Cross-Border Corporate Restructuring and European Private International Law
Fabian Kratzlmeier (Chicago) has accepted the invitation of the editors of the blog to present his recent book, titled ‘Die Grenzüberschreitende Unternehmensrestrukturierung im Europäischen Rechtsrahmen’ (Cross-border corporate restructuring and European private international law), published by Mohr Siebeck.
Reorganizing viable firms (instead of liquidating them) has been the state of the art in U.S. bankruptcy law for decades now, and it has become increasingly popular throughout Europe in recent years. This trend is reflected in legislative activities, such as the repeated reform efforts to the German bankruptcy code aiming at rescuing profitable, but over-indebted firms within the traditional insolvency procedure. It is also evidenced by practical patterns, most notably (not only) German companies using foreign restructuring instruments, in particular the English Scheme of Arrangement, to amend their financing structure while continuing trading in the 2010s. Even then – more than a decade ago – the wide-reaching impacts of such cross-border restructurings were heavily discussed in bankruptcy and private international law scholarship by some scholars, showing the (not only political) brisance of private international law in the area of restructuring law.
Whenever the earnings of a debtor company no longer cover its financial obligations, the creditors (and the shareholders) share a common interest in maximizing the pool of distributable assets. Where the continuation of the business under the old legal entity promises a higher present value compared to the liquidation of the debtor – be it piecemeal or through a business sale – economic logic demands a legal framework to resolve the underlying collective action problem. It is therefore the task of a modern insolvency and restructuring law to provide the parties involved with an appropriate set of rules that facilitates negotiations in order to adjust the debtor’s liabilities to the prospective earnings of the company (e.g. through debt reductions, deferrals or debt-equity-swaps).
In terms of the (continental) European landscape, the Restructuring Directive 2019 (hereinafter “Directive”) has set new standards in restructuring law, requiring Member States to reform and, in many cases, modernize their insolvency and restructuring laws. It mandates all Member States to maintain preventive restructuring instruments, enabling financially distressed companies to temporarily protect their business assets against collection or enforcement actions, and providing a majority voting scheme in order to cram down (groups of) dissenting creditors. In accordance with its minimum harmonization concept, however, the Directive leaves the Member States with a large number of choices and deviation options. Thus, the national restructuring frameworks differ widely from one another in some key aspects; e.g. regarding the entry threshold (the extent of financial distress required to access), the duration and scope of the moratorium, and the conditions and limits to the cram down mechanism (in particular as to group formation and priorities), to name but a few. The legal and economic positions of the various groups of stakeholders – and, consequently, their negotiating power in the immanent struggle over the distribution of going concern value – depend to a large extent on the jurisdiction in which the reorganization takes place and what options for action the local restructuring law offers to the respective stakeholders. It is obvious, that decision makers, when looking for suitable restructuring options, will not limit themselves to their home state’s reorganization tools, but explore foreign instruments as well, as past experiences with the English Scheme of Arrangement have proven before. As long as there is legal certainty, i.e. the reorganization is likely to be recognized by the relevant (i.e. asset-intensive) jurisdictions, decision makers have in incentive to choose the restructuring location that best serves their interests, ultimately resulting in a regulatory competition between national restructuring regimes throughout the EU. Private international law, in this context, regulates this competition by limiting (or unlocking) such choice of foreign insolvency and restructuring venues (and their respective laws). Against this background, the present study undertakes to comprehensively review and, building on its findings, further develop the legal framework for cross-border corporate restructurings within Europe, presenting a solution that is both coherent with existing European legislation, and consistent with the underlying principles of European insolvency law.
There is, however, another reason why further research in this area is desperately needed: Thanks to the ever-growing integration of the internal market and, thus, the establishment of international trade relations and supply chains, purely nationally operating companies (other than micro-enterprises) have long become the exception. It does not take much to make a national restructuring case an international one, i.e. the cross-border element does not need to amount to a foreign branch or similarly consolidated business structures. A foreign creditor or a third-party debtor based abroad suffices to turn a national company into an international restructuring case. Hence, the minimum harmonization of the substantive law by the Directive alone is not going to achieve the underlying goal set by the Union legislator, that is to provide all European companies with access to effective and efficient restructuring instruments. Rather, in cases with cross-border exposure, the question inevitably arises as to whether the financial crisis can be overcome in a single procedure – hauling all (including foreign) affected parties into one procedure and having it recognized across all (relevant) jurisdictions – or whether several procedures are necessary in order to implement a sustainable restructuring of the company and thus safe the going concern value.
