On 20 November 2025, the European Commission (EC) released a communication titled DigitalJustice@2030. It features the EU Digital Justice Strategy for 2025-2030 announced in May 2025 in a call for evidence (reported here).

Building on the EU Council’s e-Justice Strategy 2024-2028 (presented here), the new EC Strategy maps the main actions to be conducted the next five years both at the EU level and within the Member States, to further develop the digitalisation of national justice systems, including the uptake of AI. It includes seven areas of interests and 14 concrete actions to be implemented by 2030. These mainly concern developments relating to digital or AI-based tools for (cross-border) civil justice and the strengthening of the EU’s digital justice architecture.

A Paradigm Shift for EU Civil Justice?

Reading the Strategy may leave with mixed feelings. First, the words “competitiveness” and “investments” are repeated several times (11 and eight times respectively), while the key phrase “access to justice” – one of the cornerstones of judicial cooperation in civil matters – is mentioned only seven times. Does it mean that the new Strategy announces a shift to a market-oriented or even post-adjudicative EU justice? Second, the Strategy’s conclusion states that “with wide-scale digitalisation, it will no longer matter where users live as all Member States will have a digital justice system and access to justice via digital tools will be universal”. This prediction is surprising and may seem like digital utopia. It could also be understood as the end of private international law (PIL): no more territorial location and no more borders, and therefore no more questions of competent jurisdictions or applicable law. Is this really the case?

The Birth of European e-Justice

The objective of developing European e-Justice dates back some twenty years ago. In 2008, the Commission published a communication titled Towards a European e-Justice Strategy, defining the concept of e-Justice as “the judicial systems’ application of information and communication technologies (ICT) in their administrative procedures”. E-Justice aims at “[enhancing] these systems’ functional and financial effectiveness, the collaboration between legal authorities, as well as citizens’ access to justice” (see here).

At that time, two main actions were launched.

First, the creation of an e-Justice Portal (still in use, and greatly enriched with new functionalities and information) to provide citizens with easier access to judicial information, including a direct access to a selection of European procedures.

Second, the promotion of electronic tools to support cross-border judicial proceedings, such as the use of videoconferencing tools and a network of secure exchanges for sharing information among judicial authorities in the EU.

It also led to the creation of the European Case-Law Identifier (ECLI) and the development of pilot projects between Member States, such as the e-CODEX project which has now become an EU digital infrastructure based on e-Codex Regulation (presented here).

From e-Justice to Digitalisation of Justice in the EU

2020 was a turning point marked by the publication of a new EC communication on Digitalisation of justice in the European Union. It followed “the COVID-19 crisis [which had] considerably impacted the functioning of Member States’ justice systems and adversely affected EU cross-border judicial cooperation”. In response, the Commission proposed to take action both at European level to strengthen judicial cooperation and at national level to support Member States in the digitalisation of their justice systems.

Going beyond the development of electronic tools aiming at computerising judicial processes, digitalisation should reflect a more systemic transformation. It is based on a data-driven ecosystem and the introduction of digital technologies in the administration of justice. In that respect, the communication set up a “toolbox approach” consisting in “a comprehensive set of legal, financial and IT instruments to be used by the various actors in [the national] justice systems according to their needs”.

This has resulted in the adoption of core legal instruments focused on the digitalisation of EU judicial cooperation as exemplified by the Digitalisation Regulation (analysed here). This instrument digitalises 24 EU cross-border procedures in civil and criminal matters – with full effect in 2031.

Digital and AI-Enhanced Justice as a New Step

The novel EC Strategy DigitalJustice@2030 is conceived as a continuum of this ongoing process of digitising judicial processes, while taking into account the rapid advances in AI and legal technologies. It also builds on the growing acquis within the digital single market policy, especially in the fields of data and AI.

The Strategy can also be read as an attempt to start reshaping EU justice in a digital society. This involves enhanced development of digital tools and technical infrastructure to support the digitisation of national judicial systems of the Member States. At the same time, this national base is one of the strategy’s greatest challenges. Indeed, the EU competences are limited to cross-border civil justice pursuant to Article 81 TFEU. However, the digitalisation of justice cannot be achieved while excluding domestic justice. Therefore, the main actions’ proposals laid down in the Strategy are non-binding for Member States and – as clearly stated – rest on the “sustained cooperation between the Member States and the Commission”.

Digital and AI-Focused Judicial Training

An essential aspect of this dynamic of redefining justice in the digital age is the training of judges, judicial staff and, more broadly, legal practitioners. This aspect is covered by the European Judicial Training Strategy 2025-2030, published by the Commission on the same day as DigitalJustice@2030.

This Training Strategy provides for the thematic structuring of European fundings for training in the field of justice, focusing exclusively on the advent of digital justice. The objective is to enhance digital and AI literacy among judges and lawyers. This also includes improving their knowledge of EU digital law, both in its market and judicial dimensions.

Furthermore, the document highlights the need for judges to become familiar with the development of digital technologies, particularly AI-based tools, and the challenges associated with their use. Interdisciplinarity and the joint development of digital justice – between legal experts and computer scientists – are essential and are already at the heart of several international and local approaches to ‘algorithmic justice’ (see for instance here and here).

Digital and AI-Based Tools for (Cross-Border) Justice

A large part of the DigitalJustice@2030’s initiatives focuses on providing judges with technological tools. On the one hand, the Commission intends to support Member States and legal professionals in using these tools. This will mainly take the form of exchanges of best practices and guidelines drafted by the Commission. For instance, EC guidelines for the deployment of high-risk AI systems in the administration of justice within the meaning of the AI Act (as reported here) should be prepared.

In addition, the Commission plans to create an IT toolbox (to be hosted here) consisting of collecting AI tools for courts that are operational in the judicial systems of volunteer Member States, with a view to sharing technology with other Member States. This approach is interesting, even if it will raise significant interoperability challenges. However, it falls short of the Digitalisation Regulation which requires the Commission to provide reference software for judicial communication to be connected to e-Codex in the absence of a national solution. Still, pooling AI-based tools is an important step towards building trust between stakeholders and, in the longer term, considering European tools.

EU’s Digital Justice Architecture

The digital structuring of judicial systems is central to the concept of digital justice. This architecture ensures coordination between information systems, data flows, institutional actors and legal rules. In that respect, the new Strategy aims to create a “European legal data space”. The objective is to bring all online legal data – related to the EU jurisdiction – together, in one place, and make them interoperable and easily accessible. It includes EU and Member States legislation and caselaw, using Eur-lex, N-Lex and the e-Justice Portal to host the legal data. This implies – for data interoperablity – that Member States systematically use European normative identifiers, i.e. ELI and ECLI, as this is not currently the case.

The very concept of European legal data space is a game changer.

