, in claims regarding a publication as an act of public participation, the applicable law shall be the law of the place to which that publication is directed to. In the event of it not being possible to identify the place to which the publication is directed, the applicable law shall be the law of the place of editorial control or of the relevant editorial activity with regard to the act of public participation. With the exception of the latter new added Article, this directive shall not affect the application of the Rome II Regulation.

Union Register

The Commission shall take appropriate measures to establish a publicly accessible Union register, on the basis of the information provided in accordance with the Article concerning the national register, of relevant court decisions falling within the scope of this directive, in accordance with Union rules on the protection of personal data.

Awareness-Raising

A new addition by the Parliament. Member States shall take appropriate action, including via electronic means, aimed at raising awareness about strategic lawsuits against public participation and the procedural safeguards set out in this directive against them. Such action may include information and awareness-raising campaigns and research and education programmes, where appropriate in cooperation with relevant civil society organisations and other stakeholders.

One-Stop Shop

Parliament included a new article establishing a ‘one-stop shop’ comprising dedicated national networks of specialised lawyers, legal practitioners and psychologists, which targets of SLAPPs can contact, and through which they can receive guidance and easy access to information on, and protection against SLAPPs, including regarding legal aid, financial and psychological support.

Training of Practitioners

To foster prevention of the initiation of SLAPPs and protection of targeted natural or legal persons, it is crucial to promote relevant information, awareness-raising, campaigns, education and training, including on their rights and protection mechanisms. Parliament proposed that, with due respect for the independence of the legal profession, Member States should recommend that those responsible for the training of lawyers make available both general and specialist training to increase the awareness of strategic lawsuits against public participation and the procedural safeguards against them provided for in this directive. Training should also be provided to legal professionals in order to increase awareness of abusive court proceedings and be able to detect them at a very early stage.

Cooperation and Coordination of Services

Member States should take appropriate action to facilitate cooperation between Member States to improve the access of those targeted by manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings against public participation to information on procedural safeguards provided for in this directive and under national law. Such cooperation should be aimed at least at: (a) the exchange of current practices; and (b) the provision of assistance to European networks working on matters directly relevant to those targeted by manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings against public participation.

Deontological Rules for Legal Professionals

Member States shall, with due respect for the independence of the legal profession, encourage the adoption by professional associations of deontological rules that guide the conduct of legal professionals to discourage the taking of abusive lawsuits against public participation, and where appropriate, considering measures to address any violation of those rules.

Data Collection

Member States shall, taking into account their institutional arrangements on judicial statistics, entrust one or more authorities to be responsible to collect and aggregate, in full respect of data protection requirements, data on abusive court proceedings against public participation initiated in their jurisdiction. Data referred to shall include, in particular, many specified criteria.

Transposition into National Law

Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive according to the Parliament by 1 years, compared to the 2 years of the original Commission text.

In addition, Member States shall apply this directive also to cases pending before a national court at the time of entry into force of the national rules transposing this directive.

The readers of this blog are aware of the pending proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on corporate sustainability due diligence. The topic was dealt with in a post that can be found here, and in another post here, with reference to the recommendations by GEDIP, the European Group of Private International Law.

The proposed directive aims to foster sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour throughout global value chains. In-scope companies will be required to identify and, where necessary, prevent, end or mitigate adverse impacts of their activities on human rights.

The next steps for the directive proposal will be the trilogue discussions between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission.

The Views of the European Parliament

On 1 June 2023, the European Parliament, at 1st reading/single position, adopted amendments to the proposal. It could be summarized as follows.

Scope of application

Parliament addressed the threshold criteria to fall within the scope of the directive. The new rules will apply to EU-based companies, regardless of their sector, including financial services, with more than 250 employees and a worldwide turnover over EUR 40 million, as well as to parent companies with over 500 employees and a worldwide turnover of more than EUR 150 million. Non-EU companies with a turnover higher than EUR 150 million, if at least EUR 40 million was generated in the EU will also be included; the same for non-EU parent companies with a turnover exceeding EUR 150 million, from which at least EUR 40 was generated in the EU.

Definitions

Parliament moves in broadening the definition of ‘value chain’, to include the sale, distribution, transport, and waste management of products.

Companies’ Obligations

Parliament, in Article 8b (new), specified that the directive should lay down rules on companies’ obligations regarding actual and potential negative impacts on human rights and the environment that they have caused, contributed to or are directly involved in, with regard to their own activities, and those of their subsidiaries.
Companies would be required to identify and, where appropriate, prevent, bring to an end or mitigate the negative impact of their activities on human rights and the environment, such as child labour, slavery, labour exploitation, pollution, environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity. They should also monitor and assess the impact of their business partners, not only suppliers, but also sales, distribution, transport, storage, waste management and other areas.

Integration of Due Diligence

Companies covered by the Directive should: integrate due diligence into their corporate policies, identify and, where necessary, prioritise, prevent, mitigate, remedy, eliminate and minimise potential and actual adverse impacts on human rights, the environment and good governance; establish or participate in a mechanism for the notification and out-of-court handling of complaints; monitor and verify the effectiveness of actions taken in accordance with the requirements set out in the Directive; communicate publicly on their due diligence and consult relevant stakeholders throughout this process.
Member States should ensure that parent undertakings can take action to help ensure that their subsidiaries falling within the scope of the Directive comply with their obligations.
Companies should apply a due diligence policy that is proportionate and commensurate to the degree of severity and the likelihood of the adverse impact and commensurate to the size, resources and capacities of the company, taking into account the circumstances of the specific case, including the nature of the adverse impact, characteristics of the economic sector, the nature of the company’s specific activities, products, services, the specific business relationship.
In conflict-affected and high-risk regions, companies should uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and demonstrate heightened, conflict-sensitive due diligence in their operations and business relationships.

Prevention of Potential Negative Impacts

Companies would be required to take the following steps, as appropriate: consider establishing contractual arrangements with partners with whom the company has a business relationship, obliging them to comply with the company’s code of conduct and, where appropriate, a prevention action plan; take necessary modifications, improvements to, withdrawals of or investments in, the company’s own operations, such as into management, production or other operational processes, facilities, products and product traceability, projects, services and skills; adapt business models and strategies, including purchasing practices, including those which contribute to living wages and incomes for their suppliers, in order to prevent potential adverse impacts, and develop and use purchase policies that do not encourage potential adverse impacts on human rights or the environment; take appropriate measures to ensure that the composition, design and commercialisation of a product or service is in line with Union law and does not lead to adverse impacts, be it individual or collective. In this regard, particular attention shall be paid to potential adverse impact on children.

Mitigating Actual Negative Impacts

Where a company has caused or contributed to an actual adverse impact, it should take steps to remedy or contribute to the remedy of that adverse impact and any harm it has caused to people or the environment. Remedial measures, introduced by Parliament, would aim to restore the affected individuals, groups, communities and/or the environment to a situation equivalent to, or as close as possible to, that which existed prior to the adverse impact.

Exchanges with Stakeholders

The new rules would also require companies to engage in dialogue with those affected by their actions, including human rights and environmental defenders. Companies would also be required to regularly monitor the effectiveness of their due diligence policies. To facilitate investor access, information on a company’s due diligence policy should also be available on the European Single Access Point (ESAP).
Employees and their representatives should be informed by their company of its due diligence policy and its implementation.

Guidelines

To provide support to companies or to Member State authorities, the Commission, in consultation with Member States, the European cross-industry and sectoral social partners and other relevant stakeholders, should issue clear and easily understandable guidelines, including general and sector- specific guidance, in order to facilitate compliance in a practical manner. Each Member State should designate one or more national helpdesks for corporate sustainability due diligence.

Combating Climate Change

Companies should implement a transition plan to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Companies, with more than 1 000 employees on average according to Parliament, should have an effective policy in place to ensure that part of any variable remuneration for directors is linked to the company’s transition plan.

Sanctions

Non-compliant companies will be liable for damages and can be sanctioned by national supervisory authorities. According to Parliament, sanctions include measures such as “naming and shaming”, taking a company’s goods off the market, or fines of at least 5% of the previous net worldwide turnover. Non-EU companies that fail to comply with the rules will be banned from public procurement in the EU.

Single Market Clause

Parliament introduced the single market clause. According to the latter, the Commission and the Member States shall coordinate during the transposition of this Directive and thereafter in view of a full level of harmonisation between Member States, in order to ensure a level playing field for companies and to prevent the fragmentation of the Single Market.

Justice Costs, Injunctions and Third-party Intervention

Parliament require Member States in ensuring that: the limitation period for bringing actions for damages is at least ten years and measures are in place to ensure that costs of the proceedings are not prohibitively expensive for claimants to seek justice; claimants are able to seek injunctive measures, including summary proceedings (these shall be in the form of a definitive or provisional measure to cease an action which may be in breach of this Directive, or to comply with a measure under this Directive); measures are in place to ensure that mandated trade unions, civil society organisations, or other relevant actors acting in the public interest can bring actions before a court on behalf of a victim or a group of victims of adverse impacts, and that these entities have the rights and obligations of a claimant party in the proceedings, without prejudice to existing national law.

The Council’s General Approach of November 2022

Previously, on 30 November 2022, the Council of the European Union had adopted its negotiating position, or general approach. It included the following provisions.

Companies Concerned

In relation to companies concerned (see Article 2), the rules of the due diligence directive would still apply to large EU companies and to non-EU companies active in the EU. For EU companies, the criteria that determine whether a company falls within the scope of the directive are based on the number of employees and the company’s net worldwide turnover, whereas in the case of non-EU companies the criterion is related to the net turnover generated in the EU; if a non-EU company fulfils the criterion regarding net turnover generated in the EU, it will fall under the scope of the due diligence directive, irrespective of whether it has a branch or a subsidiary in the EU.
The Council’s text has introduced a phase-in approach regarding the application of the rules laid down in the directive. The rules would first apply to very large companies that have more than 1000 employees and €300 million net worldwide turnover or, for non-EU companies, € 300 million net turnover generated in the EU, 3 years from the entry into force of the directive.

Definitions

The European Council’s draft limits the scope of the due diligence obligations identified by the Commission in the full life-cycle “value chain” approach towards a more narrowed “chain of activities”: the latter covers a company’s upstream and in a limited manner also downstream business partners as it leaves out the phase of the use of the company’s products or the provision of services and excludes the use of a company’s products by its consumers (see Article 3(g)); then, it leaves it up to the Member States to decide whether regulated financial undertakings (including fund managers) shall be included in the scope of the directive.
The Council’s text also strengthens the risk-based approach and the rules on the prioritisation of the adverse impacts to ensure that carrying out due diligence obligations is feasible for companies (see Article 3, points (e) and (f)).

Combating Climate Change

The text of the provision on combating climate change (see Article 15) has been aligned as much as possible with the soon-to-be-adopted Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), including a specific reference to that directive, in order to avoid problems with its legal interpretation, while avoiding broadening the obligations of companies under this Article.
Due to the strong concerns of Member States regarding the provision proposed by the Commission linking the variable remuneration of directors to their contribution to the company’s business strategy and long-term interest and sustainability, this provision has been deleted (Article 15(3)). The form and structure of directors’ remuneration are matters primarily falling within the competence of the company and its relevant bodies or shareholders. Delegations called for not interfering with different corporate governance systems within the Union, which reflect different Member States’ views about the roles of companies and their bodies in determining the remuneration of directors.

Civil Liability

The Council’s text provides more clarity to the conditions of civil liability (see Article 22) with a provision that ensures full compensation for damages resulting from a company’s failure to comply with the due diligence obligations, avoiding unreasonable interference with the Member States’ tort law systems.
The four conditions that have to be met in order for a company to be held liable – a damage caused to a natural or legal person, a breach of the duty, the causal link between the damage and the breach of the duty and a fault (intention or negligence) – were clarified in the text and the element of fault was included.
Furthermore, the right of victims of human rights or environmental adverse impacts to full compensation were expressly provided for in the compromise text. On the other hand, the right to full compensation should not lead to overcompensation, for example by means of punitive damages.
Further, clarifications of the joint and several liability of a company and a subsidiary or a business partner and the overriding mandatory application of civil liability rules were made.
All of these clarifications and precisions allowed to delete the safeguard for companies that sought contractual assurances from their indirect business partners after a strong criticism of this provision due to its heavy reliance on contractual assurances.

Directors’ Duties

Due to the strong concerns expressed by Member States that considered Article 25 to be an inappropriate interference with national provisions regarding directors’ duty of care, and potentially undermining directors’ duty to act in the best interest of the company, the Council’s proposal deletes the director’s duties introduced by the Commission.

Annex I

The Annex I to the proposed directive has undergone significant changes with the main objective of making the obligations as clear and easily understandable for companies as possible, while ensuring a legally sound base. The logic of the Annex I is to list specific rights and prohibitions, the abuse or violation of which constitutes an adverse human rights impact (see Article 3, point (c)) or adverse environmental impacts (see Article 3, point (b)). To better understand how these rights and prohibitions should be interpreted, the Annex I contains references to international instruments that serve as points of reference.
To ensure the legitimacy of referring to international instruments that are legally binding only on the States, and following the overall logic of the Annex I, the Annex I covers only those international instruments that were ratified by all Member States. Overall, the Annex I of the compromise text only refers to such obligations and prohibitions that can be observed by companies, not just by States.
As regards the human rights part of the Annex I, it covers only legally binding international instruments that are recognised as a minimum list of instruments in the international framework. Concerning the environmental part of the Annex I, a limited number of additional specific obligations and prohibitions under international environmental instruments have been added, the violation of which results in an adverse environmental impact.
Moreover, the definitions of adverse environmental and human rights impacts have been clarified. Furthermore, the so-called ‘catch-all clause’ included in the Commission’s proposal has been kept in order to safeguard the indivisibility of human rights, but it has been clarified thoroughly to ensure maximum predictability for companies.

The author of this post is Willem Visser. He is one of the editors of the Dutch Journal for Consumer Law and Unfair Commercial Practices (Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht & handelspraktijken).


In April 2023, the EAPIL Working Group on the Reform of the Brussels I bis Regulation issued a preliminary position paper formulating proposals for reforming the Regulation. On 29 March 2023, the European Commission published a study to support the preparation of a report on the application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.

In my opinion, consumer protection seems to be only marginally on the radar in these documents. Therefore, I wrote this article, which was published in the Dutch Journal for Consumer Law, where I propose to extend the material scope of the provisions dealing with consumer contracts (Articles 17-19 Brussels I bis Regulation) and to significantly simplify the entire chapter on jurisdiction. A summary of my article and proposals is set out below.

Consumers are protected through EU regulations not only when it comes to their substantive rights (against unfair commercial practices, unfair terms, etc.), but also when it comes to procedural law, in particular the assesment of international jurisdiction in disputes over consumer contracts.

This procedural protection is enshrined in the Brussels I bis Regulation and its predecessors (Regulation No. 44/2001 and the 1968 Brussels Convention). These instruments will be referred to below as ‘the Brussels regime’.

The Brussels regime protects consumers by giving jurisdiction to the courts of their country of residence (Articles 17-19 Brussels I bisRegulation). That seems like a great deal, but in practice there are several limitations to that protection.

First, the consumer protection only applies to consumer contracts and not to any non-contractual obligations invoked by consumers (for example, tort, unjust enrichment and negotiorum gestio). In these types of cases the consumer cannot litigate before the court of his or her domicile, but will probably have to seek the courts of its professional counterparty: the defendant’s domicile. It is not desirable for consumers to be forced to litigate outside their country of residence, because that means extra travel time, litigating in an unfamiliar country and in a different language, with the help of a foreign lawyer, in a procedure that may well be more expensive than in his or her home country. Moreover, it is not always clear – on the basis of the various rulings by the EU Court of Justice – whether an obligation should be qualified as a ‘contractual obligation’ or a ‘non-contractual obligation’. There have been several cases where the natural person was the weaker party and needed protection, but did not get it because of the non-contractual nature of the obligation in question (see the ECJ decisions in Wikingerhof, Kolassa and Deepwater Horizon). I therefore believe that consumer protection in the Brussels Ibis Regulation should not be limited to consumer contracts but should be extended to non-contractual consumer obligations.

Second, the ECJ interpretes the concept of ‘consumer’ restrictively: it “must necessarily be interpreted strictly, in the sense that it cannot be extended beyond the cases expressly mentioned in that Regulation” (amongst others: Poker Player, C-774/19, para. 24). This restrictive approach resulted in a natural person not being able to claim consumer protection under the Brussels regime in the following situations: if he/she was a consumer but transferred his/her rights; in that case, the person to whom the rights have been transferred cannot be considered a ‘consumer’ (C-89/91); if the contract was entered into with a view to an as yet unexercised but future professional activity (C-269/95); if it concerns a class action initiated by a group of consumers (C-167/00); if both parties are consumers (C-508/12); if the consumer does not have a contract with the issuer of the certificates (C-375/13); if the agreement subsequently acquired a professional character (C-498/16); if the contract was concluded for a dual purpose, unless the contract, in view of the context of the transaction – considered as a whole – for which it was concluded, is so distinct from that professional activity that it is evident that it was concluded primarily for private purposes (C-630/17); if there is a claim by a consumer against an airline that is not a party to the transport contract (C-215/18).

So, there are quite a few situations where a natural person is not considered a ‘consumer’, and therefore cannot litigate before the courts of his or her own domicile. This is remarkable, because the European Union ensures “a high level of consumer protection” (Article 38 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). I believe that in several of the situations mentioned above, there is an unjustified lack of protection. In my opinion, the regime of Article 17-19 Brussels I bis Regulation should therefore be applied less restrictively by entering an assumption into the Regulation that a natural person acts in his capacity as a consumer. It is up to the counterparty to prove that the natural person has unmistakably acted in the context of his or her profession or business.

In addition, I believe that consumer protection should also apply to consumer collective actions. There is no valid reason why the collective nature of a claim should result in a group of consumers no longer being considered a weaker party. At the time the contracts were concluded, the consumers represented had less room to negotiate with their professional counterparty, and thus to that extent still had a weaker position. Moreover, it leads to a divergence between the competent court and the applicable law. Still, collective actions based on a breach of consumer contracts remain governed by the law of the consumers’ country. The freedom to conduct a business, guaranteed in Article 16 of the EU Charter, does not necessitate the exclusion of collective actions from consumer protection. The professional counterparty of the consumer has already had to take into account that individual consumers could bring proceedings against it in their own place of residence. That this is different in the case of a consumer collective action is therefore, in that sense, an unexpected advantage for the counterparty.

Third, in my opinion the ‘targeting requirement’ in Article 17 (1)(c) Brussels I bis Reguliation is not workable in practice. This requirement has given rise to much ECJ case-law and leads to legal uncertainty (see the legal commentary on the Alpenhof judgment). In my opinion, in this digital day and age a consumer contract should only be excluded from consumer protection where the professional would not have to expect litigating in the courts of the consumer’s domicile. This is the case only, when the contract is concluded in a physical sales area or when the consumer cannot get the goods or services delivered in his place of residence under the trader’s terms and conditions.

In light of the above, I conclude that consumer protection under the Brussels regime has not kept pace with substantive consumer law in which consumer protection has become more extensive.

But that’s not the only comment I would like to make on the current Brussels I bis Regulation. The complexity of the chapter on jurisdiction (Chapter II of the Regulation) results even today – more than 50 years after its predecessor, the Brussels Convention, was signed by the the EEC members States – in large numbers of preliminary rulings. The Brussels/Lugano regime accounts for the majority of the 245 preliminary rulings on private international law sources from 2015 to 2022. That means more than 120 questions (128 to be precise) over a 7-year period. In my opinion, that is too much for an instrument that is in place more than 50 years.

Reducing the Court of Justice’s workload is not necessarily a compelling reason to simplify a regime, but it should be borne in mind that behind every case submitted to a court, there are two or more parties who – until the preliminary question is answered – cannot proceed with their legal proceedings. The delay is considerable, since preliminary reference proceedings before the Court of Justice take 16.6 months on average.

I therefore propose to replace the articles which give rise to the largest amount of preliminary questions (Article 7(1) and (2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation) by an article which aligns jurisdiction and applicable law. My proposal is that Article 7(1) and (2) (and perhaps other parts of Article 7) should be replaced by the following rule:

A person domiciled in one Member State may also be sued in another Member State whose laws governs the relevant contractual or non-contractual obligation underlying the claim. Where there are several claims governed by different laws, the courts of the Member State which laws governs the most far-reaching claim shall have jurisdiction.

The advantage of aligning jurisdiction and applicable law is that it improves coherence between the Brussels I bis Regulation and the Rome I and Rome II Regulations (which designate the law that is applicable to a contractual or non-contractual obligation). These Regulations all aim to promote predictability of the outcome of litigation, legal certainty and mutual recognition of judgments.

Simplifying the Brussels regime would give rise to fewer preliminary questions and fewer delays. Preventing delays is one of the objectives of procedural law. As the saying goes: ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’.

I admit that I have not yet thought through all consequences of my proposals, and it is going too far to elaborate all of them in the context of my article. But it seems right to discuss these proposals further and, if possible, to include it as an option in the ongoing review of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The readers of the blog are aware of the European Commission proposal for a Regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, and the associated proposal for a Directive amending several existing directives with a view to improving digitalisation and ensuring secure, reliable and time-efficient communication between courts and competent authorities.

Presented in December 2021, the two proposals aim to ensure access to justice in the EU including in the events of force majeure, such as pandemics, and adapt judicial cooperation between Member States for such situations.

On 28 June 2023, Parliament and Council negotiators reached an agreement on the use of digital technology in the judicial cooperation among Member States. Negotiators of the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) agreed with Council negotiators on its future shape. The agreement, once formally approved by the Council, will be confirmed by a vote in the European Parliament.

The Parliament press note, which provides few details, highlights two aspects: one relating to electronic documents and videoconferencing, the other regarding inclusive digitalisation.

In relation to electronic documents and videoconferencing, the proposed legislation enables the use of digital technology for exchange of information, documents, payments of fees and videoconferencing. Communication between citizens, companies and national authorities would be ensured by an IT system, created and maintained by the European Commission and financed through the Digital Europe Programme with an access point in each Member State. The European e-Justice portal will provide information to individuals and companies on their rights and the European electronic access point will enable their direct communication with authorities.

Inclusive digitalisation refers to efforts to ensure that digitalisation does not lead to exclusion and is implemented in a way to ensure right to a fair trial for everyone. Equivalent access for people with disabilities is also stressed.

The Council press note specifies that the new rules, once adopted, will improve cross-border judicial procedures by:
-allowing parties and other relevant persons in civil, commercial and criminal hearings to participate by means of videoconferencing or other distance communication technology;
-establishing a European electronic access point through which natural and legal persons can file claims, send and receive relevant information, and communicate with the competent authorities;
-accepting electronic communication and documents from natural and legal persons;
-recognising documents with electronic signatures or seals;
-promoting the payment of fees through electronic means.

Negotiators further agreed on the need for additional training for justice professionals when it comes to the use of digital tools such as videoconferencing and the IT system and encouraged Member States to share their best practices on the use of digital tools.

The European Parliament passed on 15 June 2023 a resolution expressing support for the accession of Ukraine to the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters.

As reported on this blog, the Council of the European Union had already decided on 24 April 2023 that the Union would establish treaty relations with Ukraine under the Convention following the accession of Ukraine.

According to Article 29 of the Convention, accession to the Convention by one State creates treaty relations between that State and the States that have already joined the Convention only if neither of them has notified the depositary that the accession should not have the effect of establishing treaty relations with the other. If a State intends to issue a declaration to that effect, it must do so within 12 months of the ratification or accession of the State concerned. Absent a declaration, the Convention comes into effect between the States in question on “the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which notifications may be made”. 

The Council of the Union assessed, in its decision of 24 April 2023, that there were no reasons to prevent the accession by Ukraine from creating treaty relations between the Union and Ukraine under the Convention, and accordingly decided that an Article 29 declaration should not be issued.

By its recent resolution, the European Parliament basically expressed the same view.

The resolution does not entail, in itself, any effect on the international plane. Rather, it addresses a concern that relates to the role that the Parliament is entitled to play in the process leading to decisions regarding the establishment of the Union’s treaty relations with third countries.

Pursuant to Article 218(6) TFEU, the conclusion of an international agreement by the European Union requires a Council decision. When it comes to agreements covering fields to which the ordinary legislative procedure applies, including judicial cooperation in civil matters, the Council may only act “after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament”. The decision of 12 July 2022 whereby the Council decided that the Union would accede to the Hague Judgments followed precisely that pattern.

Now, under the current practice of the institutions, no formal procedure in accordance with Article 218(6) TFEU is initiated for the conventions that contain a non-objection mechanism, such as the Judgments Conventions. With respect to these conventions, the Commission only informs the Council and Parliament of any third country’s request to accede to a the convention in question. This means that if the Council decides to take no action regarding the third State’s accession (thus paving the way to the establishment of treaty relations with the latter), the Parliament risks being prevented from expressing its views on the desirability of the establishment of such relations.

In its recent resolution, the Parliament, having recalled that “an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties”, stated that “the fact that at international level a silence procedure has been adopted to facilitate accession by third states should be of no consequence for the EU’s internal decision-making process”.

It is thus for the purposes of the internal decision-making process of the EU that the Parliament made use, by this resolution, of its prerogative under Article 218(6) TFEU to make a stance on the establishment of treaty relations between the Union and Ukraine under the Hague Judgments.

That said, the resolution also provided the Parliament with an opportunity to issue a political statement concerning the Union’s relations with Ukraine, in general. In the operative part, the Parliament reiterated its “unwavering solidarity with the people and leadership of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders”.

On 31 May 2023, the Commission adopted an implementing decision whereby the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) entitled Effective implementation of the concept of judicial precedent in EU countries shall be registered. The English version can be downloaded here.

The decision has been taken pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/788 on the European citizens’ initiative. The Regulation establishes the procedures and conditions required for an initiative inviting the Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens of the Union consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.

The initiative comes from a small group of persons (according to Article 5 of the Regulation, an initiative must be prepared by at least seven natural persons), whose affiliation is not disclosed on the webpage. The e-mail address of the substitute to the representative of the organisers points to the University of Bucarest.

The objectives of the initiative as expressed by the organisers are the introduction of ‘a mechanism at national level which guarantees mutual recognition of final judicial decisions adopted by courts’ in other Member States and ‘the option of invoking national judicial precedents decided by the courts of the country in question’, with a view to ‘consolidat[ing] a uniform judicial practice among the Member States’.

The mechanism would apply provided that: ‘(a) the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has had occasion to interpret the applicable provisions of EU law’ and that ‘(b) the case in question concerns similar or identical legal questions’. The organisers ask for the mechanism to be ‘actually available to litigants, allowing them to request the recognition of another decision relevant to their case at any stage of the proceedings.’ Furthermore, they consider that ‘a certain degree of flexibility should be ensured in light of the ‘rebus sic stantibus’ clause, making it possible to change the case-law if certain fundamental circumstances have changed.’ In addition, Member States should be ‘obliged to impose  effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalties in cases where the mechanism is not complied with’.

The text of the initiative is available here. Judging from its last paragraph, it has wide ambitions in terms of material scope: ‘Firstly, the initiative is based on Articles 81 and 82(1) TFEU as regards the recognition of judgments with cross-border implications. Secondly, the proposal is based on Article 352 TFEU and potentially Article 114 TFEU, so as to cover all situations which lead to inconsistent application and interpretation of EU [law] that could impede the attainment of EU’s objectives and the proper functioning of its internal market.’

In the absence of further explanations, I am not sure (but curious) about how the future mechanism would relate to already existing EU legal texts on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters.

I fail to see third parties to a decision being granted, as per EU law, a right to requests its recognition in the usual sense of the word; but perhaps there is a new notion of recognition in the making – one providing for ‘precedential’ effect. Or, maybe, what makes the difference between the initiative’s desired mechanism in comparison to the status quo is the prong on ensuring litigants an option to rely ‘on national judicial precedents decided by the courts of the State concerned’, if ‘the State concerned’ is means a Member State other than the one where the court seized sits.

Again, I am not sure this is the correct understanding of the initiative, which at some point states that The mechanism ‘should apply not only to recognising final judicial decisions adopted in other Member States, but also to recognising final judicial decisions adopted in the country in question’ (italics added).

In any event, the future mechanism would only apply subject to three cumulative criteria being met: (i) the final judicial decision at stake applied provisions of Union law; (ii) the CJEU has already interpreted the same relevant provisions of Union law and (iii) the case concerned is governed by similar or identical points of law. First and second conditions do not look like too difficult to identify in a given case; the same can definitely not be claimed for the third one.

As a rule, all statements of support of a citizen’s initiative* shall be collected within a period not exceeding 12 months from a date chosen by the group of organisers (the ‘collection period’). According to Article 8 (1) of Regulation 2019/788, that date must be not later than six months from the registration of the initiative in accordance with Article 6. So far, I have found no indication on how to express support to this particular initiative. Pursuant to Article 11(7) of Regulation 2019/788, the recourse to individual online collection systems will no longer be possible for initiatives registered after the end of 2022; organisers will thus have to use the central online collection system, for which the Commission is responsible. It maybe that further clarification as regards the exact scope of the initiative’s proposed mechanism is to be found there (not to be taken for granted, though: assuming it is technically possible, there is a thin line between simply explaining an initiative and actually amending it).

*In order to ensure that a European citizen’s initiative is representative, a minimum number of signatories coming from each of those Member States is required. This translate into conditions set under Article 3 of the Regulation. Statistics on European Citizen Initiatives presented, registered, and valid, can be found in a recent report of the European Parliament.

