Italy’s First Climate Change-Related Lawsuit Against a Corporation

The author of this post is Caterina Benini, post-doctoral researcher and adjunct professor at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan.

Climate change litigation is relatively rare in Italy. Only a few months ago, the Italian Supreme Court issued its first ruling in a climate change-related lawsuit brought against a corporation.

By a decision of 21 July 2025 (order No 20381), the Joint Chambers of the Court held that Italian courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action brought by individuals and NGOs seeking damages from a company based in Italy and its majority shareholders.

Background

In 2023, two NGOs, Greenpeace and ReCommons, together with twelve individuals domiciled in Italy, initiated proceedings before the Tribunal of Rome against ENI SpA (ENI). ENI is an Italian multinational oil and gas company. It is the the head of the ENI group (ENI Group), whose exploration, development and extraction activities are carried out in 37 countries, including Italy, Cyprus, Libya, Kenya, Indonesia, Oman, Russia, Mexico and Australia. The ENI Group is responsible for 0,6 % of global cumulative emissions from the industrial revolution until today and is ranked 30th among the so-called Global Carbon Majors.

The claimants alleged that ENI failed to adopt emissions reduction plans consistent with the internationally recognised objective of limiting global temperature increase to 1,5 °C. To support the claim, they relied inter alia on ENI’s decarbonisation plan for 2050, which envisages a reduction of only 35% of emissions by 2030 while simultaneously providing for an annual increase in oil production by 3-4%. Under this plan, the oil production would rise from the current level of 1,7 million barrels per day to 1,9 million barrels per day by 2026.

The action was also brought against ENI’s majority shareholders, namely the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and Cassa Depositi Prestiti (CDP), an Italian public development bank controlled by MEF. According to the claimants, MEF and CDP contributed to ENI’s failure by omitting to exercise their shareholders’ powers to steer the company’s management towards more climate-friendly objectives.

The claimants argued that the defendants, through their climate-altering conduct, contributed to climate change and its adverse effects which are at the origin of the impairment of their right to life, health, and a healthy environment, as protected under the Italian Constitution (Articles 2, 9, 32, and 41), the European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 2 and 8), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Articles 2 and 7).

On this basis, the claimants sought (i) a declaration that the defendants are jointly liable for ENI’s failure to comply with its climate-related obligations deriving, in particular, from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement; (ii) compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages they suffered because of such failure; (iii) an order that ENI reduce its annual volume of greenhouse gases (“GHG”) emissions, and (iv) an order that MEF and CDP adopt a policy defining and monitoring ENI’s climate targets.

Substantively, the action was grounded on Articles 2043 and 2050 of the Italian Civil Code, concerning, respectively, tort liability and tort liability for hazardous activities. From a private international law perspective, the claimants contended that Italian courts are jurisdictionally competent based on Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, being the defendants all domiciled in Italy.

The defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of Rome. Of interest to this analysis is the defendants’ argument that, since the claimants grounded ENI’s liability on GHG emissions produced in 37 different countries, the Tribunal of Rome lacked jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation on the ground that the alleged conduct had, at least in part, occurred in countries other than Italy. ENI further argued that the conducts complained of could not be attributed to ENI, since they were carried out by companies belonging to the ENI Group, which are legally autonomous and independent entities.

Following such objections, the claimants availed themselves of the possibility granted by Article 41 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure of seizing the Supreme Court for a final determination on the issue of jurisdiction. The proceedings before the Tribunal of Rome were stayed as a result.

The Supreme Court’s Order

By its order of July 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed the challenges raised by the defendants and ruled that Italian courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.

At the outset, the Court clarified that the claimants sought to have a declaration that the defendants are liable in tort for the damages caused by ENI’s failure to adopt all necessary measures to reduce the overall amount of GHG emissions released into the atmosphere in the course of its direct and indirect commercial and industrial activities. These activities, the claimants argued, included not only those carried out directly by ENI, but also those conducted through its subsidiaries.

This feature allowed the Supreme Court to distinguish the present case from another case, emphatically known in the Italian media under the name Giudizio Universale (the “Last Judgment”), which was brought against the Italian government before the Tribunal of Rome in 2021 and was dismissed as inadmissible in 2024. In Giudizio Universale, the claimants sought to compel the government to revise its climate legislation and policies, thereby infringing the principle of separation of powers. By contrast, the present case concerned a “mere action for damages”, which the Court considered “justiciable”, i.e., amenable to judicial review.

Turning to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court observed that the claimants did not seek to hold ENI’s subsidiaries directly liable for climate-altering activities carried out abroad. Rather, they sought to hold ENI, as the parent company, liable for the activities of the ENI Group as a whole. The alleged liability of the parent company – the Supreme Court observed – arises from the fact that, in the claimants’ view, ENI, in its capacity as parent company, failed to adopt a commercial and industrial plan applicable to the entire group which would ensure a reduction in GHG emissions.

Noting that the alleged liability arose from climate-altering conduct partly occurring outside Italy, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of Rome shall be assessed both under Article 4(1) (whereby persons domiciled in a Member State can be sued in the courts of that Member State) and Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation (which confers jurisdiction in matters relating to tort on the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur). Despite mentioning the two provisions, the Court’s reasoning is centred on Article 7(2).

The Supreme Court recalled the case law of the Court of Justice, inaugurated by Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, whereby the term “harmful event” must be understood to comprise both the event giving rise to the damage and the damage, meaning that claimants may rely on Article 7(2) to bring their proceedings, at their choice, in either location.