It is closely linked to data governance, which is a crucial dimension of any digital architecture. It should deepen the integration of the European judicial area by providing instant access to the 27 legal systems of Member States.

This would mean, in a conflict-of-laws’ perspective, easy access in the courts of one Member State to the foreign law of another Member State. It could make the EU jurisdiction closer to a federal judicial system by making legal systems interoperable, including by overcoming multilingualism. It should also serve as a valuable resource for developing proper European legal AI tools.

This is an exciting prospect but still a long way off. Access to data – such as foreign law – will not be sufficient if it is not supplemented by a “cultural understanding” of that data in context.

Concluding Remarks

Contrary to its dominant narrative, the DigitalJustice@2030 Strategy does not address competitiveness in the European judicial area. It outlines the contours of tomorrow’s ‘Europe of Justice’, imbued with the technologies of its time. Contemporary AI techniques can profoundly transform civil justice by facilitating access to the courts, particularly in cross-border cases that will not be diluted in the digital ecosystem.

But the path, while not utopian, will not be easy, either politically or technically.

From 1 January to 30 June 2026, Cyprus holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time. Beyond its broader political and institutional priorities, the programme of the Cyprus Presidency also addresses aspects of private international law.

Operating under the motto “An Autonomous Union. Open to the World”, the Cyprus Presidency unfolds against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical uncertainty and complex global challenges. In this context, autonomy is presented as a key step in the Union’s evolving integration process, enabling the EU to act independently when necessary while remaining open to cooperation with external partners. This approach is consistent with the Joint Declaration on EU legislative priorities for 2026, signed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, which reflects the shared institutional commitment to advancing key legislative files.

In the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, the Cyprus Presidency aims to conclude negotiations on the Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood, including the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood. The Cyprus Presidency aims also to reach a general approach on the Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement of measures and cooperation in matters relating to the protection of adults.

The Cyprus Presidency takes place within the framework of the trio formed together with Poland and Denmark, which have adopted a joint 18-month programme covering the period from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2026. The trio’s shared priorities – a strong and secure Europe, a prosperous and competitive Europe, and a free and democratic Europe – provide the broader political context within which Cyprus will pursue its agenda.

This post was written by Marco Pasqua (PhD, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan). It is the final contribution to the EAPIL on-line symposium on the judgment of the Court of Justice in Cupriak-Trojan. The previous posts were written by Laima Vaige, Alina Tryfonidou, Elizabeth Perry and Anna Wysocka-Bar, and can be found here, here, here and here, respectively. Readers are encouraged to participate in the discussion by commenting on the various posts in the symposium.


On 8 October 2025, the European Commission published a Communication entitled Union of Equality: LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy 2026–2030, concerning LGBTIQ+ rights and LGBTIQ+ related actions. The document identifies three main strategic objectives.

The first, Protect, focuses on strengthening safeguards against violence and discrimination, including hate crime, hate speech, online safety and the protection of LGBTIQ+ youth. The second, Empower, aims at enabling LGBTIQ+ people to live and work freely across the EU, promoting inclusion in education, health and employment, and reinforcing anti-discrimination protection. The third objective, Engage, is about cooperation with Member States and international partners to advance LGBTIQ+ equality, support civil society and promote human rights globally.

Relevance of Cupriak-Trojan to the Commission’s Equality Strategy

The ruling of the Court of Justice in Cupriak-Trojan (C-713/23) is relevant to the above objectives in several ways and helps clarify how they may be implemented in practice.

As regards the relevant legal framework, Cupriak-Trojan further consolidates the trajectory of the Court’s case law in Coman (C-673/16), Pancharevo (C-490/20), K.S. (C-2/21) and Mirin (C-4/23). These rulings confirm that, when assessing Member State measures affecting the exercise of EU citizenship rights and family life, the central question is whether a particular action, at Member States level, amounts to an infringement of those rights derived from Articles 20-21 TFEU read together with Articles 7 and 21(1) of the Charter.

In addition, Wojewoda Mazowiecki reaffirms the direct effect of Articles 20-21 TFEU in this context, thereby ensuring that individuals can rely directly on these provisions before national authorities and courts. A further development may result from a pending case – Shipov (C-43/24) – which raises related questions and may offer additional clarification.

This line of case law reinforces the view that the Commission may legitimately prioritise measures aimed at ensuring procedural equivalence and effective administrative recognition as core elements of LGBTIQ+ equality policy. The above aspects are particularly relevant to the Empower objective, as they help ensure that individuals can meaningfully exercise their EU citizenship and free-movement rights in cross-border family situations.

Ensuring Equal Rights Across Borders: The Role of Private International Law

The policy context – namely, the Commission’s overarching approach to LGBTIQ+ equality as set out in the Communication – forms the backdrop for the section Ensuring equal rights across borders. In this part of the document, the Commission highlights the role of private international law in facilitating the continuity and recognition of family and personal status rights for LGBTIQ+ people who move within the Union.

While 22 Member States currently provide for marriage equality and/or registered partnerships, national rules on family status still differ significantly. This diversity is not, in itself, problematic. It becomes an issue when appropriate private international law mechanisms are lacking, creating uncertainty for families whose status has been validly established in one Member State but is not automatically recognised in another. According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights’ third LGBTIQ survey, around 14% of LGBTIQ+ parents face challenges of this type, particularly regarding the recognition of parent–child relationships.

The issues addressed in this section of the Communication – in particular, the challenges arising from the absence of adequate private international law rules – are directly affected by the Wojewoda Mazowiecki ruling. The Court of Justice clarified that the refusal to recognise or transcribe a family status already established in another Member State may amount to an unjustified restriction on free movement and an interference with the right to family life. This reinforces the need for reliable cross-border recognition mechanisms under EU law.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that these questions require balancing different considerations. In addition to free movement and fundamental rights, the EU Treaties also refer to the respect for national identities and legal traditions under Article 67 TFEU. The challenge, therefore, is not to assert the primacy of one objective and policy over all others, but to develop fair and workable solutions that operate coherently within the EU’s multi-layered constitutional structure.

This tension between EU-level guarantees and Member States’ constitutional identities has already been examined by this author in the EAPIL blog post commenting on Advocate General de la Tour’s opinion in the same case. As noted there, a convincing analysis must account not only for EU integrationist values – such as freedom of movement and non-discrimination – but also for the legitimate interests of Member States in regulating personal status according to their own constitutional traditions. EU law itself recognises that national competences remain protected, provided they are exercised without depriving EU rights of their essence.

Several Member States have entrenched definitions of marriage and parenthood at the constitutional level. Article 18 of Polish Constitution defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Hungary’s Fundamental Law, as amended in 2020, similarly states that “the mother shall be a woman, the father shall be a man”. Romanian Constitution defines the family in Article 48, and although the 2018 referendum to specify that marriage is between a man and a woman did not meet the turnout threshold, the debate reflects a deliberate constitutional stance.

