Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations and the Challenge of Jurisdiction: An Introduction

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This post has been written by Ekaterina Aristova, Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellow, Bonavero Institute of Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford. It is the first post in the EAPIL blog online symposium on Ekaterina Aristova, Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations: The Challenge of Jurisdiction in English Courts (OUP 2024). The others contributions, by Peter Muchlinski, Geert Van Calster, Mukarrum Ahmed, Dalia Palombo and Ekaterina Aristova can be found here, here, here, here and here respectively. Readers are encouraged to participate in the discussion by commenting on the posts.


I am delighted that the EAPIL blog is hosting a symposium on my book, Tort Litigation Against Transnational Corporations: The Challenge of Jurisdiction in English Courts, published earlier this year in the Oxford University Press Private International Law Series. This symposium provides a unique opportunity to reflect on the book’s key themes and to engage in meaningful dialogue about the crucial questions it raises.

At its core, the book examines how English courts navigate jurisdictional challenges in cases involving transnational corporations (TNCs). Specifically, it focuses on tort litigation brought against parent companies registered or having their headquarters in England and their foreign subsidiaries for alleged human rights violations and environmental harm that occurred overseas. These claims leverage the frameworks of tort law and private international law, illustrating how civil remedies can serve as a vital mechanism for accountability when other avenues are unavailable or ineffective.

While the book is written from the perspective of English law, it also draws on examples of similar claims in other jurisdictions to broaden the discussion. For instance, it examines high-profile cases such as the Nevsun litigation in Canada concerning forced labour in Eritrea; the Shell  case in the Netherlands concerning environmental pollution in Nigeria; the KiK case in Germany addressing the deaths of factory workers in Pakistan due to a devastating fire; and the Chevron case in Ecuador involving environmental devastation in the Amazon region. These examples underscore the transnational nature of business and human rights litigation and the common challenges faced across different legal systems.

The Challenge of Jurisdiction

A central question explored in the book is whether English courts should exercise jurisdiction over mass tort claims when England is the home state of a TNC. My research demonstrates that this decision often carries significant consequences: if such claims cannot proceed in English courts, they frequently cannot proceed in any forum. This reality underscores the stakes of jurisdictional determinations, which serve not only as procedural thresholds but also as gateways to substantive justice.

English courts’ decisions on jurisdictional issues reveal critical tensions inherent to cross-border disputes. These cases often involve a delicate balancing act: on one side are victims who face profound obstacles to obtaining redress in their home states due to systemic power imbalances, weak governance or lack of effective remedies. On the other side are corporate defendants, whose legal strategies frequently invoke concerns about predictability, fairness and the alleged risks of judicial overreach or forum shopping.

I argue in the book that the approach of the English courts to the operation of the rules of jurisdiction in business and human rights litigation is workable in practice.

In the pre-Brexit framework, the application of the Brussels I Regulation and the principles of English common law secured a few important wins for the claimants. For instance, the landmark Supreme Court judgments in Vedanta and Okpabi cleared several hurdles necessary to successfully establish the jurisdiction of the English courts against both the local parent and the relevant foreign subsidiary. This approach proved to be viable for many claimants.

Nevertheless, I still aim to demonstrate that the rules of jurisdiction are characterised by a conceptual challenge – a lack of normative recognition that these claims are substantially connected with England. In practice, this is problematic in the context of the wide discretionary powers of the English courts to stay proceedings in favour of the foreign forum or refuse service out of the jurisdiction. The change in the UK’s status under the Brussels I Regulation does not mean that overseas claims against British multinationals are now banned in England. The claimants are able to rely on the common law rules to initiate proceedings against English parent companies as well as foreign subsidiaries as necessary or proper parties. At the same time, as evidenced by the ongoing proceedings against Dyson, a revival of the forum non conveniens control may weaken the position of foreign claimants before the English courts. If the claimants fail to produce cogent evidence that no substantial justice will be obtainable in the foreign forum, the English courts may decline jurisdiction over claims against both local parent companies and foreign subsidiaries.

I argue that the position of claimants would be improved if greater recognition were afforded to the underlying nature of the dispute when identifying the appropriateness of England for trying business and human rights claims. These cases should not be viewed as a dispute arising solely from the subsidiary’s operations and, as such, having forum connections solely with the foreign state. Rather, they are about allocating liability between the parent company and the subsidiary, and the jurisdictional inquiry could and should reflect it.

