English Court of Appeal Reaffirms the Presence Rule of Jurisdiction, Subject to a Temporary Absence Qualification

Earlier this year, on 19 February 2026, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales handed down judgment in Fridman v Argofirma Oniks LLC [2026] EWCA Civ 139. The case concerned a fundamental question of English private international law: must a defendant be present in England at the time of service of a claim form for the English courts to have personal jurisdiction as of right or was it sufficient for the defendant to be served pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules on service? The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the common law principle that jurisdiction as of right is based on the defendant’s presence, with a qualification that temporary absence does not negate presence within the jurisdiction. The judgment raises some interesting questions about the nature and limits of the common law presence rule.

Facts

Mr Mikhail Fridman had resided in London since 2013 and owned Athlone House in Hampstead. In March 2022, he was designated under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, became an “excluded person” for immigration purposes and lost the right to be present in and enter the United Kingdom. He left the UK in September 2023.

The claimants commenced proceedings against him in February 2024 and served the claim form at Athlone House pursuant to CPR 6.9, which permits service at an individual’s “usual or last known residence”. Bryan J held that service was valid because Mr Fridman had not ceased to be resident within the jurisdiction: [2025] EWHC 300 (Comm).

Mr Fridman appealed.

Judgment

Allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal (Lewison LJ gave the leading judgment, with whom Phillips and Henderson LJJ agreed) held that compliance with the CPR rules on service does not conclusively establish the court’s jurisdiction.

The Court reaffirmed the common law principle that jurisdiction as of right is based on the defendant’s presence in England, observing that “it is presence, not residence, which is the touchstone” ([24]). Presence was characterised as a substantive jurisdictional requirement rather than a mere procedural rule, and one that was not and could not be changed by a mere change in procedural rules.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court preferred the reasoning in SSL International Plc v TTK LIG Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1170, which treated presence as a continuing substantive jurisdictional requirement, over Kamali v City & Country Properties Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1879, where the court had suggested that the CPR had displaced the common law rule.

The Court further accepted the qualification recognised in SSL International that a temporary absence, for instance on holiday, does not negate presence within the jurisdiction. On the facts, however, Mr Fridman’s absence could not be regarded as temporary. The decisive consideration was that, because of the travel ban imposed upon him, his return to England was legally impossible for an indefinite period.

Comment

The decision is welcome insofar as it confirms that common law jurisdiction as of right remains founded on presence. It also resolves the uncertainty created by the tension between Kamali and SSL International. The Court has now made clear that the CPR did not abolish the presence requirement.

One interesting feature of the judgment is Lewison LJ’s discussion of the foundations of the presence rule. The Court’s reliance on territoriality is unsurprising ([72]). More debatable is Lewison LJ’s suggestion that the rule is rooted in international law ([72]). Whether the authorities cited by the Court (Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v Rajah of Faridkote [1894] AC 670 (PC); Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation Ltd v Sedgwick, Collins & Co Ltd [1927] AC 95 (HL)) continue to support that broader proposition is likely to be of interest to both private and public international law scholars.

The more significant issue, however, concerns the Court’s reaffirmation of the temporary absence qualification recognised in SSL International. The Court observed that the notion of temporary absence must be kept “within relatively narrow bounds” ([82]) and considered that Mr Fridman’s inability to return to England was decisive. Yet the judgment provides little guidance on the precise content of the qualification.

In particular, it remains unclear whether the qualification applies only where a defendant has an established connection with England, such as residence, and then temporarily leaves the jurisdiction. Alternatively, does it also apply where a defendant who was merely physically present in England briefly leaves the jurisdiction before returning?

A simple example illustrates the problem. Suppose that a Chinese tourist comes to England on holiday, intends to fly home from Heathrow, but first embarks on a short cruise from Southampton to Norway. Is the tourist still present in England for jurisdictional purposes while the ship is in on the high seas or in Norwegian waters? The logic of SSL International and Fridman suggests that the question cannot be dismissed out of hand, but the answer is far from obvious.

A further relevant development may be found in Li v Yuan [2026] EWHC 242 (Comm), decided a week before Fridman. In that case, the High Court appears to have accepted that, for the purposes of recognising and enforcing a Chinese judgment, residence in the country of origin at the commencement of proceedings may suffice to establish indirect jurisdiction. Whether Li v Yuan is correct is open to debate. Nevertheless, this decision together with Friedman suggest that it is possible that some traditional common law jurisdictional connecting factors are currently being reconsidered in both the direct and indirect jurisdiction contexts.

Conclusion

Recent decisions concerning both direct and indirect jurisdiction suggest that it is possible that some traditional common law jurisdictional connecting factors are currently being reconsidered. Whether these developments represent a coherent evolution of the common law or merely a series of case-specific (potentially legally incorrect) responses remains to be seen. Greater guidance from the Supreme Court would be welcome.

In the meantime, the most important unresolved question raised by Fridman concerns the scope of the temporary absence qualification adopted from SSL International. Does it apply only where a defendant has an established connection with England and is temporarily abroad, or does it also apply where a defendant who was merely present in England briefly leaves the jurisdiction? The answer may determine whether the qualification remains a narrow exception or assumes a more prominent role in the future development of the common law rules on jurisdiction.