Mapping the Europeanisation of Anti-SLAPP Protection Beyond the EU

Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) – the ‘Anti-SLAPP Directive’ – marks an important step in the development of a European framework against strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs). The Anti-SLAPP Directive entered into force on 6 May 2024 and had to be transposed by 7 May 2026.

The implementation of the Anti-SLAPP Directive has itself revealed a rather uneven picture within the European Union. This has been closely followed by the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions, which identified significant differences between Member States in their legislative choices, including procedural safeguards, as well as in the timing of implementation: while several had adopted final implementing measures, others remained at the drafting stage, while a few had not yet made legislative proposals publicly available.

These developments take place against a broader backdrop of growing attention to SLAPPs at different levels. At the universal level, this has recently been reflected in the dedicated briefer on SLAPPs and public participation published by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as in its report A/HRC/63/47 of 30 July 2026, prepared for the sixty-third session of the Human Rights Council and addressing the impact of the use of SLAPPs on the enjoyment and realization of human rights, in particular the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The Anti-SLAPP Directive gives concrete regional expression to recommendations and approaches reflected in this broader international work.

This raises a broader question: if the Anti-SLAPP Directive is becoming an important benchmark within the European Union, is it also influencing legal developments beyond the EU?

The answer appears to be neither straightforward nor uniform. Developments across Europe suggest a differentiated process of Europeanisation, in which the Anti-SLAPP Directive and the standards developed within the Council of Europe – particularly Recommendation CM/Rec(2024)2 on countering the use of SLAPPs – operate as interconnected sources of inspiration, with their relative influence varying according to the legal and institutional context of each country.

Denmark: When the Directive Does not Apply

Denmark offers a starting point: due to its justice and home affairs opt-out, the Anti-SLAPP Directive does not apply to it.

The Danish position is particularly interesting because the country considered the proposal during the EU legislative process but concluded that SLAPPs were not regarded as a significant challenge in Denmark and that the proposal did not entail legislative implications for Denmark. In other words, EU membership did not translate into participation in the Anti-SLAPP legislative process, nor into a commitment to voluntary implementation.

Denmark thus provides an important counterpoint to the Brussels effect. The question is not simply whether the EU is capable of exporting its standards, but also whether those standards are perceived as necessary in countries where the phenomenon is considered limited. Whether that assessment remains warranted in light of the subsequent development of anti-SLAPP standards across Europe may, however, deserve renewed consideration.

Moldova: Brussels as a Legislative Template

The Republic of Moldova is currently a notable example of the Anti-SLAPP Directive’s influence beyond the European Union. On 22 July 2026, the Government approved a draft law prepared by the Ministry of Justice, which was adopted by the Parliament at first reading two days later. The draft introduces a dedicated anti-SLAPP framework into Moldovan law and, in several respects, closely follows the architecture of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.

In particular, it provides for security, early dismissal and remedies against abusive proceedings (Arts. 35-43), accelerated treatment of applications (Art. 35(2)) and allows the court to raise early dismissal ex officio (Art. 40), broadly reflecting Articles 6-15 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive. The burden is also placed on the claimant to substantiate the claim once early dismissal is sought (Art. 39(4)), while the proposed indicators of abusive proceedings substantially reproduce those in Article 4(3) of the Anti-SLAPP Directive (Art. 34, read with the amendments to Art. 2).

The private international law dimension is equally significant. The draft provides for refusal of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments resulting from manifestly unfounded or abusive proceedings (Art. 45), as well as jurisdiction for claims for damages and costs arising from abusive proceedings brought before foreign courts (Art. 46), closely paralleling Articles 16 and 17 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive.

At the same time, the Moldovan proposal goes beyond the EU model: its safeguards are not limited to cases with cross-border implications.

Moldova thus offers a particularly strong example of the Brussels Effect operating beyond the Union, while the domestic framework is being developed in the context of Moldova’s own constitutional, procedural and freedom-of-expression framework, illustrating how an EU model may be adapted when it travels beyond the Union.

Ukraine: Towards an EU-Inspired Anti-SLAPP Framework

Ukraine provides a further example of the diffusion of the EU anti-SLAPP model beyond the Union. According to media news, a draft law currently under preparation seeks to introduce dedicated safeguards against abusive court proceedings against public participation, with registration in the Parliament of Ukraine expected in September 2026.

