CJEU: Free Movement and Legal Gender in Shipov (C-43/24)

On 12 March 2026, the Court of Justice rendered its judgment in Shipov (C-43/24), concerning the right of citizens of the Union to free movement and national rules on the amendment of gender data in civil-status registers.

The Court held that Article 21 TFEU and Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38, read in the light of Article 7 of the Charter, preclude national legislation that does not allow a Member State’s national who has exercised free movement to amend gender-related data – including sex, first name, patronymic, family name and personal identification number – recorded in civil-status registers. The Court also ruled that EU law precludes a national court from being bound by the interpretation of national legislation given by the constitutional court of that Member State where that interpretation prevents the recording of such a change and contradicts EU law as interpreted by the Court of Justice.

Facts of the Case

The case arose from proceedings before the Bulgarian courts concerning a Bulgarian national who had been registered as male at birth but had always identified as female. After moving to Italy, where she began hormone therapy and developed a stable personal and family life, she sought before the Bulgarian courts the amendment of her civil-status data.

Her request was rejected by the Bulgarian courts on the ground that Bulgarian law did not provide for a procedure allowing the modification of gender data on the basis of gender identity. According to national case law and a judgment of 26 October 2021 by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, the notion of “sex” in Bulgarian law must be understood exclusively in its biological sense.

Seised of the case on appeal, the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation referred several questions to the Court of Justice concerning the compatibility of such national rules with EU law.

Judgment

The Court first recalled that matters relating to civil status remain within the competence of the Member States. However, when exercising that competence, Member States must comply with EU law, including the rights derived from Union citizenship and the freedom of movement guaranteed by Article 21 TFEU (para 37).

The Court then observed that refusal to recognise or amend gender identity may hinder the exercise of free movement, since gender identity – like a person’s name – forms part of a person’s identity and civil status. Where a Member State refuses to amend such data, the person concerned may face serious practical difficulties in administrative, professional and private life (para 38).

More specifically, discrepancies between a person’s lived gender identity and the information contained in identity documents may oblige that person to dispel doubts as to their identity whenever they must provide identification, including when travelling or interacting with public authorities (paras 41-44). Such situations are liable to hinder the effective exercise of the rights flowing from Article 21 TFEU (para 44).

The Court acknowledged that restrictions on free movement may be justified by overriding reasons in the public interest, provided they are proportionate (para 45). In the present case, however, the arguments based on the exclusive competence of Member States or on moral or religious considerations could not justify the restriction (para 46).

The Court also emphasised that national measures restricting free movement must comply with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, in particular the right to respect for private and family life under Article 7 (para 48). That right must be interpreted consistently with Article 8 ECHR (para 49).

Referring to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court noted that gender identity constitutes one of the most intimate aspects of private life and that States have positive obligations to ensure effective and accessible procedures for legal gender recognition (para 50). Such procedures must allow the amendment of gender-related data on official documents in a quick, transparent and accessible manner (para 51).

Against that background, the Court concluded that national legislation that does not allow the amendment of gender data in the civil-status registers of a national who has exercised free movement is incompatible with Article 7 of the Charter and Article 21 TFEU (para 55).

Lastly, the Court addressed the situation in which a national court is bound by the interpretation of national law given by the constitutional court of its Member State. It recalled that national courts must disapply national rules, including those of constitutional rank, that undermine the effectiveness and unity of EU law (paras 58-60). Consequently, EU law precludes a national court from being bound by an interpretation of national law given by the constitutional court where that interpretation prevents the recording of a change of gender data in contradiction with EU law as interpreted by the Court of Justice (para 64).

Comment

The judgment should be read in the context of the Court’s case law on the relationship between personal status and the EU right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, which has already been discussed on this blog. Over the past years, the Court has progressively developed a line of authority aimed at ensuring that national rules governing personal status do not undermine the effectiveness of Union citizenship and the EU right to free movement.

