Fifth Meeting of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions – Report (Part II)

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This post was written by Birgit van Houtert (Assistant Professor, Maastricht University) and Marco Pasqua (Examiner, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan), co-Chairs of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions as report of the Working Group’s fifth meeting. This post follows up on the report (Part I).


The fifth meeting of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions continued with the discussion aimed at identifying provisions or aspects of the draft or final national transposition measures of Directive (EU) 2024/1069 (‘Anti-SLAPP Directive’) that may raise concerns as to their compliance with the Anti-SLAPP Directive. The discussion, chaired by Birgit van Houtert and Marco Pasqua, built on the issues arising from the transposition measures for Croatia and Finland, which were examined during the respective presentations and subsequent exchange among the Working Group members – the report of this first part is available here. This second part of the report focuses on the issues arising from the transposition measures for Greece and Romania.

Greece

Chrisoula M. Michailidou (Dr. jur., Heidelberg, member of the Greek Drafting Committee on the Anti-SLAPP Directive transposition), Working Group member for Greece, presented the main features of the Greek transposition of the Anti-SLAPP Directive, focusing in particular on two provisions of Law 5326/2026: Article 5, which introduces a specific mechanism for the early dismissal of SLAPP claims, and Article 13, which inserts a new Article 40A into the Greek Code of Civil Procedure (GCCP), establishing a special jurisdictional basis for claims arising from abusive proceedings. Both provisions go beyond the minimum requirements of the Directive and illustrate the Greek legislator’s intention to strengthen the protection afforded to SLAPP targets, while also raising questions concerning their interaction with domestic procedural law and the EU framework on jurisdiction.

As already noted on this blog by Chrisoula M. Michailidou, as regards Article 5, the Greek legislation introduces a stand-alone procedure allowing the defendant in a SLAPP case to request the early dismissal of the action as manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded. The mechanism is characterised by a particularly tight procedural timetable. Within 30 days of service of the action, the defendant must file an application with the court and serve it on the claimant, setting out the grounds for dismissal and submitting the supporting evidence. The claimant has a further 30 days from service of the application to contest its admissibility and merits and submit evidence in support of their position.

Within 10 days after the expiry of the defendant’s deadline, the President of the three-member Administrative Council of the Court of First Instance sets the hearing date and designates the judge or, where the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Multi-Member Court of First Instance, determines the composition of the court. The hearing must take place no later than one month after its scheduling, and the parties must be summoned at least 20 days in advance. No adjournment is permitted. The court must decide on the application within 30 days of the hearing, exclusively on the basis of the evidence submitted by the parties. Neither witnesses nor the parties may be examined, and expert evidence cannot be taken at this stage.

A particularly noteworthy feature is that the application for early dismissal does not suspend the main proceedings. Rather, the original hearing date remains in place, with the result that the screening mechanism and the main action proceed in parallel. The former is designed to be concluded first, without requiring a stay of the latter. If the application is granted, the court issues a final judgment dismissing the action as manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded. If it is rejected, the proceedings continue under the applicable procedural framework, although subject to specific and shortened deadlines for the submission of pleadings and supplementary submissions.

Chrisoula M. Michailidou identified three issues of particular interest for comparative discussion.

The first concerns the standard for early dismissal. Whereas Article 11 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive refers to claims that are manifestly unfounded, Article 5 of the Greek law also allows dismissal on the ground of manifest inadmissibility. This constitutes an extension of the protection afforded to defendants. However, a dismissal on procedural grounds, such as lack of standing, does not necessarily have res judicata effect on the merits and may therefore leave the claimant free to bring the action again. This raises the question whether dismissing a SLAPP as manifestly inadmissible effectively brings the abusive proceedings to an end or merely postpones them.

The second issue relates to the evidentiary framework, which is particularly restrictive since the court decides exclusively on documentary evidence, without hearing witnesses, examining the parties or ordering expert evidence. This is especially significant in light of Article 7(1) of the Anti-SLAPP Directive, which places the burden of proof on the claimant. In defamation proceedings, for instance, the truthfulness of the statements at issue may depend on witness testimony or other forms of oral evidence that cannot be considered at the screening stage. Consequently, the requirement that the claim be manifestly unfounded becomes particularly important in ensuring that the early dismissal mechanism does not unduly interfere with the claimant’s right of access to court under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The presentation also raised the question whether other Member States allow oral evidence to be taken during the early dismissal procedure.

