February 2026 at the Court of Justice of the European Union

A hearing in case C-799/24, Babcock Montajes, will take place on 4 February 2026. The Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) has referred to the Court a question on the interaction between articles 25 and 36 of the Brussels I bis regulation, and on the relevance of res judicata for the purposes of recognition:

1. Is the term ‘judgment’ in Article 36(1) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] to be interpreted to the effect that the court of a Member State on which an agreement as referred to in Article 25 of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] confers exclusive jurisdiction (Article 31(2) of the … Regulation) must recognise a judgment by which a non-designated court of a Member State finds that the courts of that Member State have international jurisdiction if the judgment in question is an interim judgment, in other words, is not a decision which terminates a dispute?

2. If the answer to Question 1 is, in principle, in the affirmative: Does recognition of the interim judgment also depend on whether the interim judgment affirming the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State is binding on the non-designated court itself and/or whether the affirmation of international jurisdiction may be varied in the context of an appeal?

The parties to the main proceedings are a limited liability company incorporated under German law (hereinafter ‘Kanadevia’), which is the applicant at first instance and the respondent in the appeal on a point of law (Revision) before the German courts, and a public limited company incorporated under Spanish law (hereinafter ‘Babcock’), which is the respondent at first instance and the appellant in the appeal. The dispute concerns the performance of a contract concluded on 18 September 2017 for the construction of a waste treatment plant in San Sebastián (Spain), where Cologne (Germany) was designated as the place of jurisdiction in the event of a dispute.

Due to delays in execution, an amendment to the contract was signed on 8 August 2018 whereby Babcock was no longer required to perform part of its services. Kanadevia claimed additional costs related to the unperformed services and, on 28 March 2019, called on the bank guarantee provided by Babcock. After the amount was paid, Babcock reimbursed it to the bank.

On 30 July 2019, Babcock brought proceedings against Kanadevia before the Juzgado de primera instancia de Madrid (Court of First Instance of Madrid, Spain) with a view to obtaining the reimbursement of said amount. On 16 June 2020, the court declared that it had international jurisdiction but not territorial competence and referred the case to the Juzgado de primera instancia de San Sebastián (Court of First Instance of San Sebastián, Spain). Kanadevia did not challenge that decision. Instead, it lodged an application with the Juzgado de primera instancia de San Sebastián for a review of international jurisdiction. The application was rejected by that court on 9 December 2020 by reference to the previous order of the Juzgado de primera instancia de Madrid (Court of First Instance, Madrid).

On 8 August 2019, Kanadevia applied to the Landgericht Köln (Regional Court, Cologne, Germany) for a declaration that Babcock was obliged to reimburse it for the additional costs or to pay it damages for the partial non-performance of the services initially due. On 11 May 2021, the Landgericht Köln (Regional Court, Cologne) dismissed that action as inadmissible on the ground that, in accordance with Article 36 of the Brussels I bis regulation, it had to recognise the decision of the Juzgado de primera instancia de San Sebastián (Court of First Instance, San Sebastián). On appeal by Kanadevia, the Oberlandesgericht Köln (Higher Regional Court, Cologne) set aside the judgment of the Landgericht Köln (Regional Court, Cologne) and referred the case back to the latter after finding, in an ‘interlocutory judgment’, that the latter had international jurisdiction.

Babcock brought an appeal on a point of law (Revision) before the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) against the decision.

The case has been allocated to a chamber of five judges (F. Biltgen, I. Ziemele, S. Gervasoni, M. Bošnjak, and A. Kumin reporting), with an opinion by advocate general N. Emiliou.

On 5 February 2026, advocate general A. Rantos will deliver his opinion in case C-232/25, Idziski, on the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (which corresponds to Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation), in a case concerning personality rights. The questions are referred by the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland):

1. Must Article 5(3) in conjunction with recitals 11 and 12 of [the Brussels I Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that in a case concerning the infringement of personality rights on the grounds of the content of a cinematographic work, the courts in a Member State in which the film was broadcast, which is different to the Member State in which the film was produced, have international jurisdiction to decide an action seeking:

(a)    non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights, including an order for a statement containing an apology to be issued by the television channels that broadcast the film, regardless of the location from which it was broadcast, and also to be displayed on websites, as well as an order to display a similar statement prior to any broadcast of the film, regardless of the location from which it is broadcast, or

(b)    pecuniary performance (compensation) aimed at making good the entirety of the damage suffered in connection with the infringement of personality rights, inter alia in connection with the dissemination (broadcasting) of the film in other Member States,

having regard to the fact that:

– the applicants have their centre of interests and place of residence (head office) in that Member State,

– the applicants assert that their personality rights have been infringed as a result of the way in which the film depicts the soldiers belonging to a military unit from that Member State ([…]), whereby one of the applicants is a former soldier of that military unit, and the other is an association of former soldiers of that military unit, the particular aim of which, according to its articles of association, is to defend the memory, historical truth and dignity of that unit;

– given the historical, cultural and social context, the content of the film, including the way in which the soldiers of the abovementioned military unit ([…]) are depicted is objectively of considerable importance for the territory of that Member State?