The Council of the European Union adopted on 9 June 2023 a political agreement on the proposal for a directive on the protection of persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings, also known as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

Based on this common position, the Council will now start discussions with the European Parliament with a view to settling on the final text of the directive.

The text resulting from the Council’s general approach departs from the initial proposal (analysed by Marta Requejo in a previous post on this blog), in various respects. The suggested changes have been presented as underlying a concern for  more balanced solutions, and for increased discretion left to national courts, but have been criticised by some stakeholders as involving a watered-down compromise.

The most significant innovations include the following.

The Council, while agreeing that the future directive should apply only to matters with cross-border implications,  advocates the suppression of the provision in the Commission’s proposal that defined what matters should be considered to have such implications.

According to Article 4 of the proposal, a matter ought to be considered to have cross-border implications “unless both parties are domiciled in the same Member State as the court seised”. The proposal added that, where both parties are domiciled in the same Member State, the matter would still be deemed to have cross-border implications if (a) the act of public participation targeted by the SLAPP “is relevant to more than one Member State”, or (b) the claimant have initiated concurrent or previous proceedings against the same defendants in another Member State.

The rule providing early dismissal of manifestly unfounded claims should, according to the Council, be rephrased as follows: 

Member States shall ensure that courts may dismiss, after appropriate examination, claims against public participation as manifestly unfounded at the earliest possible stage, in accordance with national law.

The proposed rewording includes language that was not in the initial proposal (“after appropriate examination”, “at the earliest possible stage, in accordance with national law”). Conversely, the Council’s text fails to retain the paragraph in the initial proposal according to which “Member States may establish time limits for the exercise of the right to file an application for early dismissal”, provided that such time limits are “proportionate and not render such exercise impossible or excessively difficult”.

The Council further suggests the deletion of the provision in the proposal which asked Member States to “ensure that if the defendant applies for early dismissal, the main proceedings are stayed until a final decision on that application is taken”.

According to the Council, the provision on compensation in the Commission’s proposal should likewise be suppressed (arguably, because it was considered to be unnecessary, in light of the existing law). It read as follows:

Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure thata natural or legal person who has suffered harm as a result of an abusive court proceedings against public participation is able to claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm.

The Council also seeks to modify the wording of the provision in the initial proposal whereby Member States should deny recognition to judgments given in a third State in the framework of a SLAPP brought against natural or legal person domiciled in the Union. The amended version of the provision no longer refers to violation of public policy as the reason for non-recognition.

As regards jurisdiction, the text agreed by the Council retains the rule whereby those targeted by a SLAPP brought in a third State should be able to seek compensation in the Member State of the courts of their domicile, for the damages and the costs incurred in connection with the proceedings in the third country, but adds that Member States “may limit the exercise of the jurisdiction while proceedings are still pending in the third country”.

Finally, according to the Council’s general approach, the Member States should be given three years, instead of two as initially contemplated, to implement the directive in their legal systems.

On 31 May 2023, the European Commission has proposed new rules aimed to ensure that the protection of adults is maintained in cross-border cases, and that their right to individual autonomy, including the freedom to make their own choices as regards their person and future arrangements is respected when they move within the EU.

The proposals, based on Article 81(2) TFEU, cover adults who, by reason of an impairment or insufficiency of their personal faculties, are not in a position to protect their own interests (e.g., due to an age-related disease).

Specifically, In the context of a growing cross-border mobility of people in the EU, this gives rise to numerous challenges. For instance, individuals concerned or their representatives may need to manage assets or real estate in another country, seek medical care abroad, or relocate to a different EU-country. In such cross-border situations, they often face complex and sometimes conflicting laws of Member States, leading to legal uncertainty and lengthy proceedings.

The proposed Regulation, which is meant to apply 18 months after its adoption, introduces a streamlined set of rules that will apply within the EU, in particular to establish which court has jurisdiction, which law is applicable, under what conditions a foreign measure or foreign powers of representation should be given effect and how authorities can cooperate. It also proposes a set of practical tools, including the introduction of a European Certificate of Representation, which will make it easier for representatives to prove their powers in another Member State.

The proposal for a Council Decision provides for a uniform legal framework for protecting adults involving non-EU countries. It obliges all Member States to become or remain parties to the 2000 Protection of Adults Convention in the interest of the Union. Once the Decision is adopted, the Member States that are not yet party to the Convention will have 2 years to join it. Actually, some Member States have already launched their own ratification process, with the latest to announce (or re-announce) such a move being Italy, just a few days ago.

The approach underlying the package – in short, ensuring that the Hague Adults Convention enters into force for all Member States, and adopting a Regulation aimed to strengthen the operation of the Convention in the relations between Member States – reflects the suggestions that were put forward, inter alia, by the European Law Institute and the European Association of Private International Law, notably through a position paper issued in April last year.

Further analysis of the two proposals will be provided through this blog in the coming weeks.

This post was written by Nadia Rusinova (Hague University of Applied Sciences).


The judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in the Pancharevo case (C-490/20) drew the attention of the legal community across Europe (see post on this blog here), as it analyzed the compatibility with the EU law of the refusal to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate indicating two persons of the same sex as parents. Following this judgment, the legal proceedings in Bulgaria continued and final Supreme Court judgment was issued on 1 March 2023. This final court act is important for the further developments in regard to the free movement and cross-border recognition of parenthood.

The Facts

To recall the facts, the Bulgarian V.M.A. and the British K.D.K. – both women – are married and have been living together in Spain since 2015. In December 2019, the couple had a daughter, S.D.K.A., who was born and lives in Spain. The Spanish authorities issued a birth certificate for S.D.K.A. which names V.M.A. and K.D.K. as her mothers. V.M.A. also applied to the Bulgarian authorities for a birth certificate for the child, which is needed to secure a Bulgarian identity document. Sofia municipality instructed V.М.А. to disclose the identity of the child’s biological mother. V.М.А. did not do so. Sofia municipality then refused to issue the birth certificate.

V.M.A. appealed before the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Administrative Court of the City of Sofia), which in turn referred to the Court of Justice of the EU. In its judgment, delivered by the Grand Chamber, the CJEU held that a child, who is an EU citizen and whose birth certificate, issued by the competent authorities of the host Member State, designates two persons of the same sex as the child’s parents, the Member State of which that child is a national is obliged (i) to issue to that child an identity card or a passport without requiring a birth certificate to be drawn up beforehand by its national authorities, and (ii) to recognise, as is any other Member State, the document from the host Member State that permits that child to exercise, with each of those two persons, the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.

Following the CJEU judgment in Pancharevo, the referring court obliged Sofia municipality to issue a birth certificate for the child noting V.M.A. and K.D.K as her parents. After an appeal the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court (Supreme Court) overruled this decision, upholding the refusal to issue a birth certificate for the child, stating that the child is not a Bulgarian citizen (author’s unofficial translation of the judgment into English here)

What are the Facts and was is the Law?

To answer this question, it is important to review the initial application: the request is to draw up a birth certificate for the child, a prerequisite for Bulgarian identity documents to be issued. As noted, CJEU explicitly points that the obligation of the Member State under Article 4, § 3 Directive 2004/38/EC is to issue an identity card or passport to its citizens. In this sense, the question of the nationality of the child becomes crucial: if the child does not have Bulgarian nationality, then the Republic of Bulgaria is under no obligation to draw up a birth certificate, and in this case the refusal would be fully in accordance with the law.

The CJEU confirms what is obvious, finding that it is for each Member State, having due regard to international law, to lay down the conditions for acquisition and loss of nationality. Then it stated that according to the findings of the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction in that regard, S.D.K.A. has Bulgarian nationality by birth. Therefore, the entire CJEU judgment is rendered under the initial assumption that the child has acquired Bulgarian nationality at birth, stating in § 44 that “since S.D.K.A. is a Bulgarian national, the Bulgarian authorities are required to issue to her an identity card”. Following the CJEU judgment, the referring court imposed an obligation on the Bulgarian authority to issue a birth certificate for the child, again assuming that the child is a Bulgarian citizen.

The Supreme Court as a last instance court has the power to reassess the facts. The Supreme Court then starts the assessment of the requirements de novo and notes that for a child to acquire Bulgarian nationality by birth, at least one of the parents must be a Bulgarian national, and points that of importance in this case (…) is the presence of filiation with the Bulgarian citizen”. Indeed, Article 25 of the Bulgarian Constitution and Article 8 of the Law on Bulgarian Citizenship state that a Bulgarian citizen is anyone whose at least one parent is a Bulgarian citizen. How then can it be established who has the capacity of “parent” in this situation, and is it decisive that in the Spanish birth certificate the child has two (same-sex) parents?

In their plea to the first instance court, the applicants referred to the provisions of the Bulgarian Private International Law (PIL) Code. They essentially argued that the Spanish law is applicable to the establishment of parenthood and since both mothers have validly acquired the status of parent of the child in Spain, thus filiation with the Bulgarian mother is established and leads to acquisition of Bulgarian nationality. It is however questionable if these PIL provisions can be applied for the purpose of nationality determination, which is traditionally purely domestic issue. According to the Article 83 § 1 of the PIL Code, establishment of a parent-child relationship is governed by the law of the State whose nationality the child acquired at the time of birth. It is true that if the child has Spanish nationality by birth, then parenthood should be established according to the Spanish law. If it is stateless Article 83, para. 2 and 3 of the PIL Code would again point to the Spanish law as applicable law as more favorable to the child. However, for these provisions to be applicable, the child first needs to be found to be a Spanish citizen by birth or stateless, both logically following a determination of its nationality.

To initially determine whether the child has Bulgarian nationality under Article 25 of the Constitution, the parenthood would therefore inevitably be established under the Bulgarian law. Pursuant to Article 60, paras. 1 and 2 of the Family Code the origin from the mother is determined by birth. The child’s mother is the woman who gave birth, including in instances of assisted reproduction. It was therefore necessary in the present case to identify the woman who gave birth, information the couple concerned refused to disclose. This refusal led to the result that filiation with the Bulgarian mother cannot be established. The Supreme Court then held that After it was established in the case that the child (…) is not a Bulgarian citizen, in the sense of the applicable law, there is no obligation for the Republic of Bulgaria (…) to draw up a birth certificate.

The conclusion concerning the nationality of the child, and the judgment in this part, are technically correct. They are also very convenient in that they provide the ideal setting for the Bulgarian authorities to achieve the result they need to achieve, that is, to not recognise same-sex parenthood under the Bulgarian legal order. This approach allowed a formally accurate judgment and released the Supreme Court from an obligation to rule on several decidedly inconvenient issues, the first and most important one being the thorny question on the same-sex parenthood.

In addition, no danger of statelessness is present because the child is entitled to Spanish nationality. When Bulgarian nationality by birth is not possible, no other ground for acquisition can be applied to the present case. The Supreme Court notes also that the child did not acquire British nationality by birth because the British mother, who was born in Gibraltar to a parent who was a British national, cannot pass on her nationality to a child when that child is born outside the territory of the United Kingdom (footnote 14 of the AG Opinion). Since concerns regarding potential statelessness were raised, the Supreme Court needed to examine whether a danger existed for the child to be stateless – an undesired outcome for the Bulgarian authorities as it would bring supranational response and potential accountability.

To exclude potential statelessness, after establishing that the child is not Bulgarian national, the Supreme Court referred to the Spanish law that Spanish citizens by origin are persons born in Spain when the national law of neither of their parents confers nationality on the child.

Given the facts established in the case, that the national legislation of either of the parents named in the child’s birth certificate drawn up in Spain, where it was born, does not grant citizenship, it [the child] should, by virtue of the said provision, be a citizen of Spain, member of the European Union. […] its applicability, in the present case, was expressly confirmed by the Spanish Government […] as the Advocate General points out, there is no danger of the child being stateless.

Essentially, by stating that the child is not a Bulgarian national, the Supreme Court provides the mothers with the only condition needed to claim the child’s right to Spanish nationality and shifts the responsibility for the current statelessness to them.

As a consequence, the child is also an EU citizen and therefore has the right to free movement. The Supreme Court mentions that because the child is not a Bulgarian citizen, she cannot invoke either the rights arising from 4, § 3 of Directive 2004/38/EC, or those arising from Articles 20 and 21 TFEU. But this would be true only if the child was not an EU citizen. Because the child’s right to Spanish nationality “upon request” is established, it is for the mothers to exercise the right and receive the protection of the rights of the child through the acquisition of Spanish citizenship.

Is Bulgaria in Violation of its Obligations under EU law?

In § 67 and 68 of the Pancharevo ruling, CJEU also considered the possibility that S.D.K.A. does not have Bulgarian nationality. In this case, it pointed out that regardless of their nationality and whether they themselves are EU citizens, K.D.K. and S.D.K.A. must be regarded by all Member States as being, respectively, the spouse and the direct descendant of an EU citizen – V.M.A., within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) and (c) of Directive 2004/38, and therefore must be regarded as being V.M.A.’s family membersfor the purposes of the exercise of the rights conferred in Article 21(1) TFEU and the secondary legislation relating thereto”. Can we then say that Bulgaria refuses to recognize the parent-child relationship legally established between a child and both her (same-sex) parents in another Member State for the purpose of exercising EU free movement rights with both parents?

Such conclusion appears to be rushed. With the Supreme Court judgment Bulgaria does not create obstacles to the child’s freedom of movement because to exercise without impediment, with each of her two parents, her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States as guaranteed in Article 21(1) TFEUis not at all what was requested from the Bulgarian authorities. The two mothers requested a Bulgarian birth certificate intended to be used to apply for a Bulgarian identity document (this is also established and noted in §15 of the Request for preliminary ruling) and the legal nature of this request inevitably triggered the application of Bulgarian law on nationality.

The Pancharevo ruling does not require the Member States to mutually recognize the contents of birth certificates in regard to matters that do not relate to free movement rights. If the request had concerned indeed the right to free movement on the basis of the child’s being a direct descendant and V.M.A.’s family member, the authorities would not have had grounds to refuse. However, this should have been anticipated at an earlier stage of the proceedings. It is not in the Court’s power to rule on an issue not raised in any of these administrative proceedings.

What Would be the Right Way to Proceed?

It perhaps remains true that if the applicants had asked the right question, they would have received the right answer. Adequate proceeding is currently available under the Law on the entry, residence and departure of the citizens of the European Union and their family members (it is worth to note that indeed before 2019 this avenue was not available for Bulgarian citizens as this instrument used to encompass the citizens of the European Union who are not Bulgarian citizens and their family members.) As an example, this same Supreme Court rendered not so long ago a judgment recognising same-sex marriage for the purposes of free movement, in line with the Coman ruling, by issuing a permit for a long-term residence of a family member of a citizen of the EU in Bulgaria. Indeed, Bulgarian law does not permit same-sex marriage, and the Bulgarian Constitution stipulates that marriage is a voluntary union between a man and a woman. The Court then rightly noted that the disputed issue in the case is not related to the conclusion or recognition of a same-sex civil marriage in Bulgaria, but to the presence or lack of the prerequisites for a family member of an EU citizen to reside lawfully in Bulgaria. In addition, the Court’s decision holds that

It follows that a Member State cannot invoke its national law to refuse to recognize on its territory, solely for the purpose of granting a derived right of residence to a third-country national, a marriage concluded by him/her with a Union citizen of the same sex in another Member State in accordance with its law.

Readers of this blog are aware that an EAPIL Working Group has been set to reflect on the reform of the Brussels I bis Regulation. A survey has been launched to collect feedback and comments on the proposals included in the Working Group’s preliminary position paper (see further here and here). Those wishing to share their views are invited to take the survey by 15 April 2023.

Participation in the survey is opened to anybody familiar with Brussels I bis, regardless of their membership in the European Association of Private International Law.

The members of the Working Group are eager to know about the opinion of scholars and practitioners both  on the operation of the Regulation and on the improvements proposed by the Group.

All the received input is valuable for the work that is being done in preparation of the Brussels I bis Reform. Warm thanks to those who have already provided their feedback and to those who plan to so in the next few hours!

As many readers of the blog surely know already, the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPC Agreement) will enter into force on 1 June 2023.

With this in mind, a 3-month Sunrise period started on 1 March 2023. From that date, an opt-out from the jurisdiction of the Court, as laid down in Article 83(3) of the UPC Agreement, can be filed. According to the provision, applicants for and proprietors of a “classic” European patent, as well as holders of a supplementary protection certificate (SPC) issued for a product protected by a “classic” European patent, can opt out their application, patent or SPC from the exclusive competence of the Court. As a result, the UPC will have no jurisdiction concerning any litigation related to this application, patent or SPC. The application to opt out can only be made via the Case Management System of the Court (CMS); the conditions are explained here. It should be noted that the opt-out will only become effective on the date of entry into force of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court.

Filing a request to become a representative before the UPC, as per Article 48 of the Agreement, is also possible since 1 March 2023. Two categories are eligible to become representative before the UPC: lawyers authorised to practice before a court of a Contracting Member State  (Article 48(1) UPCA) and European Patent Attorneys who are entitled to act as professional representatives before the European Patent Office and who have appropriate qualifications as per Article 48(2) UPCA and the European Patent Litigation Certificate Rules.

The first experiences with the live version of the Court’s Case Management System (CMS) have just been reported by the Registrar (a week before, Luxembourg launched a call for applications for administrative support staff at the Registry and Court of Appeal of the Unified Patent Court in Luxembourg, deadline ending soon, in case of interest. Other vacancies are posted here).

Just for the record: 24 EU Member States have signed the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (Spain, Poland and Croatia have not). Initially, the UPCA will be in force in 17 states which have ratified the Agreement (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Romania, Slovakia have not). The unitary patent is the outcome of enhanced cooperation procedure; it was established via Regulation No 1257/2012 of 17 December 2012. In 2014, Regulation No 542/2014 was adopted amending Regulation No 1215/2012 as regards the rules on jurisdiction to be applied with respect to the Unified Patent Court (see consolidated version of the latter Regulation, whose Article 24(4) will still remain in force after 1 June 2023, albeit with a more limited scope of application).

This is the and final part of a post collectively written by Marion Ho-Dac and Matthias Lehmann. Part one is found here.


The previous post has underlined the DSA’s indifference to PIL. In this post, we will take the example of “illegal content” to illustrate the need for a conflict-of-laws approach.

DSA Regulation of Illegal Content and Conflicts of Laws

The DSA obliges intermediaries to inform the authorities of any effect given to their orders regarding illegal content “on the basis of the applicable Union law or national law in compliance with Union law” (Article 9(1) DSA). This formulation echoes the very definition of illegal content described as “any information … that is not in compliance with Union law or the law of any Member State which is in compliance with Union law” (Article 3 (h) DSA). The Act avoids the – quite arduous – problem how the applicable law shall be identified.  And, more broadly, it demonstrates its indifference to the mere distinction between public and private law issues, by stating that the characterisation of the illegality of the said contents, at the origin of the orders, is based on the applicable law regardless of “the precise nature or subject matter … of the law in question” (Recital 12 in fine DSA).

The same pattern reoccurs with regard to the intermediaries’ obligation to inform the authorities about individual recipients of their services (Article 10(1) DSA). The DSA simply assumes that orders requiring such information will be issued “on the basis of the applicable Union law or national law in compliance with Union law”, without detailing which national law actually is governing.

At the bottom of this method is the assumption that Union law or the national law will identify itself as applicable. Thereby, legal unilateralism is not only embraced, but also reinforced because orders based on unilateralist Union law or national law are strengthened. There are little limits the Act poses on national authorities, except that the territorial scope of their orders must be in compliance with Union law, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and – “where relevant” – general principles of international law and the principle of proportionality (see Article 9(2)(b) DSA). Interestingly, Recital 36 makes the (exceptional) extraterritoriality of the orders mainly conditional upon the EU legal basis of the illegality of the content, or requires “the interests of international comity” to be taken into account.

The problem with such unilateralism “set in stone” is that it does not overcome conflicts of laws, but exacerbates them. The law of the Member State having the strictest rules with the widest scope of application will be given preference over those who take a more liberal, balanced or nuanced approach.

Additionally, this ‘regulatory competition’ effectively suspends the country-of-origin principle laid down in Article 3(1) e-commerce Directive, which gives exclusive competence to the Member State in which the service provider addressed is established (see Recital 38 DSA). The orders regarding illegal content can be issued by the authorities of any Member State. This can be justified by Article 3(4), though, which provides a public policy exception.

The DSA’s Reason for Indifference to PIL

The reason why this road was taken is, quite obviously, the difficulties to overcome the entrenched divergences between national laws with overlapping scope. For this reason, the EU legislator decided to pass over this problem and place its rules on a different level. Conflicts of laws will be managed, not solved. This is in line with the “procedure over substance” philosophy of the Act, which has been criticised by others.

True, the illegality of internet content is often patently obvious, making the search for the applicable law a redundant exercise. Child pornography, hate speech, details of crimes or private photos do not justify long legal analysis. The DSA calls this “manifestly illegal content” and allows particularly strict measures in their regard, such as the suspension of services to their senders (Article 23(1) DSA). Still, the issue of legality or illegality may not always be so obvious, for instance when it comes to copyright infringements, the offering of accommodation services or the sale of live animals (examples taken from Recital 12), which is regulated quite differently in the Member States, not to speak of betting and gaming or the clash between privacy rights and free speech/freedom of the press that is resolved differently in different countries.

The Limits of Conflicts of Laws

In these instances, and in many others, it would have been preferable to have clear-cut rules that allow to identify the applicable rules. However, and from a more operational perspective, common substantive rules, rather than bilateral conflict-of-laws rules, should have been adopted where Union law is silent on what is illegal content. This would help to preserve individual freedom and to avoid contradicting orders between different Member States. In the absence of a political agreement between Member States on this question, the DSA opts instead for cooperation between regulators, especially the “Digital Services Coordinators” of the various Member State. However, without any clear guidance on whose laws governs, they may lack the means to solve these disputes in a matter that is legally certain, foreseeable and compatible with fundamental rights.

Moreover, the European digital environment will remain fragmented and there may be a risk that “illegal content havens” emerge (in the same way as tax havens in corporate matters). On the one hand, it can be expected that non-EU-based online platforms will choose a legal representative established in a Member State (Article 13 DSA) that is liberal in matters such as freedom of expression and privacy issues. On the other hand, one can imagine these platforms to strategically and systematically invoke their European “law of origin” (i.e. that of the Member State of establishment of their legal representative) in application of the internal market clause of the e-commerce Directive in the event of a civil liability action brought against them. Eventually, it will be for the national court of the Member States to navigate within this regulatory maze, with the sole help of the CJEU.

We guess national judges would rather favour their own law. Indeed, the law of the forum has several reasons to apply here, i.e. as the law governing the illegality of the content, the law of the place where the damages occurred and, more broadly, the law of the place of “use” of the content. This will reinforce the unilateralist tendencies that characterises the whole Act.

This post was collectively written by Marion Ho-Dac and Matthias Lehmann. It consists of two parts. Part two can be found here.


The Digital Services Act (DSA) is a landmark legislation in many respects, also regarding its volume (102 pages in the O.J., no less than 156 Recitals). It will force online platforms such as Youtube, Google or Amazon to be more responsible for the contents posted on them. It has been adopted on 19 October 2022 and will (mainly) be applicable from 17 February 2024 (Article 93(2) DSA). Inter alia, it partially amends the e-commerce Directive (Art. 89 DSA) but preserves its famous “internal market clause”.

The DSA’s Indifference to PIL

The DSA states that it applies “without prejudice to Union rules on private international law” (Recital 10 DSA). However, the text deals with the provision of “intermediary services” within the broader concept of “information society services” (i.e. digital services). These virtually always raise cross-border private-law issues (cf. also Recital 2 DSA). A basic example is a legal action by a user in the EU to request the removal of (allegedly) defamatory online content. The question of the competent court will be resolved by the Brussels I bis Regulation – but what about the applicable law?

The DSA does not resolve such conflicts of laws, but pretends they do not exist. Time and time again, it refers to the “applicable national law”, without giving any indication how this law is to be determined. The Act flies in a high legal stratosphere, hovering over any differences between Member State and other national laws.

Yet, there are instances in which conflicts of laws play a role when applying the DSA (as in all EU regulations dealing with private law issues). The first will be studied in this post and concerns the determination of the applicability of the DSA. The second instance is where the DSA makes reference to a national legal system, for instance with regard to illegal content. This will be the subject of another post.

DSA Scope of Application

In the global digital ecosystem, the application of the DSA, as a uniform body of rules, requires that EU law as such is applicable. This is far from obvious since the vast majority of online platforms are based outside the EU. The DSA’s scope of application focuses on the recipients of the intermediary service – their establishment or location in the EU – “irrespective of where the providers […] have their place of establishment” (Article 2(1) DSA). The recipients are those who simply “use” intermediary services, “in particular for the purposes of seeking information or making it accessible” (Article 3(b) DSA).

The provision on the scope of the DSA presupposes that the providers are “offering” their services to recipients in the EU. Characterising the offering to users in a given territory is a well-known difficulty in private international law. But here the issue is more sensitive than e.g. in Article 17(1)(c) Brussels I bis Regulation as it relates to the scope of the DSA’s regulatory regime.

If the text stopped there, the DSA would have a “global vocation”. Such an approach, which could be described as a kind of “maximalist European unilateralism”, is however unpalatable. It would have large extraterritorial effects, create tensions with third countries and, in practice, would probably be unworkable given the limited capacities of European market supervision.

But the DSA is much more cautious and imposes a “substantial connection” with the EU (Article 3(e) DSA). This is de jure the case when the provider of intermediary services is established in the Union. Otherwise, the text requires that either the provider has a “significant number of recipients of the service” in the EU, or that it “targets” recipients in the EU. The first criterion is based on the economic and societal weight of the foreign operator, the latter on its behaviour. Ultimately, these criteria attenuate the European unilateralist approach and thus make it acceptable on a global scale.

Impact on Conflicts of Laws

The applicability of the DSA has consequences for conflicts of laws in case of international private disputes that fall within its scope. The national law of a third State which would be designated as applicable will be set aside in favour of its provisions, which qualify as overriding mandatory rules. Though the text is silent on this, the DSA certainly is regarded as crucial by the EU for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation (cf Article 9(1) Rome I). The DSA thus belongs to the European public policy, which is part of the public policy of the Member States.

Although many of its provisions are of a procedural nature, others may have an incidence on the level of substantive law, for instance tort law. This is in particular the case for those rules that concern liability. They operate in a double-edged sword by excluding liability but only under certain conditions. Where these conditions are not fulfilled, the “free pass” on liability under EU law is suspended.

To illustrate, Art 6 DSA exempts hosting services from liability for the hosted content, but only under certain conditions. One of them is that the provider, upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of illegal content, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to it (Article 6(1)(b) DSA). In other words, where the hosting provider does not act expeditiously, the way to liability under the applicable law is open.

Although the rule does not impose liability itself, the underlying policy is that the EU will not countenance hosting service providers that do not honour their duties to remove illegal content expeditiously. This could be interpreted as an overriding mandatory rule, which supersedes foreign rules that give a free pass to all hosting service providers. Of course, this interpretation still needs to be tested in court.

The EAPIL Working Group on the Reform of the Brussels I bis Regulation has issued a preliminary position paper formulating proposals for reforming the Regulation.

The proposals are based on the opinions expressed by the members of the working group and the participants at the conference held at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg in September 2022. The proposals of the members of the Members Consultative Committee were also forwarded to the drafters of the position paper.

The chairs of the Working Group (Burkhard Hess and Geert van Calster) now invite all interested members of EAPIL and readers of the blog to participate in a survey on the proposals formulated in the position paper until 13 March 2023. The survey can be accessed here.

On 15 December 2022, the UK Government launched an open consultation on its plan for the United Kingdom to become a Contracting State to the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters (the Hague Judgments Convention).

As part of the decision-making process on becoming a Contracting State, the Government is looking to gather wide-ranging perspectives, especially from who have experience of current cross-border litigation.

Based on the overall analysis, the Government will make a final decision on signing and ratifying and any declarations to be made, and commence the necessary processes to ensure that this can be achieved within a reasonable timescale, in consultation with the Devolved Administrations.

The Convention would be implemented in UK domestic law under the terms of the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020, subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. The Convention would enter into force for the United Kingdom 12 months after the date it deposits its instrument of ratification.

The consultation, which consists of 14 questions, is meant to remain open for eight weeks, that is, until 9 February 2023.

Further details concerning submissions are available here.

A paper summarising the responses to this consultation will be published in spring 2023. The response paper will be available on-line at gov.uk.

As reported on this blog by Marco Pasqua, the European Commission adopted on 18 October 2022 its 2023 Work Programme, listing the legislative proposals, including in the area of private international law, that the Commission itself regarded as a priority.

On 15 December 2022, the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission signed a Joint Declaration on EU legislative priorities for 2023 and 2024. The document, as indicated in the official press release, “sets out a shared European vision for a stronger and more resilient Europe in the face of Russia’s unprovoked, brutal aggression against Ukraine and its wide-ranging impact – all the while tackling other serious challenges such as the climate crisis and economic headwinds”.

The joint declaration is accompanied by a working document, which lists 164 “key legislative proposals”, that the three institutions agreed to prioritise.

Some of these proposals either primarily relate to private international law or include provisions that have, or may have, significant private international law implications.

These include the proposal for a Directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence; the proposal for a Directive harmonising certain aspects of insolvency law; the proposal for a Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence; the proposal for a Directive on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (SLAPPs); the proposal for a Regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters; and the proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims.