Most recently, Slovakia adopted Constitutional Law No. 255/2025, amending the Constitution with provisions that emphasise national identity and sovereignty in areas such as marriage, parenthood, personal status and family life. The reform introduces new paragraphs 6 and 7 in Article 7, affirming that these matters fall within the exclusive domain of the Slovak constitutional order and cannot be delegated, limited, or interpreted as being transferable to any external authority beyond the national constitutional framework. Article 15 is amended to prohibit any agreement to create a child for another person. Article 41 is revised to state that the parents of a child are the mother (a woman) and the father (a man), and to restrict adoption primarily to married couples or, exceptionally, to single persons when in the child’s best interests. A new Article 52a further provides that Slovakia recognises only the biologically determined sex of men and women.

These examples illustrate that constitutional identity claims are not abstract arguments but concrete legal constraints that shape how Member States approach questions of family status and recognition – an issue that the Cupriak-Trojan judgment cannot disregard, even as it strengthens EU-law-based guarantees.

A more grounded point emerging from the ruling is its focus on the tangible difficulties created by divergent national practices. These include fragmented administrative approaches, obstacles in accessing social protection, difficulties in obtaining identity documents and uncertainty around property or inheritance rights. By highlighting these concrete effects, the judgment adds political and legal momentum to the Strategy’s commitments on cross-border recognition and judicial cooperation.

In its Communication, the Commission notes that several EU private international law instruments – including Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 on matrimonial and parental responsibility matters, Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 on maintenance obligations, Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 and Regulation 2016/1104 on matrimonial and partnership property regimes and Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 on succession – already ensure the mutual recognition of judgments in cross-border family situations, irrespective of sexual orientation or gender identity. The Commission monitors how these instruments operate in practice for LGBTIQ+ families and maintains dialogue with Member States to identify practical challenges.

The Communication’s selective examples raise a question worth noting. Regulation (EU) 606/2013 on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters is not included in the short list, despite its clear relevance to the Protect pillar. This omission may reflect the Communication’s focus on instruments that shape status recognition, but it also suggests a potential blind spot: distinctly procedural protection tools and their interaction with status recognition deserve explicit consideration when designing comprehensive cross-border safeguards for LGBTIQ+ families.

The Communication also reiterates the Commission’s support for the Proposal for a Regulation on parenthood. This initiative would harmonise core private international law rules and require Member States to recognise parenthood established in another Member State for its civil effects more broadly, not only when free movement is at stake. Recognition, however, would still operate within the limits and safeguards set out in the proposed Regulation itself (e.g., public policy), so it would not guarantee recognition in every possible case. Still, the instrument would markedly improve legal certainty and strengthen the protection of children’s rights across the Union.

Cupriak-Trojan also reinforces the logic underpinning these initiatives. It confirms that, where a family status has been lawfully created in one Member State, the authorities of another cannot simply disregard it in ways that undermine free movement or the right to family life. At the same time, the judgment operates within the established framework of EU private international law, which already accommodates exceptions and safeguards rather than imposing an unqualified, binary model of recognition.

Finally, the Commission notes that legal gender recognition remains uneven across Europe. While some Member States have embraced self-determination models, others still require medical interventions – a practice the European Court of Human Rights has deemed incompatible with human rights standards (Application No 55216/08, S.V. v ItalyApplications No 79885/12, 52471/13 and 52596/13A.P., Garçon and Nicot v. France). The Commission explains that greater convergence in this area would also support the consistent functioning of EU law in cross-border situations, and it therefore intends to facilitate exchanges of best practices to encourage Member States to adopt self-determination procedures free from unnecessary medical or age-related barriers. Again, Cupriak-Trojan confirms that procedural mechanisms cannot be used to undermine substantive EU rights, highlighting that recognition must be effective and available to all without discrimination – relevant for both the Empower and Protect pillars of the Strategy.

Judicial Cooperation and Enforcement Perspective

The ruling in Cupriak-Trojan reinforces the Strategy’s attention to judicial cooperation under both Article 81 and Article 83 TFEU. While the role of Article 81 in supporting mutual recognition and cooperation in family matters has already been highlighted, the judgment signals that Article 83 TFEU – traditionally associated with combating hate crime and enhancing criminal-law responses under the Protect pillar – may also be relevant in framing EU-level responses to discrimination against LGBTIQ+ families. At the same time, instruments based on Article 81 TFEU (and proposals such as the Commission’s parenthood regulation) appear increasingly viable, both politically and legally, as tools to secure cross-border recognition of parenthood and other family-law effects without requiring Member States to alter their domestic definitions of marriage under (Empower).

From an enforcement perspective, as ‘guardian of the Treaties’, the Commission monitors Member States’ compliance with EU law and acts decisively to uphold EU values. For example, in 2022 it referred Hungary to the CJEU over discriminatory national rules affecting LGBTIQ+ people, arguing that these laws violated fundamental rights, single market rules and core EU values under Article 2 TEU (C-769/22). The case drew support from sixteen Member States and the European Parliament, and while the Advocate General issued an opinion in June 2025, the CJEU’s judgment is still pending. Cupriak-Trojan reinforces the Commission’s supervisory toolkit – infringement action, targeted guidance and structured dialogues with Member States – by clarifying the minimum baseline of recognition EU law requires, signalling to national courts and administrations the obligation to interpret or, where impossible, disapply domestic provisions that would produce the legal vacuum condemned by the CJEU (Engage).

Practical Priorities and Next Steps

The judgment of the Court of Justicealso clarifies and strengthens the Strategy’s practical priorities: it highlights the need to develop procedural tools that provide recognition and legal certainty, such as European certificates and improved mutual-recognition rules; it emphasises that monitoring and Member State action plans should focus not only on legal reforms but also on administrative practice, interoperability of registers and training of officials; it underlines the importance of linking anti-discrimination enforcement with private international law, so that equality and free-movement rights are effective in practice; and it supports targeted capacity-building in those countries where legal and administrative gaps cause the greatest obstacles for LGBTIQ+ families.

In short, Cupriak-Trojan provides judicial momentum for the Strategy, highlighting the need to complement high-level policy objectives with concrete administrative and procedural mechanisms. The Commission’s next steps should focus on translating these commitments into practical instruments and administrative tools that ensure cross-border recognition and prevent the fragmentation that the ruling highlights.

On 26 May 2025, the European Commission launched a call for evidence to support the preparation of the EU Digital Justice Strategy for 2025-2030 – DigitalJustice@2030. Anyone can contribute by logging in to an EU login account. The call is open for feedback until 23 June 2025.

