November 2026 at the Court of Justice of the European Union

November 2026 will bring several developments of interest for European private international law, including two Opinions and three judgments in pending cases concerning the 1980 Rome Convention, the Rome II, Brussels I, Brussels I bis,  Succession and European Account Preservation Order Regulations.

The Court (first chamber, with M. Kumin acting as reporting judge) is expected to publish the Opinion of Advocate General Norkus in case C-298/25, Ofsets, on 5 November. The request, from the French Cour de cassation, focuses on the characterization of an action for damages arising from the abrupt termination of an established commercial relationship.

The dispute opposes Ofsets Limited, a Cypriot company, and Héli-union (now Sabena Technics Helicopters), a French company with which Ofsets maintained a commercial relationship for approximately twenty-five years. Their contract contained a choice-of-law clause designating the law of Jersey. Following the termination of that relationship in 2020, Ofsets brought proceedings before the French courts relying Article L. 442‑1(II) of the French Commercial Code, which imposes liability for the abrupt termination of an established commercial relationship without adequate notice. The referring court asks whether such an action falls within the sphere of contractual obligations, governed by the Rome Convention, or whether it should be classified as a non-contractual obligation subject to the Rome II Regulation. More generally, the case provides the Court with an opportunity to clarify the distinction between contractual and tortious claims in the context of longstanding commercial relationships.

On the same day, the fourth chamber of the Court (reporting judge: M. Jääskinen )  will deliver its judgment in case C-716/24, Ponner, on the scope of the European Account Preservation Order Regulation and, in particular, its interaction with insolvency proceedings opened in third countries. I reported on the hearing and on the expected publication of the opinion on 5 March 2026. As requested by the Court, Advocate General Norkus addressed only on the first question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main (Higher Regional Court, Frankfurt am Main, Germany):

Must Article 2[(2)](c) of [the EAPO Regulation], read in conjunction with [recital 8 of that regulation], be interpreted as meaning that the opening of insolvency proceedings not covered by [the recast Insolvency Regulation], but conducted in a third country, precludes the issuing of an account preservation order under Article 7(1) of [the EAPO Regulation] or the forwarding of the request for account information under Article 14(3) of [that regulation] [where] the national law of the Member State responsible for issuing the account preservation order recognises the insolvency proceedings in the third country concerned?

He proposes that the Court of Justice answers as follows:

Article 2(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters, read in conjunction with recital 8 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude the issuing of a Preservation Order under Article 7(1) of that regulation and the transmission of a request for account information under Article 14(3) of that regulation, where the national law of the Member State responsible for issuing the Preservation Order recognises the insolvency proceedings in the third country concerned.

The decision in case C-344/25, Eurovo, on Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation and the determination of the country in which a product has been “marketed”, will be published as well on 5 November (sixth chamber, with M. Biltgen as reporting judge). No opinion was requested.

The dispute stems from alleged defects affecting poultry battery-cage systems installed in Italy and used by EUROVO S.r.l.. The equipment had been manufactured in Germany and supplied through Dutch and French intermediaries before reaching the Italian operator. Following the emergence of defects, EUROVO sought damages from the manufacturer on the basis of Italian law, which it contends should apply because the cages had been marketed in Italy and the damage had occurred there. By contrast, the lower German courts held that the products had been marketed in Germany when they were first delivered by the manufacturer to the Dutch and French purchasers. On that basis, they concluded that German law governed the dispute and dismissed the action.

The Bundesgerichtshof asks, in essence, whether a product is marketed in the State where the final user acquires it, whether marketing may occur through distributors, and how Article 5 Rome II operates in complex distribution chains involving intermediaries and component products:

1. Is the term ‘market[ing]’ within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) 864/2007 to be interpreted as meaning that a product is marketed in the country in which the final consumer acquires it from the distributor even in the case where the manufacturer, which is established in another country, has previously handed over the product, at its place of establishment, to a carrier which has delivered the product directly to the place where the final consumer is established, or, in those circumstances, does the marketing take place, also in relation to the final consumer, in the country in which the manufacturer is established?
2. Is the term ‘market[ing]’ within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) 864/2007 to be interpreted as meaning that a product can be marketed not only by the manufacturer itself but also by a third party such as, for example, a distributor which has acquired it from the manufacturer?
3. If Question 2 is to be answered in the affirmative, is the ‘marketing’ of the specific defective/damaging product in the country of the end customer precluded in that event if the end customer acquires or leases the product from the distributor as a component of a larger technical system which the distributor installs at the purchaser’s premises?
4. Which national law is applicable if none of the connecting factors provided for in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) 864/2007 is present?
5. When assessing whether a product has been marketed in a particular country within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) 864/2007, must regard be had to the specific defective/damaging product, or is it sufficient if, in any case, an identical product or a product of the same type has been marketed in the particular country?

One week later, on 12 November, Advocate General Norkus will publish his Opinion in case C-626/25, Landsbanki Luxembourg, on the interaction between the consumer-protection provisions of the Brussels I Regulation and the system governing recognition and enforcement of judgments. The case has been assigned to the fourth chamber, with M. Jääskinen acting as reporting judge.

The case originates in mortgage loans granted by Landsbanki Luxembourg SA to borrowers residing in France prior to the bank’s collapse and subsequent liquidation. After unsuccessful attempts to have their claims admitted in the Luxembourg insolvency proceedings, proceedings ensued before the Luxembourg courts. Said courts dismissed the borrowers’ claims and upheld a counterclaim by the liquidator seeking payment of amounts still due under the loans. During the appeal proceedings, the borrowers argued that, as consumers domiciled in France, they should benefit from the jurisdictional protection provided by Section 4 of the Brussels I Regulation and that the French courts alone had jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The Luxembourg courts rejected that argument and ruled on the merits.