2. In the event that the first question is answered in the negative, should Article 5(3) in conjunction with recitals 11 and 22 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 be interpreted as meaning that in a case concerning the infringement of personality rights on the grounds of the content of a cinematographic work, the courts in a Member State in which the film was broadcast that is different to the Member State in which the film was produced have international jurisdiction to decide an action seeking:

(a)    non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights that occurred in connection with the broadcasting of the film in the Member State where the action was brought, including an order for an apology to be issued in this Member State, and also an order to display a corresponding statement prior to any broadcast of the film in that Member State, or

(b)    pecuniary performance (compensation) aimed at making good the damage suffered in connection with the infringement of personality rights as a result of the dissemination (broadcasting) of the film in the Member State where the action was brought,

having regard, where necessary, to the circumstances referred to in Question 1(1)–(3)?

The main proceedings relate to a film co-produced in Germany set during the Second World War, which was broadcast on television and on the internet in Germany and Poland. Certain events in the film allegedly refer to a Polish military unit that behaved in an anti-Semitic manner. A Polish national having belonged to said military unit, together with an association responsible for defending it, have brought proceedings before the Polish courts on the grounds that they consider that the film infringes their personality rights. The defendants contest the international jurisdiction of the Polish courts.

The decision will be taken by judges K. Jürimäe, K. Lenaerts, M. Gavalec, Z. Csehi, and F. Schalin (reporting).

The opinion of advocate general M. Szpunar in case C-873/24, Marwanak, on a European certificate of succession will be published as well on 5 February. By its request, the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) is asking the Court several questions on Regulation No 650/2012 on matters of succession:

1. Is Article 68(l) of Regulation No 650/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that a European Certificate of Succession must contain the information required under the national law of the State in which the property is located for the recording of the heir as its owner in the land register in respect of immovable property forming part of the estate and located in a Member State other than the State of the issuing authority where the heir has requested that such information be included in the European Certificate of Succession for the purposes of recording him or her as its owner in the land register of the State in which the property is located and where, if the European Certificate of Succession is the only document presented in support of the application for registration, the recording, under the national law of the State in which the property is located, in the land register of that State can take place only if the European Certificate of Succession contains such information?
2. Does it make any difference to the answer to Question 1 whether, under the applicable succession law, the transfer of the estate will take place by way of universal succession?
3. Does it make any difference to the answer to Question 1 whether, instead of relying on the presentation of a European Certificate of Succession containing the information referred to in Question 1, the recording in the land register of the State in which the property is located, under the national law of that State, as referred to in Question 1, can also be obtained by the heir, or, after his or her death, his or her heir, presenting another document containing a declaration by the heir, or, after his or her death, by his or her heir, to the land registry of the State in which the property is located in addition to presenting a European Certificate of Succession that does not contain the information referred to in Question 1?

The applicants are the children of the deceased. For the purposes of the settlement of the estate in respect of the immovable property located in the Czech Republic, on 27 April 2023 they applied to the Amtsgericht (Local Court, Germany; ‘the Probate Court’) for the issue of a European Certificate of Succession. They asked that the designation of the immovable property forming part of the estate in the Czech Republic be included in the Certificate of Succession. In support of their application they argued that recording the order of succession in the land register based solely on the European Certificate of Succession was possible under the Czech Land Registry Law only if the immovable property that was the subject of the recording was explicitly specified in the European Certificate of Succession.

By order of 19 July 2023 the Probate Court rejected that application in so far as it had requested that the immovable property located in the Czech Republic be explicitly referred to. The Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court, Germany) dismissed the appeal lodged against that ruling by order of 11 December 2023. It justified its reasoning by stating that including, for information purposes, individual assets of the estate which do not play a role in the presumptions and the protection of legitimate expectations under Regulation No 650/2012 would run counter to the intention of that regulation to create an instrument with formalised content that could be used in any Member State without any problems. There is no provision stipulating that the issuing authority has to make enquiries as to whether the deceased still owned the alleged asset of the estate at the time of death. The inclusion of individual assets of the estate would jeopardise the certainty of legal transactions if the mere assertion that they formed part of the estate, made by an heir in a formal supporting document, were to be included, thereby creating the impression of being official.

The applicants’ appeal on a point of law seeking the issue of a European Certificate of Succession that includes the specific designation of the immovable property forming part of the estate and located in the Czech Republic contests that ruling.

The case has been allocated to a panel composed by judges I. Jarukaitis, M. Condinanzi,  R. Frendo, A. Kornezov, and N. Jääskinen (reporting).