Unfortunately, this need for international coordination and harmonization of cross-border corporate reorganizations, arising from the very conceptual nature of collective proceedings, has been hardly taken into account by the legislator when drafting the Directive. There are only three recitals (12 to 14) dealing with these issues in the first place, and even they contain only rudimentary (and hardly expedient) considerations regarding the relationship between the Directive and existing regulations in European private international law. In particular, they reference the European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EIR) as well as the center of main interest (COMI), which is of paramount importance to the current international insolvency regime, to which it serves as the central connecting factor determining both jurisdiction and applicable law. In terms of (reliable) conclusions regarding the classification of the new restructuring frameworks and their integration into the existing private international law framework, however, the recitals only provide limited guidance. The recitals make it clear, though, that at least some of the proceedings created in transposing the Directive (i.e. those that are to be publicly announced) shall be subject to the EIR and, therefore, be included in the latter’s Annex A.
The study takes this as its starting point to demonstrate that the EIR provides a tailor-made set of rules for public proceedings, providing clear and (for the most part) fitting rules on international jurisdiction and applicable law while also guaranteeing EU-wide recognition. At the same time, however, there are some drawbacks in the EIR’s application to restructuring proceedings mainly resulting in setbacks to the collectivization mechanism aimed at on a substantive level. These issues, including rights in rem and secondary proceedings, are discussed in depth, and appropriate solutions are presented both de lege lata and de lege ferenda.
Turing to confidential restructuring frameworks, to which the recitals are silent, the scholarly debate is still evolving. Due to their private nature, they are increasingly popular in practice. At least in part motivated by the onsetting regulatory competition in the field, therefore, many Member States (including Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria) opted for a dual transposition enacting both a public and a private alternative. Since confidential procedures will not be included in Annex A and, thus, will prima facie remain outside the scope of the EIR, there are considerable hurdles to overcome in order to embed such procedures into the existing European private international law framework. First and foremost, the so-called bankruptcy clause enshrined in Art. 1 (2)(b) Brussels I bis Regulation challenges the integration into the existing secondary law altogether. A closer look at the issue reveals, however, that this provision excludes only those procedures, which qualify as “insolvency proceedings” under Art. 1 EIR, regardless of whether such proceeding is included in Annex A. Turning to international jurisdiction, the study is building on the controversy and the different propositions surrounding international jurisdiction to restructure foreign companies under an English scheme of arrangement. In that context, the arguments previously put forward in support of Art. 8 (1) (jurisdiction wherever at least one affected party has her domicile) and 24 (2) Brussels I-bis Regulation (jurisdiction at the place of the registered seat) are discussed and assessed as to their validity with regard to the new restructuring instruments. After all, the Directive differs in key respects from its English blueprint, and, thanks to its EU-law origin, requires special considerations concerning the coherence of (secondary) European law. Ultimately, the study finds that neither of the international jurisdiction rules provided for in the Brussels-I-bis Regulation are well-suited (or even practicable) for collective procedures such as the preventive restructuring instruments under the Directive. Therefore, it calls for a concentration of restructurings at the debtor’s COMI, which is in line with (and, upon a detailed examination, even envisioned by) both the EIR, and the Directive itself. In this respect, the study, using state-of-the-art European Union law methodology, extracts a coherent and consistent private international law framework for confidential restructuring procedures, centered at the debtor’s COMI, and recognized throughout the EU. At the same time, it proposes legislative amendments to the current system to clarify the private international law rules on cross-border restructurings – both for parties involved and Member States experiencing competitive pressure – and to improve the (few) inadequacies under the current legal regime.
Overall, the study reveals that the applicable law concentrates – public and confidential – restructuring proceedings at the debtor’s COMI on the one hand, but on the other hand also guarantees EU-wide recognition of the restructuring results achieved. The collectivization of creditors and shareholders implemented – in substantive terms – by the Directive, thus, continues on the level of private international law, enabling the continuation of viable companies even in a cross-border context.