September 2026 at the Court of Justice of the European Union

September 2026 promises to be a busy month for the Court of Justice of the European Union. A series of significant judgments, Advocate General opinions, and a noteworthy arbitration-related hearing will address questions ranging from the scope of the Rome II Regulation and cross-border succession disputes to the interpretation of the European Small Claims Procedure, the Montreal Convention, and the Brussels IIbis regulation.

On 3 September, Advocate General J. Richard de la Tour will deliver his opinion in case C-345/25, Gritxa, a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Qorti tal-Appell (Court of Appeal, Malta), consisting of three questions on Regulation Rome II. The dispute concerns an action brought by the State of Libya, seeking recovery of assets in Malta allegedly acquired unlawfully by the deceased BC, a former Libyan public official and son of a prominent Libyan leader. The claim relies principally on two Libyan laws, one of them providing for restitution of unlawfully obtained assets, and the other aimed at preventing public officials from obtaining unlawful gains through abuse of office and allowing recovery of such gains. Both legal acts contain significant criminal-law elements, while Libya is pursuing recovery through civil proceedings in Malta. The questions referred to the Court read:

1. Does the notion of ‘civil and commercial matters’ in Article 1 of Regulation No 864/2007 cover a claim such as that submitted by the State of Libya pursuant to the foregoing laws in order to recover assets of the deceased BC that are present in Malta?
2. Does the exception relating to administrative matters referred to in Article 1 of Regulation No 864/2007 cover a claim such as that submitted by the State of Libya pursuant to the foregoing laws in order to recover assets of the deceased BC that are present in Malta?
3. If it is established that Regulation No 864/2007 applies to the present case, what is the distinction between the obligation arising out of a tort/delict (Article 4(1) of the regulation) and unjust enrichment arising out of a tort/delict (Article 10(1) of the regulation) in a case such as that at issue before this Court

The case has been assigned to a five-judge bench, with F. Biltgen reporting.

On Thursday 10, Advocate General M. Szpunar will deliver his opinion in case C-310/25, MMWD. The request for a preliminary ruling, submitted by the Amtsgericht Hagen (Local Court, Hagen, Germany), concerns the interpretation of Regulation 650/2012 against the background of proceedings pending in Germany and in the Netherlands in relation to an estate; the widow of the deceased has waived the succession in one of them.

1. Can an heir from one Member State, where two courts in two different Member States, which do not correspond to the habitual residence of the heir, each accept jurisdiction to rule on a succession under Article 4 of the EU Succession Regulation, make before one of those courts a valid declaration concerning the waiver of succession in accordance with the formal requirements applicable there?
2. If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative:

Does such a declaration concerning the waiver of succession made before a court of another Member State vis-à-vis a court of another Member State, which considers itself as also having jurisdiction to rule on the succession under Article 4 of the EU Succession Regulation, replace the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be made before that court in such a way that it is deemed to have been validly made as at the time at which it was made?

Was the defendant able to waive the succession validly before the rechtbank Limburg (District Court, Limburg, Netherlands), as registry for the rechtbank Roermond (District Court, Roermond, Netherlands), under […] [file number], with the declarations (waiver) of 19 December 2023 and 24 February 2025?

3. If Questions 1 and 2 are to be answered in the affirmative:

Does the validity of the waiver depend on whether the heir makes the declaration concerning the waiver of succession in the first set of proceedings in the court of a Member State of which she becomes aware, in accordance with the formal requirements applicable there, or is she free to decide in which proceedings she makes the declaration concerning the waiver of succession?

The decision will be delivered by a chamber of five judges, with N.  Jääskinen acting as reporting judge.

Another opinion by M. Szpunar is scheduled one week later, this time on the European Small Claims Regulation. In case C-444/25, Ersatz-Pilot, the Amtsgericht Dresden (Local Court, Dresden, Germany) is asking the Court:

1. whether, pursuant to Article 4(4) of the European Small Claims Regulation, the claim form is not filled in properly if the form itself does not contain a statement of grounds for the application, but the claimant merely refers to an annex in support of the claim?, and
2. whether a claim that merely refers to an annex in support must be dismissed as inadmissible?