The third issue concerns the procedural consequences of the court’s decision. If the application is granted, the action is dismissed by a final judgment, which may be appealed and must be heard as a matter of priority. If it is rejected, the main proceedings continue under shortened deadlines. Furthermore, the 30-day period within which the defendant must apply for early dismissal is preclusive. Once that period has elapsed, the defendant can no longer rely on this specific mechanism and must instead invoke the abusive nature of the proceedings as a defence under Article 6 of the Greek law in the ordinary proceedings.

The second provision discussed by Chrisoula M. Michailidou was Article 13 of Law No. 5326/2026, which introduces a new Article 40A into the GCCP. The provision allows a natural or legal person residing or established in Greece, respectively, who has been subjected to abusive proceedings brought before a domestic or foreign court with the intention of discouraging public participation, to seek compensation for the resulting damage and expenses before the courts of their own residence or seat.

The new provision goes significantly beyond Article 17 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive. The latter establishes a home forum for defendants domiciled in the European Union who have been subjected to abusive proceedings before a third-country court by a claimant domiciled outside the Union. Article 40A, by contrast, is not subject to either of these limitations: it applies irrespective of the domicile of the SLAPP claimant and irrespective of whether the abusive proceedings were brought before a domestic or a foreign court. It thus provides a general jurisdictional basis for SLAPP targets residing or established in Greece to seek compensation before Greek courts. The underlying rationale is to ensure that access to this remedy does not depend on where the SLAPP claimant is domiciled.

This broad formulation nevertheless raises important questions concerning its compatibility with the jurisdictional framework established by the Brussels I bis Regulation. The issue, previously discussed by Chrisoula M. Michailidou and Marco Pasqua in the contribution to the EAPIL blog, concerns a situation in which the defendant in the subsequent SLAPP-back proceedings is domiciled in another EU Member State, for instance Italy.

On a literal reading, Article 40A could be understood as establishing an exorbitant ground of jurisdiction, comparable to the forum bonorum provided for under Article 40 GCCP. However, under Articles 5 and 6 of Brussels I bis, national rules on jurisdiction apply only where the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State. Consequently, where the defendant in the SLAPP-back proceedings is domiciled in another Member State, Article 40A cannot operate as an autonomous ground of international jurisdiction. This outcome may be achieved either through a teleological reduction of the provision or by setting it aside insofar as its application would conflict with the Regulation.

The practical significance of this potential conflict is nevertheless mitigated by Article 7(2) of Brussels I bis. Where the damage occurred in Greece, the target may already be entitled to bring proceedings before Greek courts under the jurisdictional rules developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Bier, Shevill and eDate. Its autonomous contribution lies primarily in the allocation of internal territorial competence: in domestic cases, it allows the target to bring the SLAPP-back action before the courts of their own residence or seat.

The Greek transposition thus illustrates two forms of deliberate over-implementation of the Directive. Neither provision was presented as an incorrect transposition. Rather, both illustrate the two sides of gold-plating: the possibility of strengthening the protection afforded to SLAPP targets while simultaneously raising questions concerning the consistency of the resulting national framework with the broader procedural and jurisdictional systems in which it operates. Whether the Court of Justice will eventually be called upon to clarify the boundaries of these national provisions remains to be seen.

The co-chair Marco Pasqua (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart) opened the discussion by observing that the Greek transposition offered a particularly interesting example of over-transposition, in line with the European Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to extend the Directive’s safeguards. He nevertheless suggested that the interaction between the new procedural and jurisdictional rules might give rise to some asymmetries. In particular, while Article 40A GCCP appears to provide a broad possibility for SLAPP targets to bring subsequent compensation proceedings before the courts of their domicile or seat, the practical operation of this provision may be affected by the jurisdictional framework of the Brussels I bis Regulation where the defendant in the subsequent proceedings is domiciled in another Member State. This raised the question whether the protection afforded by the Greek rules might operate differently depending on whether the case falls within the scope of the Brussels I bis Regulation or concerns a defendant domiciled in a third country.

Birgit van Houtert (Maastricht University), Working Group member for the Netherlands, then raised a question concerning the practical effectiveness of extending the solution provided for in Article 17 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive, as implemented by Article 40A GCCP, to purely domestic cases. Referring to Dutch procedural law, she observed that, proceedings against SLAPP targets in domestic cases will often be brought before the court of their place of domicile. Under ordinary domestic rules of territorial jurisdiction, SLAPP targets may thus already be able to bring proceedings before the courts of their own domicile. She therefore asked how the Greek rules on domestic venue operate and what additional practical value Article 40A might bring in such cases. In response, Chrisoula M. Michailidou referred to the basic rule of Article 22 GCCP (actor sequitur forum rei) in Greek civil procedure that already dictates that a defendant is sued before the court of their own domicile. Therefore, a SLAPP target is already sued at their own domicile. Nonetheless, Article 40A creates an autonomous venue ensuring that when the target brings a standalone claim for full compensation and costs, they retain their own home court.