The draft expressly draws on the EU Anti-SLAPP Directive and Council of Europe recommendations, and would introduce, inter alia, definitions of public participation, matters of public interest and abusive proceedings, early dismissal of manifestly unfounded claims, a shift of the burden of substantiation to the claimant, support for defendants by civil-society organisations, recovery of legal costs, financial penalties and protection against the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments resulting from SLAPP proceedings.

The proposed framework would therefore reproduce several of the Anti-SLAPP Directive’s core procedural safeguards, while adapting them to the Ukrainian legal context. The initiative is also expressly linked to Ukraine’s European integration commitments, with the authorities aiming to adopt anti-SLAPP legislation by early 2027.

Norway: The Interaction between EU and Council of Europe Standards

Norway presents an altogether different relationship with EU anti-SLAPP standards. In response to a parliamentary question on 16 February 2026, the Norwegian Minister of Justice and Public Security explained that Anti-SLAPP Directive falls outside the scope of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement and that there had consequently been no formal process to assess its relevance for Norway.

At the same time, the Norwegian Government recognised the relevance of Recommendation CM/Rec(2024)2. The Government considers Norwegian legislation to contain sound and flexible mechanisms capable of addressing abusive litigation and indicated that it was not aware of the Norwegian legal system being abused in this way.

Norway illustrates how anti-SLAPP protection may develop beyond the EU framework while remaining connected to the broader European human rights framework, notably through the Council of Europe and Article 10 ECHR.

Switzerland: Monitoring rather than Legislation

Switzerland provides another variation on this theme. Rather than adopting dedicated anti-SLAPP legislation, the Swiss authorities have so far focused on monitoring and policy development. The National Action Plan on the Safety of Media Professionals identifies SLAPPs as a concern and calls for further analysis of their extent and impact, while Switzerland has also followed relevant Council of Europe and EU developments. The Swiss example shows that the diffusion of anti-SLAPP standards may lead to institutional and policy responses without, at least for now, resulting in dedicated legislation.

The United Kingdom: A Diverse Anti-SLAPP Landscape

The United Kingdom illustrates perhaps the clearest case of a major European jurisdiction developing an anti-SLAPP framework largely independently of the Anti-SLAPP Directive.

In England and Wales, the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 introduced, respectively under sections 195 and 194, a statutory definition of SLAPPs and mechanisms allowing courts to strike out qualifying proceedings at an early stage. The relevant provisions entered into force in June 2025. Yet their scope is significantly narrower than the general phenomenon of SLAPPs: the statutory definition is confined to proceedings concerning the public interest in combating economic crime.

The first case applying these measures, Kamal v Tax Policy Associates [2026] EWHC 551 (KB), illustrates both the practical relevance and the limitations of the framework. Although the claim was struck out under existing procedural powers, the High Court also considered whether the claimant’s conduct satisfied the statutory definition of a SLAPP. The case has consequently become an important reference point for the operation of the new framework.

Yet the debate has not ended. Parliamentary discussions have continued to call for the extension of anti-SLAPP protection beyond economic crime, while further Private Members’ Bills have sought to establish a broader framework. A House of Commons Research Briefing published in July 2026 notes that the issue remains the subject of continuing parliamentary debate, with a further Chamber debate scheduled for September 2026.

Scotland has followed a different path. A public consultation conducted in 2025 considered both legislative and non-legislative responses, including the relationship between the proposed reforms, the Anti-SLAPP Directive and a Model Law developed by the Scottish Anti-SLAPP Working Group and the Anti-SLAPP Research Hub. The majority of respondents considered that SLAPPs exist, that they should be addressed principally through legal reform and that the reform should resemble the proposed Model Law. The Scottish Government subsequently agreed that the law should be reformed and indicated its intention to legislate at the next available opportunity, subject to further work on the operation of the proposed framework.

Northern Ireland, by contrast, currently has no equivalent statutory anti-SLAPP framework.

The UK therefore presents a varied anti-SLAPP landscape, with different levels of legislative development across its systems.