The decision will be one of a three-judges chamber, with N. Jääskinen reporting.

On the same day, a hearing is taking place in case C-244/25, Cabify España. In its requests, the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (High Court of Justice of Madrid, Spain) asks whether EU law requires a national court reviewing an arbitral award to be able to carry out a substantive review of compliance with mandatory EU competition law, particularly Article 101 TFEU, rather than being limited to a merely formal or external review of the award. In this context, the referring court sets out its doubt on the compatibility of Spanish constitutional case law with Articles 47 and 51 of the EU Charter, Article 19(1) TEU, and the principles of primacy, effectiveness, and unity of EU law:

(1) Is it compatible with the first paragraph of Article 47 and Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 19(1) TEU, and the principles of primacy, effectiveness and unity of EU law, for the judicial review of the validity of an arbitral award for infringement of fundamental rules of EU public policy (in casu, Article 101 TFEU) to be purely external, so that the competent court, in accordance with the Law – Articles 8(5) and 41(1) of the Ley de Arbitraje (Law on Arbitration; LA) – cannot review, with full jurisdiction and in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the decision of the arbitrators not to apply mandatory EU law?

(2) Is it compatible with the first paragraph of Article 47 and Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 19(1) TEU, and the principles of primacy, effectiveness and unity of EU law, for the judicial review of the validity of an arbitral award for infringement of fundamental rules of EU public policy (in casu, Article 101 TFEU) to be purely external, so that the competent court, in accordance with the Law – Articles 8(5) and 41(1) of the LA – cannot review, with full jurisdiction and in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, whether the arbitrators have correctly applied mandatory Union law in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union?

(3) Is it compatible with the first paragraph of Article 47 and Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 19(1) TEU, and the principles of primacy, effectiveness and unity of EU law, for the judicial review of the validity of an arbitral award for infringement of fundamental rules of EU public policy (in casu, Article 101 TFEU) to be limited by the case-law and criteria set out in the ruling of the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court, Spain) No 146/2024 of 2 December 2024?

The case has been assigned to a chamber of five judges, with T. von Danwitz reporting.

That same day (17^th September), the Court is publishing the decision in case C-876/24, Vueling Airlines. The request for a preliminary ruling originates from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Fuenlabrada (Court of First Instance of Fuenlabrada, Spain); it focuses on the interpretation of Article 33 of the Montreal Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air), and of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 (air carrier liability in the event of accidents). The main dispute concerns compensation for lost baggage belonging to a passenger who flew from Madrid to Barcelona on 8 November 2023. Her checked baggage was lost during that transport; the ticket was bought online from her home in Fuenlabrada, while the baggage check-in service was purchased at Madrid airport; the central issue is which court has territorial jurisdiction to hear the claim.

It is worth mentioning that while the flight, in two legs, started in Madrid and had Rome as final destination, the baggage had been lost at Barcelona airport, where it could not be collected and checked in for the next leg. The applicant has not provided documentation nor added any other information, regarding the contract for the second flight, from Barcelona to Rome (or regarding the return flights to Madrid). By way of consequence, the referring court assumes that there was no ‘international carriage’, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Montreal Convention.

The Spanish court is asking the CJEU:

First. Must Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 be interpreted as meaning that the liability of a Community air carrier in respect of the carriage of passengers and their baggage is also to be governed by Article 33 of the Montreal Convention in the case of carriage within a Member State of the European Union?

Second. May Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention be interpreted as meaning that the place where the carrier has a place of business through which the air transport contract has been entered into could be the principal and permanent residence of the passenger, if the contract was entered into online?

Third. Must Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention be interpreted as meaning that the place where the carrier has a place of business through which the contract has been entered into refers to the place in which the principal obligation of carriage by air was contracted for and not the place in which the ancillary service, from which the carrier’s liability arises, was contracted for, if the latter place differs from the former?