The Court will host the hearing in case C-190/25, Zelabrich Still, also on 5 February 2026. The request for a preliminary ruling, submitted by the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (Higher Regional Court, Stuttgart, Germany), concerns the interpretation of Article 19(1) and Article 63 of the Brussels II bis Regulation on matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, in divorce proceedings between a German and Italian national (hereinafter, GT), and a Russian national (hereinafter, LS), both habitually resident in Germany:

1. Do Italian proceedings on the recognition of civil effects before the competent Corte d’Appello in Naples under Article 8(2) of the Agreement of 18 February 1984 between the Holy See and the Italian Republic, amending the ‘Concordato lateranense’ of 11 February 1929, constitute proceedings relating to marriage annulment within the meaning of Article 19(1) of the Brussels IIa Regulation?
2. If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative:

Is a court first seised in Germany concerning a divorce to be decreed permitted, contrary to Article 19(1) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, to stay its proceedings under national rules in favour of the court second seised which has to rule on recognition of civil effects proceedings?

GT and LS got married in 2017 in accordance with canon law, in a Catholic church in Naples (Italy) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘concordat marriage’). On the same day, the marriage was registered with the civil registry office of that city. On January 2022, GT filed for divorce with the Amtsgericht Stuttgart (Stuttgart District Court, Germany); in the proceedings it will also be decided upon the compensatory distribution of pension rights and, at the request of LS, on post-marital maintenance.

On July 2022, GT applied to the Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Court of Naples for the annulment of the concordat marriage. The annulment was pronounced by decision of that court on 28 February 2024, which was declared enforceable by the Supremo Tribunale della Segnatura Apostolica (Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura) three months later (hereinafter the “ecclesiastical judgment”).

By order of 20 November 2024, the Amtsgericht Stuttgart (District Court, Stuttgart) stayed proceedings on the application for divorce, including the economic consequences thereof, on the ground that, if the concordat marriage were to be declared null and void by virtue of a decision recognising the ecclesiastical judgment, handed down by the Corte di Appello di Napoli (Court of Appeal, Naples), the divorce proceedings would become moot. LS has appealed against that order to the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (Higher Regional Court, Stuttgart, Germany), arguing that, in accordance with Regulation No 2201/2003, the obligation to stay proceedings lay not with the German court but with the Italian court.

Advocate general J. Richard de la Tour’s opinion will precede the judgement. The chamber is composed by judges K. Lycourgos, S. Rodin, N. Piçarra, N. Fenger, and O.  Spineanu-Matei (reporting).

Another hearing, this time a Grand Chamber one, will be held on 9 February 2026. In case C-41/25, Orsay, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany) is asking whether the tax authority of a Member State may rely on customary international law of State immunity in order to escape the international jurisdiction of the courts of another Member State, conferred by Article 6(1) of Regulation 2015/848, on insolvency proceedings, to hear an action for revocation brought against that authority:

Must Article 6(1) of Regulation 2015/848 … be interpreted as meaning that, in view of the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, it contains an implied waiver by the Member States of the European Union of the principle of State immunity for actions in which the insolvency administrator, in accordance with the applicable insolvency law, claims that legal acts in relation to a Member State are voidable because they are to the detriment of the general body of creditors?

The Grand Chamber will be composed by K. Lenaerts, T. von Danwitz, K. Jürimäe (reporting), K. Lycourgos, I. Jarukaitis, I. Ziemele, J. Passer, F. Schalin, N. Piçarra, A. Kumin, N. Jääskinen, D. Gratsias, S. Gervasoni, N. Fenger, R. Frendo. An opinion by advocate general R. Norkus has been requested.

Finally, on 12 February 2026, advocate general M. Szpunar will publish his opinion in case C-14/25, Thüringer Aufbaubank. The Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria) is asking the Court to interpret several provisions of Regulation 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims:

Is Article 21(2) in conjunction with Article 25 of Regulation No 805/2004 … to be interpreted as meaning that certification of an enforceable authentic instrument (in this case, an enforceable notarial instrument drawn up by a German notary) as a European Enforcement Order, issued by the competent authority in the Member State of origin using the standard form in Annex III to that regulation, may not be reviewed in the Member State of enforcement even where – having regard to the date on which the authentic instrument was drawn up – the temporal scope of that regulation has manifestly not been respected?

The main proceedings concern an application, made on 14 February 2022, for enforcement of a claim established as a European enforcement Order on 19 January 2021 by the German competent authorities, on the basis of an authentic instrument drawn up by a German notary on 28 May 1999, and enforceable in Germany on 1 June 1999, i.e. before the entry into force of Regulation 805/2004 on 21 January 2005.

The decision of that court granting the application was subsequently overturned on appeal by the latter party. On appeal by the applicant for enforcement, the case came before the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria). That court states that the certification of the authentic instrument as a European Enforcement Order was carried out in “manifest” disregard of the temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004, since, in accordance with Article 26 of that regulation, it applies only to authentic instruments drawn up or registered after its entry into force on 21 January 2005. That court therefore wonders whether Article 21(2) of the regulation, which prohibits any review of the substance of the certification as a European Enforcement Order in the Member State of enforcement, is applicable in the event of manifest disregard of the scope of Regulation No 805/2004 by the competent authorities in the Member State of origin.

The case has been assigned to a panel of three judges – N. Piçarra, N. Fenger and O. Spineanu-Matei (reporting).

— Note for those interested in arbitration: the publication of advocate general A. Biondi’s opinion in the case of Reibel, C-802/24, is expected on 26 February 2026.