 General Context

As explained on the dedicated webpage, this new strategy aims “to support and strengthen Member States’ capabilities to deploy and use digital technologies, including AI tools, in their judicial systems”. Moreover, it should propose a “set of tools (…) to improve the efficiency, resilience and quality of justice”.

It is a clear continuum of Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters adopted in 2023. This latter instrument only tackles certain aspects of digitalisation in the context of cross-border disputes (briefly analysed here). According to the Commission, there is a need “to digitalise practices that are common to all justice systems” notably via “[common] or similar IT tools (including AI tools) and data standards”. To achieve this innovative and integrative step in judicial digitalisation new mechanisms and common frames of reference may be beneficial at EU level.

Future EC Communication

The future document will take the format of a Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. It will therefore not be a binding legislative text, but a soft law instrument containing policy guidelines that may also give rise to future toolkits or recommendations for Member States and their judicial authorities. There are two main reasons for that. First, the digitalisation of judicial systems goes beyond the Union’s competence on judicial cooperation in civil matters (which is cross-border by nature pursuant to Article 81 TFEU), as it blurs the frontier between cross-border disputes, on one side, and purely domestic cases, on the other side. Second, the deployment of digital and AI-based technologies within the Judiciary is a highly complex and sensitive process, implying new technical, ethical and legal skills as well as financial investments. However, Member States are not progressing at the same pace on these issues.

The forthcoming Communication will be drafted under the lead of DG Justice and Consumers (DG JUST) within its “A1 Unit” in charge of Digital transition and judicial training”. The text is expected to be published in the last quarter of 2025 and should be adopted together with the new Judicial Training Strategy (2025-2030).

Next Steps

The supporting document of the call for evidence provides for a list of possible workstreams with actions to be further developed:

Data on digitalisation of national justice systems and exchange of best practices: to create an overview of digitalisation practices in national justice systems, allowing meaningful exchange of best practices. Member States should be able to exploit synergies and implement existing well-functioning systems; and to aim at their interoperability – rather than each Member State developing its own national tools.

IT/AI Toolbox for Justice: to accelerate the level of digitalisation and generate cost savings for Member States, the toolbox could pool information about IT (including AI) tools at EU level.

AI in justice: to ensure the consistent application of the rules under the AI Act and help national authorities to make informed decisions on whether to use AI tools in justice, for which purpose and how. This would include identifying the opportunities related to the development and use of AI tools in the framework of judicial proceedings.

European Legal Data Space (ELDS): to ensure wide and systematic access to EU and national legislation and case-law and to promote the use of legislative and judicial data for the training and development of justice-adapted AI tools.

Digital court proceedings: to achieve fully digitalised cross-border court proceedings in civil and commercial matters. Key enablers include the use of trusted digital identities such as the European Digital Identity Wallet and the European Business Wallet, qualified signatures and seals, time stamps, e-delivery and e-archiving.

EU funding for digitalisation: several workstreams depend on access to sufficient funding at national and EU level. Availability of EU funding should be ensured under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the existing financial programmes. Without prejudice to the Commission proposal and the negotiations with the co-legislators, the need for appropriate funding will be assessed for the next MFF, covering the period 2028-2034.

This post was prepared together with Sofiya Kernychna PhD (Jagiellonian University).


This post aims at presenting introduction of online marriage in Ukraine and the attitude towards its recognition in neighboring Poland.

Digitalisation of Public Services in Ukraine

In 2019 the Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine introduced a resolution  creating a web portal, a state mobile application and the brand ‘State in a smartphone’ – Diia (acronym for ‘State and I’ in Ukrainian). Later, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the resolution titled Matters of the Unified State Web Portal of Electronic Services and the Unified State Portal of Administrative Services, which regulated the operation of the Diia Portal. At first Diia Portal provided access to a digital driver’s licence and vehicle registration. In 2024, the number of users was over 21 million Ukrainians.

Digitalisation of Some Aspects of Marriage Conclusion in Ukraine

The 2022 aggression of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, and the martial law that was introduced in Ukraine as a result of it, also affected family relations in Ukraine, including the procedure for conclusion of marriage and its state registration. Due to the full-scale invasion, many men and women joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine and began to take part in military operations.

On 7 March 2022, the Government of Ukraine has adopted resolution titled Some Matters of State Registration of Marriage under Martial Law, which provided for a separate procedure for military personnel and certain other persons to conclude a marriage during martial law. In particular, state registration of marriage if one of the fiancés is, for example, a member of the Armed Forces, the Security Service, a police officer or an employee of a healthcare institution, could be conducted by the departments of the state civil registration office without the personal presence of such fiancé. In such a case, the application, which was at the same time a confirmation of the fact of consent to conclude a marriage, was submitted to the commander (supervisor) of this fiancé, who certified the authenticity of the signature and ensured that the application was forwarded to the registry office. The peculiarity of this procedure was that it was possible to register a marriage outside the civil registry office, in which case the marriage certificate was drawn up by the commander. On 30 October 2024 the above resolution was repealed due to introduction of online marriage conclusion and registration.

In the context of martial law, as part of digitalisation in Ukraine, another innovation has emerged. Since 27 February 2023, it has become possible for all Ukrainians to apply for marriage via the Diia Portal. The procedure took 10 minutes. It was possible only to submit an e-application for marriage registration. The marriage itself could not yet be concluded and registered in Diia Portal. Marriage registration, as well as the issuance of a marriage certificate, took place only at the civil registry office.

Introduction of an Online Marriage in Ukraine

On 29 March 2024, the Government of Ukraine adopted the resolution Procedure for the Implementation of a Pilot Project for the State Registration of Marriages in Electronic Form. It provides that ‘the process of remote marriage through the Diia application has several stages, including: submission of an application by a man and a woman using the Diia application with an electronic signature; the process of verifying the accuracy of the data provided by the future spouses, with the possibility of correcting inaccuracies and errors; the possibility of setting the date of registration of the marriage; the process of registering a marriage with a certificate of marriage; and the process of obtaining a marriage certificate’.

In June 2024, Ukraine launched the online marriage registration service through the Diia application, opening a new era in the field of state civil registration. This historic step is aimed at maximising digitalisation and simplifying procedures for couples wishing to register their marriage. The Central Department of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine has launched the Digital Office of the Civil Registry Office, which processes marriage applications through the Diia Portal. This innovative solution is especially relevant for couples who, due to circumstances, cannot be together, as well as for those who value minimal contact with government agencies. On 22 June 2024, first 3 couples contracted and registered their marriage online in Ukraine.

The entire process of marriage registration takes place in the Diia – from application to conclusion of the marriage. The application process takes about 10 minutes. The service is provided in one business day. The maximum cost is 1.663,85 UAH (approximately 35 EUR), depending on the selected services and the day of marriage registration. Sometime after the online ceremony, the electronic marriage record is displayed in the Diia application. Later, the Civil Registry Office ensures the delivery and handing over of the marriage certificate to the newly married husband and wife through the Ukrainian Post Office service. Online marriages not only simplify the lives of Ukrainians in the current martial law situation by enabling remote marriage through the Diia application, but also provide convenience, time savings, transparency and, most importantly, guarantee security, especially in the context of military operations.