In his opinion delivered on 26 February 2026, Advocate General D. Spielmann proposed that the Court answer the questions as follows:

(1)         Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the determination of the courts having territorial jurisdiction to hear an action for damages against an EU air carrier is to be governed by Article 33 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, concluded at Montreal on 28 May 1999, signed by the European Community on 9 December 1999, and approved on its behalf by Council Decision 2001/539/EC of 5 April 2001 (‘the Montreal Convention’), including in the case of carriage within a Member State of the European Union.

(2)         The provision must be interpreted as meaning that ‘where [the carrier] has a place of business through which the contract has been made’ does not include the principal and permanent residence of the passenger, if the contract was entered into online.

(3)         Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the place where the carrier has a place of business through which ‘the contract’ has been made refers to the place in which the principal obligation of carriage by air was contracted for and not the place in which the ancillary service, from which the carrier’s liability arises, was contracted for, if the latter place differs from the former.

The judgment will be delivered by a chamber of five judges, with N.  Fenger reporting.

Finally, on September 24 the Court will publish its decision in case C-176/25, Steizer, on the Rome II regulation, and in case C-190/25, Zelabrich, on Regulation Brussels II bis.

Case C-176/25, Steizer, corresponds to a request for a preliminary reference submitted by the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Higher Regional Court, Düsseldorf), focusing on Regulation Rome II and the law applicable to the formal validity of the assignment of exclusive rights to use photographs:

1. Is Article 8(1) of the Rome II Regulation to be interpreted as meaning that the law of the State for which protection is claimed also applies to the question of the (formal) validity of the assignment of exclusive rights to use photographs from the author to the assignee?
2. If Question 1 is answered in the negative, is the question of the (formal) validity of the assignment of exclusive rights to use photographs from the author to the assignee governed by the lex loci contractus and, consequently, are Articles 4 and 11 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘the Rome I Regulation’) applicable?

The facts leading to the main dispute can be summarized as follows: the applicant, a German seller of vehicle accessories, commissioned a Polish professional photographer to take photographs of car mats between 2014 and 2018. The arrangements were made orally. The photographs were taken in Poland and delivered on USB sticks. No written agreement was concluded on the use of the photographs taken or on the assignment of the rights of use of those photographs, nor was any agreement made on the law applicable to the commissioning of the photographer or to the assignment of rights of use. During the period from February to March 2018, the defendant offered floor mats for cars on eBay, using the photographs taken at the applicant’s request to illustrate the various items on offer. The applicant regards the defendant’s publication of the photographs on the internet as an infringement of her rights of use of the photographs.

Advocate General Emiliou delivered his opinion on 23 April 2026. He proposed that the Court answers:

Article 1(1), Article 10, Article 11 and Article 18(2) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation involving a conflict of laws, the issue of the potential requirements as to form with which a contractual licence or assignment of copyright needs to comply in order to be regarded as valid or evidenced is governed by the substantive law(s) designated by the rules laid down in that regulation.

The reporting judge is O. Spineanu-Matei.

Finally, in case C-190/25, Zelabrich, at the request of the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart, Germany) the Court will clarify whether Italian recognition proceedings giving civil effect to ecclesiastical marriage annulments fall within the Regulation’s concept of marriage annulment proceedings, and how the Regulation’s lis pendens rules should operate in such circumstances.

If the Court follows the proposal of Advocate General J. Richard de la Tour, published on 30 April this year, the answer will be that Article 19(1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation

must be interpreted as meaning that proceedings in Italy for the recognition of a judgment relating to marriage annulment delivered by an ecclesiastical court before a corte d’appello (Court of Appeal, Italy) which has jurisdiction under Article 8(2) of the Lateran Concordat of 11 February 1929, concluded between Italy and the Holy See, modified by the agreement, with additional protocol, signed in Rome on 18 February 1984, are not proceedings relating to marriage annulment within the meaning of Article 19(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003, as amended.

Again, the reporting judge is O. Spineanu-Matei.

Note: Probably of interest, although not directly addressing a PIL instrument, is the Grand Chamber case C-449/25, Serviciul pentru Imigrări al judeţului Bihor (Partenariat civil). The opinion of Advocate General L. Medina is due on September 17.