The Court recognised that climate-altering activities, while occurring at the sites of production, transportation, and commercialisation of fossil fuels, are inherently diffuse in nature, as their effects contribute to global warming in the atmosphere as a whole.

With regard to the place where the damage occurred, the Court held that this should be localised at the claimants’ place of residence, namely Italy. According to the Court, this is where the claimants’ life expectancy, health conditions, and overall quality of life were adversely affected by climate change, and where they suffered individual, concrete, and actual harm to their legally protected interests.

As for the event giving rise to the damage, the Court ruled that it occurred in all places where GHG emissions were released in the atmosphere by ENI, either directly or through its subsidiaries. In the Court’s view, this means that the courts of several Member States have, in principle, jurisdiction under Article 7(2). These include Italian courts, since emissions were also produced in Italy.

The Court further noted that the claimants had identified the starting point of the causal chain in ENI’s industrial and commercial strategy of not reducing GHG emissions across the ENI Group. Since a decision of this type – the Court argued – is generally taken by ENI’s governing bodies, which operate at ENI’s registered office and operational headquarters in Rome, Italy, this entails that also the event giving rise to the damage can be localised in Italy. On this basis, the Court confirmed the jurisdiction of Italian courts under Article 7(2).

Finally, the Court declined to rule on whether ENI could be responsible for emissions produced by its subsidiaries. This issue, relating to corporate personhood, was held to concern the merits of the case and therefore fell outside its assessment on the jurisdiction of the seised court.

Comment

The decision was eagerly awaited by Italian scholars and NGOs. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s approach to matters of jurisdiction has largely fallen short of expectations.

Several aspects of the ruling appear problematic.

First, the Court contented itself to mentioning Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, but basically failed to apply it. This omission is difficult to justify. Article 4(1) provides that persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of that Member State. Its application was rather straightforward in this case, as all the defendants were domiciled in Italy. The Court’s analysis should have begun and ended there. Instead, as observed, the Court focused almost exclusively on Article 7(2). The reasons for this choice are not stated in the Court’s order.

Both the choice of relying on Article 7(2) and the way in which Article 7(2) was applied by the Court are unconvincing.

As regards the first point, the Court failed to consider that Article 7(2) was simply inapplicable to the case. This provision applies in proceedings initiated in a Member State against a person domiciled in another Member State. This was not the situation at hand. Article 7(2) had thus no role to play from the outset.

The issues surrounding the interpretation and application of Article 7(2) warrant a more elaborate analysis.

Regrettably, the Court did not clearly identify what it considered to be the “event giving rise to the damage”. As described above, the Court initially appeared to regard the climate-altering emissions occurring in 37 different countries as the relevant event, only to later characterise the parent company’s decision not to reduce GHG emissions across the ENI Group as such. The overall impression is that the Court sought to demonstrate that the Tribunal of Rome would possess jurisdiction over the case no matter which conduct represents, in the circumstances, the event giving rise to the damage.

By adopting this approach, the Court missed an opportunity to clarify a critical issue likely to recur in current and future climate change litigation. In many such cases, claimants argue that a corporation’s decision not to reduce GHG emissions constitutes a negligent omission. This also appears to have been the claimants’ position in the present case, where their submissions largely emphasised ENI’s failure to reduce emissions to the extent that a reasonable operator would have done under similar circumstances.

This raises the following question: should a corporation’s decision not to reduce GHG emissions be regarded as a genuine omission, or rather as a negligent commissive act consisting in the emission of GHGs beyond the level required by the relevant duty of care? And first and foremost, does this distinction matter for private international law? Or should the characterisation of the event giving rise to the damage as commissive or omissive be rather left to the merits of the case?

In the present author’s view, this issue is also relevant at the jurisdictional stage. Properly localising the event giving rise to the damage for the purposes of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation requires a clear understanding of the true nature of the conduct in question. Depending on whether the conduct is characterised as commissive or omissive, it may be localised in different places, potentially conferring jurisdiction on courts in different States.

Applying this reasoning to the ENI case, if the event giving rise to the damage – namely, the emission of GHGs beyond a certain threshold – is characterised as commissive, it should be localised in the places where the emissions occurred. Given that the ENI Group’s emissions occur in multiple countries, this would possibly confer jurisdiction on courts of more than one Member State under the “event giving rise to the damage” limb of Article 7(2). Both courts in Italy and Cyprus would, for instance, be competent under Article 7(2) if we follow this characterisation.

If, by contrast, the conduct is characterised as omissive, it should be localised at the place where the decision not to reduce emissions was taken at the company’s headquarters. In ENI’s case, this is, univocally, Rome.

This analysis further implies that courts are not bound by the characterisation of the event giving rise to the damage as commissive or omissive advanced by the claimants. Rather, they should assess whether the conduct is commissive or omissive in light of both parties’ submissions, the evidence available, and the factual context.

Had the Italian Supreme Court undertaken such an analysis, it would likely have characterised ENI’s conduct as commissive. Based on the memorials available on Greenpeace’s website, it seems that the claimants essentially alleged that the volume of GHG emissions released by the ENI Group exceeded what a reasonable operator would have emitted under the applicable duty of care. Describing this conduct as a “decision not to reduce emissions” merely relabels the same commissive emitting behaviour.

A different conclusion might be warranted if the company were subject to a binding legal obligation to reduce emissions by a specific percentage. However, in the absence of such a binding obligation, the claimants’ argument rests on the contention that emitting a certain volume of GHGs breached the duty of care and constituted negligence. This, however, does not transform a commissive act into an omission.