Transcription of Foreign Marriage Certificates in Poland

Being aware of the innovations in Ukraine, Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs issued an official letter of 15 May 2025 addressed to Polish authorities concerning the potential recognition of marriages contracted online by Ukrainian citizens, which would happen in Poland via transcription of the marriage certificate into Polish Civil Status Registry. In case a Ukrainian citizen lives in Poland and needs a Polish civil status certificate for the legal use in Poland (for example in order to obtain PESEL – Polish Personal Identification Number used in numerous administrative and civil procedures), this person might want to have a Ukrainian marriage certificate transcribed. One might have doubts whether an ‘online’ marriage certificate can be transcribed in Poland if online form of contracting marriage is unknown to Polish legal system.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs informs that if a foreign law provides for the possibility to celebrate a marriage remotely (online) and an appropriate certificate was issued by a competent authority, in accordance with the local law, then transcription might be possible in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Civil Status Records. If a foreign certificate in question does not indicate that the marriage was celebrated at a distance, this aspect should not be further examined. If the document reveals that the marriage was concluded “electronically”, the discretion of the civil status registrar is still limited to the examination allowed by the Law on Civil Status Records. Potential refusal of transcription may take place on the basis of the grounds exclusively enumerated in Article 107, which include, in addition to the formal requirements relating to the foreign document itself, a public policy clause.

Marriage Certificate and Public Policy Clause

In order to assess whether the transcription might be perceived as contrary to public policy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs consulted the Department of International Cooperation and Human Rights within the Ministry of Justice. In its Opinion, the Ministry of Justice reminded that the use of public policy clause against transcription of foreign civil status certificates was lately subject to voluminous case law of administrative courts (which together with Civil Status Registrars) were faced with marriage certificates of same-sex couples or birth certificates indicating persons of same-sex as parents (aspects reported also on this blog in: Legal Status of a Child Born Through Surrogacy – Latest From Poland or AG De La Tour’s Opinion in Wojewoda Mazowiecki on Poland’s Refusal to Transcribe a Same-Sex Marriage Certificate).

Then, the question is posed whether contracting marriage by the future spouses using modern distance communication technologies constitutes a violation of any fundamental principle of the Polish legal order or whether it should rather be considered ‘another manifestation of the rapid e-development of social relations, falling within the standards of the rule of law’.

The Opinion rightly indicates that family law in Poland foresees that sometimes a declaration of a future spouse can be made by a representative, and therefore, without the simultaneous physical presence of both future spouses in the same place. Hence, the legal system recognizes that various practical difficulties may prevent future spouses from physically appearing at the same time in the same place. It is also pointed out in the Opinion that at the time these provisions were drafted, the technical possibilities of digital communication were simply unknown.

Then, it is reminded that the introduction of online marriage is ‘undoubtedly a sign of the times’. Also, the state of Polish law fully confirms such conclusion. The COVID pandemic has contributed to the rapid development of the digital society in Poland. Trends in national and international law indicate a move towards e-justice (for example, online court hearings, while the adjudicating panel, participants and witnesses are physically located in different places become reality). Even though in Poland there are no online marriages, the Ministry of Justice ‘does not see any arguments’ in favor if refusing transcription of contemplated Ukrainian marriage certificates based on public policy clause.

It is worth to mention that the Ministry of Justice supported its standpoint by reference to views presented by legal scholars (citing Ewa Kamarad, Zastosowanie klauzuli porządku publicznego w sprawach dotyczących zawarcia małżeństwa – wybrane zagadnienia, 2012 Problemy Współczesnego Prawa Międzynarodowego, Europejskiego i Porównawczego 10, pp. 106-118 and Michał Wojewoda, Zagraniczne rodzicielstwo osób jednej płci a rejestracja stanu cywilnego w Polsce, 2020 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 8, pp. 30-38 – not available in open access).

Even thought, as the Ministry of Justice emphasized, the Opinion is not binding on Civil Status Registrars or administrative courts, it is a very welcomed voice and might have impact on the approach towards potential transcription of marriage certificates originating also from other jurisdictions (see the post on Utah’s online marriage and its reception in Germany: Match in Virtual Heaven? No, Says German Supreme Court).

On 19 May 2025, the leaders of the European Union (António Costa, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission) and the United Kingdom (Keir Starmer, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom) met in London for the first EU-UK summit since the UK withdrew from the EU.

At the end of the meeting, the leaders adopted three documents, among which a Common Understanding setting out the conclusions of the exploratory talks on areas for potential strengthened bilateral cooperation. Those areas are clasified under the following headings:

  • Security, defence, and development cooperation, comprising security and defence; cooperation on maritime security and safety; development and disaster cooperation; health security.
  • Putting people at the centre of the European Union – United Kingdom relationship.
  • Strengthening our economies while protecting our planet and its resources, comprising energy cooperation (exploring the participation of the United Kingdom in the European Union’s internal electricity market); new technologies; working towards a Common Sanitary and Phytosanitary Area; working towards linking Emission Trading Systems of the European Union and the United Kingdom; provision of services through entry and temporary stay of natural persons for business purposes; competition cooperation.
  • Internal security and judicial cooperation, comprising reinforced law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters; cooperation in relation to drugs risks and threats.
  • Irregular migration, comprising upstream migration; working together on practical solutions and returns; bolstering United Kingdom and European Union border security including through law enforcement cooperation; addressing challenges and abuses of visa policy

In spite of the assertion according to which ‘The UK and the European Commission agreed that it is in their mutual interest to deepen people-to-people ties, particularly for the younger generation’, only a vague non-committal paragraph (number 55) is devoted to judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters:

The European Commission and the United Kingdom note the importance of the positive judicial cooperation in civil and commercial law, including family matters. In this context, they welcome that the Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters will enter into force for the United Kingdom on 1 July 2025.

No mention to cooperation in the area appears in the dedicated website of the European Council listing the main results of the summit.

In a Joint Statement  the leaders of the UK and of the EU have agreed to hold annual summits in order to strengthen the bilateral relationship.

On 11 February 2025, the European Commission adopted its 2025 work programme, titled Moving forward together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union.

Consistent with the political priorities set out last year for the period 2024-2029, the programme contemplates measures aimed, inter alia, at strengthening economic competitiveness, responding to geopolitical instability, addressing migration and climate change and safeguarding European values and democracy.

The initiatives on which the Commission intends to focus in 2025 are listed in three annexes.