Romania

Elena Alina Oprea (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca), Working Group member for Romania, presented the Romanian transposition of the Anti-SLAPP Directive, introduced by Law No. 193/2026, published in the Official Journal No. 845 of 7 October 2026 and entering into force on 10 October 2026. While the Romanian legislation follows the Anti-SLAPP Directive in relation to its definitions and general scope, the presentation identified several deliberate extensions, two instances of non-conformity and a number of further issues that could potentially be addressed through an interpretation consistent with EU law.

As regards the extensions beyond the Directive’s requirements, the Romanian law applies not only to cross-border disputes but also to purely domestic cases (Article 1(4)). This extension is justified in the explanatory memorandum by reference to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758. Furthermore, Article 18 requires all judgments delivered in proceedings falling within the scope of the law to be published on both portal.just.ro, the courts’ portal, and ReJust, the Romanian case-law database. This goes beyond Article 19(3) of the Anti-SLAPP Directive, which requires the publication of final appellate and highest-instance decisions. Under Article 11(2), the defendant’s claim for damages is also exempt from judicial stamp duties (taxa judiciară de timbru). In addition, Article 16 assigns specific responsibilities to the Romanian Ombudsman, including providing information to SLAPP targets, participating in awareness-raising campaigns and judicial training and preparing a dedicated annual report.

From a private international law perspective, the most significant transposition concerns Article 14 of the Romanian law. This provision establishes an autonomous and mandatory ground for refusing recognition of third-country judgments in anti-SLAPP proceedings, as provided for by Article 16 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive. Rather than relying on a potential violation of public policy, the Romanian legislator expressly provides for refusal where the foreign proceedings are considered manifestly unfounded or abusive under Law No. 193/2026, in addition to the other grounds for refusal laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure.

Elena Alina Oprea then identified two aspects in which the Romanian transposition appears incompatible, or at least problematic, with the Anti-SLAPP Directive.

The first concerns the right to appeal against decisions in SLAPP proceedings. Article 9(4) of the Romanian transposition provides that a decision granting an application for early dismissal may be challenged in accordance with the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, thereby complying with Article 13 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive. However, Article 9(5) provides that a decision rejecting the defendant’s application for early dismissal takes the form of an încheiere definitivă (a final interlocutory order), ordering the proceedings to continue.

Under the general rule in Article 466(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, interlocutory orders may be challenged together with the appeal against the judgment on the merits, unless the law provides otherwise. By expressly declaring the refusal decision final, the Romanian law triggers this exception, with the result that the decision cannot be challenged either separately or together with the appeal on the merits. Although the appellate court will reconsider the merits of the case under Article 476 CPC, it will not review the refusal of early dismissal as such.

According to Elena Alina Oprea, this raises concerns from the perspective of effective Anti-SLAPP protection. Recital 40 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive clarifies that, while a decision granting early dismissal should be subject to appeal, a decision refusing early dismissal could also be subject to appeal in accordance with national law. The latter wording suggests that the possibility of appealing a refusal of early dismissal is left to the discretion of Member States. The wording definitivă is unequivocal and the obligation of consistent interpretation cannot operate contra legem. Moreover, the Romanian legislator was aware of the issue: an amendment expressly invoking Recital 40 was rejected by the Senate Legal Committee.

The second issue concerns Article 18 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive, which was not transposed. Under that provision, bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded before 6 May 2024 prevail over Articles 16 and 17 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive. The Romanian law contains no corresponding provision regulating the relationship between the relevant instruments. Instead, the matter is left to the general clause in Article 1.065 CPC, according to which Book VII of the Code applies insofar as international treaties to which Romania is a party, EU law or special legislation do not provide otherwise.

The difficulty is that this general clause contains no temporal limitation. It therefore gives precedence to all relevant treaties, irrespective of when they were concluded, thereby extending beyond the temporal scope of Article 18 of the Directive. The practical consequences of this omission may be limited, since, to the presenter’s knowledge, Romania has not concluded any bilateral or multilateral conventions concerning the recognition of judgments after 6 May 2024. Nevertheless, the formal gap in the transposition remains.

In addition to these two instances of non-conformity, Elena Alina Oprea examined four further aspects in which the wording of the Romanian law might give rise to difficulties, but which could potentially be resolved through a purposive interpretation consistent with EU law.