This approach emerged clearly in Coman (C-673/16), where Article 21(1) TFEU was held to preclude the authorities of a Member State from denying a right of residence to the spouse of a Union citizen solely because that Member State does not recognise same-sex marriage under its national law. The same logic informed Pancharevo (C-490/20), where the Court held that a Member State must recognise a birth certificate issued by another Member State indicating two mothers in order to ensure the child’s effective enjoyment of EU citizenship rights. The case was discussed on this blog by Marta Requejo Isidro on the AG’s Opinion (here), as well as by Johan Meeusen (here) and Nadia Rusinova (here and here). In a similar vein, in K.S. (C-2/21) the Court reiterated that national rules concerning personal status must not compromise the exercise of EU citizenship rights.

More recently, the Court addressed the specific issue of gender identity in Mirin (C-4/23), ruling that EU law preclude a Member State from refusing to recognise a change of first name and gender identity lawfully acquired in another Member State. The AG’s Opinion and the judgment have also been discussed on this blog (here and here) by Helga Luku.

Lastly, related questions have been explored in the online symposium on Cupriak-Trojan (C-713/23), with contributions by Laima Vaigė, Alina Tryfonidou, Elizabeth Stuart Perry, Anna Wysocka-Bar and Marco Pasqua, and a commentary on the AG’s Opinion by Marco Pasqua (here).

At the same time, however, the ruling appears to go somewhat further than previous case law. For this reason, it may be read not only as continuity but also as a possible step in a more evolutionary direction.

Three aspects seem particularly noteworthy.

First, the factual and legal configuration of the case differs from earlier rulings on the circulation of personal status. In previous cases, the Court dealt with situations in which a specific element of personal status had already been lawfully established in another Member State and the issue was whether the Member State of nationality could refuse to recognise it. In the present case, by contrast, the applicant had undergone gender reassignment while residing in another Member State (Italy) but had not obtained formal legal recognition there. The request concerned the possibility of amending the civil-status register in the Member State of nationality (Bulgaria). The issue was therefore not the recognition of a status already established abroad. Nevertheless, the Court approached the situation through the prism of Article 21 TFEU and the effectiveness of Union citizenship, suggesting that obstacles to free movement may arise not only where recognition is refused, but also where the legal framework prevents an individual from securing a civil-status position consistent with their identity.

Second, the judgment places greater emphasis on the positive obligations incumbent upon Member States. While earlier case law mainly concerned the duty to recognise a personal status lawfully established in another Member State, the Court now stresses more clearly that national legal systems must also provide accessible procedures enabling individuals to obtain amendments to civil-status records consistent with their gender identity. In doing so, the Court explicitly relies on the standards developed by the European Court of Human Rights under Article 8 ECHR.

From this perspective, the ruling illustrates a growing alignment between Luxembourg and Strasbourg. At the same time, however, the Court’s reasoning leaves open the question whether EU law adds an autonomous layer of protection beyond the framework already developed under the ECHR.

Third, the reasoning in Shipov signals a shift toward a citizen-centered conception of legal identity. Earlier case law treated cross-border recognition mainly as a technical requirement: the aim was to ensure that a status lawfully established in one Member State was not denied elsewhere. Here, the Court highlights that inconsistencies in civil-status records do not simply impede recognition – they interfere with the individual’s legal identity and daily life within the Union.

In this light, personal status emerges as a core element of the mobile Union citizen’s legal identity, whose coherence must be safeguarded across borders. The ruling thus frames status as a fundamental dimension of EU citizenship, pointing toward a more integrated, identity-sensitive architecture of the European legal space – a perspective that could guide future legislative initiatives in Brussels.

Finally, Shipov seems to illustrate the growing asymmetry between negative and positive integration in EU law: while the Court ensures that personal status in all its aspects moves with the citizen across borders and shapes their identity, the question remains how a corresponding framework might be developed – broadly, one that, within the current competences of Member States, ensures compliance with EU law and the constraints it increasingly entails, whether through coordinated national measures or a more uniform domestic approach.