Annex I deals with new initiatives. No new measures based on Article 81 TFEU are indicated in the document. However, some of the initiatives considered – in particular those based on Article 114 TFEU – may have at least an indirect impact on private international law issues.

One notable proposal is the First Omnibus Package on Sustainability. On 30 January 2025 the European Commission presented its compass to boost Europe’s competitiveness over the next five years. In this context, the omnibus proposals aim to ease regulatory and administrative burdens on businesses, with a strong focus on simplifying requirements in sustainable finance reporting, sustainability due diligence and taxonomy. The first omnibus package would introduce amendments to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence. The general objective is simplification. Which aspects will be affected remains to be seen.

Another proposal is the EU Space Act, which aims to establish a common framework for sustainability, security and safety in space, ensuring a harmonized, EU-wide approach. Space activities, including those carried for commercial purposes, may raise a range of issues relating to private international law.

The protection of democracy and fundamental values is also addressed. Several non-legislative initiatives are contemplated, including a European Democracy Shield and an EU Strategy to Support, Protect, and Empower Civil Society.

Annex II is about the annual plan on evaluations and fitness checks. It refers to instruments such as Regulation (EU) 2018/302 (the Geo-blocking Regulation — GBR).

Pending legislative proposals are discussed in Annex III. The document refers, among others, to the Proposal for a Regulation on combating late payment in commercial transactions; the Proposal for a Directive on European cross-border associations; the Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of the digital euro and related measures; the Proposal for a Directive harmonizing certain aspects of insolvency law; the Proposal for a Directive on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes; the Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions, and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood, including the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood; and the Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement of measures, and cooperation in matters relating to the protection of adults.

Also interesting is Annex IV, on withdrawals.

The list of proposals that the Commission plans to withdraw includes the Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims. The statedreason for the withdrawal is the absence of a foreseeable agreement, meaning the proposal is effectively blocked, and further progress appears unlikely.

Similarly, the Proposal for a Directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI Liability Directive) is also to be withdrawn. The stated reason is again the lack of a foreseeable agreement, but it is specified that the Commission intends to evaluate whether to introduce a revised proposal or explore an alternative approach.

On 16 January 2025 the European e-Justice Strategy 2024–2028 has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union. It provides a framework designed to enhance the digitalization of justice systems across the EU and is a continuation of the Union’s ongoing efforts to modernize judicial systems.

Context

The Strategy builds on several EU legislative instruments. Among these, Regulation (EU) 2022/850 on the e-CODEX system, which establishes a computerized framework for the secure cross-border exchange of judicial data. This system enables judicial authorities to communicate through secure services, streamlining judicial cooperation. For more details on Regulation (EU) 2022/850, see the earlier posts by Elena Alina Ontanu and Marta Requejo Isidro on this blog, available here and here. Complementing this, the Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 on service of documents and Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 on taking of evidence require the use of interoperable IT systems based on e-CODEX for digital communication in civil and commercial matters starting in May 2025.

The ‘Digitalisation Package’, comprising Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 and Directive (EU) 2023/2843 on the digitalization of cross-border judicial cooperation and access to justice, is central to the EU’s e-Justice initiatives.

These instruments enable natural and legal persons and their representatives to communicate electronically via a European electronic access point. They also allow authorities to securely exchange data in civil and commercial matters with cross-border implications. Implementation of these instruments will require the establishment of national access points and compliance with electronic communication principles. Further insights into Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 are found in Marion Ho-Dac’s post on this blog.

Non-legislative initiatives, such as the consolidation of the e-CODEX system under eu-LISA management, support these legislative measures. Member States play a critical role in connecting to e-CODEX and enabling interaction between authorities, legal professionals and individuals through secure digital channels.

The shift to mandatory compliance with digitalization initiatives highlights the EU’s dedication to legal certainty and operational efficiency in justice systems.

Guiding Principles, Operational Goals, Follow-up Mechanisms

The Strategy is founded on principles that prioritize respect for fundamental rights, access to justice, people centricity, bridging the digital divide, digital empowerment of users and sustainability. Operationally, the Strategy promotes efficiency through principles like the once-only, digital by default approach, interoperability and cybersecurity, dynamic justice, data-driven justice and open source.

The strategic and operational objectives of the e-Justice Strategy’s are then referred to and briefly described. Its overarching goal is to facilitate the right to effective judicial protection, focusing on four key strategic objectives: improving access to digital justice, strengthening judicial cooperation, increasing efficiency and fostering innovation.

To improve access, the Strategy emphasizes inclusivity, ensuring digital justice is accessible to all, with tools like the e-Justice Portal and tailored training for users and professionals. Efforts will focus on bridging the digital divide and enhancing the functionality of online platforms to deliver added value.

In terms of cooperation, the strategy prioritizes interoperability between Member States’ systems, supported by the implementation of the ‘Digitalisation Package’. Real-time tools, such as video conferencing and AI-driven interpretation, will further streamline cross-border judicial processes.

Efficiency is another critical focus, with data-oriented approaches driving transparency and innovation. Technologies like automated case allocation and online dispute resolution will optimize resources, while selective digitization of face-to-face processes ensures flexibility.

Finally, the Strategy promotes innovation by integrating new technologies and promoting the exchange of experiences and best practices across Member States. This approach aims to enhance the justice system’s functionality while safeguarding fundamental rights.

The Strategy’s action plan is outlined. The e-Justice domain focuses on several key working areas: e-CODEX, e-Justice Portal, electronic access points, real time (RT) applications, law data and case law, AI and other innovative IT services in the justice domain and, finally, other working areas.

The strategic objectives are further broken down into operational objectives, for which specific actions to be taken and the actors involved are identified.

A follow-up mechanism ensures effective implementation through annual monitoring reports, stakeholder consultations and a mid-term review in 2026 to adjust the Strategy as needed.

On 17 October 2023, the European Commission adopted its 2024 work programme. As explained in a press release, the programme aims at simplifying the rules for citizens and businesses across the Union.

The initiatives that the Commission plans to take, or pursue with particular interest, in the course of 2024 are listed in three annexes.

Annex I is concerned with new policy and legislative initiatives. None of the initiatives in question relates to judicial cooperation in civil matters.

Annex II, on REFIT initiatives (i.e., initiatives aimed at making EU law simpler, less costly and future proof), contemplates, among other things, a revision of online dispute resolution for consumer disputes.

The repeal of the online dispute resolution for consumer disputes Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 524/2013) will remove associated reporting requirements, which are no considered to be longer needed. In addition, a proposal for a directive amending Directive 2013/11 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes is addressed. The goal is, generally, to simplify and reduce current reporting requirements.

Various procedures with possible implications for private international law are featured in Annex III, which lists the pending procedures that the Commission regards as a priority. Although they are based on Article 114 TFEU rather than Article 81 TFEU, they are also relevant to private international law, notably insofar as they lay down provisions which are meant to apply whatever the applicable law, as determined under conflict-of-law rules, and accordingly interfere with the latter.