The recently adopted proposal for a Regulation aimed at harmonising at EU level the rules of private international law relating to parenthood (which Marta Requejo presented here) is not among those listed in the document.

There is also no reference to the expected developments regarding the international protection of adults.

On 7 December 2022, as announced through the Commission Press Corner, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation aimed at harmonising at EU level the rules of private international law relating to parenthood.

The proposal is focused on the best interests and the rights of the child. It will provide legal clarity for all types of families, who find themselves in a cross-border situation within the EU, be it because they move from one Member State to another to travel or reside, or because they have family members or property in another Member State. One of the key aspects of the proposal is that the parenthood established in a Member State of the EU should be recognised in all the other Member States, without any special procedure.

Union law as interpreted by the European Court of Justice, notably on free movement, already provides that parenthood established in a Member State should be recognised in all the other Member States for some purposes: access to the territory, right of residence, non-discrimination with the nationals. However, this is not the case for the rights derived from national law.

Today’s proposal allows children in cross border situations to benefit from the rights derived from parenthood under national law, in matters such as succession, maintenance, custody or the right of parents to act as legal representative of the child (for schooling or health matters).

Background

Commission President von der Leyen said in her 2020 State of the Union speech that “If you are parent in one country, you are parent in every country”. With this statement, the President referred to the need to ensure that the parenthood established in a Member State is recognised in all other Member States for all purposes.

EU citizens can live and work in different EU countries. They travel, move for work, buy houses, start families. At the moment, Member States have varying national laws on the recognition of parenthood, so when a family finds itself in a cross-border situation, it might lose the rights derived from parenthood under national law.  The non-recognition of parenthood puts at risk the fundamental rights of children, including their right to an identity, to non-discrimination and to a private and family life.

The proposal was identified as a key action in the EU Strategy on the rights of the child and the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy. The European Parliament welcomed the Commission’s initiative in its Resolution on the protection of the rights of the child in civil, administrative and family law proceedings and in its Resolution on LGBTIQ rights in the EU. The Council conclusions on the EU Strategy on the rights of the child underline that children’s rights are universal, that every child enjoys the same rights without discrimination of any kind and that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or by private institutions.

Protecting Children Rights

The proposal aims at protecting the fundamental rights of children, providing legal certainty for the families, and reducing the legal costs and burden for the families and the Member States’ administrative and judicial systems.

The main elements of the proposal include: (a) designation of the jurisdiction: the proposal determines the courts of the Member States that have jurisdiction in matters related to parenthood, ensuring the best interest of the child; (b) designation of the applicable law:as a rule, the law applicable to the establishment of parenthood should be the law of the State of the habitual residence of the person giving birth. Where that rule results in the establishment of parenthood as regards only one parent, alternative options ensure that parenthood can be established as regards both parents; (c) rules for recognition of parenthood: the proposal provides for the recognition of court decisions and authentic instruments establishing or providing evidence of the establishment of parenthood. As a rule, parenthood established in a Member State, should be recognised in all the other Member States, without any special procedure; (d) creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood: children (or their legal representatives) can request it from the Member State which established parenthood, and choose to use it to prove their parenthood in all the other Member States. The Commission proposes a harmonised template, common to the whole EU. The use of the Certificate would be optional for families, but they have the right to request it and to have it accepted all over the EU.

The proposal will complement other EU private international law rules, on matters such as succession. It does not harmonise substantive family law, which remains the competence of the Member States.

Next Steps

The Commission’s proposal has to be adopted unanimously by the Council, after consulting the European Parliament. Five years after the Regulation becomes applicable, the Commission will evaluate its application by Member States and may propose amendments.

This post was written by Felix M. Wilke, University of Bayreuth.


The new EU Sale of Goods Directive 2019/771 and its sibling, the Supply of Digital Content and Digital Services Directive 2019/770, understandably have attracted a lot of attention in the field of substantive private law. By contrast, to my knowledge, their (negative) private international law dimension has not been featured in any prominent way yet. In this post, I want to highlight and contextualize this aspect. Any input, e.g. regarding directives I might have missed or explanations different from the ones I offer, is very much welcome.

The Wonderful World of Conflict of Laws in EU Directives

When faced with the term “EU Conflict of Laws”, most people will nowadays immediately think of the different regulations in this area: Rome I to III, the Succession Regulation etc. But this is not the whole story. Some of the Union’s provisions with a direct impact on private international law can be found in directives. Beginning with Article 6(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EEC, many of such instruments on the protection of consumers required the Member States to take “the necessary measures to ensure that the consumer does not lose the protection granted [by the respective legal instrument] by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-Member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a close connection with the territory of the Member States”. Other examples are Article 12(2) of the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services Directive 2002/65/EC and Article 22(4) of the Consumer Credit Agreements Directive2008/48/EC.

Moreover, Article 12(2) of the Time Sharing Directive 2008/122/EC sets forth that, under certain conditions, “consumers shall not be deprived of the protection granted by this Directive, as implemented in the Member State of the forum” where the law of a third country is applicable. (While Articles 17–19 of the new Package Travel Directive 2015/2302 have an obvious connection to conflict of laws, they operate differently.)

All these provisions are still in force. National law of the Member States must contain respective rules – and these rules clearly must be conflict-of-law rules, as they have to affect situations in which the law of a third country would otherwise be applicable (mostly because of a choice by the parties).

A Change of Heart between 2008 and 2011?

Things are different for the new Sale of Goods Directive. While Article 7(2) of the old Sale of Goods Directive1999/44/EC was drafted along the lines of the examples just mentioned, any such provision is now missing from the directive repealing it. (The Supply of Digital Content and Digital Services Directive does not introduce a conflict-of-law provision, either.) The same fate befell Article 12(2) of the Distance Contracts Directive 97/7/EC when the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU repealed it. From this perspective, EU private international law has actually lost two provisions in the last decade or so.

As the EU legislator seems to have changed its stance on this issue between 2008 and 2011, two possible reasons from this period suggest themselves. The first concerns the new approach to harmonisation of substantive private law by directives, the second the emergence of EU regulations on conflict of laws.

Full Harmonisation

The Distance Contracts Directive and the old Sale of Goods Directive were minimum harmonisation directives. The Member States could maintain or introduce provisions if they ensured a higher level of consumer protection. By contrast, both the Consumer Rights Directive and the new Sale of Goods Directive are full harmonisation directives. Unless otherwise provided, Member States may not maintain or introduce divergent provisions, whether less or more stringent.

Yet no clear link of this changed approach to harmonisation with the present conflict-of-law issue is apparent. True, it is now more or less irrelevant which national law of an EU Member State is applicable to a sale of goods to a consumer. The key rules will be the same across the board (also see Recital 10 Sale of Goods Directive). But this is not with what the respective old provisions and the remaining provisions in other directives were and are concerned. They were and are about protecting the consumer from the application of the (disadvantageous) law of a third country.

Rome I and Choice of Law (in Consumer Contracts)

For anyone interested in EU private international law, the years between 2007 and 2009 have, of course, special significance. In this time frame, the first EU regulations on conflict of laws were passed and became applicable. In particular, Rome I was passed in 2008 and has been applicable to contracts concluded as from 17 December 2009. So, are the rules found in Rome I on consumer contracts and choice of law in general the reason for the lack of conflict-of-law provisions in more recent directives?

As a matter of law, the answer must be negative. This is because the scope of application of Articles 6(2) and 3(4) of the Rome I Regulation on the one hand and of the conflict-of-law rules in the directives on the other hand do not perfectly overlap: The provisions in the directives have not entirely become redundant once Rome I entered into force. For one, Article 6(4) of Rome I excludes certain contracts. For another, even the relatively broad requirement of “directing activities” in Article 6(1)(b) of Rome I only pertains to the Member State in which the consumer is habitually resident. A consumer concluding a contract in another Member State may not be protected even where Article 6 Rome I would encompass a consumer habitually resident in that country. Finally, Article 3(4) Rome I is too narrow to catch all cases subject to the conflict-of-law provisions in directives.

As a matter of policy, however, one can assume that Rome I was a big factor. The Commission’s Proposal for the new Sale of Goods Directive does refer to the protection of consumers under Rome I, although only in the context of compatibility of the draft with EU private international law. (See also Recital 65 Sale of Goods Directive.) When the Commission states that the legislative proposal “does not require any changes to the current framework of EU private international law”, it is not clear whether it took the actual change it proposed to make to EU private international law – eliminating a conflict-of-law provision – into account.

Is there Reason to Mourn?

Life is easier without conflict-of-law provisions in directives, to be sure. Nothing to transpose for national legislators, and no reason for courts to even think about special national conflict-of-law rules favouring consumers. Does this offset the detriments to consumers? One can certainly think so. While the exclusion of some consumers from the protection offered by Article 6 Rome I can lead to some strange results, they only affect a very small number of situations. The practical impact of the conflict-of-law provisions in directives does not seem to have been very big, anyway. As far as I can tell, the Court of Justice only had to deal with any of these provisions once: Case C-70/03 (Commission v. Spain) concerns Spain’s too restrictive transposition of Article 6(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive into its national law.

In any case, the death of conflict-of-law provisions in directives should not be silent. Unlike during the legislative process leading to the Consumer Rights Directive and the new Sale of Goods Directive, the EU legislator should openly communicate that – and preferably also why – it considers such provisions unnecessary. And this not only from a scholarly perspective: In the highly complex realm that is EU (substantive) consumer law, a national legislator might simply miss that a conflict-of-law provision transposing one of the old directives has now lost its base.

A recent Briefing paper titled Updating the European digital identity framework, authored by Mar Negreiro and Maria Niestadt (from the European Parliamentary Research Services), may be of interest to the readers of this blog.

It deals with the proposal of the European Commission, released in June 2021, to create a “European Digital Identity” (EDI) and a dedicated “Wallet” for citizens and businesses in the European Union (hereafter ‘EDI Regulation proposal’).

General Background of a ‘European Digital Identity’ and its Dedicated ‘Wallet’

The ‘European Digital Identity Wallet’ (EDIW) aims to allow people and companies based in the EU, to store person identification data (e.g. name, address, gender, civil status) and electronic attestations of attributes (e.g. bank account, birth certificate, diploma, company statute) for cross-border use. It should also allow users to authenticate and access online public or private services (Article 6a of the EDI Regulation proposal). According to the European Commission, by means of this digital wallet, proving your identity and sharing electronic official documents across the EU Member States will be possible with ‘one click’ on your smartphone!

This legislative proposal surely is a coherent and necessary continuum of the digitalisation momentum in the Union, both in its economic (i.e. internal market policy) and judicial (i.e. judicial cooperation in civil and criminal) dimension. One of its main political objective is for the Member States and the Union to regain control over the identity of European citizens in the digital ecosystem. Indeed, the dominant tech platforms have been developing private forms of ‘digital ID’, competing with national legal identification schemes. Under the EDI Regulation proposal, the digital wallet should only be issued under the supervision of Member States (i.e. directly by the State or based on a mandate/recognition requirements from the State). The project also aims to support the empowerments of ‘EU digital citizens’ in the same vein as the Declaration on European Digital Rights and Principles recently put forward by the European Commission to ensure a human-centred digital transformation in the Union. Users should be “in full control” of the wallet (Article 6a (7) of the EDI Regulation proposal) based on the key-principles of the GDPR, such as the requirement of data minimisation.

However, the proposal also raises several concerns about, inter alia, the effectivity of data protection, the risk of exclusion of parts of European society, the system’s vulnerability to fraud and data loss. I propose to add to that list uncertainties with regard to private international law rules and their implementation in ‘EDIW context’. The first question that occurs to me is as follows: what will be the legal scope of the cross-border portability of the information contained in this digital wallet?

Legal Outlines of the European Digital Identity Wallet
The Acquis based on the eDIAS Regulation

The EDIW proposal builds on the acquis of the eIDAS Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market. This latter lays down the conditions for the mutual recognition, between EU Member States, of electronic identification means of natural and legal persons, based on national notified electronic identification schemes (Article 6). By consequence, the identity – unique by essence – of citizens and businesses based in a Member State can be established throughout the Union (or, at least, in the other Member States that have notified such schemes). Concretely, it should for instance allow a person, domiciled in one Member State, to open a bank account in another Member State remotely, via an electronic identification (eID). The bank should be able to verify the age and the legal identity of the client, his/her financial records and the paperwork could be signed online using e-signatures (see here for other ‘promotional’ examples).

For the proper functioning of the mutual recognition principle, the eIDAS Regulation provides for three “assurance levels” applicable to the electronic identification schemes; they characterise “the degree of confidence in electronic identification means in establishing the identity of a person” (see Recital 16 and Article 8). Against this background, mutual recognition of electronic identification means – used for authentication for an online service – is mandatory for the ‘host State’ only when the public body of the ‘home State’ uses the “substantial” or “high” assurance levels for accessing that service online (Article 6).

‘European Digital Identity Wallet’: What Does It Mean?

The EDI Regulation proposal goes further than the current eIDAS Regulation in making mandatory for all Member States to provide electronic identification means and to recognise the notified electronic identification schemes (eDIs) of other Member States. In that respect, it lays down common requirements for the issuing of European Digital Identity Wallets (EDIW) by Member States (Article 6a of the EDI Regulation proposal). These wallets are understood as “electronic identification means […] containing person identification data and which is used for authentication for an online or offline service” (see Article 1, (3) (a) (2) of the proposal, with the understanding that ‘authentication’ enables the electronic identification as well as the origin and integrity of data in electronic form to be confirmed).

By comparison with a more familiar concept, ID cards issued by EU Member States (following the implementation of Regulation 2019/1157 on strengthening the security of identity cards of Union citizens) are also characterised as ‘electronic identification means’ under the eIDAS Regulation and the EDI Regulation proposal. But the future EDIW is much more than a mere digital ID card. It is both “a product and service” that allows the user “to store identity data, credentials and attributes linked to her/his identity, to provide them to relying parties on request and to use them for authentication, online and offline, for a service […] and to create qualified electronic signatures and seals” (Article 1, (3) (i) point 42 of the proposal).

Legal Scope of the European Digital Identity Wallet

The digital wallet should, inter alia, allow the “validation” of person identification data and electronic attestations of attributes by relying parties. More widely, Member States should provide “validation mechanisms” to ensure that the “authenticity and validity” of the digital wallet can be verified. In that respect, the EDIW should meet the “high level of assurance”, by reference to the eIDAS Regulation (see above), in particular with regard to “identity proofing and verification” requirements. The high level of assurance is based on technical specifications, standards and procedures “the purpose of which is to prevent misuse or alteration of the identity” (Article 8, (2), c).

It is also worth mentioning that the EDI Regulation proposal lays down a minimum list of attributes (e.g. address, age, civil status, family composition, financial and company data), the authenticity of which should be verifiable electronically, at the request of the user, by qualified providers of electronic attestations of attributes, against the relevant authentic source at national level (Article 45d and Annex VI).

Eventually, the proposed EDIW framework does not appear very clear about the normative scope of trans-European data flows via the digital wallet, between (presumption of) authenticity and validity.

Some Private International Law Issues Raised by the EDIW
The Legal Implication of the Mutual Recognition Technique

Beyond the strengthening of a common ‘technological infrastructure’, the ultimate goal of the ‘European Digital Identity Wallet’ (EDIW) is to ensure the cross-border recognition of Europeans’ legal identity and additional information about them (i.e. attestation of attributes such as certificates of birth or diplomas). This brings us to more familiar territory, starting with the core question of the legal significance of the mutual recognition technique in this specific context.

Mutual recognition should provide for a cross-border portability of the data stored within the digital wallet, such as age, gender, nationality or company data. In that respect, the relevant methodology may be based on the international circulation of foreign public documents that have consolidated a legal situation in a first Member State and whose legal consequences are expected in the host Member State (cf. the inspiring work of Professor Ch. Pamboukis). In the case of ‘non-decisional’ public documents (e.g. a professional qualification or a driving licence, ‘crystallised’ in the digital wallet issued by the State of origin), these documents should produce non-normative procedural effects of an evidentiary nature. The data stored in the digital wallet may also be presumed to be formally valid, which allows them to flow across legal borders: the person concerned may use them in the ‘host State digital jurisdiction’ in the same way as in his/her State of origin.

When the data contained in the digital wallet are no longer related to administrative/public aspects (e.g. diploma or driving licence mentioned above) but to personal status and individuality (e.g. name, domicile, civil status, family composition), the mutual recognition technique could take on a different meaning. Indeed, the public documents in question are no longer limited to ‘establishing’ a situation certified by a public authority but are of a ‘receptive’ type. The public authority issuing the public document has ‘received’ the private will expressed by the parties in order to authenticate it. In this context, it could be argued that the digital circulation of such a public document (e.g. a marriage or a name certificate) carries a presumption of validity of the legal situation (i.e. negotium) contained in it (i.e. instrumentum). This distinction is well-known among private international law experts and the suggested reasoning should be the same whether the information is ‘digitised’ or formalised in a paper document. Indeed, electronic attestation of attributes should have “the equivalent legal effect of lawfully issued attestations in paper form”, pursuant to the EDI Regulation proposal (Recital 27).

Critical Assessment

The future ‘European Digital Identity Wallet’ could have a real impact on the international recognition of personal and family status in the Union. The same could be said for the status of legal persons. For citizens and businesses, intra-European free movement would be strengthened and, in practice, greatly simplified.

The main methodological consequence from the private international law perspective should be the ‘eviction’ of the conflict-of-laws rules and reasoning. This is understandable insofar as, in practice, the presumption of probative value of a foreign public document, on the basis of mutual recognition, implies, in our view, a presumption of validity of the legal situation it contains (cf. here).

In the European context, this statement should be even more accurate, because of the remarkable influence of EU citizenship and fundamental rights (such as the right to privacy which applies to the identity of individuals) on conflict-of-laws. Several examples may be found in the caselaw of the CJEU, such as the recent Pancharevo judgment (commented on the blog) raising exactly this issue. For part of scholars and many Member States, this is however the pitfall to be avoided. But actually, the intra-European digital flow of personal data, via this European digital wallet, should instead reinforce this trend.

The Interplay Between the EDIW and Other Legal Instruments

It is important to note that the EDI Regulation proposal, like the current eIDAS Regulation, gives priority to other rules of EU and national law on specific sectors. In that respect, the proposal lays down that the (future) regulation “does not affect national or Union law related to the conclusion and validity of contracts or other legal or procedural obligations relating to sector specific requirements as regards form with underlying legal effects” (Article 2, §3). The issue of normative interplay between the EDIW framework and other important instruments will be crucial. This will be the case, inter alia, in the field of personal status, regarding Regulation 2019/1191 on Public Documents but probably also some ICCS conventions (such as Convention n°34 recently entered into force), as well as national rules on the international legal effects of public documents. This is also true for EU instruments which support the cross-border cooperation between public national authorities and the free movement of citizens and businesses, i.e. the IMI System and the Single Digital Gateway.

The ‘One-click EU Recognition’ is not yet ready to be the revolutionary new tool for private international law partitioners, but the European Digital Identity Wallet is definitively a topic for us!

The author of this post is Francesca Maoli, who is a Researcher at the University of Genova.


The Brussels II ter Regulation on matrimonial matters, matters of parental responsibility and child abduction has become fully applicable on 1 August 2022, meaning that legal proceedings instituted on or after that date, as well as authentic instruments and agreements registered on that date or afterwards, must, in all EU Member States (excluding Denmark), be dealt with in accordance with the Recast Regulation, rather than its predecessor, the Brussels II bis Regulation

Amending Brussels II bis: Improve the Tradition or Face Innovation?

The process that eventually resulted in the adoption of the Recast Brussels II Regulation was launched on the assumption that, overall, the old Brussels II bis Regulation had functioned reasonably well. The 2014 European Commission’s Report on the operation of the latter Regulation stressed that the system was in need of improvement, rather than radical change.

The existing rules have undergone several changes. Some amount to simple refinements and fixings. Others are more meaningful.

The most prominent innovation brought about by the Brussels II ter Regulation is, arguably, the abolition of exequatur for all decisions on parental responsibility. The two-track system envisaged in Brussels II bis, however, remains in place. While the general discipline is now contained in Article 30 and following of the Brussels II ter regulation, ‘override’ return orders and access orders (which the old regime already regarded as ‘privileged’ decisions) keep on benefiting from a special regime. Recognition and enforcement of the latter orders can be refused if they are irreconcilable with a later decision relating to parental responsibility concerning the same child, provided that such a later decision was given (i) in the Member State where recognition is invoked, or (ii) in another Member State or in the non-Member State of the habitual residence of the child, provided that the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State are met.

This post does not purport to analyse the new rules in details (a wealth of literature has been produced on the topic: see here for some references). It merely intends to ‘zoom in’ a selection of issues of special practical importance.

Private Divorces

The European Commission set itself the object of retaining the status quo as concerns matrimonial matters (this was, actually, the preferred policy according to the 2016 Recast Proposal). The Recast Regulation has nevertheless introduced, also in this area, some significant innovations.

One such innovation is about ‘private divorces’, i.e., divorces that fundamentally occur out of court, based on an agreement between the spouses.

The Brussels II ter Regulation comes with a definition of authentic instruments and agreements, respectively in Article 2(2) and (3). Authentic instruments and agreements in matrimonial matters, if they are given binding legal effects in the Member State of origin, benefit from recognition ‘without any special procedure being required’ (Article 65(1)), unless one of the grounds for refusal of recognition provided by Article 68(1) apply. The same is true of authentic instruments and agreements in matters of parental responsibility (Article 65(2)).

In practice, as clarified in Recital 70, authentic instruments and agreements are to be treated as equivalent to decisions. For this, they must have been formally drawn up or concluded in a Member State that would have had jurisdiction according to the regulation (Article 64). Where this is not the case, they may still circulate across Member States under domestic PIL provisions, or otherwise.

The EU decided to adopt rules on private divorces in light of developments that have arisen, recently, in domestic legislations. When the Brussels II bis Regulation was adopted, the laws of the Member States did not contemplate out-of-court divorces. This is why the Regulation itself failed to include provisions in this regard. This state of affairs has proved problematic. A case is currently pending before the ECJ (C‑646/20, Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport), concerning a dissolution of marriage by joint declaration of the spouses before an Italian civil registrar, whose duty is to assess whether the conditions for an out-of-court divorce are met (Article 12 of the Italian Decree Law No 132/2014 requires, inter alia, that the spouses do not have minor children). While noting that ‘Regulation No 2019/1111 is inapplicable to the present case ratione temporis’, being therefore ‘not possible to draw any conclusions from it for the purposes of interpreting Regulation No 2201/2003’, AG Collins suggested in its Opinion that Articles 2 and 21(1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation be given a broad interpretation, thereby concluding that Italian private divorces should be treated as ‘divorce judgments’ for the purpose of the Brussels II bis Regulation (just like they will do under the Recast Regulation).

The Best Interests of the Child and the Child’s Participation in Parental Responsibility Proceedings

The most significant changes brought about by the Brussels II ter Regulation concern children. One key goal of the Regulation is to enhance the protection of their fundamental rights, as enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter oof Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Specifically, Article 24 of the Charter creates a link between children’s rights – as protected by universal and regional systems – and the EU legal order.

The Regulation fosters the principle of the best interests of the child, which underlies both the general ground of jurisdiction of the habitual residence of the child (Recital 20) and the rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments (Recital 55).

While the overall regime of jurisdiction in parental responsibility matters is left substantially unaltered, some significant revision occurred concerning choice of court. Article 10 of the Brussels II ter Regulation provides the formal and substantial condition that an agreement of the parties must fulfil to be effective: those conditions reflect, in general, a concern for the best interests of the child. Among the other requisites, a ‘substantial connection’ must exist between the child and the State of the chosen forum. The new provision expands the cases in which the aforementioned connection is deemed to exists, thus creating more possibilities to exercise party autonomy. In addition, the choice of court results now disconnected from the existence of a proceeding concerning the dissolution of marriage (even if Recital 23 still mentions this circumstance). Finally, ‘persons who become parties to the proceedings after the court was seised may express their agreement after the court was seised’, with the specification that such acceptance of jurisdiction during the proceedings may also be implicit (Article 10(2)).

Child participation is another key issue. Recital 2 states that the Regulation ‘clarifies the child’s right to be provided with an opportunity to express his or her views in proceedings to which he or she is subject’, thus recognizing the already existing obligations stemming from international and EU law. The hearing of the child finds a comprehensive discipline in Article 21, which sets out a general obligation to hear the child in all proceedings on parental responsibility, in line with Article 12 UNCRC. The same obligation is stated in Article 26 in the context of child abduction proceedings.

All in all, a decision relating to a child may not be enforced if the child concerned was not given the opportunity to express their views in accordance with Article 21 (unless specific circumstances occur, as specified by Article 39(2)). As to ‘privileged decisions’, namely, overriding orders and orders concerning the rights of access, the violation of Article 21 prevents the issuance of the certificate aimed at facilitating recognition and enforcement (Article 47(3)(b)).

In spite of the foregoing, the opportunity for the child to be heard is still subject to ‘the national law and procedure’. Therefore, it remains unclear to what extent national practices of the Member States will be affected by the new provisions. The importance of the described innovations should, however, not be underestimated. The Regulation has built a solid link between EU proceedings on parental responsibility, on the one hand, and the obligations arising from international texts in this area. Against this background, in order for the child to be given a ‘genuine and effective opportunity to be heard’ (Articles 21 and 26), other aspects should be considered, such as the right of the child to receive adequate information, as suggested, inter alia, by the Guidelines of the Council of Europe on Child-Friendly Justice and the recent work of the Committee of experts on the rights and the best interests of the child in parental separation and in care proceedings (CJ/ENF-ISE).

The focus on the child’s best interests is further witnessed by Article 56 of the Recast Regulation. This provides that the enforcement of a decision may be suspended if it ‘would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm due to temporary impediments which have arisen after the decision was given, or by virtue of any other significant change of circumstances’. According to Recital 69, this may take the form of a manifest and strong objection of the child voiced after the adoption of the decision (Recital 69).

International Child Abduction

Chapter III of Brussels II ter is about international child abduction. The new instrument confirms the intention to enhance the operation of the 1980 Hague Convention with respect to intra-EU abductions. The overriding mechanism or trumping order, which consents the court of the Member State of habitual residence of the child before the abduction to the return of the child despite a contrary decision issued in the State of refuge, is still operating. However, the recourse to the overriding mechanism is permitted only when the decision of non-return has been issued pursuant Article 13(1)(b) (grave risk of harm) and 13(2) (objection of the child) of the 1980 Hague Convention. Moreover, the court of the child’s habitual residence can issue such a decision only in the context of a proceedings on the merits of parental responsibility, thus reaching a stable assessment on the future of the child. Therefore, the risk of multiple transfers is mitigated.

On other aspects, the discipline is more detailed. Some innovations, inspired to the will to give substantial content to the child’s best interests, are to be welcomed.

The whole Article 24 of the Regulation is dedicated to the celerity of return proceedings: a term of six week after the lodgment of the application is prescribed at each instance, unless ‘exceptional circumstances’ make it impossible to respect this time limit. As concerns appeal proceedings, the term starts to run at the moment in which ‘the required procedural steps have been taken and the court is in a position to examine the appeal’. Similar obligations are placed upon Central Authorities, which shall act expeditiously in processing return applications. The same purpose inspires the possibility to declare return orders provisionally enforceable, notwithstanding any appeal (Article 27(5)). The enforcement proceedings themselves must be fast (Article 28).

The Regulation also provides that the requested court may invite the parties to consider mediation or other ADRs, unless it would result contrary to the best interests of the child, not appropriate in the particular case or would unduly delay the proceedings (Article 25). The explicit mention of this possibility follows the specific attention that the family law scholars and practitioners are devoting to mediation, the potentialities of which are undoubtful. For this reason, the recast could have devoted even more structured discipline to mediation, currently mentioned only in the Chapter dedicated to international child abduction.

The best interests of the child also play a crucial role when it comes to provisional measures aimed at ensuring a contact between the child and the person seeking the return of the child (Article 27(2)). The requested court, while deciding on the return, may also adopt provisional, including protective, measures that are  recognized and enforced in all other Member States until the court with jurisdiction as to the substance intervenes (as results from Articles 27(5), 35(2) and 36(1)(c), as well as Recitals 30, 44-46 and 59).

Autonomy, Flexibility and Protection of the Rights of the Child: The Role of Cooperation

Overall, the approach of the EU lawmaker with the Brussels II ter Regulation has resulted in the will to balance the enhancement of party autonomy, the need to grant judicial and non-judicial authority a certain degree of flexibility and the protection of the fundamental rights of the child.

As already mentioned, the latter has inspired some detailed obligations concerning, inter alia, the hearing of the child and a specific attention towards the discipline of international child abduction proceedings. While party autonomy has been empowered also in the context of parental responsibility, through the new discipline on choice of court agreements and implicit acceptance of jurisdiction, those rules have been surrounded by safeguards aimed at protecting the child’s best interests. The same reasoning applies to authentic instruments and agreements circulating according to Article 65(2) of the regulation, which are subject to the grounds for refusal of recognition or enforcement provided by Article 68(2) and (3). Specific reference is made to the possibility for the child to express his or her own views, which may result compressed in the context of out-of-court proceedings or private arrangements.

At the same time, the objective of protect children and their best interests has sustained the introduction of a certain degree of flexibility to national authorities: for instance, the possibility to issue cross-border protective orders pending an international child abduction proceedings, or to suspend the enforcement of a decision when the physical or the psychological wellbeing of the child is at risk.