Once the Luxembourg judgment became final, the liquidators sought its recognition and enforcement in France. A declaration of enforceability was granted and subsequently confirmed by the Cour d’appel de Paris, which held that it could not review the jurisdiction of the Luxembourg courts because, under Article 35(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, it was bound by the factual findings on which those courts had based their jurisdiction.

The borrowers then appealed to the Cour de cassation, arguing that the Luxembourg courts had disregarded the jurisdictional rules protecting consumers and that the French courts should therefore have refused recognition under Article 35(1) of the Regulation.

The French Cour de cassation has referred the following questions to the Court of Justice:

1. Must Article 24 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a party domiciled in a Member State has declared his or her claim in insolvency proceedings brought in another Member State entails the prorogation of the jurisdiction of the court conducting the insolvency proceedings as regards a counterclaim directed against that party, even if he or she claims to be a consumer?
2. Must Article 24 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters be interpreted as meaning that a plea of lis pendens, by which a party who claims to be a consumer explicitly asserts the jurisdiction of the court of his or her domicile under Article 15 of the Brussels I Regulation, is equivalent to contesting the jurisdiction of the court before which proceedings have been brought, for the purposes of that legislation?
3. Must Article 35(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters be interpreted as meaning that, where a party claims, before the court of a Member State, that he or she is a consumer in order to assert the jurisdiction of the courts of his or her domicile, the fact that that court has not made findings of fact allowing an assessment to be made whether the conditions for applying Article 15 of that regulation were met has the effect of depriving the courts of the Member State applied to of the right to examine, having regard to all of the relevant facts, whether the rules of jurisdiction that protect consumers were applicable and complied with?

On November 19th, the fourth chamber of the Court (reporting judge: M. Jääskinen) will deliver its judgment in case C-98/24, Koda, on the interpretation of Regulation No 650/2012. The request concerns the notion of “disposition of property upon death”, the treatment of declarations of disinheritance, and the transitional provisions governing choices of law made before the Regulation became fully applicable.

I reported on the case on the occasion of the hearing and of the delivery of the opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, which took place on 29 January 2026. Mr. Campos considered the request inadmissible, but proposed, in the alternative, the following:

Article 3(1)(d), Article 22(1), Article 25, Article 26(1) and (2), and Article 83(3) and (4) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as meaning that

–            The definition of “disposition of property upon death” in Article 3(1)(d) of Regulation No 650/2012 includes a declaration of disinheritance, to which Article 83(3) and (4) of that regulation therefore applies.

–            The choice-of-law fiction laid down in Article 83(4) of Regulation No 650/2012 cannot be applied where the deceased made a choice of law applicable to his or her succession after the date on which that regulation became fully applicable, in accordance with Article 22(1) thereof.

–            Article 26(1)(a) and (2) of Regulation No 650/2012, on the capacity of a person making a disposition of property upon death to make such a disposition, is not intended to govern whether, and, as the case may be, under what conditions, a person who enters into an agreement as to the succession of more than one person may subsequently modify or revoke that agreement. The binding effects of an agreement as to succession are governed by Article 25 of Regulation No 650/2012

On the same day, the Court (same chamber, same reporting judge) is also expected to rule in case C-683/24, Spielerschutz Sigma. A summary of the facts of the case as well as the questions referred to Luxembourg can be found here. The reference, originating from Austria, addresses the compatibility with EU law of the Maltese legislation designed to shield holders of Maltese gaming licences from the recognition and enforcement of judgments delivered in other Member States. In his opinion of April 23, 2026, Advocate General Emiliou proposed that the reference be declared inadmissible, on the ground that an answer to the questions reaised is not necessary for the referring court to give judgment in the main proceedings.

Finally, on 26 November the Court will hand down its judgment in C-515/25, Mekanova, a case concerning jurisdiction under the Brussels Ia Regulation in actions seeking compensation for delayed or cancelled flights. The dispute was brought by a Bulgarian passenger against Wizz Air Hungary Ltd.. While the substantive claim is based on Regulation No 261/2004, the questions referred concern the interpretation of Article 7(5) of Brussels Ia, notably the notion of “branch, agency or other establishment”, and the relationship between EU jurisdictional rules and national procedures for payment orders. The sixth chamber of the Court, with M. Bilgen acting as reporting judge, will address the following questions:

1. Is Article 7(1)(a) and (5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (‘Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012’):, read in conjunction with Article 5(1) thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that it lays down binding provisions on the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States within the European Union which cannot be precluded by national legal provisions governing specific types of simplified procedures, such as the order for payment procedure, for which specific conditions for the jurisdiction of national courts are also laid down? If the question is answered in the affirmative, do those provisions require that a judgment which has already been delivered must be set aside, or do they preclude its setting aside, even where an attempted unlawful choice of court is suspected?
2. Regardless of the answer to the first question, is Article 7(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, in accordance with the judgment of 11 April 2019, Ryanair DAC, C 464/18, to be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘branch, agency or other establishment’ is an independent concept of EU law and, if so, what is its meaning in relation to the requirement regarding the conclusion of a contract within the scope of the establishment’s operation?
3. If the first question is answered in the negative – meaning that the aforementioned provisions are not binding – and the first part of the second question is answered in the affirmative, is Article 7(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, in conformity with the judgment of 13 November 1990, Marleasing, C 106/89, to be interpreted as meaning that national legal provisions which provide for jurisdiction based on the existence of a ‘place of business’ in a particular Member State are to be interpreted in accordance with the interpretation given by the Court of Justice of the European Union to the term ‘branch, agency or other establishment’?
4. Is Article 7(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate on claims brought against a branch, agency or other establishment, it regulates not only the allocation of jurisdiction between the Member States of the European Union, but also the allocation of local jurisdiction between the courts of each individual State?