The list features the proposed Regulation on combating late payment in commercial transactions. The text is meant to address the inadequacy of the current legal framework, as shaped by Directive 2011/7 (the Late Payment Directive).

The proposed Directive on liability for defective products, repealing Directive 85/374 (Product Liability Directive) is also among the listed priorities, as is the proposed Directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI Liability Directive). The objective of the latter is to promote the rollout of trustworthy AI to harvest its full benefits for the internal market. It does so by ensuring victims of damage caused by AI obtain equivalent protection to victims of damage caused by products in general. It also reduces legal uncertainty of businesses developing or using AI regarding their possible exposure to liability and prevents the emergence of fragmented AI-specific adaptations of national civil liability rules.

The proposed Directive on improving working conditions in platform work is equally on the list. Its rules may have a bearing on the operation of the rules of Rome I on the law applicable to employment contracts.

Annex III goes on by mentioning the proposed Directive on European cross-border associations, and the connected proposed Regulation as regards the use of the Internal Market Information System and the Single Digital Gateway, which aim at facilitating the effective exercise of freedom of movement of non-profit associations operating in the internal market.

The list further includes the proposals on the digital euro (see further this post) and the proposed Directive harmonising certain aspects of insolvency law. According to the Commission, action at EU level is needed in the field of insolvency to substantially reduce the fragmentation of insolvency regimes. The future instrument would support the convergence of targeted elements of Member States’ insolvency rules and create common standards across all Member States, thus facilitating cross-border investment. Measures at EU level would ensure a level playing field and avoid distortions of cross-border investment decisions caused by lack of information about and differences in the designs of insolvency regimes. This would help to facilitate cross-border investments and competition while protecting the orderly functioning of the single market. Since divergences in insolvency regimes are a key obstacle to cross-border investment, addressing this obstacle is crucial to realising a single market for capital in the EU.

On 18 October 2022, the European Commission adopted its 2023 Work Programme. As explained in the press release that accompanies the document, the programme aims to set out a bold and transformative agenda in the face of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, rising energy prices and the knock-on effects on the economy, while defending Europe’s democratic values and pursuing long-term goals and interests.

The initiatives that the Commission plans to take, or pursue with particular interest, in the course of 2023 are listed in three annexes.

Annex I is concerned with the new policy and legislative initiatives that the Commission intends to propose. None of the items in this Annex is based on Article 81 TFUE, on judicial cooperation in civil matters. No reference is made in the document to two topics that formed (and still form) the object of discussion among academics and stakeholder, namely the recognition of parenthood and the protection of vulnerable adults.

Annex II, on REFIT initiatives (i.e., initiatives aimed at making EU law simpler, less costly and future proof), contemplates, among other things, a revision of alternative dispute resolution and online dispute resolution framework to improve enforcement of consumer law. A strong alternative dispute resolution (ADR) framework will enable consumers and businesses to solve their disputes rapidly and at a low cost, out-of-court. The increase in online shopping during the pandemic has shown that there is room for overall simplification notably in cross-border disputes and cost-effective measures, e.g., through digital tools and collective ADR disputes mechanisms. The idea is to modernise the ADR framework in view of the rapid development of online markets and advertising and the need to ensure that consumers have access to fair, neutral and efficient dispute resolution systems.

Various procedures involving aspects of private international law are featured in Annex III, about the pending procedures that the Commission regards as a priority.

The proposed Directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (the AI Liability Directive) appears in this list. Liability ranked amongst the top barriers to the use of AI by European companies. This is so because current national liability rules, in particular based on fault, are not suited to handling liability claims for damage caused by AI-enabled products and services. Under such rules, victims need to prove a wrongful action or omission by a person who caused the damage. The specific characteristics of AI, including complexity, autonomy and opacity (the so-called “black box” effect), may make it difficult or prohibitively expensive for victims to identify the liable person and prove the requirements for a successful liability claim. In particular, when claiming compensation, victims could incur very high up-front costs and face significantly longer legal proceedings, compared to cases not involving AI. Victims may therefore be deterred from claiming compensation altogether. Therefore, the objective of this proposal is to promote the rollout of trustworthy AI to harvest its full benefits for the internal market. It does so by ensuring victims of damage caused by AI obtain equivalent protection to victims of damage caused by products in general. It also reduces legal uncertainty of businesses developing or using AI regarding their possible exposure to liability and prevents the emergence of fragmented AI-specific adaptations of national civil liability rules. From a private international law perspective, the impact of the Directive and the (possible) future implementation in national rules and the relationship with the Rome II Regulation shall be investigated.

The list of priority pending procedures also include the proposed Directive on liability for defective products. Directive 85/374/EEC, which the proposal aims to repeal, has the objective to provide an EU-level system for compensating people who suffer physical injury or damage to property due to defective products. Since its adoption in 1985, there have been significant changes in the way products are produced, distributed and operated, including the modernisation of product safety and market surveillance rules. The green and digital transitions are underway and bring with them enormous benefits for Europe’s society and economy, be it by extending the life of materials and products, e.g. through remanufacturing, or by increasing productivity and convenience thanks to smart products and artificial intelligence. Therefore, the revision of the Directive seeks to ensure the functioning of the internal market, free movement of goods, undistorted competition between market operators, and a high level of protection of consumers’ health and property. In particular, it aims to: ensure liability rules reflecting the nature and risks of products in the digital age and circular economy; ensure there is always a business based in the EU that can be held liable for defective products bought directly from manufacturers outside the EU; ease the burden of proof in complex cases and ease restrictions on making claims, while ensuring a fair balance between the legitimate interests of manufacturers, injured persons and consumers in general; ensure legal certainty.

Also in the list of the Commission’s priorities is the proposed Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence. An overview of the Commission proposal has already appeared on this blog. As suggested in a recommendation of GEDIP that has recently been brought to the attention of the readers of this blog (see here), the Proposal may need to be reconsidered and improved in various respects.

Another priority pending procedure is the proposed Directive on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation”, or SLAPPs). The initiative has been the object of a dedicated post on this blog.

Finally, the Commission intends to include among its priorities the initiatives it has taken regarding the digitalisation of judicial cooperation in cross-border civil and commercial matters, i.e., the proposed Directive on digitalisation of judicial cooperation and the proposed Regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters. An illustration is found in this post.

The proposed Directive on consumer credits and the proposed Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims equally feature in the list of the priority pending legislative proposals.

On 19 October 2021, the European Commission adopted its 2022 Work Programme, setting out its key initiatives and the next steps in the agenda for the year ahead towards a post-COVID-19 Europe greener, fairer, more digital and more resilient.