In this context – and with a view to those objectives – the new provisions of the regulation dedicated to cooperation are of particular interests. Direct cooperation and communication between courts and between Central Authorities are now subject to a more detailed discipline and, therefore, encouraged. Chapter V is entirely dedicated to the role and obligations of Central Authorities, when cooperating between themselves and with courts. Other provisions are to be found in other parts of the regulation. Article 86 concerns direct judicial communication and provides that courts from different Member States should cooperate and communicate directly in all cases that are appropriate (for instance, when a court takes provisional or protective measures, it shall inform the court of another Member State having jurisdiction). The dialogue between judicial authorities can effectively contribute to the good administration of cross-border situations, as well as support swifter procedures, with positive repercussions on children. Of course, it could provide specialized training for judges, who need to be acquainted with this possibility and perhaps acquire new skills.

Those and other provisions contribute to a more fragmented discipline compared to the Brussels II bis regulation. On the other hand, if well applied, they may contribute to a better enhancement of the child’s best interests in the EU judicial space. As always, the application of the tool in practice will show its fruits.

A quick update related to the insolvency regulation (Regulation 2015/848): on 30 August 2022 the Commission adopted Decision (EU) 2022/1437 confirming the participation of Ireland in Regulation (EU) 2021/2260 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings to replace its Annexes A and B.

The Decision takes up the notification to the Commission of 31 May 2022 whereby Ireland notified its wish, in accordance with Article 4 of Protocol (No 21), to accept and be bound by Regulation (EU) 2021/2260 of the European Parliament and of the Council. The preamble explains that there are no specific conditions attached to the participation of Ireland in Regulation (EU) 2021/2260 and there is no need for transitional measures; the measure concerned by the current notification of Ireland merely updates the Annexes A and B to that Regulation containing the list of national insolvency proceedings and the list of national insolvency practitioners, respectively.

The Decision has entered into force the day after its publication in the Official Journal, thus on 1 September 2022.

This post was contributed by Dr. Vincent Richard, who practices with Wurth Kinsch Olinger in Luxembourg.


The end of the summer is the right time to draw readers’ attention to the recent entry into force in all EU Member States except Denmark of the Evidence Regulation recast on 1 July 2022 (Regulation 2020/1783).

The Evidence Regulation facilitates the cross-border taking of evidence by allowing a court or authority to request a court located in another Member State to take evidence there. The Regulation also allows courts to take evidence directly from another Member State after having asked permission from the central authority of that Member State.

The main goal of the recast is to bring the Evidence Regulation into the digital era by imposing that all communications and exchanges of documents should be carried out through a decentralised IT system such as e-CODEX and by encouraging the taking of evidence through videoconferencing. Additionally, the recast facilitates the direct taking of evidence and it introduces interesting changes to the notion of “court” under the Regulation.

Electronic Transmission of Requests through e-CODEX

The main objective of the recast is to impose an electronic transmission of requests and documents among courts using the Evidence Regulation. To that end, Article 7 (former Article 6 of Regulation 1206/2001) was entirely modified to provide for a fully dematerialised procedure and to allow electronic signatures, governed by Regulation no 910/2014 on electronic identification.

Communication between courts relies on the e-CODEX system, which is a decentralised and interoperable system for cross-border communication, allowing secure communication between preapproved and identifiable users such as judges and clerks. The e-CODEX system has already been used to connect the commercial registers of the Member States and in several pilot projects. The solution has been tested by a limited number of States in the application of the European Payment Order, Small Claims and European Account Preservation Order Regulation. The Regulation on the taking of evidence and the Regulation on the service of documents are the first texts on judicial cooperation in civil matters to require Member States to deploy access points to the e-CODEX system, but the Commission wishes to generalize the method, both in civil and criminal matters. On this issue, the reader may consult a recent blog post by Marta Requejo on the entry into force of the e-CODEX Regulation.

Because of the technical difficulties that this transformation entails, the relevant article (Article 7) did not enter into force in July 2022 with the rest of the Regulation but it will enter into force in 2025, three years after the adoption of the implementing regulation defining technical specifications (Commission implementing regulation (EU) 2022/422 of 14 March 2022).

Taking of Evidence through Videoconferencing

Where the taking of evidence requires the hearing of a person who is not in the territory of the requesting court, the Regulation encourages Member States to use videoconferencing whenever possible (Articles 12 and 20). This technology can be used to hear a party, a witness, an expert or even a child in the context of the application of Regulation 2019/1111. The recast encourages the use of videoconferencing, whether the taking of evidence is carried out by the requested court or directly by the requesting court.

The Notion of “Court” under the Regulation

Article 2 of the recast provides two definitions. One on the “decentralised IT system” and one on the notion of “court”. The latter definition is worth mentioning because it aimed to close the debate as to whether notaries can use the Evidence Regulation. (On the broader issue of notaries in EU PIL, see the post by Martina Mantovani on this blog, here)

Under the recast, the notion of court encompasses not only courts per se but also “other authorities in Member States as communicated to the Commission under Article 31(3), that exercise judicial functions, that act pursuant to a delegation of power by a judicial authority or that act under the control of a judicial authority, and which are competent under national law to take evidence for the purposes of judicial proceedings in civil or commercial matters”.

Hence, Member States are free to delegate the taking of evidence to notaries or court clerks and other Member States must respect this choice as long as it was communicated to the Commission. Recital 5 specifies that this definition includes authorities that qualify as courts under other Union legal acts, such as Brussels I bis, Brussels II ter and the Succession Regulation.

Direct Taking of Evidence

Article 19 to 21 of the recast further encourages requesting courts to use direct taking of evidence after asking permission from the central authority where the evidence is located. If that central body does not answer within 30 days of acknowledgement of receipt of the request, article 19(5) provides that the requesting court may send a reminder. Interestingly, if the requesting court does not receive a reply within 15 days of the acknowledgement of receipt of the reminder, the request for the direct taking of evidence shall be considered accepted. The Regulation, therefore, provides that the silence of the central body is equivalent to implicit acceptance of the taking of evidence on its territory. Exceptionally, the central body may, however, still refuse the taking of evidence after the deadline until the moment of the actual direct taking of evidence.

Conclusion

The Evidence Regulation has never been used much but it remains a useful tool at the disposal of judges and counsels who need to gather evidence abroad in cross-border disputes. The introduction of the e-CODEX system and the use of videoconferencing should speed up the process of obtaining evidence abroad.

Moreover, the recast foreshadows the method that will be followed in judicial cooperation in the coming years and it will be interesting to observe the implementation of e-CODEX in all Member States.

On 25 May 2022, the European Commission published a set of Questions and Answers (Q&As) to clarify the practical implementation of the new sets of Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs), adopted in June 2021 (Decision 914/2021/EU). Contracts based on the earlier sets of SCCs will no longer be a lawful basis for international data transfers after 27 December 2022 (Q&A No. 22).

As a reminder, SCCs are standardised and pre-approved model data protection clauses that allow controllers and processors to comply with their obligations under EU data protection law. They are based on a triangular relationship, whereby the obligations assumed by the data importer and the data exporter (the parties to the contract) by virtue of their contractual agreement can be enforced by the data subject, acting as a third-party beneficiary.

SCCs are, by definition, incorporated within an international contract between a controller/processor of personal data established in the EU (or subject to the GDPR pursuant to Article 3(2) thereof) and a controller/processor established in a third country and placed beyond the scope of application of the GDPR (cf Q&A No. 24). Owing to their congenital “foreign element”, these contracts must speak the language of private international law (PIL), at least in cases where they are concluded between two commercial entities (see Q&A No. 2 for the potential range of users of the SCCs). In this respect, the Commission’s Q&As bring along welcome clarifications concerning some of most recurrent PIL issues arising out of these clauses, such as those regarding the contents and limits of conflict-of-laws party autonomy and the interplay between these contracts and the legal order (notably, the overriding mandatory rules) of the receiving third country.

While being of certain interest for the private international lawyer, the relationship between local laws (objectively applicable to the data importer) and the SCCs remains extremely complex and it deserves its own blogpost. For this reason, Section A of this blogpost will briefly present the major “PIL innovations” brought along by the 2021 SCCs, focusing solely on choice of law and choice of court clauses. Section B will then point to some unresolved issues that presently find no answer in the Commission’s Q&A (nor elsewhere).

A. Modernised SCCs and PIL: What’s New

The first and most evident innovation brought along in 2021 consists in an attempt at simplification of the regulatory environment. The three distinct sets of SCCs adopted under Directive 95/46 [Decision 2001/497/EC (SCCs for controller to controller transfers), Decision 2004/915/EC (alternative set of SCCs for controller to controller transfers) and Decision 2010/87/EU (transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries)] have been replaced by two sets of SCCs: one concerning the relationship between controllers and processors to fulfil the requirements in Article 28(3) and (4) of the GDPR; one dealing with SCCs as a tool for the transfer of data outside the EEA. The latter present an innovative modular structure consisting of 4 “modules”, covering four transfer scenarios (cf Q&A Nos 21 and 27): transfer from EU-based Controller to Non EU-based Controller (Module 1); transfer from EU-based Controller to Non EU-based Processor (Module 2); transfer from EU-based Processor to Non EU-based Processor (Module 3); transfer from EU-based Processor to Non EU-based Controller (Module 4).

The parties have to combine “general clauses” (that are applicable regardless of the specific transfer scenario) with the module(s) that applies to their specific situation.

For the purposes of the present blogpost, only the SCCs as a tool for the transfer of data outside the EEA will be considered, as specifically concerns the Clauses dealing with applicable law (A.1) and jurisdiction over remedies (A.2).

A.1 Applicable law

The regime governing the choice of the applicable law has undergone significant modifications in the 2021 restyling. To fully grasp these innovations, it is useful to briefly present, at the outset, the previous regime(s) established by the SCCs adopted under Directive 95/46/EC.

– Applicable Law under the Previous SCCs Regime

Concerning applicable law, the previous sets of SCCs clearly regarded international data transfers as a dynamic process, consisting of three distinct strands.

First, the processing of personal data by the data exporter, including the transfer itself, were governed, up to the moment of the transfer, by the objectively applicable data protection law [clause 4 of the SCCs set out by Decision 2001/497/EC; clause I(a) of the SCCs set out by Decision 2004/915/EC; clause 4 of the SCCs set out by Decision 2010/87/EU]. The “objectively applicable data protection law” is, in this context, the Member State law applicable to the EU-established controller by virtue of EU law itself (ie the law determined pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 95/46/EC until 23 May 2016, and by Article 3 GDPR after this date. This law now includes the GDPR-complementing provisions issued by the Member States based on the opening clauses scattered throughout the GDPR, whose spatial scope of application remains uncertain in current law).

Second, the processing of personal data by the data importer, occurring after the transfer to the third country, was seen as a separate processing operation, placed beyond the scope of the direct application of EU law, and governed by the law chosen by the parties to the SCCs. There was not, however, an unrestricted freedom of choice, which was limited to:

(1) the law of the Member State where the data exporter was established [clause 5 (b) first indent of the SCCs set out by Decision 2001/497/EC; clause II(h)(i) of the SCCs set out by Decision 2004/915/EC];

(2) the provisions of an adequacy decision applicable to the third country where the data importer is established, even if such adequacy decision was not applicable ratione materiae to this importer, provided that such provisions were of a nature which made them applicable in the sector of that transfer [cf. Clause 5 (b) second indent of the SCCs set out by Decision 2001/497/EC; clause II (h)(ii) of the SCCs set out by Decision 2004/915/EC];

(3) a (more or less) extensive set of “mandatory data protection principles”, set out in the annexes of the SCCs [clause 5 (b) indent of the SCCs set out by Decision 2001/497/EC; clause II(h)(iii) of the SCCs set out by Decision 2004/915/EC].

Evidently, it is not possible to qualify the choices made under (2) or (3) as a veritable “choice of governing law”: said provisions or principles would have been applied in conjunction with a national law (objectively) applicable to the data importer under local PIL.

Finally, all three sets of SCCs contained a provision entitled “governing law”, whereby “the Clauses shall be governed by the law of the Member State in which the data exporter is established” (respectively clauses 10, IV and 9). The actual scope of this choice of law clause shall be read in the light of what has been said regarding the first two strands of the data processing operation: vis-à-vis the first step, there is no room for party autonomy and the chosen law cannot directly govern the processing operations carried out by the exporter within the EU, including the transfer. The processing of the transferred data by the importer in the third country must also be excluded from the scope of the chosen “governing law”, otherwise the (different) choice eventually made under (2) or (3) above would have been deprived of practical significance. In essence, the law appointed under the clause entitled “governing law” was therefore limited to the “contractual issues” posed by the SCCs (validity, form, nullity, consequences of the total or partial breach etc).

– The 2021 SCCs

The 2021 SCCs did not change the approach with respect to the first strand of the data transfer operation, which remains subject to the “objectively applicable law”, ie the GDPR as eventually complemented by the applicable Member State law (see Clause 2).

With respect to the second strand, the new SCCs took away the possibility of choosing between different alternatives as regards the legal regime applicable to the processing operations carried out by the importer in the third state. The obligations of this party vis-à-vis the exporter and the data subjects are now set out in greater detail in the SCCs themselves, without any specific reference to a national governing law. Clause 4 specifies, in any event, that the SCCs shall “be read and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679”.

Finally, there is, just as in the previous sets of SCCs, a clause (Clause 17) titled “Governing law”, which is quite innovative as compared to its predecessors. Consistently with the “modular structure” of the SCCs, this clause presents different wordings depending on the specific transfer operation at stake.

  • For transfers from controller to controller (Module 1), the parties are free to choose the law of one of the EU Member States, subject to the sole requirement that such law allows for third-party beneficiary rights. In particular, neither the clause itself nor the Q&A require an objective connection between the chosen Member State and the transfer operation: the laws of the Member States are deemed perfectly fungible in this respect.
  • This unrestricted freedom of choice disappears for Modules 2 (transfer from controller to processor) and 3 (transfers between processors): the law of the Member State where the exporter is established applies in principle, unless it does not allow for third parties beneficiary rights. In that case, the parties must choose the law of another Member States that allows for such rights (again, no objective connection is required).
  • Module 4 (transfers from processor to controller) deals with the situation of a non EU-established controller that transfers data to a EU-established processor (eg. outsourcing of payroll services to a EU company). This transfer comes under the scope of EU law once the EU-based processor sends the data back to its controller, established outside the EEA. Given that this data was originally placed under a different (and possibly less protective) legal regime, EU law relaxes some of its requirements and the SCCs allow, in this case, for an unrestricted choice of applicable law (cf. Q&A No. 37). It is uncertain as to whether this unrestricted freedom of choice continues to exist if the data transferred by the processor partially originates in the EU: in this case, in fact, the Q&As specify that the relaxation of other requirements no longer applies (cf. Q&A 44). Despite the silence of the Q&As on this specific point, the same solution seems required as concerns the governing law.

A lingering uncertainty concerns the scope of the governing law and, in particular, the question as to whether it extends to directly regulating the processing operations carried out by the data importer in the third country. According to Q&A No. 37, this law “will govern the application of the SCCs”. It is also stressed that Clause 17 shall be read in conjunction with Clause 4, whereby the interpretation and application of the SCCs should conform to, and should not contradict, the GDPR. Nonetheless, throughout the Q&A, the governing law is mentioned with respect to marginal contractual issues such as formal requirements (Q&A No. 6); the formalisation of the parties’ consent within the docking clause (Q&A No 12); the time limits (Q&A No. 37).

A.2 Jurisdiction over Remedies

With respect to jurisdiction for remedies, the previous sets of SCCs were consistent in that they enabled the data subject who invoked third-party beneficiary rights to sue one or both parties to the contract in the Member State where the data exporter was established, without prejudice to any other substantive or procedural rights he may have had under national or international law.

The new SCCs (Clause 18) are, at once, more detailed and more liberal on this point, insofar as they set out, concerning modules 1, 2 and 3, the general principle whereby “any dispute arising from these Clauses shall be resolved by the courts of an EU Member State”. This provision is particularly important from a systemic point of view, as it makes sure that, irrespective of the law governing the processing activities carried out by the importer, the most important principles of EU data protection law would be enforced in any case as overriding mandatory provisions of the forum.

Clause 18 then requires the parties to expressly designate the court of a Member State: again, the freedom of choice seems unrestricted and no longer dependent on the existence of an objective connection between forum and dispute. Letter (c) of that Clause adds the most important innovation, insofar as it allows the data subject to bring legal proceedings against the data exporter and/or data importer before the courts of the Member State in which he/she has his/her habitual residence. This choice of court agreement extends the procedural rights granted to the data subject by Article 79 GDPR, a provision that opens a ground of jurisdiction solely with respect to actions brought against the EU-established data exporter, jurisdiction for any action brought against the third-country data importer being left, under than provision, to national PIL.

It must be stressed on that Q&A No. 33 contains a somewhat confusing reference to national law, as it states, concerning the forum opened by letter (c), that “such actions can be brought before the competent court of the EEA country (as determined by national law) in which you live …”. Nonetheless, the data subject’s possibility of suing the data importer in the Member State of his/her habitual residence should depend not on the (dubious) existence, in national law, of a forum actoris, but rather on the choice of court agreement resulting from the combined reading of letters (c) and (d) of Clause 18 (the latter stating that “[t]he Parties agree to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of such courts”). A totally different question is knowing whether, and under which conditions, the designated court will enforce this choice of court agreement: in case the Brussels I bis Regulation is not deemed applicable to these contracts (see Section B), the answer to this question will indeed depend on the (non uniform and potentially inconsistent) national laws of the Member States.

A derogatory regime is set in place for Module 4, which allows the parties to designate any court, ie even the court(s) of a third country. In this respect, however, Q&A No. 33 specifies that this shall not affect the procedural rights conferred to the data subject vis-à-vis the data exporter under Article 79 GDPR

B. Modernised SCCs and PIL: What’s Unresolved

Despite the useful clarifications brought along by the Commission Q&As, concerning notably the room for manoeuvre given to the parties to the SCCs regarding choice of law and choice of court agreements, there still exists some major open questions regarding the practical operation of these PIL devices, that are liable to impinge on the effectiveness of SCCs as a tool for the effective protection of European personal data in case of extra-EEA transfers.

It must be remembered that the main purpose of the SCCs is to “provide a comprehensive data protection framework that has been developed to ensure continuity of protection in case of data transfers to data importers that are not subject to the GDPR” (Q&A No. 24). Within this framework, the third-party beneficiary rights granted to the data subject play a pivotal role, as evidenced by the importance attached to them during the choice of the governing law (supra, Section A.1). Third-party beneficiary rights are a key-element of the so-called “private enforcement” of EU data protection law, insofar as they allow the data subject to directly invoke the protection vested by the GDPR and the SCCs both against the importer and the exporter, and to do so before a court in the EU.

Intuitively, the effective ability of the data subject to ground the jurisdiction of such courts and to invoke the application of said law will depend on the procedural treatment of these choice-of-law and choice-of-court agreements in the seised/designated courts. In this respect, the applicability of both the Brussels Ibis and the Rome I Regulations to the SCCs remains controversial, and finds no clarification in the Commission’s Q&As. Conversely, both the SCCs and the Q&As seem to simply assume that these choice-of-law and choice-of-court agreements will be enforced by any court in the EU.

B.1 Civil and Commercial Matters?

The Brussels I bis and the Rome I Regulations (as well as the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements) apply in “civil and commercial matters”. A recent and exhaustive summary of the (uniform) meaning of this expression in EU PIL can be found in the Opinion of AG Szpunar and the judgment rendered by the ECJ in Rina. Regard should be had, in particular, to the need of ensuring that the Regulations are broad in scope (§ 31 of the judgment in Rina) and to the “the elements which characterise the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute or the subject matter thereof” (§ 32). This assessment aims at excluding that one of the parties (or both) is acting in the exercise of “public” powers, ie “powers falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between private individuals” (§ 34).

Against this backdrop, it is worth stressing that the SCCs set up by the Commission can be used by the parties (which, in most cases, will be private commercial operators) without the prior approval by a public authority, the competent DPA. The triangular relationship between the data importer, the data exporter and the data subject heavily relies of private contract law. If it is true that these are all factors that may vouch for the inclusion of SCCs within the scope of “civil and commercial matters”, the fact remains that the Commission’s Q&As stress, on many occasions, the specific “nature” of the SCCs and the ensuing limits placed on the parties’ substantive party autonomy: “if the parties change the text of the SCCs themselves (beyond the adaptations mentioned below) they cannot rely on the legal certainty offered by an EU act” (Q&A No. 7, emphasis added). It will likely be for the ECJ to determine whether the specific nature of “EU act” attached to the SCCs and the limitations it entails for ordinary contract law are enough to exclude a characterisation as “civil and commercial matters” for the purposes of EU PIL.

If the Brussels 1bis Regulation was deemed applicable ratione materiae, it would ensure the effectiveness of the above-mentioned choice-of-court agreements throughout the EU. The fact that said agreements are invoked by a third-party beneficiary should not pose any problem in the light of the Gerling case law. Clearly, the Brussels Ibis Regulation would not be applicable to choice of court agreements concluded under Module 4, in cases where jurisdiction is conferred upon a third-state court.

B.2 A “Free” Choice of Governing Law?

The applicability of the Rome I Regulation to the SCCs elicits more substantial doubts.

To begin with, it is uncertain as to whether the choice of law made by the parties under current Clause 17 can be deemed “free” in the sense of Article 3 thereof. Setting aside the non-problematic case of the (unrestricted) freedom of choice available for Module 4, Module 2 and 3 confer very limited leeway: the parties must choose the law of the Member State where the data exporter is established, deviations being admissible solely if this law does not allow for third-party beneficiary rights (it must be added that the unrestricted freedom of choice which follows from this circumstance is at odds with the limitation set by the general rule: a “cascade” list of options or, even better, a rule turned around a “close(st?) connection” with another Member State would have been a more logical complement to the general rule).

As concerns the requirement that the choice of law made under Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation shall be “free”, it is worth stressing that both the Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona and the judgment of the Court in Gruber Logistics started from the assumption that a “choice” of law which is actually imposed by law would be incompatible with this provision (respectively, §§ 97-101 of the Opinion and § 39 of the judgment). In the same case, the Court clarified that regulation does not prohibit the use of standard clauses which are pre-formulated by one of the parties (or, it must be assumed, by a third party). In such a case, freedom of choice, within the meaning of Article 3, can be exercised by consenting to such a clause and is not called into question solely because that choice is made on the basis of a pre-formulated clause.

The compatibility of Clause 17 of the SCCs with the Rome I Regulation teeters along the fine line which separates an ex lege imposition of an applicable law and the sheer pre-drafting by the Commission. It must be stressed, in this respect, that SCCs are established through an Implementing Decision of the Commission, but they can be used by the parties on a voluntary basis to demonstrate compliance with data protection requirements (Q&A No. 1). Nonetheless, if the parties choose to resort to these standard clauses, they are not free to amend the wording of Clause 17, besides the exercise of the freedom of choice (if any) explicitly allowed under that provision. If this provision is amended, the parties need to submit their contract to the DPA for prior approval, to be able to proceed with the transfer. It is highly doubtful that a DPA would approve a contract containing, for example, a choice of third-country law for the transfer scenarios corresponding to Modules 1, 2 and 3. In fact, in the Schrems II, the ECJ attached great importance to the safeguards following from the application of the law of the Member State where the exporter is established, when assessing if the protection granted by the former SCCs was “essentially equivalent” to that guaranteed within the Union (§ 138).

B.3 Universal Application v Restrictions to the Freedom of Choice

More fundamentally, it must be determined whether the Rome I Regulation is compatible with the “geographical” restriction of the parties’ freedom of choosing the applicable law. This problem is shared by Modules 1, 2 and 3: the chosen law shall be, in all of these cases, the law of a Member State, whereas a choice of third-country law would be totally admissible under the combined reading of Articles 2 and 3 of the Rome I Regulation. From the standpoint of the general theory of PIL, behind this asymmetry lie irreconcilable philosophical stances as concerns the international interchangeability of (private) laws. The Rome I Regulation starts from the assumption of a perfect interchangeability between all the (private) laws of this world, irrespective of their specific contents, and subject to a sheer ex post control through the gateway of the public policy exception. Conversely, the Commission’s SCCs (and probably the GDPR itself) adopt a more prudential approach based on an ex ante pre-selection of laws (those of the Member States of the EU) which, because of their contents, can be deemed “essentially equivalent” in terms of the protection granted to personal data. Again, this is a thorny issue that the ECJ might likely have to resolve in the near future, considering that, according to the Commission, SCCs are, at present, “the most popular tool” for transferring personal data outside the EEA in accordance with the GDPR (Q&A No. 3).

Council Decision (EU) 2022/1022 of 9 June 2022 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters specific to Mining, Agricultural and Construction Equipment (MAC Protocol), has been published in the Official Journal L 172, of June 29.

Pursuant to the Decision, the signing on behalf of the Union of the Protocol adopted in Pretoria on 22 November 2019 is authorised, subject to its conclusion.

A Declaration is attached to the Decision in compliance with Article XXIV(2) of the MAC Protocol, providing that, at the time of signature, acceptance, approval or accession, a regional economic integration organisation is to make a declaration specifying the matters governed by that Protocol in respect of which competence has been transferred to that organisation by its Member States. It specifies that, in respect of matters governed by the MAC Protocol, the European Union has exercised its competence by adopting Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Article IX of the MAC Protocol – ‘Modification of provisions regarding relief pending final determination’), Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (Article X of the MAC Protocol – ‘Remedies on Insolvency’ – and Article XI of the MAC Protocol – ‘Insolvency assistance’) and Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (Article VI of the MAC Protocol – ‘Choice of law’).

The Declaration lists the States members to the European Union and excludes from its scope Denmark and certain territories belonging to Member States. It shall be approved on behalf of the Union, subject to the adoption of a decision on the conclusion of the MAC Protocol at a later stage.

Regulation (EU) 2022/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on a computerised system for the cross-border electronic exchange of data in the area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters (e-CODEX system), and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726, has been published on the Official Journal of 1 June 2022.

Marion Ho-Dac has reported on this blog on the procedures at the institutional level towards the adoption of the instrument (see here and  here).

The Regulation is based on the TFEU, especially on Article 81(2) and Article 82(1) thereof. It is thus meant to contribute to the overall objective of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice of guaranteeing effective access to justice for citizens and businesses and facilitating judicial cooperation between the Member States. More specifically, it concerns communication between parties and courts, as well as between authorities in different Member States,  through the cross-border electronic exchange of data.

The underlying idea of the Regulation is quite basic and definitely not new: technology tools are key for the above-mentioned communication to be effective, but they need to be secure. In this context, e-CODEX (e-Justice Communication via On-line Data Exchange) was launched under the multiannual e-Justice action plan 2009-2013 to promote the digitalisation of cross-border judicial proceedings and to facilitate the communication between Member States’ judicial authorities; it has been working experimentally since then. Simply put, the e-CODEX system consists of a package of software products which can be used to set up an access point for secure communication. Access points using e-CODEX can communicate with other access points over the internet via a set of common protocols, with no central system involved.

During the last years e-CODEX has developed in a way allowing the Commission to define it as ‘the main tool and the gold standard for establishing an interoperable, secure and decentralised communication network between national IT systems in cross-border civil and criminal proceedings’ (COM (2020) 712 final). It could thus receive legislative blessing (and support). Moreover, the system has so far been managed by a consortium of Member States and other organisations, with funds from the participant Member States and from EU grants. For sustainability reasons, the model needed to be replaced.

In keeping with the above, the Regulation has been adopted to establish the legal framework for the e-CODEX system. It lays down rules on the definition, composition, functions and management of the system ; on the responsibilities of the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), regarding the e-CODEX system ; on the responsibilities of the Commission, Member States and the entities operating authorised e-CODEX access points; and on a legal framework for the security of the e-CODEX system. It should be noticed that it does not provide for the mandatory use of e-CODEX.

The text, with EEA relevance, shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will nevertheless take some time until the institutional structure it sets up is into motion (for instance, eu-LISA is not expected to take over the e-CODEX system before July 2023). In as far as civil justice in cross-border cases is concerned, it is important to know that the European e-Justice portal will use e-CODEX to enable citizens to electronically sign and send applications for European payment orders and small claims to competent courts in the Member States. e-CODEX shall also work as digital channel to serve documents and to take evidence abroad under the new service and evidence Regulations, adopted on 25 November 2020.

Strategic lawsuits against public participation, commonly known as ‘SLAPPs’, are a particular form of harassment used primarily against journalists and human rights defenders to prevent or penalise speaking up on issues of public interest.

The term was coined by Professors George W. Pring and Penelope Canan in their book SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out (Temple University Press, 1996).

The phenomenon is now well known everywhere, but anti-SLAPP legislation has so far only been enacted in a few countries, such as Australia or Canada. In the Europe Union, action was not officially taken until the assassination of Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in 2017, who was famous in and outside Malta due to her regular reporting of misconduct by Maltese politicians and politically exposed persons. When she was murdered, more than 40 lawsuits (most for pretended libel) had been filed in Maltese courts; some of them are still pending against her heirs and her family.

The Council of Europe has acknowledged as well the need for a Recommendation on Combating SLAPPs, and is currently working on it (the picture on the right belongs actually to the website of Dunja Mijatović, the Commissioner for Human Rights).

Since February 2018, European MEPs have been calling on the EU Commission to promote anti-SLAPP EU legislation giving investigative journalists and media groups the power to request a rapid dismiss of vexatious lawsuits.

