Here We Go Again: AG Rantos on Jurisdiction Over the Infringement of Personality Rights

This post was written by Giacomo Marola (PhD).

As announced on this blog, on 5 February 2026 Advocate General (AG) A. Rantos delivered his Opinion in Case C-232/25, Idziski, following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Polish Supreme Court.

The case concerns the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation) in proceedings relating to the alleged infringement of both collective and individual rights, such as the rights to “national identity” and “dignity and reputation”, which Polish case law, on the basis of Article 23 of the Polish Civil Code, qualifies as “personality rights”.

As such, the Court’s ruling expected in Idziski will add one more piece to a thirty-year-long line of case law, from Shevill to eDate Advertising, Bolagsupplysningen, Mittelbayerischer, and Gtflix.

Facts of the Case

The preliminary reference arose from a dispute before the Polish courts brought by Z.R., a Polish resident and former member of a military organisation involved in the Polish resistance during the Nazi occupation of World War II (“the X military unit”), and by Ś., an association representing former soldiers of that unit, against two German co-producers of a TV series (“U.” and “Z.”).

Although the parties’ names are anonymised, the context suggests that the series is “Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter” (internationally known as “Generation War”) and that the military organisation concerned is the “Armia Krajowa”. Set during World War II, the series also depicts events in Nazi-occupied Poland and includes portrayals of the Armia Krajowa.

According to the plaintiffs, the series portrayed the soldiers of the X military unit as antisemitic, nationalistic, and complicit in the Holocaust, allegedly infringing their personality rights under Polish law, such as their right to a national identity, an undistorted historical record, and dignity and reputation.

The series was broadcast on Polish television and in several other Member States, and was also made available online, either in full or in excerpts.

Proceedings at National Level and the Questions Referred

Z.R. and Ś. brought an action before the Polish courts seeking compensation for non-pecuniary harm and injunctive relief. They requested that the defendants be ordered to: (i) publish an apology on Polish television and relevant channels in other Member States; (ii) authorise the plaintiffs to publish the apology themselves if the defendants fail to do so; (iii) publish an apology on two websites; (iv) stop displaying the symbol of the X military unit in the series; and (v) display a specified introductory text before any broadcast.

At first instance, the Kraków Regional Court dismissed the defendants’ objection to Polish jurisdiction and upheld most of the plaintiffs’ claims. The Kraków Court of Appeal confirmed jurisdiction and partially amended the first-instance judgment. Both parties subsequently filed appeals before the Polish Supreme Court.

Having doubts as to the interpretation of “the place where the harmful event occurred” within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, the Polish Supreme Court decided to stay the proceedings and referred two questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

By its first question, the Supreme Court asked whether Polish courts have jurisdiction over all the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of the “victim’s centre of interests” ground of jurisdiction, as recognised by the Court of Justice in eDate, taking into account that: (i) the series was broadcast in Poland; (ii) the plaintiffs have their centre of interests in Poland; (iii) one plaintiff is a former member of the X military unit and the other is an association of former members, while the series allegedly infringes their personality rights in portraying that unit; and (iv) the series’ content is of significant importance in Poland.

By its second question, the Supreme Court asked whether, if the first question is answered negatively, Polish courts should nonetheless have jurisdiction to award compensation for the harm caused by the broadcast in Poland, and to order injunctive remedies with effects limited to that Member State.

The Opinion of AG Rantos: A Quest for Judicial Continuity

Based on a careful review of the Court of Justice’s case law, AG Rantos answered the first question negatively and the second affirmatively. He thus concluded that the Polish courts do not have “full” jurisdiction based on the “victim’s centre of interests”, but they do have “mosaic” jurisdiction based on the broadcasting or accessibility of the series in Poland. According to the AG, that jurisdiction covers both compensation and the requested injunctive remedies, provided that their effects are confined to Polish territory.