The Commission Work Programme, by informing how political priorities will be coped to turn them into concrete action, is composed of four Annexes: the first addresses new policy and legislative initiatives; then, the second is in charge of simplifying existing legislation; it follows the third, focused on pending priority legislative files the Commission would the co-legislators to take the swiftest action on; finally, as consequence of the previous ones, the forth, based on intended withdrawals of pending proposals.

Among the new policy initiatives under the Annex I, the one dealing with private international law and having Article 81 TFUE as legal basis to be relied upon relates to the recognition of parenthood between Member States.

While the establishment of this civil status governing the legal relationship between a child and another person is disciplined by the domestic family law, the recognition of the parenthood already established abroad, crucial in cases of acquisition of nationality, residence, EU citizenship, maintenance and succession, is dealt with by private international law rules. Because currently parenthood established in one Member State may not be recognised in another, problems when travelling or moving to another Member State arise, endangering the child’s rights resulting from parenthood.

This is why, in the absence of uniform private international law rules on this issue, both on applicable law and on procedures for the recognition of judgments, a Commission Proposal aimed to ensure that parenthood, as established in one Member State, is to be recognised across the EU is expected in the 2022, so that children maintain their rights in cross-border situations, in particular when their families travel or move within the Union. Surely, if this initiative combines the work to ensure that the Union of equality becomes a reality for all and the need for a less bureaucracy, in so far as promoting the free movement of public documents and recognition of the effects of civil status records, the crux of the matter, politically speaking, will relate to the recognition obstacles new forms of parenthood day-by-day face in the EU when exercising their parenthood-based rights. A tough challenge? Yes, but the Union is full of colors and “if you are parent in one country, you are parent in every country” is urgent to come a reality from a legal point of view too.

Another private international law issue pointed out to be dealt with will be to strengthen judicial cooperation on the protection of vulnerable adults in cross-border situations.

The absence of uniform private international law rules on this field of law, the diversity of Member States’ law on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of protection measures, and the limited accessions to the key international instrument in this area, mainly represented by the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the international Protection of Adults, raise considerable problems. However, it remains to be discovered how this will be pursued since no specific legislative initiative is expected to be addressed in the 2022, at least at EU level by the European Commission. A missed opportunity? Given the need, it seems so.

Finally, the new policy initiatives across the six headline ambitions put forward by the President von der Leyen in the Political Guidelines, building on her 2021 State of the Union speech (i.e. “The European Green Deal”, “A Europe fit for the digital age”, “An economy that works for people”, “A stronger Europe in the world”, “Promoting our European way of life”, “A new push for European democracy”) will affect lots fields of law, private international law included; on the other, Annexes II, III and IV will not.

Therefore, the European Commission will start discussions with the Parliament and Council to establish a Joint Declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities the co-legislators agree upon to take swift action.

On 7 June 2021, the Council of the European Union has adopted a political document titled Conclusions on the Protection of Vulnerable Adults across the European Union.

The document sets out the views of the Council in this area with respect to both civil and criminal matters.

As regards civil matters, the document stresses the importance of the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the international Protection of Adults, which is currently in force for ten Member States, and some third countries, such as Switzerland and the UK (albeit only with respect to Scotland).

The Council invites the Member States for which the Hague Convention is already in force to promote greater awareness of the  Convention among courts and practitioners.

Member States that are engaged in procedures procedures to ratify the Convention, are invited to advance such procedures with a view to finalising the ratification as swiftly as possible, in particular in view of the 2022 Special Commission on this Convention organised by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.

Finally, the Council invites all other Member States to commence and/or advance domestic consultations on a possible ratification of the Convention as swiftly as possible.

The document highlights the relevance of the (international) protection of adults, as understood by the Convention, to the implementation of the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2021-2030).

It also notes that both the number and proportion of older people are growing across Europe. According to the Ageing Report 2021 issued by the European Commission on 20 November 2020, the total population of the EU is projected to decline in the long term, and the age structure will change significantly in the coming decades. The EU population is projected to decline from 447 million people in 2019 to 424 million in 2070 and, during this period, Member States’ populations will age dramatically given the dynamics in fertility, life expectancy and migration. The median age is projected to rise by five years over the coming decades.

A significant number of adults – the document observes – face limitations. Eurostat expects a fifth of the EU population to have some form of disability by 2050. Many of these adults are or will become vulnerable and, by virtue of the multiple barriers that are still in place for persons with a serious mental and/or physical disability, are not or will not be in a position to protect their own interests without adequate support.

This situation impacts the legal capacity of vulnerable adults, who face challenges and difficulties in protecting their rights, defending their interests and accessing justice, both in national and in cross-border situations. In cross-border situations, for instance in the case of citizens residing in a State other than that of their nationality, these existing difficulties may be exacerbated by additional obstacles with respect to language, representation or access to the judicial system and to public services in general.

Today, there are no uniform private international law rules applicable in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters regarding the protection of vulnerable adults in cross-border situations across the EU, and there are disparities between Member States’ laws on jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of protection measures.

The Council acknowledges in its Conclusions that diversity of the rules on these issues might impair the exercise of the right of vulnerable adults to move freely and reside in the Member State of their choice, and might also hinder the possibility for these citizens to obtain adequate protection regarding the administration of their property in a cross-border context.

The document further recalls that the right to self-determination is a fundamental right, and powers of representation through which an adult has made arrangements in advance for his or her care and/or representation should be respected within the EU. The Hague Convention, among other things, ensures that such a power of representation has legal force in a Contracting Party.

Finally, the Council takes note that at the ‘High-Level Conference on the protection of vulnerable adults across Europe: the way forward’, held on 30 March 2021, some panelists stressed that, while it is important to build experience and assess the results of implementing the 2000 Hague Convention, the EU should be more ambitious and go further in seeking the approximation of private international law rules to ensure the effective protection of vulnerable adults on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition.

The Conclusions, however, do not include any indication as to whether and when the political institutions of the Union might consider the adoption of such additional measures.

The latest edition of the Brussels Agenda, published by the Joint Brussels Office of the Law Societies, features three interesting contributions concerning the impact of Brexit on Private International Law: Will the UK rely more on private international law in the future?, by Michael Clancy; Cross Border Mediation in a Post Brexit World, by Peter Causton; and Recognition and Enforcement of judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, a note on the UK accession to the Lugano Convention and on further possible developments, namely with respect to the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters.

The three papers are a very reliable source for the upcoming developments in the UK, given that they’re coming straight from the horse’s mouth.

With respect to the developments on a future access of the UK to the Lugano Convention, Matthias Lehmann has posted recently a piece on this blog (UK Applies for Accession to Lugano Convention). In addition, Giesela Rühl has uploaded an article on Private International Law Post-Brexit on SSRN, which was reported by Marion Ho Dac here.