Several EP Resolutions are worth being mentioned in this regard: Resolution of 28 March 2019 on the situation of the rule of law and the fight against corruption in the EU, specifically in Malta and Slovakia (P8_TA(2019)0328); Resolution of 25 November 2020 on strengthening media freedom: the protection of journalists in Europe, hate speech, disinformation and the role of platforms (P9_TA(2020)0320); Resolution of 11 November 2021 on Strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) and civil society (P9_TA(2021)0451). In all three, the EP condemned the use of SLAPPs to silence or intimidate investigative journalists and other actors, and called on the Commission to present a proposal to prevent them.

Parliament’s move did not fall on deaf ears. The growing number of physical, legal and online threats to and attacks on journalists and other media professionals over the past years was reflected in the Commissions’ 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Reports.

In September 2021, the Commission presented a Recommendation on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union.

More important from the regulatory perspective (not in terms of scope, however) is the adoption, on 27 April 2022, of a proposal on a Directive covering SLAPPs in civil matters with cross-border implications. In addition, on the same day the Commission approved a complementary Recommendation to encourage Member States to align their rules with the Directive also for domestic cases and in all proceedings, that is, not only civil matters; it also calls on Member States to take a range of other measures, such as training and awareness raising, to fight against SLAPPs. Both texts, which show a broad political ambition, can be accessed here.

The proposed Directive will have to be negotiated and adopted by the European Parliament and the Council before it can become EU law.

By contrast, the Commission Recommendation is described in the official press release as ‘directly applicable’: in the understanding of the Commission, ‘Member States will need to report on implementation to the Commission 18 months after adoption of the Recommendation’. It should be noted that recommendations are not binding acts (a different thing is that the subject of a recommendation is expected to oblige the suggestions made). Moreover, regarding this particular Recommendation the guideline in the sense of aligning national law with the Directive in domestic cases and for all types of proceedings is impossible to comply with until the Directive as such is enacted.

In this post I only intend to present the general features of the proposal and to highlight three of its rules. A couple of comments will be added as quick reactions to which more learned readers may in turn respond.

General Features of the Proposed Directive

The proposal is based on Article 81(2)(f) TFEU.

  1. The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.
  2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures, particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, aimed at ensuring …

(f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States.

Resistance on the side of the Council to this legal base will not come as a surprise (by the way: it may be claimed as well that the Commission is acting outside of clear competences regarding the Recommendation: the principle of conferred competences also applies to non-binding activities of the Union).

To the best of my knowledge, the point was not addressed in any of the meetings of the Expert Group against SLAPP. The only reference to Article 81 TFUE seems to be by way of an answer from the Commission to an expert who asked ‘whether the solutions envisaged will introduce procedural schemes that are new and difficult to enact in different Member States’ in the 6th (and final meeting) of the Expert Group. The Commission replied that ‘the legal basis is linked to article 81 of TFEU which deals with civil matters having cross-border implications but as the Directive is not too prescriptive, Member States will be able to implement the provisions in a way which is consistent with their national systems’.

The proposed Directive aims at enabling judges to swiftly dismiss manifestly unfounded lawsuits against natural and legal persons (not only journalists and human rights defenders, but also academics or researchers) on account of their engagement in public participation. It also requests from the Member States that they establish several procedural safeguards and remedies, such as compensation for damages, and dissuasive penalties for launching abusive lawsuits.

The text consists of 39 recitals and 23 articles divided into six chapters. Recitals 1 to 19 provide in-depth explanations of the SLAPP phenomenon and of related notions in plain and accessible language. Recitals 20 to 34 (actually, recitals 14 and 15 too) define the cross-border setting for the purpose of the Directive, and describe the specific procedural tools and remedies at the service of defendants in SLAPP cases. Recitals 35 and 36 deal with the relationship between the proposed Directive and other EU law acts (none on private international law). Numbers 37, 38 and 39 refer to Denmark and Ireland.

Chapter I (article 1 to 4) is labelled ‘General provisions’. Chapter II (articles 5 to 8) comprises so-called common rules on procedural safeguards. Chapter III (articles 9 to 13) addresses the early dismissal of manifestly unfounded court proceedings. Chapter IV (articles 14 to 16) focuses on remedies against abusive court proceedings. Chapter V (articles 17 and 18) include two rules on protection against third-country judgments. Chapter VI is devoted to the typical final provisions.

Most of the rules of the proposed Directive are purely procedural. In this regard, the proposal appears at first sight as a direct intrusion into the procedural autonomy of the Member States. In fact, if the outcome of the negotiations is similar to the draft, Member States will enjoy most of the times a large marge of manoeuvre when transposing the Directive; actually, it is to be expected that they will be able to claim that existing rules in the domestic systems comply already with (some of) its mandates. Indeed, such rules are normally conceived for domestic litigation; however, courts in the Member States do not usually follow different procedural tracks depending on whether the dispute is purely domestic or has cross-border implications. National procedural provisions created with cross-border litigation in mind are the exception. Interestingly, should new rules be created to accommodate the Directive’s terms, they may get extended to domestic procedures as a consequence of the accompanying Recommendation.

Articles 17 and 18 – Protection Against Proceedings Outside the Union

Article 17, ‘Grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of a third-country judgment’, and Article 18, ‘Jurisdiction for actions against third-country judgments’, may deserve a different assessment, i.e., Member States are likely to need enacting new rules to transpose these provisions. Pursuant to Article 17

Member States shall ensure that the recognition and enforcement of a third-country judgment in court proceedings on account of public participation by natural or legal person domiciled in a Member State is refused as manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) if those proceedings would have been considered manifestly unfounded or abusive if they had been brought before the courts or tribunals of the Member State where recognition or enforcement is sought and those courts or tribunals would have applied their own law.

The Directive imposes not only the public policy exception as a ground for non-recognition or enforcement of a third State decision independently of whether the Member State affected is a party to a bilateral or multilateral convention: it establishes as well the conditions for its application. Although with an open-ended clause, the Directive also defines what ‘abusive’ litigation is under Article 3(3), thus limiting the freedom of the Member States to give contents to the public policy exception.

According to Article 18,

Member States shall ensure that, where abusive court proceedings on account of engagement in public participation have been brought in a court or tribunal of a third country against a natural or legal person domiciled in a Member State, that person may seek, in the courts or tribunals of the place where he is domiciled, compensation of the damages and the costs incurred in connection with the proceedings before the court or tribunal of the third country, irrespective of the domicile of the claimant in the proceedings in the third country.

The ground for jurisdiction is a forum actoris based on domicile. Many Member States have given up fora privileging the claimant except in cases of asymmetry of the parties to the litigation, capable of creating procedural imbalances between them. It is submitted that on many SLAPP occasions this will be the case, therefore the head of jurisdiction, albeit exorbitant at first sight, will be justified. However, it should be considered that publishers houses and journals are sometimes involved in these disputes supporting or sharing the side of the journalist or human rights defender. Be it as it may, and more relevant: with the current wording, the forum actoris will work also against defendants domiciled in a Member State, if they have filed a claim with a third State. Article 19 – a compatibility clause regarding the Lugano Convention- does not change this outcome; actually, it creates a (further) situation where the Convention and the Brussels Ibis Regulation will apply differently.

Article 4 – An Enlarged Definition of Cross-border Implications

The Directive includes among other a definition of ‘matters with cross-border implications’, whereby a matter is considered to have such implications unless both parties are domiciled in the same Member State as the court seised. In that case – that is to say, when both parties are domiciled in the Member State of the court seised-, the situation is still cross-border for the purposes of the Directive and the transposing legislation if

(a) the act of public participation concerning a matter of public interest against which court proceedings are initiated is relevant to more than one Member State, or

(b) the claimant or associated entities have initiated concurrent or previous court proceedings against the same or associated defendants in another Member State.

The requirements under (a) will be easy to be met in the era of the internet. As for (b), it describes a situation of lis pendens or of related actions in the sense of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, although only for the purposes of applying the Directive, i.e., without (in principle) any consequence on the rules of Articles 29 to 34 of the Regulation. A ‘without prejudice’ recital would nevertheless be advisable.

Moreover, it is submitted that neither (a) nor (b) should be limited to the involvement of Member States, and that such limitation works against the very aim of the Directive. Moreover, for reasons of consistency relating to Article 18, it would make sense to define ‘cross-border implications’ as including acts of public participation relevant to the Member State of the court seized and third States, as well as the situation of parallel or related litigation in a Member State and a third State. Of course, such extension is likely to increase the doubts as regards the basis of the EU legislative initiative. As an alternative, it can be suggested to the Member States that they adopt national rules similar to the EU ones, to be applied to the situations described above.

— Final note: an open-access paper on strategic litigation (SLAPP and beyond) authored by Prof. B. Hess, MPI Luxembourg, member of the MSI-SLP Committee of Experts on Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (Council of Europe), will be published in the days to come. An update will follow.

On 19 April 2022, the European Commission has launched a new page on the e-Justice Portal concerning children from Ukraine (available here in all EU languages).

It is an operational extension, in a dramatic context, of the work undertaken by the Commission to strengthen the protection of migrant children.

Background

According to the European Commission:

Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine raises questions about the situation of refugee children who are displaced in the European Union from Ukraine. The issue becomes even more complex when these children are separated from their families, either because they have remained in Ukraine or because they are refugees in another Member State.

It is now urgent to be able to ensure that these children are protected against the risk of violence, exploitation, illegal adoption, abduction, sale or child trafficking. For this reason, it is essential to use the instruments that protect the rights of these children.

There are instruments in European and international law to ensure the protection of children, with special provisions for the protection of and assistance to children temporarily or permanently deprived of their family environment, including in emergency situations, such as an armed conflict.

EU and International Rules on Civil Judicial Cooperation 

The new webpage contains clear and practical information on the rules applicable to judicial cooperation in cross-border cases involving Ukrainian children, including issues of jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions, and cooperation between authorities, in particular via the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (EJN-civil).

It provides for many useful links to key legal instruments and information on Ukrainian law provided directly by the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice.

This page is intended for judges, lawyers, notaries, central authorities, but also for social workers in charge of child protection and staff in charge of registering minors arriving from Ukraine.

More information here.

On 23 February 2022, the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence was released.

In recent years, many experts have expressed their views on the Union’s ambition to regulate corporate due diligence comprehensively and in a binding manner at the EU level. The private international law (PIL) aspects have received particular attention (e.g. here and more globally here), including on our blog (e.g. here, here and here) and others (here and here).

Indeed, a first central issue is the spatial applicability of the (forthcoming) EU instrument so that it effectively covers transnational (harmful) conduct of multinational companies, incorporated in the Union or active in the EU market (see Article 2, §1 and §2). Another major issue concerns remedies for the damage caused by companies through their supply chain, to victims and to the environment. The Directive proposal provides for rules on liability for violation of the due diligence requirements laid down by the text.

In this context, what are the main solutions of the Directive proposal on the PIL aspects? Here are some brief elements of the response that experts on the matter will analyse in more detail during the negotiations of the text (see already Geert Van Calster thoughts)

Private Enforcement Scheme

One of the main objectives of the Directive proposal is to “improve access to remedies for those affected by adverse human rights and environmental impacts of corporate behaviour” (p. 3). Remedies and more globally enforcement rules are indeed a key-factor for normative effectiveness. Private parties should be empowered to report concerning behaviours of multinational companies or misconducts (see Articles 9 and 19 of the Directive proposal). As a crucial step, victims should be able to sue the company liable for any damage caused within the Union’s territory or, most frequently, outside the Union through its value chain. The Directive proposal provides for a common civil liability regime (although incomplete). This is a great improvement, in particular for foreign victims who could seek remedies within the EU (Article 22).

Against this background, the private enforcement regime remains dependent on the jurisdiction of a “European forum” (i.e. among national courts of EU Member States) and, then, on the application of EU law.

No Specific Provision on Jurisdiction in the Union

The Directive proposal provides for a private enforcement scheme but without mentioning any specific rules on jurisdiction. Hence, Brussels I bis Regulation will remain the applicable legal framework within the EU judicial area.

EU-based Companies

The jurisdictional rules of the Regulation are, in principle, applicable once the defendant is domiciled in the Union, regardless of whether there is any other connection with the EU legal order (Article 4). When the defendant is a legal person, it lays down a flexible concept of domicile; it may be the statutory seat of the company, its central administration or its principal place of business (Article 63). In the present case, it means that the mother or ordering company located in the Union may be sued by any victims before a “European forum” for compensation of losses suffered in a third country. In that respect, the solution follows the rationale of the home country control.

However, the situation would be less effective if the victims also decide to sue, as co-defendant, other companies of the value chain of the European undertaking (e.g. subsidiaries or business partners), when the former are not established in the Union. In such a case, the Brussels I bis Regulation is not applicable pursuant to its Article 8,(1). It will be for the national laws of Member States to determine the jurisdiction of their courts. This is regrettable; the discrepancies between national rules may weaken the EU provisions on remedies. Some courts will be competent, others not, in equivalent disputes.

Nonetheless, the lack of legal approximation here is not inconsistent with the European enforcement regime, since the latter is limited for now – under Article 22 of the Directive proposal – to civil liability claims against the company in charge of the due diligence requirements pursuant to Article 7 and 8 of the text. Hence, national law remains applicable to the civil liability of “subsidiaries or of any direct and indirect business partners in the value chain” (Article 22, §3 of the directive proposal). The lack of a uniform substantive liability regime in the forthcoming EU instrument, directly applicable to these potential co-defendants, mitigates or, at least, may explain, the absence of a ground jurisdiction based on EU law in such circumstances.

Non-EU-based Companies

A much more problematic situation concerns foreign companies – i.e. domiciled outside the Union – that are economically active in the internal market and, in that respect, covered by an EU due diligence obligation. The jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation are in principle not applicable, even if the losses were suffered on the Union’s territory. Private enforcement will depend on the national laws of EU Member States on the jurisdiction issue. European remedies are therefore likely to remain totally ineffective before certain domestic courts of the Union where no specific ground for jurisdiction, such as a forum necessitatis, exists. Victims will be treated differently in the European judicial area; some of them will not be able to benefit from remedies. It also creates a severe discrepancy between European and foreign companies. The latter may avoid private enforcement as a result of this lacuna in the European legal system.

A solution may be found in the obligation of foreign companies to have a representative in the Union pursuant to Article 16 of the Directive proposal. It could be argued that the European domicile of this representative, set up for the public enforcement of the EU due diligence regime should also apply for private enforcement, based on the civil liability regime of Article 22 (see Article 16, §4 on public enforcement, mentioning the cooperation with supervisory authorities). In that regard, the preliminary explanation of the Directive proposal describes quite broadly the role of those mandated authorised representatives; they may be addressed by a competent authority of a Member State on all issues necessary inter alia for “[the] enforcement of legal acts issued in relation to this Directive” (page 25).

In a more effective way, a specific ground of jurisdiction could be introduced. It could be the forum of the Member States “in which the company generated most of its net turnover in the Union in the financial year preceding the last financial year” (Article 16, §3). This is the criterion laid down by the Directive proposal for the designation of the authorised representative in the Union. Therefore, it could be easily transposed to international competence, linking public and private enforcement schemes, as already suggested above.

No Specific Choice of Law Rules (either)

The extraterritoriality of the forthcoming EU substantive rules on due diligence is not enough (legally speaking) to guarantee their application before “European fora” when damage was suffered in third countries. In that respect, the Directive proposal opts for the mandatory nature of the civil liability regime laid down in Article 22: it is “of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State” (Article 22, 5).

From a PIL perspective, this formulation may be seen as ambiguous. First, the mandatory nature under EU law of all the text on corporate due diligence should be made explicit (even if it may be seen as obvious). Second, regarding the civil liability regime it is about its overriding mandatory dimension, whatever law is applicable, since this technique applies ex ante, before any conflict-of-laws reasoning. At the same time, it will still be necessary for the national courts (in EU Member States) to determine the law applicable to the case. Indeed, the Directive proposal does not lay down a complete and fully uniform regime of liability. More protective regimes under national law could prevail (recital 59) and some questions are referred to national law (for instance, the burden of proof of the absence of misconduct of the company, see recital 58).

Against this background, the Rome II Regulation will remain applicable for cross-border disputes concerning non-contractual obligations. The Regulation lays down a provision on overriding mandatory provisions (Article 16). It could therefore provide for the unilateral application of the national law of the competent court (its lex fori), which contains the EU due diligence duty and its attached civil liability regime (as already proposed by Giesela Rühl). However, it remains to be expressly clarified in the proposal whether the European provisions concerned – including (where appropriate) their implementation in the national laws of the Member States – have such an international mandatory nature.

In any case, PIL issues are crucial and condition the effectiveness (and therefore the success) of EU law (including EU values) beyond the Union’s borders in this area.

On 31 March 2022, the EU Commission disclosed that it has been working on a proposal for a bilateral treaty to be concluded with the UK focused on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

The purpose of the treaty would be to facilitate the circulation of judgments between the EU and the UK. It would not be a double convention and thus would not include rules governing the (direct) jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States.

Scope

At the present time, the material scope of the treaty would be limited to civil and commercial matters. It would not, therefore, extend to family law.

Jurisdiction of the Foreign Court

The (indirect) jurisdiction of the foreign court would be assessed by a single flexible text. Foreign courts would be considered to have jurisdiction if there was a meaningful connection between the foreign court and the dispute. The French presidency might have pushed for adopting this test, which is currently applied in the French common law of foreign judgments.

In addition, a provision of the treaty would clarify that the test would not be satisfied if the foreign court had retained jurisdiction on the basis of a number of exorbitant rules of jurisdiction that would be identified. This list seems to be clearly inspired for the red list of the Brussels instruments.

Public Policy Exception

The public policy clause is probably the most innovative provision of the treaty. It would be applicable in principle, unless “actual mutual trust” could be found to exist between the relevant EU Member State and the UK.

A provision would then identify cases where such “actual mutual trust” would be presumed.

No scrum, no trust

This would be the case for all judgments circulating between France and the UK, because France participates in the 6 Nations Rugby Championship (so-called “scrum proviso”).

The scrum proviso would apply between Italy and the UK for judgments rendered 32 days after Italy would win its first Championship or would win in Twickenham by more than 20 points.

More details on the draft treaty are available here.

Annexes A and B to the insolvency Regulation list, respectively, the national insolvency proceedings and national insolvency practitioners (as notified by Member States) to which that Regulation applies. They have been replaced by Regulation (EU) 2021/2260 of 15 December 2021.

The new Annexes are operative as of 9 January 2022

The reasons for the amendment are explained given in Recital 2 of the Regulation:

In October 2020, the Netherlands notified the Commission of recent changes in its national insolvency law which introduced a new preventive insolvency scheme, as well as new types of insolvency practitioners. That notification was followed in December 2020 by notifications from Italy, Lithuania, Cyprus and Poland relating to recent changes in their national law which introduced new types of insolvency proceedings or insolvency practitioners. Following the submission by the Commission of its proposal for an amending Regulation, further notifications were received from Germany, Hungary and Austria relating to recent changes in their national law which introduced new types of insolvency proceedings or insolvency practitioners. Subsequently, Italy clarified the date of entry into force of its new provisions on insolvency and restructuring which it had notified to the Commission in December 2020, and notified an amendment to a previous notification. Those new types of insolvency proceedings and insolvency practitioners comply with.

Neither Ireland nor Denmark are taking part in the adoption of the Regulation. Accordingly, they are not bound by it or subject to its application.

At the beginning of December 2021 the European Commission launched a new initiative aiming to digitalise cross-border judicial cooperation – the Proposal for a Regulation on Digitalisation of Judicial Cooperation and Access to Justice in Cross-Border Civil, Commercial and Criminal Matters, and Amending Certain Acts in the Field of Judicial Cooperation.

The proposed regulation does not establish new European procedures, but focuses on electronic communication in the context of cross-border judicial cooperation procedures and access to justice in civil, commercial and criminal matters in the EU. With the adoption of this regulation the European legislator seeks to create the necessary legal framework to facilitate electronic communication in the context of the cross-border judicial cooperation procedures in civil, commercial and criminal matters.

The present text follows a proposal from December 2020 for a Regulation on a Computerised System for Communication in Cross-Border Civil and Criminal Proceedings (mentioned earlier in other blogs available here, here, and here) – and two recast regulations from November 2020 – the Service of Documents Regulation and the Taking of Evidence Regulation (see earlier blogposts here and here). The Service of Documents and Taking of Evidence Regulations establish a first comprehensive legal framework for electronic communication between competent authorities in cross-border judicial procedure, and will rely – as the present proposal – on the e-CODEX decentralized IT system to exchange standardized forms, documents, and certifications (more on the e-CODEX decentralized system pilots can be read here, here, and here).

The proposal is based on Articles 81(1) and 82 TFEU and follows an identical approach to the solutions chosen in the recasts of the Service of Documents and Taking of Evidence Regulations for the use of electronic communication means. However, the text of the present proposal will not become applicable in relation to the aforementioned regulations.

The EU Regulations covered by this initiative are listed in two annexes: one concerning legal acts in civil and commercial matters and the other the legal acts in criminal matters (available here).

The present development comes after a number of instruments have been adopted over the years to enhance judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal cases. These instruments had been developed with a paper-based format in mind, an approach followed by most national procedures within the EU. This characteristic of the European instruments and the lack of interconnection of the national electronic systems (where available for judiciaries) meant that national authorities and individuals have not been able to rely extensively on the developments of digital communication or security mechanism offered by electronic documents, signatures and seals in cross-border proceedings. Given this situation, during the COVID-19 pandemic many technical solutions were developed in an ad-hoc manner to limit disruption of justice services and judicial cooperation. However, such solutions may not always satisfy the highest level of security and guarantee of fundamental rights.

For this reason further steps were considered necessary by the European legislator. Rules on digitalisation are becoming desirable to improve access to justice as well as the efficiency and resilience of the communication flows inherent to the cooperation between judiciaries and other competent authorities in EU cross-border cases. The pandemic increased consideration for creating a framework that is able to secures access to justice and facilitate communication of authorities in charge of delivering justice services during long lasting disruptive events.

The Explanatory Memorandum of the proposal emphasizes the importance to achieve the following goals: efficient cross-border cooperation, resilience in force majeure circumstances, and contributing to securing access to justice within ‘a reasonable time’ as crucial element for the right to a fair trial.

Aims of the Proposal

The proposed regulation aims to ‘ensure an adequate and holistic infrastructure for electronic communication between individuals, legal entities or competent authorities with the authorities of another Member State’. This common approach should:

  • Ensure the availability and broad use of electronic means of communication in cross-border cases between Member States’ competent authorities including the Justice and Home Affairs and EU bodies;
  • Enable the use of electronic means of communication in cross-border cases between individuals and legal entities, and courts and competent authorities (except for situations covered by the Service Regulation);
  • Facilitate the participation of parties in oral hearings through videoconference or other distance communication technology in cross-border civil and criminal proceedings for reasons other than the taking of evidence (taking of evidence by videoconference or other distance communication technology fall under the Evidence Regulation);
  • Ensure that documents are not refused or denied legal effect solely on the grounds of their electronic form (this is not to touch upon courts’ powers to decide on the validity, admissibility and probative value as evidence under national law); and
  • Ensure the validity and acceptance of electronic signatures and seals in electronic communication in cross-border judicial cooperation and access to justice.

When adopted the text is set to coordinate Member States’ efforts in digitalising judicial services and establish a coherent framework for the existing EU rules, leading to simplification and speeding up of communication between Member States authorities and individuals and legal entities.

The e-CODEX system will secure the interoperability of national and EU access points, while the European e-Justice Portal is expected to undergo some modifications to support the interaction between natural and legal persons and courts and competent authorities in cross-border proceedings.

Overview of the Text of the Proposal

The first articles (Articles 1-2) establish the scope of the act, the limitations to its application and defines the concepts used within its provisions. Article 3 is dedicated to the rules concerning the decentralised system consenting electronic communication between courts and competent authorities. The use of the system is to be compulsory, except in case of disruption of the system or in other specific circumstances. Article 4 establishes the European electronic access point. The European electronic access point is to be part of the e-CODEX decentralised IT system and may be used by natural and legal persons for electronic communication with the courts and competent authorities in civil and commercial matters having cross-border implications. This is to be located on the European e-Justice Portal. Article 5 sets a duty on the EU Member States’ courts and competent authorities to accept electronic communication from natural and legal persons in judicial procedures, but leaves the choice of the electronic means of communication at the discretion of the natural and legal persons (e.g. European electronic access point, national IT portals were available for participation in judicial procedures). Article 6 recognises an electronic submission to be equivalent to a paper one and requires national authorities to accept such communications from natural and legal persons. Article 7 provides the legal basis and sets out the conditions for using videoconferencing or other distance communication technology in cross-border civil and commercial proceedings under the legal acts listed in Annex I and in civil and commercial matter where one of parties is present in another Member State. Additionally, special rules are set by this article for hearing children. Article 8 addressing the same aspect for criminal matters, including special rules for hearing a suspect person, an accused, convicted person or children. Article 9 focuses on using trust services (i.e. electronic signatures and seals) in electronic communication. Article 10 requires that electronic documents are not denied legal effects solely on the ground that they are in electronic form. This provision is similar to provisions on the matter included in the Recast Service of Documents and Tacking of Evidence Regulations as well as the eIDAS Regulation. Article 11 provides the legal basis for electronic payment of fees, including through the European e-Justice Portal. This point is of high significance in cross-border procedures as it proved to be a problematic aspects in the application of the European uniform procedures in several Member States (e.g. the European Order for Payment, the European Small Claims Procedure). Article 12 lays the framework for the Commission to adopt the necessary implementing acts, while Articles 13-14 mandate the Commission to create, maintain, and develop the reference implementation software and deal with the matter of cost bearing for various IT developments. Article 15 addresses the aspects related to the protection of personal data exchanged through the digital means. Articles 16-18 set the rules for collecting data and evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed Regulation. This is followed by a number of articles focusing on the amendment of several regulations in civil, commercial and criminal matters. Articles 19-22 introduce a number of amendments to Regulations in civil and commercial matters included in Annex I, while Article 23 seeks to amend criminal matters side related to the Regulation on mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders.

Regulations to be Amended by the Proposal

The European uniform procedures regulations – European Order for Payment, European Small Claims Procedure and the European Account Preservation Order – will be amended by the present proposal. The rules seek to create the legislative format to: (1) recognise the submission of the applications or other forms of the procedures by electronic communication means provided by the present proposal or any other means of communication, included electronic, accepted by the Member State of origin or available to the court of origin, (2) secure the recognition of electronic signatures, (3) make available means of electronic payment of court fees (i.e. for the European Small Claims Procedure), (4) secure the communication by electronic means of communication between the authorities and the parties involved.

Another regulation to be amended is the Insolvency Regulation. The proposal introduces provisions related to the cooperation and communication between courts for secondary insolvency proceedings in the sense that these should be carried out via the decentralised electronic means referred to by the present proposal – e-CODEX. Additionally, any foreign creditor should be able to lodge claims in insolvency proceedings by any means of communications accepted by the State of opening of the proceedings or by the electronic means provided by Article 5 of the proposal.

In criminal matters, the Regulation on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders will also be amended when the proposed regulation will be adopted. The e-CODEX decentralized system consenting electronic communication between courts and competent authorities will have to be used for a number of actions, namely: (1) by the issuing authority to transmit the freezing order to the executing authority, or central authority; (2) for the executing authority to report on the execution of the freezing order; (3) to inform the issuing authority on any decision to recognise and execute or not to recognise and execute an issued freezing order; (4) for the executing authority to report the postponement of the execution to the issuing authority and subsequent measures taken for its execution; and (5) for the execution authority to make a reason request to the issuing authority to limit the period for which the property is to be frozen. The same applies for similar provisions related to confiscation orders.

Concluding Remarks

When adopted this regulation will achieve one of the goals set out in last year’s Communication on the Digitalisation of Justice: making ‘digital communication channels the default channel in cross-border judicial cases’. If properly applied this will address two main problems of cross-border judicial cooperation: inefficiencies affecting this cooperation and barriers to access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal cases.

Now, it remains to be seen how the adopted text of the regulation will look like and how long it will take for achieving its full deployment in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal cases.

The European Commission (EC) set out an initiative Recognition of parenthood between Member StatesAs underlined by the EC, the initiative aims to ensure that parenthood, as established in one EU country, is recognised across the EU, so that children maintain their rights in cross-border situations, in particular when their families travel or move within the EU. Currently, in certain circumstances they might see the parenthood not recognised, which in turn might result in adverse consequences for the child (for example, obstacles in obtaining a passport or an identity card).

These problems might be easily illustrated by the background of the case, which resulted in a very recent judgement of the Court of Justice in Stolichna obshtina, rayon “Pancharevo” (C-490/20). See posts on this blog on the attitude of administrative authorities of some Member States, on the example of Bulgaria and AG Kokott’s opinion as to its implications in EU law, especially the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU – respectively – here and here.

Inception Impact Assessment

As reminded in the inception impact assessment published in Spring 2021, there is currently no instrument on the recognition of parenthood at the international level. The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) is engaged in exploring the possibilities of tackling this issue (information about these works might be found at HCCH website here). In the EU, each Member State applies its own law on the recognition of civil status records/judgements on parenthood handed down in another Member State. On the one hand, under EU treaties, substantive family law falls within the competence of Member States. Their substantive rules on the establishment and recognition of parenthood differ. On the other hand, the EU has competence to adopt measures concerning family law with cross-border implications pursuant to Article 81(3) TFEU. These measures can include the adoption of common conflict rules and the adoption of common procedures for the recognition of judgments issued in other Member States. The EC plans to present a proposal of the regulation by the third quarter of 2022.