First, Article 17(1) of the Anti-SLAPP Directive grants a right to claim damages to defendants domiciled in the EU who are subjected to abusive proceedings concerning public participation before courts in third countries. Article 15(1) of the Romanian transposition allows the target to claim compensation for costs incurred în legătură cu procedura aflată pe rolul instanței din țara terță. Read literally, the reference to proceedings pending before a third-country court could restrict the remedy to proceedings that are still ongoing. This would be narrower than the Directive, which imposes no such limitation. The provision should therefore be interpreted as referring to proceedings that have been conducted, rather than only those currently pending. Otherwise, the remedy would cease to be available precisely when the foreign proceedings come to an end, which is often the moment when the target’s losses can be fully quantified.

Second, Article 14(1) of the Anti-SLAPP Directive provides for the recovery of all types of costs incurred in the proceedings, including the full costs of legal representation, unless those costs are excessive. Article 13 of the Romanian transposition refers to the general rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, including Article 451(2) CPC, which allows courts, even of their own motion, to reduce lawyers’ fees where they are manifestly disproportionate to the value or complexity of the case or to the work performed. Applied to SLAPP proceedings, these criteria could operate to the detriment of the defendant. The apparent simplicity of a manifestly unfounded claim, as well as the amount of work required from the defendant’s lawyer, particularly where the burden of proof lies with the claimant, might lead the court to consider the legal costs excessive. This could result in under-compensation and undermine the requirements of the Directive. Compliance would therefore depend on courts taking account of the stakes for the defendant and the public interest involved and refraining from readily reducing legal representation costs.

Third, Article 10 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive allows courts to require the claimant to provide security for the estimated costs of the proceedings where there are elements indicating abusive court proceedings. The Romanian law does not specify a particular amount of security, which does not in itself constitute a breach of the Directive. However, the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply in the absence of a specific rule and cap the security at 20% of the value of the claim or, in the case of non-pecuniary claims, RON 10,000 (approximately EUR 2,000). If applied to reputational claims, which are typically non-pecuniary, this ceiling could render the security merely symbolic, depriving the provision of its effet utile. The difficulty would disappear if courts considered that Article 7 of the transposition law provides otherwise, since it requires security to cover the estimated costs and potential damage suffered by the defendant. An express legislative clarification would nonetheless have avoided uncertainty on this point.

Fourth, Elena Alina Oprea addressed the dissuasive penalties applicable to SLAPP claimants under Article 12 of the Romanian law, which transposes Article 15 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive. The Directive allows Member States to provide for discretionary penalties, provided that they are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Article 12 establishes a fine ranging from RON 10,000 to RON 100,000 (approximately EUR 2,000-20,000), which is one hundred times higher than the ordinary fine for bad-faith claims under Article 187(1)(1)(a) CPC. However, the amount is not linked either to the claimant’s financial resources or to the value of the claim. Its deterrent effect may therefore be questionable in relation to typical SLAPP claimants, such as large undertakings, wealthy individuals or public figures. Compliance with the Directive will depend on the courts’ willingness to apply fines towards the upper end of the statutory range and to combine them with damages under Article 11 and publication of the judgment under Article 10.

Elena Alina Oprea concluded that the Romanian transposition was characterised as correct in its definitions and generous in its scope, but procedurally “timid”. According to her view, the impossibility of appealing against decisions refusing early dismissal raises concerns as regards the effectiveness of Anti-SLAPP protection. Most of the other shortcomings could be addressed through an interpretation consistent with EU law, although this would come at the expense of legal certainty, particularly in a field where procedural speed is essential.

Before the end of the meeting, Marco Pasqua highlighted two aspects of the Romanian transposition that he considered particularly interesting from a comparative perspective.

First, he returned to the issue of international conventions, noting that this had not been expressly addressed in most national transposition measures. He suggested that the EU’s external competence in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters might provide an avenue for addressing the relationship between future international conventions and national rules implementing the Anti-SLAPP Directive, for instance through provisions safeguarding the application of the latter.

Secondly, he drew attention to the Romanian legislator’s decision to provide for a fixed statutory range of pecuniary penalties. This offered an interesting point of comparison with other national transpositions, which generally leave the determination of the amount to the court, taking account of the circumstances of the individual case. While the amounts laid down by Romanian law are substantial when compared with the penalties ordinarily applicable in domestic civil proceedings, Marco Pasqua questioned whether they would necessarily have a sufficiently deterrent effect in cases involving very high-value claims or particularly wealthy litigants. Referring to the particularly high amounts involved in some Italian SLAPP cases, he noted that differences in the level of financial penalties across Member States may be a relevant factor in determining where parties choose to bring anti-SLAPP proceedings, potentially giving rise to forum-shopping considerations on this point.

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