The Assas International Law Review (Revue de droit international d’Assas) is an open access online journal published once a year by the doctoral school of the University. It features articles on public and private international law written by professors and doctoral students.
The main theme of the 2021 issue is art and international law.
The issue features seven articles on this topic (including one on litigation aimed at returning cultural objects). It also includes short articles summarizing the doctoral theses recently defended at the University and four more articles on various topics.
Of particular note for private international law scholars are the following articles.
In the first article, Marie Elodie Ancel offers a French perspective on the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in Enka v. Chubb (La loi applicable à la Convention d’arbitrage au Royaume-Uni: les enseignements de l’arrêt Enka). She concludes as follows:
Par conséquent, le raisonnement conflictualiste tel qu’il est pratiqué par la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni ne présente pas de pertinence particulière dans le contexte français. À l’inverse, il serait concevable pour la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni de s’inspirer de la méthode française et de forger des règles matérielles que les juges anglais pourraient appliquer pour statuer, aux divers moments que le droit anglais leur ménage pour ce faire, sur la validité, l’étendue ou l’interprétation de la clause d’arbitrage. D’ailleurs, comme the validation principle, les présomptions et contre-présomptions censées permettre d’établir un éventuel choix tacite de la loi applicable à la clause d’arbitrage ont la nature de règles matérielles du for. La Cour suprême démontre d’ailleurs un indéniable talent pour créer de telles règles… En théorie, elle pourrait donc l’exercer pour définir directement le régime substantiel des clauses d’arbitrage. Cependant, puisque le Royaume-Uni a intégré la Convention de New York dans sa législation de manière stricte et sans profiter de l’article VII (1) et que la Cour suprême préconise d’appréhender la clause d’arbitrage de la même manière, quel que soit le moment où le juge anglais est amené à en vérifier la validité ou l’efficacité, il ne faut pas espérer de révolution méthodologique outre-Manche. La méthode conflictualiste y sera sans doute encore longtemps pratiquée, quitte à réviser et reconcevoir les présomptions censées établir un choix tacite de la loi applicable. Les deux rives de la Manche ne sont pas près de se réunir.
The second article is written in English by Diana Reisman and is concerned with 2019 Hague Judgments Convention (Breaking Bad: Fail-Safes to the Hague Judgement Convention).
This Note explores a contingency that is neither acknowledged nor addressed by the Judgments Convention: a marked deterioration in the judiciary of a party following the expiration of the twelve-month suspension period. When a state obligates itself, under the terms of the Judgments Convention, to enforce the civil and commercial judgments of another State Party, it does so with confidence in the quality of the judicial culture of that other state, including the degree of fairness and judicial transparency with which cases are prosecuted. However, the integrity of the judiciary is not necessarily enduring, nor is it immune to the effects of political change in the state. Suppose that a State Party whose judicial culture was judged fair and transparent at the time of ratification or accession experiences internal change, leading to a sudden or a gradual alteration in its judicial culture, which causes concerns for some of the other treaty partners. As drafted, the Judgments Convention would oblige the other States Parties to continue to perform their treaty obligations to that State Party. Herein lies the conundrum of the Judgments Convention: It relies on the assumption that its parties’ quality of justice is stable over time such that their private law judgments should be enforced on a fast track in each other’s courts. Should the quality of one state’s justice system later decline, litigants contesting enforcement of one of that state’s civil judgments would have the burden of conforming their objections to the Judgments Convention’s narrow grounds for nonrecognition. Other States Parties would find themselves in the position of recognizing and enforcing problematic civil judgments issued from the compromised State Party.
The 2021 Issue is freely available here.
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The main theme of the 2021 issue is art and international law.
The issue features seven articles on this topic (including one on litigation aimed at returning cultural objects). It also includes short articles summarizing the doctoral theses recently defended at the University and four more articles on various topics.
Of particular note for private international law scholars are the following articles.
In the first article, Marie Elodie Ancel offers a French perspective on the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in Enka v. Chubb (La loi applicable à la Convention d’arbitrage au Royaume-Uni: les enseignements de l’arrêt Enka). She concludes as follows:
Par conséquent, le raisonnement conflictualiste tel qu’il est pratiqué par la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni ne présente pas de pertinence particulière dans le contexte français. À l’inverse, il serait concevable pour la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni de s’inspirer de la méthode française et de forger des règles matérielles que les juges anglais pourraient appliquer pour statuer, aux divers moments que le droit anglais leur ménage pour ce faire, sur la validité, l’étendue ou l’interprétation de la clause d’arbitrage. D’ailleurs, comme the validation principle, les présomptions et contre-présomptions censées permettre d’établir un éventuel choix tacite de la loi applicable à la clause d’arbitrage ont la nature de règles matérielles du for. La Cour suprême démontre d’ailleurs un indéniable talent pour créer de telles règles… En théorie, elle pourrait donc l’exercer pour définir directement le régime substantiel des clauses d’arbitrage. Cependant, puisque le Royaume-Uni a intégré la Convention de New York dans sa législation de manière stricte et sans profiter de l’article VII (1) et que la Cour suprême préconise d’appréhender la clause d’arbitrage de la même manière, quel que soit le moment où le juge anglais est amené à en vérifier la validité ou l’efficacité, il ne faut pas espérer de révolution méthodologique outre-Manche. La méthode conflictualiste y sera sans doute encore longtemps pratiquée, quitte à réviser et reconcevoir les présomptions censées établir un choix tacite de la loi applicable. Les deux rives de la Manche ne sont pas près de se réunir.
The second article is written in English by Diana Reisman and is concerned with 2019 Hague Judgments Convention (Breaking Bad: Fail-Safes to the Hague Judgement Convention).
This Note explores a contingency that is neither acknowledged nor addressed by the Judgments Convention: a marked deterioration in the judiciary of a party following the expiration of the twelve-month suspension period. When a state obligates itself, under the terms of the Judgments Convention, to enforce the civil and commercial judgments of another State Party, it does so with confidence in the quality of the judicial culture of that other state, including the degree of fairness and judicial transparency with which cases are prosecuted. However, the integrity of the judiciary is not necessarily enduring, nor is it immune to the effects of political change in the state. Suppose that a State Party whose judicial culture was judged fair and transparent at the time of ratification or accession experiences internal change, leading to a sudden or a gradual alteration in its judicial culture, which causes concerns for some of the other treaty partners. As drafted, the Judgments Convention would oblige the other States Parties to continue to perform their treaty obligations to that State Party. Herein lies the conundrum of the Judgments Convention: It relies on the assumption that its parties’ quality of justice is stable over time such that their private law judgments should be enforced on a fast track in each other’s courts. Should the quality of one state’s justice system later decline, litigants contesting enforcement of one of that state’s civil judgments would have the burden of conforming their objections to the Judgments Convention’s narrow grounds for nonrecognition. Other States Parties would find themselves in the position of recognizing and enforcing problematic civil judgments issued from the compromised State Party.
The 2021 Issue is freely available here.
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