Overall, as noted by Geert Van Calster, AG Rantos’ Opinion reveals a reasonable and commendable concern for preserving coherence with the existing Court of Justice’s case law. This concern is articulated most clearly in the Opinion’s concluding part, where the AG observes that “the Court’s current case-law is well settled and a broad interpretation of a derogating provision, Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 in this case, could create more problems than it solves” (para. 80).

At this stage, the emphasis on judicial continuity and self-restraint is both welcome and persuasive. With the debate over the forthcoming reform of the Brussels I bis Regulation already underway, a creative judicial intervention revisiting a body of case law consolidated over more than three decades could create legal uncertainty and risk pre-empting or unduly constraining future legislative choices in this politically, judicially, and doctrinally sensitive area.

A Settled Body of Case Law Still Open to Reconsideration?

That said, it remains to be seen whether the Court of Justice will follow the AG’s cautious approach or seize the opportunity to revisit its settled interpretation of the forum delicti in personality rights disputes.

Although revisiting the existing case law at this stage would be undesirable, it is not entirely unlikely. On one hand, the Court has recently shown a willingness to adopt innovative interpretative approaches in adjacent fields, as illustrated by its case law on Article 7(2) in Case C-34/24, Apple Store Nederland (see further on this blog here and here). On the other hand, the present case raises structurally significant issues, for which the temptation to recalibrate the existing interpretative solutions cannot be dismissed.

Indeed, in light of the existing case law, Idziski raises significant questions concerning five key aspects.

What Counts as “Rights Relating to Personality”?

First, the case raises questions about what exactly constitutes “rights relating to personality”. Divergent conceptions of this notion exist across the EU Member States. Following Mittelbayerischer, Idziski illustrates that in the EU, particularly in Poland, such rights are not confined to first-generation individual rights like reputation or privacy, but may also encompass collective rights or interests, such as the protection of national identity.

This raises the question of whether such rights or interests should be characterised as “rights relating to personality” for the purposes of EU private international law. In light of Mittelbayerischer, the answer appears affirmative. The issue of characterisation, however, is clearly more relevant at the choice-of-law stage than at the jurisdictional stage. Notably, the notion of “rights relating to personality” is expressly referred to in Article 1(2)(g) of the Rome II Regulation, without reference to national law. By contrast, the concept does not appear in the Brussels I Regulation, although it is mentioned in Recital 16 of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

In any event, the problem of characterisation cannot be regarded as entirely irrelevant at the jurisdictional stage under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. Settled case law of the Court of Justice confirms that “the place where the alleged damage occurred within the meaning of that provision may vary according to the nature of the right allegedly infringed” (Pinckney, para. 32).

Shevill or eDate? Jurisdiction in Cases of Parallel Publication

Second, the Idziski case highlights the ongoing uncertainties about the boundaries between the Shevill and eDatejurisdictional rules, particularly for content published simultaneously online and offline (so-called “parallel publications”).

In this respect, the Polish Supreme Court advanced three arguments supporting the exclusive application of eDate to the present case. First, the rise of streaming and on-demand audiovisual services blurs the distinction between TV and online dissemination. Second, geolocation technologies can limit the territorial reach of online content. Third, applying different rules to online and offline versions of the same content would fragment litigation and undermine the proper administration of justice.

Against this background, AG Rantos argued that, under the principle of tempus regit actum, EU law must be interpreted in light of the technological context at the time of the relevant facts (before 2015);  subsequent technological developments are irrelevant for the present case.

On this basis, the AG first argued that TV broadcasting, unlike online publishing, typically has a regional scope and is not designed to ensure the “ubiquity” of content. Accordingly, the condition justifying the Court’s eDate standard for online content is not met for TV broadcasting. Furthermore, he noted that applying eDate systematically in cases of parallel publication would not necessarily enhance legal certainty, since the applicable jurisdiction framework would then depend on the discretionary choices of individual producers in deciding whether to disseminate the contested content online and offline. Finally, the availability of geolocation technologies, and the resulting partitioning of the Internet along national borders, supports the conclusion that the Shevill framework should apply in the present case.