Private Claims, Public Interest

An important theme running through the book is the dual nature of these claims: while they are framed as private disputes, they often serve broader public interest purposes. Tort litigation against TNCs is more than a matter of resolving liability between claimants and corporate defendants – it also functions as a tool for advancing corporate accountability for human rights and protecting emerging public norms.

By situating these cases at the intersection of private law and public interest, the book highlights how tort litigation challenges traditional distinctions between public and private norms. It argues that English courts’ approaches to jurisdiction in these cases have far-reaching implications for the global regulatory landscape, particularly in the field of business and human rights.

Looking Ahead

The book concludes by advocating for a more nuanced approach to jurisdiction in tort litigation against TNCs, one that complements rather than replaces substantive legal rules on corporate accountability. It argues that private international law when applied thoughtfully, can serve as a powerful tool to bridge governance gaps in the business and human rights field. While litigation is not a perfect solution, it plays an important role in the absence of binding international frameworks. It offers victims a means of asserting their rights, challenging power imbalances and seeking remedies in otherwise inaccessible contexts.

I am thrilled to have an esteemed panel of discussants – Professor Peter Muchlinski, Professor Geert van Calster, Dr Dalia Palombo and Dr Mukarrum Ahmed – join the symposium. Each brings a unique perspective to the debates sparked by the book, from legal theory to regulatory practice, and I am eager to hear their insights.

This symposium is an opportunity to engage critically with the questions at the heart of my book: How should courts balance competing interests in cross-border tort claims? What role should home states play in regulating their corporations’ overseas conduct? And how can private international law evolve to meet the challenges of globalisation? I look forward to these discussions and hope they will inspire new thinking about the intersections of law, business and human rights.

1 reply
  1. Marco Pasqua
    Marco Pasqua says:

    Dear Ekaterina,

    First of all, let me express my heartfelt thanks for the symposium on your book, and my compliments extend to the organizer and all the contributors. It is exceptionally stimulating and has deepened my eagerness to read your work quite soon.
    The topics you explore resonate deeply with me, and I find them not only compelling but truly fascinating. With this in mind, I would like to share a few reflections that I hope you will find interesting.

    I would like to start from the end — specifically from a remark you provide in the concluding part of your work, which I find particularly significant — and then circle back to the beginning. I am referring to your assertion that ‘litigation is not a perfect solution’. I agree with you, at least to the extent that it raises a legitimate question about the limitations of litigation as a perfect tool. As you aptly highlight, litigation in the context of human rights and environmental harm indeed presents a ‘challenge’ (I truly appreciate your choice of this term) with respect to jurisdiction. And so, from this thought-provoking conclusion, I will rewind to address the starting point of your contribution.
    In my view, jurisdiction cannot be addressed as an end in itself. A more comprehensive approach is needed. As you point out, access to justice —enshrined in the Third Pillar of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights — requires far more than a mere jurisdictional rule conferring jurisdiction on the courts considered (mine as a civil law approaching to the matter). It calls for something deeper: (effective) access to justice. Achieving this outcome necessitates not only establishing an appropriate jurisdictional framework but also implementing a range of measures — predominantly procedural (i.e. support in standing/representation via NGOs, legal aid in general, access to evidence etc.) though not exclusively (as judicial outcome, a new ‘conception’ of compensation, whether individual or collective) — to transform mere access into effective access.
    One particularly commendable example, in my opinion, is the recently adopted Directive (EU) 2024/1069 on SLAPPs. The directive reflects a clear understanding that in cases involving a unique intersection ‘private claims, public interest’, it is not enough to ensure access to justice. It is equally critical to create a tailored set of procedural tools to guarantee its effectiveness. Of course, other private international law considerations also come into play, such as applicable law issues (where alignment remains absent in the SLAPPs Directive, at least at the moment) and recognition and enforcement ad hoc mechanisms (which, fortunately, have been included).

    In addition, I hold a firm belief in the role, functions and capacity of courts as a paramount forum for the examination and balancing of the interests at stake.
    Against this backdrop, the classic notion of litigation becomes so transformed and adapted in these specific contexts that it leads to an intriguing final question: can we still refer to this as litigation in the traditional sense, or does it represent a new, distinct form of dispute resolution (in the proper adjudication sense) altogether?
    In essence, can the (necessary) adjustments go so far as to distort the core of the litigation mechanism, or are they merely adaptations that leave its essence intact?

    Thank you again for sharing your work, which inspires such meaningful reflections. I look forward to hearing your thoughts and to the opportunity to engage further in these fascinating discussions.

    Warm regards,

    Marco

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