Public Consultation

The EC has also lunched a public consultation. The outcome of the consultation was recently published (and is available here). Although collected answers are not necessary representative for the whole EU (interestingly, out of 389 answers 112 come from Slovakia), they indicate that indeed there are instances where parenthood was not recognised as between Member State.

(…) the cases mainly involved a child born out of surrogacy (37% or 116 responses), followed by a child born out of assisted reproductive technology (ART) (23% or 73 responses) and second parent adoption by the partner of the biological parent (21% or 65 responses). Other cases in which parenthood was not recognised included parenthood established by operation of law (14% or 45 responses) and adoption by two parents (10% or 30 responses). Adoption by one single parent and establishment of parenthood over an adult were not recognised according to 6% (or 18 responses) and 3% (or 8 responses) respectively.

As specified by respondents, the primary reason for not recognising parenthoods established in another Member State is that the recognition of parenthood is contrary to the national law of the Member State [or rather a public policy of that Member State? – AWB] where recognition is sought (72% or 184 responses) (…)

Expert Group

The Expert Group was set up to advise EC on the preparation of this new legislative initiative. The Group has met already on several occasions. As  minutes of these meeting reveal (see here for details), the Group was discussing, inter alia, the very notion of “recognition” with respect to parenthood, which often is confirmed by an administrative document, for example the birth certificate.

(…) existing Union instruments address the circulation of authentic instruments under three possible forms: acceptance, only enforcement and recognition and enforcement, and that by definition enforcement is not applicable to the status of persons. The group considered that acceptance may refer only to the evidentiary effects of the facts recorded in the document but not to the existence of a legal relationship, such that only recognition would be relevant for the purposes of the planned regulation on parenthood. 

It was thus agreed that the term ‘recognition’ should be used in the proposal as it refers not only to the factual elements but also to the legal effects of the authentic instrument. 

Enhanced Cooperation?

It might be added that adoption of a regulation under Article 81(3) TFEU requires unanimity. As a result, so far regulations aimed at unifying international family law were adopted within enhanced cooperation, due to lack of such unanimity (for example, the Divorce Regulation). The side effect is that these regulations are applied only in participating Member States, which undermines the unification efforts of the EU. Hence, there is a risk that non-participating Member States could be the ones, in which the problem of non-recognition of parenthood established in another Member State is more pressing than in other ones.

In June 2021, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament issued a Draft Report with recommendations to the Commission on Responsible private funding of litigation.

The Report was accompanied by a Study on Responsible private funding of litigation of the European Added Value Unit (authors: Jérôme Saulnier with Ivona Koronthalyova and Klaus Müller) of the European Parliament, issued in February 2021. Such studies are mandatory for proposals made by the European Parliament under Art. 225 TFEU.

The opinion of the Parliament is that, while Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers identifies certain safeguards relating to litigation funding, they are limited to representative actions on behalf of consumers taken under that Directive, and therefore exclude many other types of action or categories of claimants. The Parliament proposes to establish effective safeguards to all types of claims.

Regulatory Scheme

The Parliament proposes first to regulate the activities of litigation funders within the EU by establishing an authorisation system by supervisory autorities. Individual Member States could decide that funding litigation would be prohibited for proceedings in their Member State, or “for the benefit of claimants or intended beneficiaries resident within their Member State”.

Funders should conduct business from a registered office in a Member State, from which they would have to seek the authorisation.

Funding agreements entered into by unauthorised funders would be invalid.

Rules Governing Third Party Funding Agreements

The Parliament then proposes to adopt rules governing the content of third party agreements and disclosure obligations.

In particular, the following mandatory rules would apply:

  • Any clause in third party funding agreements granting a litigation funder the power to take or influence decisions in relation to proceedings would have no legal effect.
  • Agreements in which a litigation funder is guaranteed to receive a minimum return on its investment before a claimant or intended beneficiary can receive their share, would have no legal effect.
  • Absent exceptional circumstances, where a litigation funding agreement would entitle a litigation funder to a share of any award that would dilute the share available to the claimant and the intended beneficiaries to 60% or below of the total award (including all damages amounts, costs, fees and others expenses), such an agreement should have no legal effect.
  • Provisions that purport to limit a litigation funder’s liability for costs should have no legal effect.
Applicable Law

While the proposed directive does not include express choice of law rules, it provides that funders would commit to submit funding agreements to the law of the Member State of the intended proceedings “or , if different, of the Member State of the claimant or intended beneficiaries”.

Article 5(1) of the proposed Directive reads:

Member States shall ensure that supervisory authorities only grant or maintain authorisations, whether for domestic or cross-border litigation or other proceedings, to litigation funders who comply with the provisions of this Directive, and who meet, in addition to any suitability or other criteria as may be set out in national law, at least the following criteria: 

(b) they commit to concluding third-party funding agreements subject to the laws of
the Member State of any intended proceedings, or, if different, of the Member
State of the claimant or intended beneficiaries;

So, it seems that the law of the claimant (or intended beneficiaries) should always apply. Since the competence to allow the activity is attributed to the State where the claimant would be resident (see above), it seems that the intent of the drafters of Art. 5(1)(b) was to designate the law of the residence of the claimant (or intended beneficiaries).

The obvious problem with this rule is that there could be several claimants, and that the text expressly contemplates the possibility that there would be intended beneficiaries, who could also have their residence in a different State.

Another problem is that the rule seems to exclude claimants based outside of the EU (would at least a branch in the EU suffice?).

Finally, it would quite remarkable that a Member State prohibits third party funding, but then would have to accept it for claimant based in more permissive States, under the law of those other States.

Overall assessment on choice of law: peut mieux faire.

On 16 July 2021, the EU Commission has issued a Proposal for a Council Decision on the accession by the European Union to the Hague Convention of 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.

Under the Proposal, the EU would make two declarations.

External Competence

The European Union declares, in accordance with Article 27(1) of the Convention, that it exercises competence over all the matters governed by this Convention. Its Member States will not sign, ratify, accept or approve the Convention, but shall be bound by the Convention by virtue of its conclusion by the European Union. 

For the purpose of this declaration, the term “European Union” does not include the Kingdom of Denmark by virtue of Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Commercial Tenancies

The European Union hereby declares under Article 18 of the Convention that it will not apply the Convention to commercial leases (tenancies) of immovable property situated in the European Union.

The declaration is explained as follows:

a declaration is needed in order to ensure that the achievement of the policy objectives of the Brussels Ia Regulation is not affected by the accession to the Convention. More specifically, in cases involving commercial tenancies, the Brussels Ia Regulation affords exclusive jurisdiction to courts in a Member State where the immovable property is located. The Judgments Convention does not include such exclusive jurisdictional rules for commercial tenancies. Therefore, under the Convention, Member States would be obliged to recognise and enforce third-country judgments on commercial leases of immovable property that is situated on their territory. This would be in contradiction to the policy objective behind the Brussels Ia Regulation to attribute exclusive jurisdiction to courts in the EU for disputes related to immovable property situated in the EU.

No Declaration Pursuant to Articles 18 and 19

The Commission will not make declarations pursuant to Articles 18 and 19 of the Convention.

On the possibility to make declarations, Member States opposed a declaration based on Article 19 of the Convention and did not express clear views on declarations under Article 18. Only a small number of stakeholders favoured accession with a declaration under Article 19 while there was no clear tendency detected for Article 18 declarations.

This post was contributed by Alexia Pato, who is Postdoc Research Fellow at the University of McGill (Montreal, Canada).


The present post provides an overview of the legal initiatives on artificial intelligence (AI) recently launched at the EU level and the questions they generate from a private international law (PIL) perspective.

The analysis starts with the 2021 Proposal for a Regulation on harmonised rules on AI and continues with the EU Parliament’s detailed recommendations for drawing up a Regulation on liability for the operation of AI systems.

Overview of the Proposed AI Regulation

On 21 April 2021, the EU Commission published its much-awaited Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on AI, following explicit requests from the Council and the Parliament (see, in particular, the AI-related resolutions of the Parliament of October 2020 on ethics, civil liability and intellectual property). The proposed Regulation’s goal is to promote the free movement of AI-related goods and services, while ensuring the protection of fundamental rights.

If enacted, the Regulation would create a horizontal regulatory framework for the development, placement on the market and use of AI systems in the Union, depending on the risks that those systems generate for people’s health and safety or fundamental rights. In particular, Article 5 forbids AI practices which create an unacceptable risk (some exceptions may nevertheless apply). The prohibition extends to AI systems deploying subliminal techniques beyond a person’s consciousness to induce a particular behaviour and to those exploiting the vulnerabilities of a group of people (e.g., a doll integrated with a voice assistant that encourages children to play dangerous games in order to maximise their fun).

Real-time remote biometric identification (e.g., facial recognition) and social scoring are deemed to create an unacceptable risk as well. As regards high-risk AI systems (Title III), they must undergo an ex ante conformity assessment in order to be placed on the EU market (Articles 19 and Title III, Chapter 5).

The proposed Regulation imposes a series of requirements in relation to data, documentation and recording keeping, transparency and information to users, human oversight, robustness, accuracy and security (Articles 8 to 15). Examples of high-risk AI systems include medical assistants (e.g., IBM’s Watson assistant), chatbots and automated recruitment applications. Lastly, AI systems which create a low or minimal risk are permitted.

For a general assessment of the Proposal, see the CEPS Think Thank with Lucilla Sioli (DG CONNECT) available here, as well as the Ars Boni podcast available here.

The Extraterritorial Reach of EU law

As Article 2 of the proposed AI Regulation would confer the Regulation an extraterritorial reach, PIL questions emerge. In particular, the EU rules on AI are meant to apply to (1) providers placing AI systems on the EU market or putting them into service there, irrespective of their place of establishment; (2) users located in the EU; (3) providers and users located in a third state, when the output produced by the AI system is used – but not marketed – in the EU.

Remarkably, Article 2 bypasses the traditional choice of law methodology and unilaterally delineates the Regulation’s territorial scope of application.

This legislative technique has been used on other occasions: the most recent example is perhaps Article 3 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Literature on the latter provision shows that the extraterritorial application of laws creates a fertile ground for overlaps and high compliance costs. The same observation could apply to AI if other states chose to exercise their (legislative) jurisdiction extraterritorially. How private (or public) international law will tackle that concern remains to be seen.

Moreover, interpretative issues are likely to arise, as the wording of Article 2 is vague. In particular, when is a user “located” in the EU – does the temporary presence on the territory trigger the application of the Regulation? What is the “output” of an AI system? And finally, when is an AI system “placed on the EU market” or “put into service” there?

The Law Applicable to Civil Liability

It is acknowledged that the misuse of AI systems may be harmful, despite the great potential of technologies to significantly improve our lives in many sectors. Traffic accidents involving either autonomous – i.e. driverless – or driver-assist vehicles are a telling example in that regard.

Currently, the law applicable to civil liability in such a scenario essentially depends on the actors involved – the driver, the manufacturer of the car, the designer of the software, etc. Several PIL systems applying different connecting factors might come into play, namely the Rome II Regulation, the 1971 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents and the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability. Considering the fact that national civil liability regimes vary (sometimes significantly) from one state to another, the outcome of a case might be different depending on the court seized.

For a thorough PIL analysis, see T. Kadner Graziano, “Cross-Border Traffic Accidents in the EU – The Potential Impact of Driverless Cars” (Study for the JURI Committee, 2016), available here.

The EU Commission announced that a new piece of legislation addressing civil liability should soon complement the proposed AI Regulation, following the EU Parliament’s detailed recommendations for drawing up a regulation on liability for the operation of AI systems. If followed by the Commission and adopted, the text would partially harmonise national laws on civil liability in the EU. These shall however not be replaced; only adjustments would be provided.

The object of the future Regulation is to hold the operators of high-risk AI systems strictly liable, while operators of other AI systems would be subject to a fault-based liability regime. Finally, the drafting of the future Regulation should go hand in hand with the necessary review of the Product Liability Directive in order to build up a consistent liability framework in the EU.

According to Article 2 of the Parliament’s Draft Proposal, the liability rules enacted at the EU level would apply “on the territory of the Union where a physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by an AI system has caused harm or damage to the life, health, physical integrity of a natural person, to the property of a natural or legal person or has caused significant immaterial harm resulting in a verifiable economic loss”.

I find the wording of this provision unclear: shall the future Regulation apply where a court of a Member State is seized with a dispute involving damages caused by AI systems (as the terms “on the territory of the Union” suggests) or must the damage, the operator, the activity or the victim additionally be located in the EU?

Additionally, even though the future Regulation bypasses the Rome II Regulation according to Article 27 of the latter, traditional choice of law rules would still be needed to designate the law applicable to questions falling out of the future Regulation’s scope (such as the law applicable to multiple liability where non-operators are involved, just to mention one example). Fragmentation would therefore not be completely avoided.

For an analysis of the Draft Proposal from a PIL perspective, see J. von Hein, “Liability for Artificial Intelligence in Private International Law” (online presentation, 25 June 2020), available here.

Conclusion

The interaction of AI with the PIL field brings interesting research questions on the table for legal scholars. As things currently stand, however, the EU’s legislative initiatives do not overcome the sempiternal difficulties experienced in PIL, namely the fragmented application of laws, and the difficulty to manage interactions between multiple legal texts because of their overlapping and extraterritorial effect.

The Council of the European Union will aim at establishing a general approach on the regulation on assignments of claims on 7 June 2021 in Luxembourg.

The text which should be adopted is an amended version of the 2018 proposal of the European Commission for a Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims, which was adopted by the European Parliament  in 2019 with 24 amendments.

The main features of the new text are as follows.

Law of the Habitual Residence of the Assignor

One of the most debated issues was whether the principle should be that third party effects of assignment of claims should be governed by the law of the habitual residence of the assignor or the law of the assigned claim. The Commission had proposed to retain the former, with certain exceptions.

In line with the Commission proposal, the law of the assignor’s habitual residence received more support than the assigned-claim law as it would lead to more predictability for third parties. The law of the assignor’s habitual residence was deemed suitable for bulk assignments subject to different laws and future claims and consistent with Regulation (EU) 2015/848 (Insolvency Regulation).

Law of the Assigned Claim

The list of exceptions, however, has slightly increased. The law of the assigned claim would apply to a longer list of claims in financial markets, but also to credit claims. This last exception will not doubt be criticised. Recital 27(b) clarifies its scope, which seems extensive:

The third-party effects of assignments of claims arising out of agreements whereby credit is granted in the form of a loan should be governed by the law of the assigned claim. This should include credit claims as defined in point (o) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2002/47, often used as financial collateral within the Eurosystem. In order to facilitate the cross-border assignment of claims arising out of syndicated loans and lending-based crowdfunding on secondary financial markets, the third-party effects of the assignment of claims arising out of syndicated loans and lending-based crowdfunding should also be subject to the law of the assigned claim.

Scope

It was also thought that the scope of the instrument should be further clarified and restricted. In particular, three matters are excluded from the scope of the future regulation:

– the transfer of financial instruments, including securities and derivatives;
– the transfer of crypto-assets; and
– the assignment of claims where the claims are not in intangible form but incorporated in a certificate or represented by a book entry.

On 17 September 2020 the Court of Justice of the EU issued a judgement in the case of WV v Landkreis Harburg (C-540/19) concerning the interpretation of the jurisdictional rules of the EU Maintenance Regulation, in particular its Article 3(b). An opinion in this case was prepared by AG Sánchez-Bardona.

Factual Background

WV’s mother lived in a residential care home for the elderly in Germany. In accordance with § 1601 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, WV, the son, was required to provide maintenance to his mother. However, he failed to do so. As the mother did not have adequate means to cover expenses, she received, under the German Sozialgesetzbuch, social assistance from a public body – the Landkreis Harburg. Pursuant to § 94(1) Sozialgesetzbuch, maintenance claims are by way of statutory subrogation transferred to the public body providing social assistance. Relying on this provision, the Landkreis Harburg lodged an application with the Amtsgericht Köln (Germany) claiming from WV the payment of maintenance arrears and regular maintenance for the future.

WV submitted that German courts lack jurisdiction. The lower instance court shared this view, noting that, according to Article 3(b) of the Maintenance Regulation, jurisdiction lies with the court for the place where the creditor is habitually resident. At the same time the concept of “creditor” is defined in Article 2(1)(10) of this Regulation as meaning “any individual to whom maintenance is owed or is alleged to be owed”. Hence, only the creditor personally can make use of the ground listed in Article 3(b). The dispute reached the Bundesgerichtshof, which referred a preliminary question to the CJEU.

Previous Jurisprudence of the CJEU

As reminded in the opinion and in the judgement, the Brussels Convention and Brussels I Regulation included jurisdictional rules for maintenance claims (until Maintenance Regulation has started to be applied on 18 June 2011). Pursuant to these rules, jurisdiction lies with the courts of the defendant’s domicile (based on general rule – Article 2 Convention; Article 4 Regulation) and with the courts for the place where the maintenance creditor is domiciled or habitually resident (Article (5)(2) of both acts).

The CJEU ruled on the interpretation of Article (5)(2) of the Convention in Blijdenstein (C- 433/01), a case similar, as to its factual background, to the one considered in Landkreis Harburg. The Court stated in Blijdenstein that Article 5(2)

cannot be relied on by a public body which seeks, in an action for recovery, reimbursement of sums paid under public law by way of an education grant to a maintenance creditor, to whose rights it is subrogated against the maintenance debtor.

The CJEU explained on that occasion that the general principle is that the courts of the State in which the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction “and that rules of jurisdiction which derogate from this general principle cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases expressly envisaged.” (24)

The “derogation provided for in Article 5(2) of the Convention is intended to offer the maintenance applicant, who is regarded as the weaker party in such proceedings, an alternative basis of jurisdiction (…) that specific objective had to prevail over the objective of the rule contained in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention, which is to protect the defendant as the party who, being the person sued, is generally in a weaker position.” (29).

Then, it submitted that “a public body which brings an action for recovery against a maintenance debtor is not in an inferior position with regard to the latter. Moreover, the maintenance creditor, whose maintenance has been covered by the payments of the public body, is no longer in a precarious financial position.” (30) Additionally, “the courts of the defendant are better placed to determine the latter’s resources.” (31)

AG’s Opinion Arguing the Need to Depart from Blijdenstein

The AG’s Opinion submitted numerous reasons for which the CJEU should depart from Blijdenstein. The AG underlined the differences between Brussels Convention and Maintenance Regulation, analyzed the CJUE’s “new” jurisprudence relating to the latter (namely: Sanders and Huber, C-400/13; V, C-499/15; R, C-468/18), in particular as regards the regulation’s overarching principles, like protection of maintenance creditors or the effective recovery of maintenance claims in cross-border situations. Additionally, with reference to the Hague Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance obligations, the advantages of the coincidence between ius and forum were sketched.

Departure from Blijdenstein and its Justification

The CJEU shared the views of the AG and departed from Blijdenstein jurisprudence. In practical terms, it means that public bodies like Landkreis Harburg might file claims against maintenance debtors at the place of maintenance creditor’s habitual residence, which in most instances would coincide with their own.

The CJEU underlined that Article 3 of the Maintenance Regulation:

contains neither a general principle, such as jurisdiction of the court for the defendant’s domicile, nor derogating rules which would have to be interpreted strictly (…) but rather a number of criteria which are equal and alternative (…). (29)

and

does not specify that the claim must be brought by the maintenance creditor himself or herself before the courts identified in paragraphs (a) and (b) [and therefore does not] preclude a claim relating to a maintenance obligation from being brought by a public body, to which the claims of that creditor have been transferred by way of statutory subrogation, before one or the other of those courts. (31)

Consistent with the opinion, the CJEU also pointed to the fact that the Maintenance Regulation, as opposed to Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation, does apply no matter domicile or habitual residence of the defendant. Hence:

refusing to allow a public body subrogated to the claims of a creditor to bring an action before the courts where that creditor is habitually resident in circumstances where the maintenance debtor is domiciled in a third State is most likely tantamount to requiring that public body to bring its action outside the European Union. (35)

This would result in legal and practical difficulties, which go against the objective of the effective recovery of maintenance claims.

The CJEU convincingly added that:

The transfer of the maintenance creditor’s claims to such a public body impairs neither the interests of the maintenance debtor nor the predictability of the applicable rules of jurisdiction; that debtor must, in any event, expect to be sued either before the court for the place where he or she is habitually resident or before the courts for the place where that creditor is habitually resident. (38)

The CJEU also referred to Hague Protocol, underling that its Article 10 provides that the right of a public body to seek reimbursement of a benefit provided to the creditor in place of maintenance is governed by the law to which that body is subject. This:

ensures, in the vast majority of cases – which are those in which the seat of the public body and the habitual residence of the creditor are in the same Member State – a parallel between the rules on jurisdiction and those concerning the applicable substantive law. (43)

On 24 February 2021 the Court of Justice of the EU issued a judgement in the case BU v Markt24 GmbH (C-804/19) following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria). The case concerns jurisdictional rules for employment contracts in Brussels I bis Regulation, in particular its Article 21. The opinion in this case was prepared by AG Øe.

Background

BU whose place of residence is in Salzburg (Austria) signed the employment contract for carrying out cleaning work in Munich (Germany) for Markt24 GmbH, whose registered office is also located in Munich. BU signed the contract with an employee acting as intermediary of Markt24. The contract was signed in a bakery in Salzburg, even though Markt24 had an office in this city at that time. It was agreed that BU would start working on 6 September 2017, but she was never allocated any work, even though she could be contacted by telephone and was prepared to work. BU has not received remuneration, but she was registered with the Austrian social security institution as an employee. On 15 December 2017, the defendant terminated the employment contract. On 27 April 2018, BU filed a claim to the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) asking for outstanding wage and other payments for the period of her employment.

Since the documents initiating the action could not be served on the defendant, a procedural representative in absentia was appointed. The representative contested jurisdiction of the Austrian court. It seems that, in accordance with domestic law in place in Austria, namely § 4(1)(a) Arbeits- und Sozialgerichtsgesetz (“ASGG” – Law on the labour and social courts), Landesgericht Salzburg would have jurisdiction, based on the place of residence of the employee and also the place where the remuneration was to be paid. At the same time there were doubts whether jurisdiction exists under Brussels I bis Regulation, in particular its Article 21(1)(b)(i), which grants jurisdiction to courts for “the place where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work”. Landesgericht Salzburg decided to refer a preliminary ruling to the CJEU asking few alternative questions.

Is Section 5 of Chapter II Brussels I bis Applicable at All, If No Work Was Actually Performed?

The Court reminded that the concept of an “individual contract of employment” referred to in Brussels I bis Regulation must be given an autonomous interpretation (point 24). As flows from its previous jurisprudence, this concept “presupposes a relationship of subordination of the employee to the employer; the essential feature of an employment relationship is that for a certain period of time one person performs services for and under the direction of another in return for which he or she receives remuneration” (point 25). If the above conditions are met, parties are bound by a “contract of employment” within the meaning of the Regulation, “irrespective of whether the work which is the subject of that contract has been performed or not” (point 26).

Hence, the CJEU stated that Section 5 of Chapter II Brussels I bis (namely, its special jurisdictional rules for employment contracts) “must be interpreted as applying to a legal action brought by an employee domiciled in a Member State against an employer domiciled in another Member State in the case where the contract of employment was negotiated and entered into in the Member State in which the employee is domiciled and provided that the place of performance of the work was located in the Member State of the employer, even though that work was not performed for a reason attributable to that employer.”

Does Brussels I bis Allow for the Application of Domestic Rules on Jurisdiction If More Beneficial to the Employee?

As rightly underlined in the opinion, the fact that the rules of the ASGG are more favorable to the employee is irrelevant, as section 5 of Chapter II Brussels I bis does not provide for certain minimum standards of the protection of employees, which might be further developed by the national legislation (points 43-44 of the opinion). Instead, this Regulation provides for a unified system of jurisdictional rules. If a dispute falls within the scope of application of Brussels I bis, its rules of jurisdiction must take precedence over national ones (points 30-32 of the judgement). Hence, the CJEU ruled that the provisions set out in Section 5 of Chapter II Brussels I bis preclude the application of national rules of jurisdiction, irrespective of whether those rules are more beneficial to the employee.

How to Understand Article 21(1)(b)(i) Brussels I bis, If the Work Was Never Actually Performed?

As underlined in the opinion, the Court has never before had a chance to explain how to understand the concept of the “place where the employee habitually carries out his work”, in case no work was actually performed (point 23 of the opinion). The Court noted that this concept refers to “the place where, or from which, the employee in fact performs the essential part of his or her duties vis-à-vis his or her employer” (point 40). The Court shared also the view presented in the opinion that:

in the case where the contract of employment has not been performed, the intention expressed by the parties to the contract as to the place of that performance is, in principle, the only element which makes it possible to establish a habitual place of work (…) That interpretation best allows a high degree of predictability of rules of jurisdiction to be ensured, since the place of work envisaged by the parties in the contract of employment is, in principle, easy to identify (point 41).

The Court had no doubt that in the case at hand that place is Munich (Germany).

At the same time, the Court underlined that in accordance with Article 20 Brussels I bis Regulation, section 5 of its Chapter II applies without prejudice to, inter alia, Article 6 point 5, which provides that a person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State, “as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place where the branch, agency or other establishment is situated”. The Court noted that Landesgericht Salzburg should determine whether that provision may also be applicable in the case given that Markt24 had an office in Salzburg at the beginning of the employment relationship.

CJEU stated that Article 21(1)(b)(i) of Brussels I bis must be interpreted as meaning that an action may be brought before the court of the place where or from where the employee was required, pursuant to the contract of employment, to discharge the essential part of his or her obligations towards the employer. This is however without prejudice to Article 7(5) of the Regulation.

Is Article 7(1) Brussels I bis Applicable to an Employment Relationship, If No Work Was Actually Performed?

One of the questions was not answered either in the opinion or in the judgement, as there was no doubt that Section 5 of the Chapter II Brussels I bis does apply to the case at hand. By this question Landesgericht Salzburg wanted to clarify whether Article 7(1) Brussels I bis might apply to the employment relationship, in such specific circumstances, when no work was actually performed and whether § 4(1)(a) or (d) of the ASGG could be applied. It is not clear whether the ASGG was supposed to be applied instead of Article 7 Brussels I bis or somehow indirectly by the intermediation of it.

Pursuant to Protocol No 22 to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not bound by the measures enacted by the EU in the area of freedom, security and justice, including as regards judicial cooperation in civil matters.

However, an agreement was concluded in 2005 between the European Community, as it was then, and Denmark to ensure the application in Denmark, and in respect of Denmark, of the EU rules concerning the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil and commercial matters, i.e., at that time, the rules laid down in Regulation 1348/2000.

According to Article 3(2) of the 2005 agreement, whenever amendments to the latter Regulation are adopted, Denmark shall notify to the Commission of its decision whether or not to implement the content of such amendments.

This occurred when the 2000 Service Regulation was replaced by Regulation 1393/2007, and has now occurred for Regulation 2020/1784 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, which was adopted on 25 November 2020 (as announced on this blog by this post by Apostolos Anthimos) and is set to apply in full from 1 July 2022.

In accordance with Article 3(2) of the 2005 agreement, Denmark has by letter of 22 December 2020 notified the Commission of its decision to implement the contents of Regulation 2020/1784. In accordance with Article 3(6) of the agreement, the Danish notification creates mutual obligations between Denmark and the Community. Thus, Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 constitutes an amendment to the agreement and is considered annexed thereto.

In accordance with Article 3(4) of the agreement, the necessary administrative measures enter into force on the date of entry into force of Regulation 2020/1784.

Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of 25 November 2020 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC was published on 4 December 2020 (OJ L 409/1).

It consists of 79 recitals, 26 provisions (some of them actually looking as recitals, and vice-versa), and two Annexes, the second being a correlation table of provisions – to my mind, a good lawmaking practice. It will enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union; transposition shall be ready by 25 December 2022; the national measures will apply from 25 June 2023.

The Key Features of the Directive in a Nutshell

The Directive is based  on Article 114 TFEU (see nevertheless Recital 76, arguing that the intervention of the EU is necessary due to the relevance of the cross-border element).

Having regard to its overarching objective, the Directive joins the group of measures aiming simultaneously at the protection of the consumer, the promotion of fairer competition and the creation of a level playing field for traders operating in the internal market (in other words, this piece of legislation has not been conceived only for the sake of consumers; therefore, it is here submitted that it should not be interpreted only with them in mind).

The Directive  takes up the failures of precedent legal acts in relation to the enforcement of consumer law, particularly Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests. As in other fields of EU law, it clearly endorses private enforcement.

According to the Directive, a consumer is any natural person who acts for purposes outside that person’s trade, business, craft or profession, independently of how she is referred to (data subject, traveler, retail investor, etc) in the legal act allegedly infringed.

The Directive covers infringements of the provisions of Union law referred to in its Annex I, to the extent that they protect the interests of consumers, and provided the natural person involved acts as such.

For those willing to get the whole picture as to the scope of the Directive it is worth noticing that it does not substitute the enforcement mechanism contained in the EU legal acts listed in Annex I (by the way: keep in mind that Annex is subject to be amended each time that a new Union act relevant to the protection of the collective interests of consumers is adopted). In addition, Member States are able to retain or introduce national legislation that corresponds to provisions of this Directive in relation to disputes that fall outside the scope of Annex I. My understanding is that this possibility relates only to subject matters, and not to the subjective scope of the Directive.

The impact of the Directive on national systems will depend on the Member State concerned. National procedural mechanisms for the protection of collective or individual consumer interests – where they exist – do not need to be replaced. It is for the Member States to decide whether the procedural mechanisms for representative actions required by the Directive are part of an existing procedural mechanism for collective injunctive measures or redress measures, or a distinct procedural mechanism.