Hence, according to AG Rantos, online broadcasting falls under the eDate approach, whereas television broadcasting falls under Shevill. This bifurcation may give rise to legal uncertainty, parallel proceedings, and conflicting judgments. However, it appears to be an almost inevitable consequence of the eDate approach, which differentiates jurisdiction according to the medium through which personality rights are infringed.

Since eDate, the Court of Justice has justified the bifurcation of jurisdictional rules by reference to the “ubiquity” of the Internet. The insistence on ubiquity reflects conventional wisdom from early cyberspace literature of the late 1990s. However, this view no longer fully reflects the realities of the contemporary Internet. The assumption that online content is necessarily global overlooks the widespread use of geolocation technologies and the increasing territorialisation of online services. At the same time, the Internet’s pervasive presence in virtually all aspects of private and social life, driven by smartphones, social media, and IoT devices, has increasingly blurred the line between online and offline activities.

In any event, the perception of the Internet as “ubiquitous” may reflect how it was commonly understood and represented in 2015. From this perspective, Idziski does not appear to provide an ideal opportunity for the Court to reconsider or overturn prior case law, particularly since the Court has continuously invoked the “ubiquity” rationale also after 2015, most recently in Gtflix (2021). Any recalibration of the current jurisdictional framework could likely be better achieved by the legislator in the forthcoming recast of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The Requirement of “Individual Identification” after Mittelbayerischer

Thirdly, Idziski raises questions about when jurisdiction based on the “victim’s centre of interests” is available, in light ofMittelbayerischer.

In that judgment, the Court of Justice held that a victim cannot rely on jurisdiction at their centre of interests if they are not individually identified, directly or indirectly, in the harmful content.

Against this background, the Polish Supreme Court noted that, unlike in Mittelbayerischer, the TV series at issue focuses on a small, closed group of individuals, the soldiers of unit X, so that its members could largely be identified individually.

AG Rantos, however, took the view that the applicants cannot be regarded as individually identified within the meaning of Mittelbayerischer. The characters in the TV series are fictional, so Z.R. is not mentioned either expressly or implicitly. Moreover, the Ś. was established several decades after World War II. AG Rantos also notes that the Ś. currently has around 5,000 members, and the centres of interest of individuals from the X military unit could be located in any EU Member State.

AG Rantos is probably correct in arguing that, in Idziski, the plaintiffs are not sufficiently individually identified within the meaning of Mittelbayerischer. Yet the case illustrates how the requirement of individual identification can create uncertainties in practice. As AG Bobek argued in Mittelbayerischer, distinguishing content on this basis overlooks the wide variety of harmful information and the differing degrees of individualisation of potential recipients. From a policy perspective, the referring court rightly observed that excluding jurisdiction when the victim is not individually identified favours authors who publish stigmatising messages about a group. Under current case law, such authors could only be sued for all the harm caused in the place of their own establishment or domicile.

Objective Factors and the “Victim’s Centre of Interests”

Fourth, Idziski gives the Court of Justice an opportunity to clarify the role of objective factors in analysing jurisdiction based on the “victim’s centre of interests”, namely those relating to the content and context of the harmful information (e.g., the language of the content, its relevance in the forum State, etc.).

In eDate, the Court endorsed a distinctly subjective construction of the “victim’s centre of interests”. Subsequent judgments, however, have given some weight to objective factors. Notably, in Bolagsupplysningen, the Court held that the courts of the plaintiff’s centre of interests were best placed to adjudicate because the reputational harm arose from content published on “a professional site managed” in that Member State and written in a “language” intended “to be understood by people living in that Member State”. Similarly, in Mittelbayerischer, the Court emphasised that the link between the dispute and the forum in personality rights cases should not rest solely on subjective factors but also on objective elements. Nevertheless, the Court has so far abstained from formally incorporating these factors into the “victim’s centre of interests” ground of jurisdiction.