The Western Balkans: Accession as a Driver of Approximation

The Western Balkans offer perhaps the most revealing laboratory for assessing whether the EU Anti-SLAPP framework can operate as a form of regulatory approximation beyond the Union. This is particularly significant in the context of EU accession, where the EU acquis increasingly serves as a reference point for domestic reform. The picture, however, remains far from uniform, as illustrated by the European Commission’s 2026 Rule of Law Report of 17 July 2026 for Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, which records different degrees of legislative and institutional development across the region.

In Albania, SLAPPs targeting journalists continue to be reported, but the legal framework is also undergoing relevant reforms. In January 2026, Albania removed criminal defamation provisions for registered journalists under certain conditions and committed to the further decriminalisation of defamation. At the same time, preparatory legal analysis has begun to assess how the national framework could be aligned with the EU Anti-SLAPP acquis and strengthened through effective procedural safeguards.

Montenegro presents a more limited form of legal development. The country does not yet have dedicated anti-SLAPP legislation and the absence of a statutory definition of SLAPPs makes the identification of such cases more difficult.

North Macedonia similarly shows a gap between the recognition of SLAPPs and the development of specific legal safeguards. The country has no dedicated anti-SLAPP legislation, while limited awareness of the phenomenon among judges, lawyers and journalists continues to hamper its effective identification and prevention. This is particularly relevant in light of the reported increase in proceedings for insult and defamation involving journalists.

Serbia offers perhaps the most developed example of both the potential and the limits of EU-driven approximation in the region. SLAPP cases persist and are increasingly affecting investigative media and civil society organisations. Yet legislative approximation is only part of the picture: Serbian courts have also continued to apply the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights inconsistently, highlighting the interaction between the emerging EU procedural model and the pre-existing Strasbourg framework on freedom of expression and abusive litigation.

Kosovo demonstrates yet another form of Europeanisation. Rather than relying principally on dedicated legislation, the Strategic Plan for Access to Justice 2026–2028 adopted by the Kosovo Judicial Council gives priority to SLAPP cases. Judges at all levels are expected to prioritise proceedings involving SLAPPs against media and civil-society actors and to resolve them urgently. This represents a form of institutional diffusion without legislative transposition.

Finally, anti-SLAPP standards have inspired legislative initiatives within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A draft law on citizen initiatives and the protection of citizens and activists includes anti-SLAPP provisions aligned with European standards, but the legislative process has not yet resulted in a comprehensive statutory framework.

The Western Balkans therefore reveal a spectrum rather than a single model. The influence of the EU framework is visible, but it is gradual, conditional and heavily dependent on domestic implementation capacity. It also operates alongside, and in interaction with, the broader human rights standards developed within the Council of Europe.

Türkiye: An Area for Further Attention

Türkiye represents a less developed dimension of the European anti-SLAPP landscape. The issue of abusive proceedings against public participation appears to require further attention, particularly as regards the development of dedicated procedural safeguards. The Turkish experience therefore remains an area for further study.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus: Growing Attention to the Anti-SLAPP Framework

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus further illustrate the growing attention to SLAPPs beyond the EU. Documented cases of abusive litigation against journalists and other public-interest actors have highlighted the limits of ordinary procedural safeguards, while the EU Anti-SLAPP framework and Council of Europe standards have increasingly been referred to as benchmarks for domestic reform. These developments support the need for more effective and dedicated procedural safeguards, even where no specific legislative framework has yet been established.

Towards a Fragmented Europeanisation of Anti-SLAPP Protection?

The picture that emerges is not one of a uniform “Brussels effect”, but of a fragmented Europeanisation of anti-SLAPP protection. The Anti-SLAPP Directive has become an important reference point beyond the Union, but its influence is neither automatic nor uniform. It forms part of a broader European framework in which EU law, Council of Europe standards and national legal traditions interact and mutually reinforce one another, although their respective legal effects and modes of implementation differ.

The more interesting question, therefore, may no longer be whether the Brussels effect extends beyond the Union, but how EU law contributes to a broader European framework in which different legal instruments and institutional actors address the same underlying problem.

Anti-SLAPP protection offers a particularly clear illustration of this dynamic: rather than producing a single European model, the interaction between EU law, human-rights standards and domestic procedural law is contributing to the emergence of a multi-level European framework for protecting public participation against abusive litigation.

Ultimately, what matters may be less the convergence of legal models than the effectiveness of the protection they provide.