What matters is that at least one national procedural mechanism for representative actions complies with the Directive in every Member State, and, as a consequence, at least one effective and efficient procedural mechanism for representative actions, for injunctive measures and for redress measures, is available to consumers in all Member States.

In terms of contents, the Directive does not address every aspect of the proceedings. Already whether these should be judicial or administrative, or both, is to be decided by the Member States considering the area of law or the economic sector at stake.

The provisions eventually adopted focus on legal standing (and its mutual recognition), remedies (injunctive relief, redress measures), funding, settlements, allocation of costs, information about representative actions, effects of final decisions, limitation periods, disclosure of evidence, and penalties.

It is for the Member States to lay down the rules complementing those of the Directive under the principle procedural autonomy, subject to the requirements of effectiveness and non-discrimination.

Aspects of the Directive of Interest for PIL

The Directive does not intend to affect the application of rules of private international law regarding jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of judgments or applicable law, nor establish such rules (in other words, the well-known shortcomings of the existing PIL instruments are not remedied).

This intention has not prevented the lawmaker from shaping two cross-border categories: ‘cross-border infringements’, and ‘cross-border representative actions’.

The former covers ‘in particular’ the case of consumers affected by an infringement who live in Member States other than the Member State in which the infringing trader is established; what else is included is unclear. The latter designates the situation of a qualified entity bringing a representative action in a Member State other than that in which it is designated; conversely, if a qualified entity brings a representative action in the Member State in which it is designated, that representative action will qualify as a domestic representative action, even if it is brought against a trader domiciled in another Member State and even if consumers from several Member States are represented within that representative action. I would argue here that those categories have no meaning beyond the Directive itself; in other words, they should be accorded no significance in terms of application of PIL instruments.

Recital 22, according to which ‘It should be noted that Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 does not cover the competence of administrative authorities or the recognition or enforcement of decisions by such authorities’, deserves a similar assessment. In my view, whether a representative action filed by an administrative authority falls under the scope of the Brussels I Regulation or not still depends on the autonomous characterization of the dispute as ‘civil and commercial’.

In addition to the clarification regarding PIL instruments, the following issues of interest for cross-border disputes are addressed in the Directive (not necessarily in the operational part).

Useful information for the courts – When bringing a representative action, a qualified entity should provide sufficient information on the consumers concerned by the representative action to the court or the administrative authority, thus allowing the court or administrative authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction and to determine the applicable law.

Useful information for the consumers – Member States should be able to set up national electronic databases that are publicly accessible through websites providing information on the qualified entities designated for the purpose of bringing domestic representative actions and cross-border representative actions, as well as general information on ongoing and concluded representative actions.

Legal standing criteria – For the purposes of cross-border representative actions, qualified entities should be subject to the same criteria for designation across the Union. Examples are listed – non exhaustively – under recital 25. Moreover, qualified entities that have been designated on an ad hoc basis are not allowed to bring cross-border representative actions.

Mutual recognition – Member States should ensure that cross-border representative actions can be brought before their courts or administrative authorities by qualified entities that have been designated for the purpose of such representative actions in another Member State. The identity of qualified entities enabled to sue abroad will be communicated to the Commission, who will compile a list and make it publicly available. Inclusion on the list serves as proof of the legal standing of the qualified entity bringing the representative action.

Opt-in – In order to ensure the sound administration of justice and to avoid irreconcilable judgments, where the consumers affected by an infringement do not habitually reside in the Member State of the court or administrative authority before which the representative action is brought, an opt-out mechanism is excluded regarding representative actions for redress measures. In other words, consumers have to explicitly express their wish to be represented in that representative action in order to be bound by the outcome of the representative action.

Cooperation and the exchange of information between qualified entities from different Member States is encouraged, in order to increase the use of representative actions with cross-border implications.

December 2020 will be quiet at the Court (regarding private international law cases).

The judgment in C-774/19 Personal Exchange International will be delivered (6th Chamber: Bay Larsen, Safjan, Jääskinen; no opinion, no hearing) on Thursday 10. The question was referred on September 5, 2019, by the Vrhovno sodišče Republike Slovenije (Slovenia):

Must Article 15(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 be interpreted as meaning that an online poker playing contract, concluded remotely over the internet by an individual with a foreign operator of online games and subject to that operator’s general terms and conditions, can also be classified as a contract concluded by a consumer for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, where that individual has, for several years, lived on the income thus obtained or the winnings from playing poker, even though he has no formal registration for that type of activity and in any event does not offer that activity to third parties on the market as a paid service?

On Thursday 17, AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona’s opinion on C-709/19 Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, will be published. The Hoge Raad (the Netherlands) asked the Court to interpret once more Article 7(2) Brussels I bis in a case of patrimonial damage. The preliminary reference was lodged September 25, 2019; a hearing had been scheduled for last September, rescheduled, and eventually replaced by questions for written answer.

1.(a)  Should Article 7(2) of [the Brussels Ia Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that the direct occurrence of purely financial damage to an investment account in the Netherlands or to an investment account of a bank and/or investment firm established in the Netherlands, damage which is the result of investment decisions influenced by globally distributed but incorrect, incomplete and misleading information from an international listed company, constitutes a sufficient connecting factor for the international jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts by virtue of the location of the occurrence of the damage (‘Erfolgsort’)?

(b)    If not, are additional circumstances required to justify the jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts and what are those circumstances? Are the additional circumstances referred to [in paragraph 7 below] sufficient to found the jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts?

2. Would the answer to Question 1 be different in the case of a claim brought under Article 3:305a of the BW (Burgerlijk Wetboek: Netherlands Civil Code) by an association the purpose of which is to defend, in its own right, the collective interests of investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1, which means, among other things, that neither the places of domicile of the aforementioned investors, nor the special circumstances of individual purchase transactions or of individual decisions not to sell shares which were already held, have been established?

3. If courts in the Netherlands have jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation to hear the claim brought under Article 3:305a of the BW, do those courts then, on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, also have international and internal territorial jurisdiction to hear all subsequent individual claims for compensation brought by investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1?

4. If courts in the Netherlands as referred to in Question 3 above have international, but not internal, territorial jurisdiction to hear all individual claims for compensation brought by investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1, will the internal territorial jurisdiction be determined on the basis of the place of domicile of the misled investor, the place of establishment of the bank in which that investor holds his or her personal bank account or the place of establishment of the bank in which the investment account is held, or on the basis of some other connecting factor?

The hearing in C-30/20 Volvo e.a., also on Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, will be held on the same day. The preliminary reference, from a commercial court in Madrid (Spain), was lodged on January 22, 2020. It will be decided by the 1st Chamber (Bonichot, Bay Larsen, Toader, Safjan, Jääskinen, with M. Safjian as reporting judge), with the opinion of the French AG, M. Richard de la Tour. At first sight, the question looks like a simple one:

Should Article 7(2) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] be interpreted as establishing only the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State for the aforesaid place, meaning that the national court with territorial jurisdiction within that State is to be determined by reference to domestic rules of procedure, or should it be interpreted as a combined rule which, therefore, directly determines both international jurisdiction and national territorial jurisdiction, without any need to refer to domestic regulation?

That the reference has been allocated to a chamber of five judges, together with the fact that the AG’s view has been requested, certainly means that the decision will go beyond choosing one or the other alternative interpretations.

On 2 December 2020, following a lengthy procedure, the Recast Service Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 of 25 November 2020 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters) was finally published in the Official Journal of the European Union (the Position of the Council at first reading in view of the adoption of the Recast had appeared a few days earlier: see it here).

The contents of the Regulation were known, in substance, since an agreement was reached, in June 2020, between the Council and the European Parliament as a result of the trilogue consultations.

Previous posts in this blog illustrated the envisaged innovations and the challenges posed by the recast, and discussed some of the issues raised by the current rules.

The Recast will apply from 1 July 2022.

The European Order for Payment (EOP, Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006), the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP, Regulation (EC) No 861/2007) and the European Account Preservation Order (EAPO, Regulation (EU) No 655/2014) applied for several years in Romania without any specific implementation legislation being adopted to coordinate their interaction with the national procedural rules.

As generally regulations do not require any specific additional legislative action from the Member States to be applied at national level, Romanian authorities relied on the principle of direct application of the three instruments. However, the referral to national procedural rules in several articles of the regulations (e.g. existence of an appeal mechanisms, costs of proceedings, assistance) as well as reliance on national rules when no specific provisions are contained in the European legislation (Article 26 EOP, Article 19 ESCP, and Article 46 EAPO) can create disparities and give rise to variations in the application of these instruments even within one Member State.

Recently, this direct application approach changed. In December 2019 the Romanian Government and, subsequently, the Parliament initiated acts to amend national laws. These legislative amendments were aimed at facilitating the application of these regulations and clarifying particular procedural aspects in order to ease judicial cooperation between Member States for the EOP, ESCP, and EAPO procedures. The new national rules dedicated to the EOP, ESCP, and EAPO focus mainly on issues of jurisdiction of Romanian courts, identifying the national authorities involved in the application of the Regulations, and establishing the applicable procedural fees.

EAPO: A Guided Implementation Process to Avoid an Infringement Procedure

The amendment of national legislation regarding the EAPO has been triggered by the initiation of an infringement procedure by the European Commission. A letter of formal notice (letter C(2019) 6729 final) was sent to the Romanian authorities in 2019 – more than two years since the regulation became applicable – because the Government failed to communicate relevant information for the application of the regulation as required by Article 50 EAPO Regulation.

Following this formal notice, the Romanian Government acted expediently to avoid a possible referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union in an infringement procedure. The Government’s Note proposing the legislative amendment as well as in the Statement of Reasons for the law approving the Government Emergency Ordinance containing implementation provisions refer to this risk as well as that of hefty fines for the national budget due to non-compliance with EU law. Based on these reasons the Government moved quickly in December 2019 to adopt an Emergency Ordinance – Ordonaţa de urgenţă nr. 75 din 13 decembrie 2019 pentru completarea Ordonanţei de urgenţă a Guvernului nr. 119/2006 privind unele măsuri necesare pentru aplicarea unor regulamente comunitare de la data aderării României la Uniunea Europeană, precum şi pentru modificarea Ordonanţei de urgenţă a Guvernului nr. 80/2013 privind taxele judiciare de timbre.

Based on the Government’s Note, the Emergency Ordinance No. 75/2019 was meant to address information that had not been clearly provided for the application of the EAPO in Romania. This concerned:

  • the methods that could be used to obtain account information regarding a debtor holding a bank account in Romania (Article 50(1)(c) EAPO Regulation) and
  • which courts were competent to handle EAPO requests, the available means of appeal, the national authority competent to receive requests for obtaining account information about bank accounts and to provide such information, and the methods applicable to receive this information (by Romanian and authorities in other Member States).

The new article Article I8 of the Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 regarding certain measures necessary for the application of some Community Regulations after the date of accession of Romania to the European Union explicitly addresses the information requirements contained in Article 50(1) letters (a)-(d), (l) and (m) EAPO Regulation.

Based on this legislative amendment, the courts competent to issue Preservation Orders in Romania based on an authentic instrument would be the ones having jurisdiction to handle the claim at first instance (Article 1(1) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Articles 6(4) EAPO Regulation). Further, any appeal against a decision to reject in whole or in part an application for a Preservation Order would be handle by the hierarchical higher court to the one that issued the initial decision (Article 1(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Articles 21 EAPO Regulation). This means that different type of courts can have jurisdiction to receive an application for an EAPO based on the threshold of the claim. These would be either the district courts (judecătorii) for requests of up to 200.000 RON (approx. 42.000 euros) or the general courts (tribunale) for applications above this threshold. Similarly, any request to revoke or modify a Preservation Order based on Article 31(1) EAPO Regulation will be handled by the hierarchical higher court to the one that issued it (Article 1(3) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006).

The remedies available to the debtor against the enforcement of a Preservation Order according to Article 34 EAPO Regulation will rest with the enforcement court (Article 1(4) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006). Again any appeal against the remedies available to the creditor and the debtor based on the provisions of Articles 33-35 EAPO will lie with the hierarchical higher courts to the courts that issued the Preservation Order (Article 1(3)-(4) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Articles 33(1), 34 and 35 EAPO Regulation). In such circumstances, the appeal would have to be introduced within a period of 30 days from the date of communication of the decision challenged, unless the law establishes otherwise. This last part gives rise to some uncertainty, especially for foreign parties which are presumed not to be familiar with the Romanian legal system and its particularities. Hence, relying on a local practitioner would remain necessary although representation is not mandatory in the EAPO procedure (Article 41 EAPO Regulation).

Any request to obtain information and identify a debtor’s potential bank accounts in Romania according to Article 14 EAPO Regulation will be dealt with by the National Union of Judicial Enforcement Officers (Uniunea Naţională a Executorilor Judecătoreşti, UNEJ). The National Union of Judicial Enforcement Officers is the designated information authority competent to provide this information upon request. For this purpose, the Union has been granted direct and free of charge access to the Ministry of Public Finance IT system – PatrimVen (Article 2 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006).

With regard to procedural costs related to the issuance of a European Account Preservation Order, the court fees are fixed at 100 RON (approx. 21 euros) (Article 11(1) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees). The EAPO court fee is similar to fees applicable in other national procedures concerning protective measures. Its low value is certainly convenient, especially for high-value EAPOs.

EOP and ESCP: Implementation Legislation A Decade into their Application

The EOP and ESCP have been the testing ground for direct application of ‘second-generation’ European regulations into national procedure. This has led to interpretation difficulties (e.g. amount of court fees to be paid, appeal and review mechanisms, lack of legal assistance) and mixed results according to previously published research findings (e.g. further Luxembourg Report on Mutual Trust and Free Circulation of Judgments and Cross-Border Debt Recovery in the EU). During this initial period, the only legislative provision implicitly referring to these instruments was Article 636 New Code of Civil Procedure. The article states that European enforceable titles for which the exequatur procedure is not required are immediately enforceable in Romania without any preliminary formality.

The legislative change for these two European procedures came in July 2020. A law – Law No 132 of 15 July 2020 – was adopted by the Parliament. The law amended one more time the Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 regarding certain measures necessary for the application of some Community Regulation after the date of accession of Romania to the European Union and the Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees. Two new articles were added to facilitate the application of the EOP and ESCP Regulation in Romania – Articles I9 and I10 (see Statement of Reasons). As for the EAPO Regulation, these articles address only some of the elements that require coordination between the European rules and national legislation, namely: the requirements of Article 29(1)(a)-(b) EOP Regulation and Article 25(1)(a), (c) and (g) ESCP Regulation

For the EOP, the jurisdiction will rest with the courts that would be competent to handle the claims on the merits at first instance (Article 1 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006). These would be either the district courts (judecătorii) or the general courts (tribunale). The district courts have competence for claims up to 200.000 RON (approx. 42.000 euros). The claims above this threshold will be handled by the general court as first instance court.

Any review request in the framework of the EOP Regulation will be examined by the same court that issued the EOP but in a panel of two judges (Article 2 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006). Although this legislative step clarifies some organisational aspects of the review proceeding, it does not solve how the review should be handled based on various national means (see here also). The national procedures according to which the review should be handled are broader in scope than the provisions of Article 20 EOP Regulation and require some legal knowledge. This keeps the proceeding rather complex for a first-time user with little legal training.

With regard to the ESCP, the Romanian courts competent to issue the ESCP judgment are the district courts (judecătoriile) according to Article 2(1) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006. The ESCP judgment will be subject only to appeal before the competent general court (tribunal) and will have to be filed within 30 days from the moment the judgment was communicated to the party (Article 2(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Article 17 ESCP Regulation).

A request for review – as for the EOP procedure – will rest with the court that issued the ESCP judgment. However, unlike for the EOP, the provisions related to the ESCP do not expressly indicate that the review will be handled by a panel of judges. This difference in the drafting of the legal text is regrettable as it gives rise to potential confusions and interpretations per a contrario given the special nature of the rules.

Both EOP and ESCP provisions related to the competent courts to receive the application forms do not change the practice of the Romanian courts but confirm the already existing interpretation followed by practitioners.

For court fees, the Romanian legislator opted for a fixed court fee as for similar national procedures (ordonanţa de plată and procedura cu privire la cererile de valoare redusă). Hence, an application for an EOP will cost the applicant 200 RON (approx. 41 euros) (Article 6(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees). While the ESCP claims will vary between 50 RON (approx. 10,5 euros) for claims below 2.000 RON (or their equivalent) and 200 RON (approx. 41 euros) for claims above this threshold (Article 6(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013). The procedure following opposition to an EOP and review requests will involve an additional fixed fee of 100 RON (approx. 21 euros) (Article 6(21) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees. This legislative action is welcomed as it puts an end to the different approaches followed by Romania courts. These varied between a fixed cost identical to the equivalent national procedures and a court fee based on the value of the claim submitted.

The most important legislative development related to the application of the ESCP concerns the implementation of specific provisions regarding the assistance to the provided to the parties (Article 11 ESCP Regulation).

According to Article 1 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006, practical assistance for filling in the Claim Form (Form A) will be provided by the lawyers designated for this purpose by each local Bar Association for periods of three months (on a rotation basis). The list of lawyers to provide legal assistance and their contact details will be published online by the Union of National Bar Associations in Romania and each local Bar Association. This list is also to be communicated to each district court for publication at its premises as well as online on the website of the Romanian Courts. Finding the necessary details will remain certainly more challenging for foreign users as the information on the websites is generally available only in Romanian.

The costs for this assistance will be fixed based on a protocol of understanding establishing the representation fees for ex officio legal representation. No fee will have to be paid by the party receiving assistance in accordance with Article 11 ESCP Regulation. Although a welcomed legislative clarification such lists do not appear to have been published for the time being with the indicated national websites or their whereabouts are not easy to spot (even for a legally trained subject). Given that the legislative changes were only introduced four months ago, practical application and technical adjustments may take some time to be calibrated by the local Bar Associations and district courts.

These legislative steps undertaken by the Romanian authorities are certainly a good development for facilitating the interaction between the European and national procedural rules and the application of the EOP, ESCP, and EAPO. Domestic rules have an important influence on the manner in which the European procedures are applied and represent a key prerequisite for certainty, visibility of the procedures, and their subsequent success.

On 16 November 2020, the JURI Committee of the European Parliament will vote on the draft recommendations for second reading on the proposed directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, the proposed regulation amending Regulation No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, and the proposed regulation amending Regulation No 1393/2007 on the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters.

During the afternoon session, the JURI Committee will hold a Workshop on ”The 40th Anniversary of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction”, in the presence of the EP Coordinator of Children’s’ Rights, Ms Ewa Kopacz.

The workshop will mark the 40th anniversary of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and is aimed at examining assessing the success and importance of the Convention in ensuring the prompt return and thus the best interests of the abducted children. Against this background, the workshop will bring together Members of the European Parliament and a number of experts, practitioners and academics with a view to presenting the functioning of the Convention from the child’s rights dimension and pointing out ongoing issues with its implementation. The programme and two in-depth analysis on the topic can be downloaded here.

Both the voting and the workshop will be webstreamed.

On few occasions Polish tax authorities made references to the EU Succession Regulation and applied foreign law designated by its provisions, even though revenue and other administrative matters are explicitly excluded from its scope. This post presents shortly the inheritance taxation rules in Poland, explains why tax authorities felt the need to look into foreign succession laws for tax purposes and how the content of foreign law was ascertained.

Exclusion of Taxes from the scope of the EU Succession Regulation

The EU Succession Regulations states in its Article 1(1) that it does not apply to revenue, customs or administrative matters. Recital 10 makes reference to taxes in particular. It explains that it is for national law to determine how taxes are calculated and paid. The question is how to proceed if national tax law makes a direct reference to succession law concepts.

It might be reminded that inheritance taxes in Member States were once subject to an EU-sponsored study (which might be consulted here).

Inheritance Taxation in Poland

Inheritance taxation in Poland is regulated by a separate statute (available here – in Polish only). It provides that the acquisition of goods located in Poland and rights exercised in Poland by an individual as a result of inter alia succession is subject to taxation. Acquisition of goods located abroad or rights exercised abroad is subject to taxation, provided that at the moment of opening of the succession the beneficiary was a Polish national or had habitual residence in Poland. The acquisition of ownership of movable property located in Poland or rights exercised in Poland is not subject to taxation, provided that neither the beneficiary, nor deceased were Polish nationals and had habitual residence in Poland.

There are numerous exemptions from inheritance tax, including the one for the closest family members. The beneficiary is the taxpayer. The tax point arises at the moment of the acceptance of the succession. If the acquisition was not reported to tax authorities the tax point (re)arises at the moment when a document in writing is produced. If it is a court decision the tax point arises at the moment the decision becomes final. The tax base is the net worth of the estate calculated in the prescribed manner. The tax due depends on the degree of affinity or kinship between the deceased and beneficiary and varies between 3% to 20% of the tax base exceeding certain thresholds. Taxpayers are obliged to file a tax return, based on which tax authorities issue a decision indicating tax to be paid.

Tax Point Linked to the Acceptance of the Succession

As mentioned above, the tax point with respect to succession arises at the moment of its acceptance. This clearly refers to the acceptance of the succession, an institution known in the substantive succession law regulated by the Polish Civil Code (here). It states that an heir acquires the estate at the moment of the opening of the succession. Nevertheless, the heir may accept the estate without limitation of liability for debts, with limitation of that liability or may renounce the succession. The time limit for such statement is six months counting from the moment when an hair have learned about his/her title of acquisition.

It is simple to indicate a tax point for inheritance taxation in a purely domestic case. However, inheritance taxation comes into play also in cases which are less intensively connected to Poland. For example, acquisition of an immovable property located in Poland is taxed, even if both the deceased and the beneficiary are foreign nationals with habitual residence abroad. In those cases, in accordance with the EU Succession Regulation, succession is governed by foreign law. The doubt as to the tax point might occur in instances when lex successionis does not know the concept of an acceptance of succession.

Acceptance of Succession when Foreign Law is Applicable

While assessing the tax point tax authorities stated that the concept of an acceptance of succession used for tax purposes must take into account the law applicable to civil law aspects of the particular case. This law should be designated in accordance with the EU Succession Regulation.

In the recent tax ruling of 27 August 2020 (signature: 0111-KDIB2-3.4015.112.2020.1.AD) the tax authority analysed English law (as the deceased was habitually resident in the UK). It was explained that in the UK succession case is dealt with differently than in Poland. It is an appointed executor, who is responsible for assessing the value of the estate, payment of debts and payment of inheritance taxes in the UK. The executor is responsible also for sending documents to the probate court. Once the decision of the probate court is delivered, the estate might be transferred to heirs. As a result a final decision of the probate court may be perceived as an equivalent to the acceptance of succession. In an earlier tax ruling of 31 December 2019 (signature: 0111-KDIB4.4015.114.2019.2.MD) the tax authority analysed US succession procedure and also stated that the decision of the court is conclusive for tax purposes in Poland.

Please note that the above are not decisions in particular tax proceedings, but tax rulings, which only interpret the law on the taxpayer’s application and are issued based on information and explanations provided by the taxpayer. Hence, while issuing a tax rulings tax authorities are not establishing the content of foreign law. Tax rulings may be found by their signatures in the public database (accessible here – in Polish only).

Ascertainment of the Content of Foreign Law

In the tax proceeding concerning succession governed by Australian law tax authorities went even further and lined the tax point to the actual transfer of funds from Australia to Poland. The taxpayer was arguing that the tax point have arisen earlier, at the moment of the opening of succession (as the foreign exchange rate used for calculating tax due was more favourable at that time). The decision resulted in a dispute and the tax decision was appealed to the administrative court. The court in its judgement of 26 June 2018 (signature: I SA/Wr 164/18; it may be found by its signature in the public database here – in Polish) set aside the tax decision due to procedural faults, in particular when it comes to ascertainment of the content of foreign law.

The court stated that it is not enough that the tax authorities have asked Polish Consulate in Sidney for information on Australian law and that the decision has indicated provisions of the South Australia Administration and Probate Act 1919 as the basis for conclusions. The court suggested that indeed the tax point arose earlier than at the moment of the bank transfer, but in order to indicate this moment a careful analysis of Australian succession law must be made. For this purpose tax authorities should ask Ministry of Finance for guidance, which might in turn, within the framework of legal aid procedure, contact Australian tax authorities. Australian succession law should be applied as it would be applied by Australian tax authorities in similar cases. Also an expert witness may be appointed.

The above shows the relevance of private international law for the work of administrative authorities, influence of lex successions designated by the EU Succession Regulation on tax matters, but also reveals that tax authorities are not necessarily competent to proceed with the ascertainment of the content of foreign law.

It is widely known that disputes related to sports are most of the times referred to arbitration. Football is of course in the forefront. Usually cases referred to either the CAS or the FIFA Dispute Boards lead to an award. Not so in the case at hand. As a result, the creditor was left with the sole option, i.e. to return civil litigation. However, the road was not paved with roses…

1. The facts

The Appellant, a resident of the Netherlands, is a professional football player’s agent of Dutch nationality, licensed by the Royal Dutch Football Association. The Respondent is a Greek football société anonyme, which runs a professional football team participating in the Greek Super League. The Club is affiliated with the Hellenic Football Federation (the “HFF”), which in turn is a member of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”). It has its seat in Thessaloniki, Greece.

In May 2012, the Appellant represented the professional football coach D. and three coach assistants as their agent in the contractual negotiations with the Respondent. In this context, the Parties signed a Private Agreement setting out, in essence, the terms and conditions on which the Respondent should pay the Appellant for his services in facilitating the signing of the contracts between the Respondent and the Coach, and the Assistant Coaches.

The Agreement stated, inter alia, the following: ‘the parties also expressly agree that the competent Committee of FIFA will have jurisdiction to decide for any and all disputes that might arise from or in relation to the present agreement and that the FIFA Regulations will apply to any such dispute’.

Owed to a negative result, the Team lost its chance to qualify for the Greek cup final. As a consequence, a clash was provoked between the Team and the Coach, which resulted in the discontinuation of their cooperation, and the non-payment of the second tranche to the Agent by the Team.

Stage A: FIFA

On September 2014, the Appellant filed his claim with FIFA, claiming the Respondent’s payment of 70.000 € in accordance with the Agreement. FIFA informed the Appellant of the following:

We would like to draw your attention again to art. 1 of the Players’ Agents Regulations, which stipulates that “These regulations govern the occupation of players’ agents who introduce players to clubs with a view to negotiating or renegotiating an employment contract or introduce two clubs to one another with a view to concluding a transfer agreement within one association or from one association to another”. Moreover, art. 1 par. 2 of the Regulations stats that “The application of the regulations is strictly limited to players’ agents activities described in the paragraph above”. In light of the aforementioned and by way of clarification, it would rather appear that your claim lacks legal basis, since the services provided by you and which are object to your claim i.e. providing services on behalf of the coaching staff are outside the scope of the abovementioned provisions’.

Stage B: CAS

On December 2014, the Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport. He sought, inter alia, to: (1) set aside the decision issued on by the FIFA; (2) issue a (new) decision condemning Respondent to pay Appellant an amount of 70.000 € on outstanding commissions.

The Sole Arbitrator noted that Article R47 of the CAS Code states as follows: ‘An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with CAS if the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or if the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has exhausted the legal remedies available to it prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of that body’.

Based on the foregoing, the Sole Arbitrator stated that it is undisputed that the CAS has jurisdiction to hear appeal cases only under the condition that a ‘decision’ has been rendered, in which connection the Appellant argued that the FIFA Letter satisfies the requirement for constituting a ‘decision’, whereas the Respondent denied that this is the case.

The Appellant did not deny the accuracy of FIFA’s (alleged) decision regarding lack of jurisdiction and did not really want to have this issue verified by the CAS. As stated in the appeal that he rather sought ‘an award on the basis of the merits and essentials of the case here presented, despite the fact that the appealed decision did not entail an elaboration on the essential content of the dispute’.

The Arbitrator regarded the appeal as an attempt to circumvent FIFA’s lack of jurisdiction – which was not contested by the Parties – and, in this manner, to make the CAS, as an appeals body, hear and decide on the substantive aspects of the dispute, notwithstanding that FIFA, as the first-instance body chosen by the Appellant, did not consider itself to have jurisdiction. Since it neither is, nor should be possible to circumvent a first-instance judicial body’s undisputed lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide on a substantive issue by merely attempting to refer such a decision to the CAS through a more or less fictitious appeal, the Sole Arbitrator ruled that the CAS had no jurisdiction to hear the ‘appeal’. In addition, the Arbitrator stated that an appeal to the CAS filed under the rules governing appeal proceedings set out in the Code therefore cannot merely be ‘transformed’ into a request for arbitration.

Based on the above, the Sole Arbitrator found that the CAS did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the present dispute.

Stage C: Swiss Supreme Court

In accordance with the CAS Statutes, the agent challenged the CAS ruling before the Swiss Supreme Court. However, the latter did not render a ruling, because the agent requested discontinuance of the proceedings. Hence, the CAS decision became final and conclusive.

Stage D: Thessaloniki Court of 1st Instance

As a consequence, the agent returned to the path of ordinary civil and commercial court jurisdiction. He filed a claim before the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance. The team challenged the jurisdiction of Greek courts, invoking the arbitration clause stipulated in the agreement. In a rather superficial fashion, the Thessaloniki court ordered the stay of proceedings, and referred the case to the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber. The agent lodged an appeal.

2. The Ruling of the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal of 7 May 2020

The Thessaloniki Court of Appeal quashed the first instance judgment by applying domestic rules of arbitration. It considered that, under the circumstances above, the arbitration clause has lost its validity.