By contrast, under the “mosaic” jurisdiction, in Gtflix the Court categorically refused to assign relevance to any objective elements beyond the mere accessibility of the harmful content in the forum. The Court reasoned that making jurisdiction dependent on “additional conditions, such as requiring that the activity concerned be ‘directed to’ the Member State in which the court seised is situated”, could “lead … to the de facto exclusion” of the plaintiff’s option to sue in any Member State where the content is accessible. A person claiming harm to personality “must always” be able to bring proceedings before the courts of the place where the damage occurred.

Against this background, in Idziski, the Polish Supreme Court argues that, when the alleged victim is not individually identified in the harmful content, it would be appropriate to consider, alongside the victim’s centre of interests, whether the content has “objectively considerable importance” in the forum State. On this basis, the referring court contends that the series’ plot, and the Polish thread in particular, is clearly of considerable importance for the Polish public.

On this issue, AG Rantos maintains that no weight should be given to objective factors in the jurisdictional analysis under the “victim’s centre of interests”. He recalls that, according to settled case law, the “place of the damage” under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation covers only “the place where the event giving rise to the damage … directly produced its harmful effects upon the person who is the immediate victim” (Dumez, para. 20). Moreover, in line with the Court of Justice’s reasoning in Gtflix on the irrelevance of objective factors under “mosaic” jurisdiction, the AG argues that considering such factors “could be unfavourable” for the victim.

It remains to be seen whether, in Idziski, the Court will seize the opportunity to clarify the role of objective factors in the jurisdictional analysis based on the “victim’s centre of interests”.

“Mosaic” Jurisdiction and the Availability of Injunctive Relief

Finally, Idziski raises the question of whether, in personality rights disputes, courts with “mosaic” jurisdiction may grant injunctive relief whose effects are confined to the forum State.

Starting with Bolagsupplysningen, the Court held that, in online personality rights cases, courts with “mosaic” jurisdiction may award territorially “divisible” remedies, like compensation, but cannot order territorially “indivisible” remedies, such as rectification or removal of online content.

Although often equated with the distinction between “compensation” and “injunctive relief”, the exact scope of “divisible” versus “indivisible” remedies remains partially unclear and rests on relatively weak grounds.

Assuming that compensation for personality harm can be precisely apportioned across national borders overlooks the practical difficulties courts face in quantifying such harm. Conversely, treating injunctions against online platforms as necessarily territorially “indivisible” ignores geolocation technologies, which can, in principle, restrict access or removal of content to specific territories.

In Idziski, the Polish Supreme Court notes that the plaintiffs do not seek the rectification or removal of online content, but preventive and reparatory injunctions for TV and online broadcasts, such as publishing apologies or including an introductory text before any broadcast. The Court holds that if national law allows these remedies to be confined to Poland, “mosaic” jurisdiction should be upheld.

AG Rantos agrees with the Polish Supreme Court. Since TV broadcasting typically has a national scope, injunctions such as publishing an apology on TV can be effectively confined to Polish channels. For online dissemination, he suggests that, if permitted by national law, courts could require the apology to appear via another medium limited to Poland, such as the written press or national television, or to address only the effects of the infringement within that State. Surprisingly, AG Rantos does not mention geolocation technologies, which are the most common way to prevent online injunctions from “spilling over” beyond the forum State.

In any event, it is submitted that the Court of Justice should carefully evaluate whether, in personality rights disputes, courts with “mosaic” jurisdiction should be allowed to issue injunctions against online content such as those sought in Idziski. Permitting such injunctions could increase the use of “mosaic” jurisdiction, thereby raising the risks of forum shopping, fragmented litigation, and further segmentation of the Internet along national borders within the EU internal market. Moreover, in practice, national courts would often need to assess, as a precondition for jurisdiction, whether online publishers can implement geolocation technologies accurate enough to prevent injunctions from “spilling over” beyond the forum State. Such an assessment would be difficult to reconcile with the settled case law principle that a court seised on the basis of the forum delicti must “be able readily to decide whether it has jurisdiction” (Kolassa, para. 61).