Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Private Law

In April this year, the Oxford University Press published The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Private Law, edited by Douglas A Kysar and Ernest Lim. The Handbook provides a comprehensive and authoritative treatment of the intersection between climate change and private law in general, including private international law (PIL), bringing together contributions from leading scholars across a wide range of fields.

The Handbook

The Handbook contains 46 chapters, divided into six parts. Part I deals with theoretical approaches to private law (law and economics; critical and social theory; relational justice). Parts II, III and IV, on the law of obligations, property, and corporate and commercial law, respectively, are composed of 28 chapters, which leave no (private law) stone unturned. Part V addresses area perspectives from the EU, UK, US, India, Australasia, East and Southeast Asia, Africa, China and Brazil. The concluding Part VI engages with the emerging issues of legal education, lawyering, AI, horizontal effect of human rights and indigenous peoples.

While the Handbook focuses on the intersection between climate change and private law, it is of wider relevance to anyone interested in the field of business and human rights. In this field in the UK, for instance, litigators and courts have recently started to look at causes of action beyond negligence, such as unjust enrichment, property and civil liability for breaches of regulatory law (see, for example, Begum v Maran (UK) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 326; Josiya v British American Tobacco Plc [2021] EWHC 1743 (QB); Campbell v James Finlay (Kenya) Ltd [2023] CSIH 39; Limbu v Dyson Technology Ltd [2024] EWCA Civ 1564). The Handbook offers a treasure trove of ideas about how climate change, and by analogy other business and human rights violations, can be conceptualised across these and other areas of private law.

The Handbook features a chapter on PIL, written by Ekaterina Aristova (University of Surrey) and Uglješa Grušić (UCL). The chapter is available here and here.

The Chapter on PIL

The chapter examines PIL issues arising in transnational climate change cases based on private law. It adopts a broad comparative perspective, going beyond EU PIL to consider a range of legal traditions, while acknowledging that most relevant litigation has so far occurred in Continental Europe.

The chapter’s central argument is that PIL matters for climate change litigation because it can either facilitate or restrict access to remedy by opening or closing the jurisdiction of particular courts, shaping which law applies, and regulating the cross-border effectiveness of remedies. In a world where some courts and laws are more receptive to climate change arguments than others, these choices carry real consequences.

At the same time, the chapter cautions against overstating the current importance of PIL in this field. Transnational climate change cases based on private law remain relatively limited in number. While academic debates about the PIL dimensions of climate litigation are lively and growing, including contested questions about the interpretation of Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation and the relevance of emissions authorisations under Article 17, these debates are only partially reflected in existing case law. In most of the cases that have been brought so far, PIL arguments have either not been raised by the parties, not addressed by the courts, or resolved straightforwardly. The gap between the richness of academic debate and the current state of practice is a defining feature of this field, and one that the chapter seeks to map with care.

The chapter surveys transnational private law cases across three categories: cases seeking reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (for example, Milieudefensie v Shell in the Netherlands); cases seeking remediation of climate change damage (for example, Lliuya v RWE in Germany and Asmania v Holcim in Switzerland); and cases brought under the 2017 Duty of Vigilance Law in France. Against this backdrop, it analyses rules of jurisdiction, applicable law, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

The chapter concludes that, while a dedicated PIL regime for climate litigation may not be necessary, existing rules in most jurisdictions, if interpreted adaptively, can respond to the unique challenges of this field.

Recent Developments

Climate change is a treacherous terrain to navigate. Since the chapter was submitted in July 2025, two significant decisions have already been handed down.

Italy: ENI and the first climate jurisdiction ruling of the Italian Supreme Court

In Italy, the Joint Chambers of the Corte di Cassazione issued their first ruling on jurisdiction in a climate change case brought against a corporation, by decision of 21 July 2025 (Order No 20381). The case was discussed in detail on the EAPIL Blog by Caterina Benini here.

From a PIL perspective, the case is notable because the Corte di Cassazione was called upon to determine jurisdiction under Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation over ENI SpA, an Italian multinational oil and gas company, as the principal corporate defendant, and then to address the more novel question of whether Italian courts also had jurisdiction over two Italian public-body shareholders in their capacity as defendants alongside ENI. The court confirmed jurisdiction, holding that Italian courts are competent to entertain proceedings brought against a company domiciled in Italy and its majority shareholders.

Switzerland: Holcim and the first admissibility ruling in Swiss climate litigation

On 17 December 2025, the Cantonal Court of Zug issued an interim decision in Asmania v Holcim (Case A1 2023 9), declaring admissible the climate lawsuit brought by four residents of Pari Island, Indonesia, against Swiss cement manufacturer Holcim. This is the first time a Swiss court has admitted a climate claim against a large corporation.

The court confirmed the civil nature of the dispute, found that the claimants had a sufficient and current interest to sue, notwithstanding the diffuse and collective dimensions of climate change, and held that the requested emissions-reduction pathway was sufficiently specific and measurable to be enforceable. It rejected Holcim’s argument that climate change is exclusively a matter for the legislature, holding that court decisions complement rather than replace the national climate policy. The court also cited the Hague Court of Appeal’s reasoning on admissibility in Milieudefensie. The jurisdiction of Swiss courts over Holcim is straightforwardly based on Article 2(1) of the Lugano Convention, the equivalent of Article 4(1) of Brussels I bis.

Together, these two decisions confirm the broader trend identified in the chapter: PIL issues are beginning to enter climate litigation in practice, but largely at the threshold jurisdictional stage and on straightforward domicile grounds. The harder questions about choice of law, the ‘mosaic principle’, and the role of Article 17 of Rome II remain, for now, matters of academic debate awaiting their judicial moment.