CJEU Rules on the Notion of ‘Succession’ under the Succession Regulation
On 26 March 2026 the Court of Justice, with no hearing and no opinion, handed down the judgment in Isergartler case (C-618/24) concerning the very notion of ‘succession’ under the Succession Regulation. The preliminary question originated from Austria.
Facts of the Case
At the heart of the case lies the provision of § 677 Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – ABGB), which provides for a statutory legacy for a person taking care of the deceased before their death. It reads as follows
A person close to the deceased who cared for the deceased for at least six months during the three years preceding his or her death, to an extent which is not merely minimal, shall be entitled to a statutory legacy, unless a gift has been granted or remuneration agreed upon (…) “Persons close to the deceased” means persons from the circle of legal heirs of the deceased, their spouses, registered or unregistered partners and their children, as well as the cohabiting partner of the deceased and his or her children.
The deceased, habitually resident in Austria, died in 2021. A court in Austria decided that the estate of the deceased was assigned to XK, to TR and to VQ. As SM supported the deceased in the last three years of her life, he claimed EUR 57 200 on the basis of § 677 ABGB. Parties disputed whether this claim may be classified as a matter of ‘succession’ under Succession Regulation, and consequently whether Article 4 Succession Regulation establishes jurisdiction of Austrian courts.
The Supreme Court of Austria, being the referring court, noted that the claim ‘exists independently of any testamentary disposition made by the deceased person’. It ‘appears to be akin to a reserved share of an estate, in addition to which it is due, since a beneficiary cannot be deprived of it except on grounds of disinheritance’. On the other hand ‘an analogy could also be made with the rules of contract law or of undue enrichment, since that measure aims to remunerate specific services’. It ‘restricts the deceased person’s freedom to determine his or her succession’ There are ‘diverging doctrinal views as to whether such a measure is covered by the law of succession or the law of obligations’ (see paras. 20-23).
The judgement of the Court of Justice
The Court of Justice decided that ‘succession’ within the meaning of Succession Regulation does cover a statutory legacy claimed under § 677 ABGB.
The reasoning of the Court of Justice
The Court of Justice noted that ‘succession’ within the meaning of Article 4 is the same concept as ‘succession to the estates of deceased persons’ mentioned in Article 1 and Article 3(1)(a), even if in German language version – as opposed to other language versions – different expressions are used in these provisions. The concept of ‘succession’, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) Succession Regulation is defined broadly to the extent that it covers ‘all forms of transfer of assets, rights and obligations by reason of death’. As recital 9 stresses Succession Regulation applies to ‘all civil-law aspects of succession to the estate of a deceased person’. Article 23(1) provides that law applicable governs ‘the succession as a whole’.
The objectives of Succession Regulation are to help heirs and legatees, other persons close to the deceased, and creditors of the succession to assert their rights in the context of a succession with cross-border implications. It is supplemented by another objective, namely of mutual recognition of decisions aimed at avoiding irreconcilable decisions being given in different Member States, which in turn is naturally connected to the principle of a single estate. The latter principle is expressed in both Article 4 on jurisdiction and Article 23(1) on applicable law as both refer to ‘the succession as a whole’. For this purpose, an interpretation of these provisions which would lead to a fragmentation of that succession would be incompatible with the objectives of Succession Regulation (here the Court of Justice referred to its decision in VA, ZA – C‑645/20, commented on this blog here).
Article 1(2) Succession Regulation lists the matters excluded from the scope of the Succession Regulation. These include, for instance, ‘property rights, interests and assets created or transferred otherwise than by succession, for instance by way of gifts’ or ‘maintenance obligations other than those arising by reason of death’. As results from previous case law of the Court of Justice (in UM case – C‑277/20 – commented on this blog here and Mahnkopf case – C-558/16) these exclusions are to be interpreted strictly.
Noting some analogies of the claim under § 677 ABGB to law of obligations, the Court of Justice underlined that the measure, irrespective its classification under national law, ‘has a close structural connection with the matter of succession’, as it applies after the death of the deceased, ‘irrespective of any testamentary disposition made by the deceased person and, in any event, in addition to a reserved share of the estate and that it cannot be withdrawn, unless there is a ground for disinheritance’. What is more, the measure ‘benefits persons close to the deceased, defined as being those from the circle of legal heirs of the deceased, their spouses, registered or unregistered partners and their children, as well as the cohabiting partner of the deceased and his or her children’. Hence, ‘the main purpose of that measure concerns the rights of the carer in the context of the succession’. It seems that the measure ‘relates principally to the matter of succession’ and is covered by the scope of Succession Regulation. Such measure is not covered by any of the exclusions from the Succession Regulation (paras 45-49).
Final remarks
The judgment does not seem controversial as it is in line with the previous case law of the Court of Justice. The Court rightly analysed the definition of ‘succession’ included in the Succession Regulation and influenced by other provisions of this instrument, underlying the importance of its objectives, in particluar the principle of a single estate.

I keep repeating: Austria is the absolute Mụsterschüler (model student) as far as the succession regulation is concerned. The German BGH should take lessons in Vienna on how to apply the regulation and solve problems concerning it – as Karlsruhe remarkably stays behind in terms of quality in that respect.
Austrian law and Austrian succession procedure provide more interesting qualification questions. I currently have a case pending with a Polish immovable subject to an Austrian Überlassung an Zahlungs statt (§ 154 AußStrG), which is a liquidation tool leading to acquisition of estate property by a creditor. Such acquisition cannot be confirmed in an ECS, so we have to work with the order of the Austrian court. Procedurally it is clearly within the scope of the regulation, but although in my case the wife of the deceased acquires the property, she does it as a creditor, not the heir. That material construction is not easy to implement in other member states and causes tax problems.
So altogether Austrians provide us with a lot of interesting material to work with and at the same time play by the rules when applying the succession regulation.
Thank you Martin!
This is a very interesting comment, especially the example of practical challenges caused by the institution of Überlassung an Zahlungs statt while the immovable property is located outside of Austria. As usually, the proper functioning of the Succession Regulation requires understanding of differences between legal system in the EU and cooperation between all involved parties – beneficiaries, professionals and authorities across borders.
Fingers crossed that this case is ‘settled speedily, smoothly and efficiently’ as Succession Regulation promises!