In addition, it dismissed a fresh plea by the Team, by virtue of which the dispute should be tried by the Financial Dispute Resolution Committee of the Hellenic Football Federation (HFF). The court invoked Article 1 Para 3 of the HFF Football Agents Statutes, which has a similar wording to that of Art. 1 of FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations (see above under I).

As a next line of defence, the Team pleaded a set off the claim by way of defence with respect to two costs orders issued against the agent by the CAS and the Swiss Supreme Court respectively. The Thessaloniki CoA dismissed the defence, stating that a set off is not possible, because the orders were not declared enforceable in Greece. Following the above, the court examined the case on the merits, applying Greek law. It recognized that the Team ought to compensate the Agent in full satisfaction of the claim.

3. Remarks

Notwithstanding that, in light of the evidence produced, the outcome of the judgment was correct, the court started and finished its examination by omitting any reference to provisions of International Commercial Arbitration and Private International Law. This proves yet another time that courts prefer to stick to their national comfort space, defying any international rules applicable in Greece by virtue of ratification or direct application.

In particular, the court failed to refer to the rules of the 1999 Greek law on International Commercial Arbitration, i.e. the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration, although the case was falling under its scope.  In addition, the reasoning concerning the costs orders is not free of doubt: Incidental recognition of foreign judgments is regulated under the Lugano Convention; hence, the Swiss Supreme Court costs order should have been taken into account. Things are a bit complicated in regards to the CAS costs order. Incidental recognition of foreign arbitral awards is not regulated in the 1958 New York Convention. However, Article III of the Convention states that ‘Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon’. Article 903 Greek Code of Civil Procedure states that a foreign arbitral award is recognized automatically, if the requirements set for recognition are met. Hence, incidental recognition of the CAS costs order was also possible.

Finally, bearing in mind the cross-border nature of the dispute, the court could have examined the issue of applicable law under the scope of the Rome I Regulation. In fact, Article 4(1)(b) provides that, in similar cases, the law applicable is the law of the country of the habitual residence of the service provider. However, it appears that both litigants referred to provisions of Greek law in their briefs. Hence, the court considered that the parties tacitly agreed for the application of domestic law.

On 10 August 2020, the European Commission launched a public consultation on Regulation 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (“the EEO Regulation”).

The consultation is carried out in the framework of an ongoing evaluation of the EEO Regulation.

In this context, the European Commission “seeks opinions on how the Regulation is working, also with regard to the revised Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 1215/2012). It also aims to collect practical experiences with the EEO Regulation, and attitudes towards its use in the future”.

The consultation is open until 20 November 2020 (midnight Brussels time) and can be found here.

On 14 July 2020, Austria ratified the 1965 Hague Service Convention. The Convention is set to enter into force for Austria on 12 September 2020. All EU Member States will then be be bound by the Convention. In practice, the latter will apply in  the relationship between the (Members States of the) EU, one the one hand, and some fifty more States worldwide, on the other.

The Austrian ratification comes more than four years after the Council of the European Union issued a decision authorising Austria to sign and ratify, and Malta to accede to, the Convention ‘in the interest of the European Union’.

The Council decision reflects the fact that, as stated in the preamble, the Union ‘has external competence with regard to the Convention in so far as its provisions affect the rules laid down in certain provisions of Union legislation or in so far as the accession of additional Member States to the Convention alters the scope of certain provisions of Union legislation’, such as Article 28(4) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Still, the Convention ‘does not allow for participation by regional economic integration organisations such as the Union’, meaning that, to make sure that the Convention is in force for all Member States, the Union had no other option but to authorise (and in fact request) the Member States that had not yet done so, to ratify – or accede to, depending on the circumstances – the Convention in the interest of the Union itself.

The Convention is already applicable to Malta as of 17 July 2018.

OIP[2]On 7 July 2020, the Members of the Committee on Legal Affairs will vote on the provisional agreement resulting from the interinstitutional negotiations on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers. The text is available here.

Here are some points of interest (and a few on-the-spot comments).

1. The resulting document will be a directive not intended to replace the enforcement mechanisms contained in previous legal acts listed in Annex I, among which the GDPR.

2. The Directive will cover both domestic and crossborder infringements, in particular when consumers affected by an infringement live in one or several Member States other than the Member State where the infringing trader is established.

3. As announced in the Commission’s proposal (referred to here), the Directive should not affect the application of nor establish rules on private international law regarding jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of judgments or applicable law (NoA: how long have academics and the CJEU, AGs included, been warning about the PIL rules being utterly inadequate for collective redress? Apparently not enough).

4. Qualified entities should be allowed to bring representatives actions in the Member State where they have been designated as well as in another Member State.

5. When a qualified entity brings a representative action in another Member State than the one of its designation, that action should be considered a cross-border action.

6. When a qualified entity brings a representative action in the Member State where it is designated, the action is considered a domestic representative action even if that action is brought against a trader domiciled in another Member State or even if consumers from several Member States are represented within that action. (NoA: if I am understanding this correctly, the action against a trader domiciled in another Member State is domestic for the purposes of the Directive, although from a PIL perspective it is definitely not domestic).

7. Principle of origin: for the purpose of cross-border representative actions, qualified entities should comply with the same criteria across the Union. It should be for the designating Member State to ensure that the qualified entity designated for the purpose of cross-border representative actions fulfils the criteria, to assess whether it continues to comply with them and, if necessary, to revoke the designation of the qualified entity.

8. Legal standing: Member States should ensure that cross-border representative actions can be brought in their courts (or administrative authorities) by qualified entities designated for the purpose of such representative actions in another Member State.

9. Qualified entities from different Member States should be able to join forces within a single representative action in front of a single forum, subject to relevant rules on competent jurisdiction (NoA: usually who the claimant is has no impact on jurisdiction, so the caveat has to refer to something different. In any event, is this a lost opportunity to reflect on extended rules for related claims?).

10. The mutual recognition of the legal standing of qualified entities designated for the purpose of cross-border representative actions should be ensured

11. When bringing a representative action, the qualified entity should provide sufficient information on the consumers concerned by the action to the court or the administrative authority. The information should allow the court (or the administrative authority) to establish its jurisdiction and the applicable law.

12. Cooperation and exchange of information between qualified entities from different Member States have proven to be useful in addressing in particular cross-border infringements (NoA: has it?). There is a need for continuing and expanding the capacity-building and cooperation measures to a larger number of qualified entities across the Union in order to increase the us representative actions with cross-border implications.

13. The Commission should draw up a report, accompanied if appropriate by a relevant proposal, assessing whether cross-border representative actions could be best addressed at Union level by establishing an European Ombudsman for collective redress (NoA: not sure what his/her role would be).

The Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament reached on 30 June 2020 a provisional agreement on the modernisation of Regulation 1206/2001 on the taking of evidence abroad, and Regulation 1393/2007 on the service of judicial and extra-judicial documents (see here and here for contributions appeared on this blog regarding the reform).

The provisional agreement now needs to be submitted for endorsement by Member States’ representatives.

The purpose of the amendments under discussion is, generally, to improve the efficiency and speed of cross-border judicial proceedings by taking advantage of digitalisation and the use of modern technology, and by these means advance access to justice and fair trial for the parties.

Changes include the mandatory use of an electronic decentralised IT system, composed of interconnected national IT systems, for the transmission of documents and requests between Member States. The new regulations will also task the Commission with the creation, maintenance and future development of a reference software which Member States can choose to apply as their back end system, instead of a nationally-developed IT system.

As to the service of documents, the envisaged new rules provide that documents can be served electronically and directly on an addressee with a known address in another Member State, when his or her express consent is given in advance. The service can be performed through qualified electronic registered delivery services or, under additional conditions, by e-mail.

The new rules also aim to promote the use of videoconferencing or other distance communication technology in the taking of evidence.

On 22 June 2020, Parliament and Council negotiators reached a deal on the first EU-wide rules on collective redress.

The new rules introduce a harmonised model for representative action in all member states that guarantees consumers are well protected against mass harm, while at the same time ensuring appropriate safeguards from abusive lawsuits. The new law also aims to make the internal market function better by improving tools to stop illegal practices and facilitating access to justice for consumers.

Background

The Representative Action Directive is a part of the New Deal for Consumers, launched in April 2018 by the European Commission, to ensure stronger consumer protection in the EU. It includes stronger consumer rights online, tools to enforce rights and compensation, penalties for violating EU consumer law and improved business conditions.

The Agreement

The main elements of the agreement are as follows.

1. Each Member State will name at least one qualified entity (an organisation or a public body) that will be empowered and financially supported to launch actions for injunction and redress on behalf of groups of consumers and will guarantee consumers’ access to justice.

2. On designation criteria for qualified entities, the rules distinguish between cross-border cases and domestic ones. For the former, entities must comply with a set of harmonised criteria. They have to demonstrate 12 months of activity in protecting consumers’ interest prior to their request to be appointed as a qualified entity, have a non-profit character and ensure they are independent from third parties whose economic interests oppose the consumer interest;

3. For domestic actions, member states will set out proper criteria consistent with the objectives of the directive, which could be the same as those set out for cross-border actions.

4. The rules strike a balance between access to justice and protecting businesses from abusive lawsuits through the Parliament’s introduction of the “loser pays principle”, which ensures that the defeated party pays the costs of the proceedings of the successful party-

5. To further avoid abusive lawsuits, Parliament negotiators also insisted that courts or administrative authorities may decide to dismiss manifestly unfounded cases at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings in accordance with national law.

6. Negotiators agreed that the Commission should assess whether to establish a European Ombudsman for collective redress to deal with cross-border representative actions at Union level.

7.  The scope of collective action would include trader violations in areas such as data protection, financial services, travel and tourism, energy, telecommunications, environment and health, as well as air and train passenger rights, in addition to general consumer law.

Next steps

Parliament as a whole and the Council will now have to approve the political agreement. The directive will enter into force 20 days following its publication in the Official Journal of the EU. Member states will then have 24 months to transpose the directive into their national laws, and an additional six months to apply it.

Click here to access the procedure file.

European_CommissionOn 26 May 2020, the European Commission launched a public consultation on cross-border investment within the EU.

Why this initiative?

First, the Commission is currently working on a new regulatory framework for intra-EU investments in order to make the internal market more attractive for foreign investors. The main objective of the future legislation will be to better protect and facilitate cross-border investments (see communication COM/2020/102, A New Industrial Strategy for Europe).

Second, following the Achmea judgment of the European Court of Justice (Case C-284/16), an agreement for the termination of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties has recently been adopted by a broad majority of Member States. At the same time, many investors but also arbitration practitioners have raised concerns because of this brutal change in the regulatory framework. They principally  invoke the loss of effective enforcement of their rights within the EU.

The main topics of the consultation are as follows: the first section contains some general questions aimed at gaining inputs on respondents’ familiarity with cross-border investments and linked issues; the second seeks feedback from stakeholders on rules to protect intra-EU investments; the third invites views on enforcement of intra-EU investment protection rules, including dispute resolution mechanisms and remedies when issues related to cross-border investments arise; the fourth section contains some general questions to assess the overall EU investment protection framework (as presented in section two and three); the fifth section seeks views of stakeholders on measures to facilitate and promote cross-border investment.

The consultation is open until 8 September 2020 and can be found here.

In May 2018, the European Commission published a proposal for a Regulation amending the 2001 Evidence Regulation. The name of the proposal immediately clarifies the lack of ambition of the project: the intention is to amend the existing text, not to recast it.

The Commission Proposal

The Proposal aims at improving the 2001 Regulation by: using electronic transmission as the default channel for electronic communication and document exchanges; promoting modern means of taking evidence such as videoconferencing and incentives (via the financing of national projects) for Member States to equip courts with videoconferencing facilities; removing legal barriers to the acceptance of electronic (digital) evidence; tackling divergent interpretations of the term ‘court’;  communicating the importance of the uniform standards provided by the Regulation (streamlined procedures, equal standard of protection of the right of the parties involved); best practices for competent courts, to help them apply the procedures properly and without delay; and raising courts’ and legal professionals’ awareness of the availability of the direct channel of taking evidence under the Regulation.

On 13 February 2019, the European Parliament adopted its first-reading position on the proposal, with 37 amendments to the text of the Commission.

On 29 November 2019, the Council of the European Union adopted a general approach of the text.

The main purpose of the proposal is to improve transmission of requests and communication by using modern communication technology. There is no doubt that this is an important concern. Yet, the operation of the Evidence Regulation arguably raises much more important issues.

The Optional Regulation

The Evidence Regulation should further European integration by facilitating and expediting the taking of evidence in other Member States.

Instead, it is the experience of many European practitioners that the Regulation does just the opposite. It creates obstacles, and slows down the taking of evidence abroad. The reason is simple: the Regulation requires the intervention of authorities in the requested state as a preliminary step to the taking of evidence abroad. The most liberal provision in this respect is Article 17, which introduced “Direct taking of evidence by the requesting court” in other Member States. But even under Article 17, it is necessary to “submit a request to the central body or the competent authority” of the requested state.

The European Union has abolished the exequatur procedure for judgments rendered in civil and commercial matters. Under the Brussels II bis Regulation, decisions on the return of a child are immediately enforceable and may not be challenged in the requested state, even for alleged violations of human rights. But the taking of evidence abroad is still subject to a preliminary procedure. The system completely lags behind.

In Lippens and ProRail, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressed the issue by ruling that the application of the Evidence Regulation was not mandatory, and that Member States could simply ignore it and take evidence abroad under their own procedures, without seeking any kind of approval from the requested state. In particular, the CJEU ruled in ProRail:

43. (…) it must be recalled that, according to recitals 2, 7, 8, 10 and 11 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001, the aim of the regulation is to make the taking of evidence in a cross-border context simple, effective and rapid. The taking of evidence, by a court of one Member State in another Member State must not lead to the lengthening of national proceedings. (…)

45. An interpretation of Articles 1(1)(b) and 17 of Regulation No 1206/2001 according to which the court of a Member State is obliged, for any expert investigation which must be carried out directly in another Member State, to take evidence according to the method laid down by those articles would not be consistent with those objectives. In certain circumstances, it may be simpler, more effective and quicker for the court ordering such an investigation, to take such evidence without having recourse to the regulation. 

The CJEU however reserved cases where the taking of evidence would affect the powers of the requested Member State.

The Proposal of the Commission does not address the optional character of the Regulation. This means that the future amended Regulation will remain an optional instrument that the courts of the Member States are free to (continue to) ignore.

Liberalizing the Taking of Evidence in Other Member States

The most important issue that the Proposal does not tackle, however, is that of the obstacles that the Regulation creates in the taking of evidence abroad, and that litigants avoid by resorting to national law.

During the legislative process which lead to the adoption of the initial Evidence Regulation, Germany had proposed to fully liberalize the operation of judicial experts in other Members States. Under this exception, courts could appoint a judicial expert to carry out his mission in other Member States without any need for a preliminary procedure in the requested state. The exception was eventually not adopted. However, this is exactly what the CJEU has allowed in ProRail, which was concerned with the operation of a judicial expert in another Member State.

The reform of the Evidence Regulation was thus the perfect opportunity to reconsider the issue. A much more ambitious reform would have attempted to identify cases where the taking of evidence abroad could be liberalized by abolishing any preliminary procedure, and cases where some kind of involvement of the requested state would still appear to be justified.

Instead, the European lawmaker is about to ignore the problem and, by doing so, to generate considerable uncertainty.

Disclosure: the author was a member of the expert group established by the European Commission for the purpose of drafting the Proposal of the Commission.

On 29 November 2019, the Council of the European Union adopted a general approach regarding the recast of Regulation 1393/2007 on the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents abroad. On 7 February a new Council document was published, featuring the Annexes of the future Recast Regulation.

The new Regulation, which will likely be adopted in the Summer or Autumn of 2020, is not expected to bring about major changes to the current legal landscape.

A comparison is provided below between some key features of the Commission’s proposal of 31 May 2018, on the one hand, and the corresponding solutions envisaged in the compromise text elaborated by the Council, on the other.

1. The Commission proposed to clarify by an additional paragraph in Article 1 that the Regulation does not apply “to service of a document on the party’s authorised representative in the Member State where the proceedings are taking place regardless of the place of residence of that party”, thereby moving to the body of the Regulation what was already stated in Recital 8 of the 2007 Regulation. Concurrently, the Commission envisaged to introduce a new provision – Article 7a – requiring the recipient to appoint a representative for the purpose of service in the forum State for all documents following the one introducing proceedings. The Council took the view that both innovations should be dropped.

2. The Commission Proposal aimed to enhance electronic communication between Transmitting and Receiving Authorities, suggesting the establishment of national IT systems (Article 3a). This provision was partially amended, following the concerns of national delegations with respect to the sustainability of a decentralized mechanism.

3. The Proposal introduced a new provision, aiming at a more active assistance of Member States authorities towards a smoother and more efficient search of the whereabouts of the defendant (Article 3c). The provision underwent minor amendments by the Council.

4. The Proposal added two paragraphs to Article 8. One was meant to extend the delay by which the recipient may refuse service, while the other intended to specify the duty of the court of the forum to examine whether the refusal was founded. The Council’s compromise text retained the former suggestion, while rejecting the latter.

5. The Proposal introduced two additional paragraphs in Article 14 on service by post, suggesting the use of a specific acknowledgment of receipt, and deeming postal service as validly effected when served to adult persons living in the same house with the recipient. The Council rejected the proposed amendments. With reference to Article 14, two additional points should be stressed: first, the wording of the provision has changed in a way that leads to the conclusion that postal service does not have to pass through transmitting authorities / court channels; second, postal service may be resorted to not only for persons domiciled, but also for those who are merely present in the country of destination.

6. The Commission Proposal attempted to pose an obligation to all Member States to provide information on professions or competent persons permitted to effect direct service. The Council deleted this part of the proposal almost in its entirety. The efforts of the Commission towards extending direct service in all Member States met with the adamant refusal of the Council.

7. The Proposal introduced a provision on electronic service (Article 15a). The Council adopted in principle the proposal as Article 14a, slightly modifying its wording. It also stated the obligation of Member States to specify the conditions under which electronic service will be accepted.

8. The Commission proposed two innovations on Article 19, regarding the situation where the defendant fails to enter an appearance: an additional tool of communication for the purposes of Article 19(2), i.e. sending an e-mail or a message to an address or an account known to the court seised, and a streamlined approach to the delay within which an application for relief must be filed with the court (2 years following the date of the judgment). Both proposals were discarded by the Council.

As a general conclusion, it may be stated that the innovative steps proposed by the Commission were met with reservation both by the European Parliament and the Council. What hopefully will improve is the cooperation between Member States authorities in the preliminary field of transmission. This will of course depend on the willingness and preparedness of Member States.

Regarding actual service of process, the situation remains the same. A divide among Member States will continue to exist in regards to direct service; e-service will heavily depend on the conditions set out by Member States; a unified approach regarding the term within which an application for relief was rejected; finally, the obligation of the claimant to serve everything abroad will continue to exist, save for the exceptions provided for by the Regulation (legal representative and unknown residence), confirmed by the CJEU in the Alder case.

On 10 February 2020, the European Commission announced its intention to open a process of consultation to get feedback from citizen and stakeholders on whether the EU should join the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters (the Hague Judgments Convention). 

In the words of the Commission, the EU has put in place a highly developed internal acquis for the cross-boder recognition and enforcement of judgments, as a necessary complement to its single market. By way of contrast, at the international level the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters has, until recently, not been successfully regulated, even if some bilateral agreements between States exist.

Currently, civil or commercial judgments rendered by courts in the European Union can be recognised and enforced in a third country only in a limited number of situations, namely: (i) based on the 2005 Choice of Court Convention, which has a limited scope; (ii) in Iceland, Norway and Switzerland based on the Lugano Convention; (iii) based on a limited number of bilateral treaties between individual Member States and third States; (iv) based on multilateral treaties related to particular matters; or (v) on the basis of the national law of third States, sometimes subject to reciprocity. 

The Commission believes that the adoption in July 2019 of the Hague Judgments Convention may change the situation just described. Moreover, it claims that a future proposal for EU accession to the Judgments Convention would be in line with the objectives set out in the Political Guidelines for the European Commission (2019-2024), in particular related to “An economy that works for people”.

The policy objectives of the EU accession to the Judgments Convention would be: to enhance access to justice for EU businesses and citizens through a system that facilitates the recognition and enforcement of judgments everywhere in the world where the debtor happens to have assets; to increase legal certainty for those involved in international trade and investment; to reduce costs for businesses and citizens involved in international dealings or in international dispute resolution; to allow the recognition and enforcement of third-country judgments in the EU only where fundamental principles of EU law are respected, such as for instance the right to a fair trial, and which do not affect the EU acquis related to the internal recognition and enforcement of judgments.

As for the policy options, the Commission puts forward the following:

Option 0: Baseline scenario: no policy change. The Union will thus not accede to the Judgments Convention and the current status quo will continue. However, given the EU’s active involvement in these negotiations and the fact that its results reflect EU’s policy interests, this scenario is taken into account mainly as a benchmark in order to assess the other options.

Option 1a: The Union will accede to the Judgments Convention without making any declaration.

Option 1b: The Union will accede to the Judgments Convention, excluding certain matters reflecting the EU’s policy objective of protecting weaker parties, such as consumers, employees or, in matters relating to insurance, the policyholder, the insured or the beneficiary, or/and certain matters falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of EU courts, for instance with regard to disputes relating to tenancies or commercial lease of immovable property.

Option 1c: The Union will accede to the Judgments Convention excluding State entities from the application of the Convention

Option 1d: A combination of options 1b and 1c

The Commission’s preliminary assessment of acceding to the Convention points to a positive outcome in economic terms, coupled with an improvement of growth and investment, thus of employment (the Commission acknowledges nontheless that as trade and investment of companies from outside the EU might also increase, some negative economic impacts in the short term cannot be excluded for EU competitors).

From the point of view of access to justice, signing the Convention would have postive implications as well. In terms of administrative burdens, the Commission is once again optimistic: although some Member States with a simple system for recognition and enforcement would face some negative impact if the new system based on the Judgments Convention is implemented, the Commission believes that such possible negative impacts would be offset by the important economic benefits.

The public consultation on the above-mentioned policy objectives and options, and on the likely impacts of signing the Convention, will be launched in March/April 2020 and run for a minimum period of 12 weeks. It will be available via the Commission’s central public consultations page; the questionnaires will be available in English, French and German but the replies can be made in any of the 24 official languages.

An in-depth Study on the Hague Judgements Convention Draft of November 2017, requested by the JURI Committee of the EU Parliament, to a large extent, still valid under the final version, can be downloaded here; it includes a chapter devoted to the relationship with the EU rules, and policy recommendations on the position of the EU vis-à-vis the Convention. A detailed explanation of the Convention as adopted is provided by A. Bonomi (Professor at the University of Laussane) and C. Mariottini (Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg) at the Yearbook of Private International Law, vol. 20 (2018/2019), pp. 537-567

According to a press release published on 9 January 2020, the MEPs can soon start negotiating the final shape that the legislation will take with Council. The Legal Affairs Committee confirmed the European Parliament’s negotiating position with 20 votes in favour and 2 abstentions.

The draft rules allow eligible entities, such as consumer organisations and certain independent bodies, to seek remedy, including compensation; enforce a high level of protection; and to represent the collective interest of consumers. Collective action would be authorised against trader violations, in domestic and cross-border cases, in areas such as data protection, financial services, travel and tourism, energy, telecommunications, environment and health.

The text approved by MEPs on 26 March 2019 also introduces the “loser pays principle”, which ensures that the losing party reimburses the winning party’s legal costs, to avoid abusive use of the new instrument. The proposed legislation reflects concerns raised by mass harm scandals with cross-border implications, e.g. Dieselgate and Ryanair.

The new rules would strengthen the right to access to justice by allowing consumers to join forces across borders and to jointly request that unlawful practices be stopped or prevented (injunction), or to obtain compensation for the harm caused (redress).

Background

On 11 April 2018, the Commission published a proposal for a new Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC.

The proposal follows the REFIT Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law, published on 23 May 2017, which showed that due to globalisation, the rise of cross-border trading and e-commerce, the risk of infringements affecting large numbers of consumers is increasing.

The proposal aims to modernise and replace Directive 2009/22/EC (the Injunctions Directive). In order to do so, it intends to:
(a) expand the scope of the injunctions system in order to cover other horizontal and sector-specific EU instruments relevant for the protection of collective interests of consumers in different economic sectors (such as financial services, energy, telecommunications, health, environment);
(b) lay down procedures for compensatory redress (currently, Member States must have in place only procedures for obtaining an order to stop or prohibit an infringement);
(c) modify the rules on qualified entities;
(d) make the procedure more efficient – Member States will have to ensure ‘due expediency’ of procedures and to avoid procedural costs becoming a financial obstacle to bringing representative actions;
(e) promote collective out-of-court settlements.

Within the European Parliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) with Geoffroy Didier as rapporteur. He submitted his draft report to the JURI Committee on 12 October 2018. The Committee adopted the report on 7 December. Parliament adopted its first-reading position on 25 March 2019.

The proposal was presented by the Commission to the Council on 22-24 April 2018. On 20 November 2019, the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) decided to submit a compromise text proposed by the Finnish Presidency to the Competitiveness Council of 28 November 2019, with a view to reaching a general approach. The text as agreed is available here.

Main Features

In what follows I offer a summary of the main points of the proposal from a private international law perspective. Some, like the definition of a “cross-border action”, are a little bit puzzling, to say the least. I leave nevertheless open the assessment of the impact of the Directive on domestic law and the relationship with the current European private international law rules. Prof. Stefaan Voet (Leuven University) has kindly accepted to address these points in a future post.

1. The Directive should cover both domestic and cross-border infringements, in particular when consumers concerned affected by an infringement live in one or several Member States other than the Member State where the infringing trader is established (Recital 8 and Article 2(1)).

2. This Directive should not affect the application of nor establish rules on private international law regarding jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of judgments or applicable law. The existing Union law instruments apply to the representative actions set out by this Directive (Recital 9 and Article 2(3)).

3. A qualified entity should be able to bring a representative action in the Member State where it has been designated as well as in another Member State. Building on Directive 2009/22/EC, the new Directive should make a distinction between these two types of representative actions. When a qualified entity brings a representative action in another Member State than the one of its designation, that action should be considered a cross-border action. When a qualified entity brings a representative action in the Member State where it is designated, it should be considered a domestic representative action even if that action is brought against a trader domiciled in another Member State or even if consumers from several Member States are represented within that action. Decisive for determining the type of the representative action should be the Member State in which the action is brought. For this reason, a domestic representative action could not become a cross-border one during the course of proceedings, or vice versa (Recital 9a and Article 3(4b)).

4. The right of a qualified entity to bring a cross-border representative action should be limited to the area of activity of that entity (Recital 10c and Article 4a).

5. Qualified entities designated on an ad hoc basis should not be allowed to bring cross-border representative actions (Recital 11a).

6. It should be for the designating Member State to ensure that the qualified entity designated for the purpose of cross-border representative actions fulfills the required conditions, to assess whether it continues to comply with them and, if necessary, to revoke the designation of the qualified entity (Recital 11b and Article 4.a – whereby Member States may designate as well public bodies as qualified entities for the purpose of cross-border representative actions.)

7. Qualified entities from different Member States should be able to join forces within a single representative action in front of a single forum, subject to relevant rules on competent jurisdiction. This should be without prejudice to the right of the court or administrative authority seized to examine whether the action is suitable to be heard as a single representative action (Recital 11d and Article 4b).

8. The mutual recognition of the legal capacity of qualified entities designated for the purpose of cross-border representative actions should be ensured. The identity of these organisations and public bodies should be communicated to the Commission and the Commission should make that list publicly available. Inclusion on the list should serve as proof of the legal capacity of the organisation or public body bringing the action. This should be without prejudice to the right to examine whether the purpose of the qualified entity justifies the action in a specific case (Recital 11e and Article 4a).

9. In order to prevent conflicts of interest, Member States should be able to set out rules according to which their courts or administrative authorities could examine whether a qualified entity bringing a cross-border representative action for redress is funded by a third party having an economic interest in the outcome of a specific cross-border representative action and, if this is the case, reject the legal capacity of the qualified entity for the purpose of that action (Recital 11e a and Article 4b).

10. The courts or administrative authorities should be able to assess the admissibility of a specific cross-border representative action in accordance with national law. In accordance with the principle of non-discrimination, the admissibility requirements applied to specific cross-border representative actions should not differ from those applied to specific domestic representative actions (Recital 11h and Article 4.b).

On 28 November 2019 the European Added Value Unit published a study accompanying the European Parliament’s legislative own-initiative report on Common minimum standards of civil procedure.

The summary reads as follows:

The European Added Value Assessment (EAVA) estimates whether and to what extent adoption of EU minimum standards of civil procedure could generate European added value. The European added value is quantified as a percentage reduction of the total cost of civil procedure. The total cost of civil procedure is estimated based on data on the number of civil and commercial proceedings in the EU-28 and the cost of litigation in the Member States. Based on this analysis, the EAVA estimates that introducing EU common minimum standards of civil procedure could reduce annual costs for citizens and businesses in the European Union by as much as € 4.7 to 7.9 billion per annum. The European added value could be potentially generated through reduction of fragmentation, simplification and filling gaps in the current EU procedural rules. Furthermore, EU common minimum standards would contribute towards building mutual trust between judicial authorities of different Member States. Increasing trust has the potential to enhance legal certainty and stability for citizens and businesses, further reduce uncertainty and delay costs.